THERE IS A GOD

VEBER

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There Is A God

By FRANCE VEBER, Ph. D.

"Timeo lectorem unius libri."

Translated

By REV. GEORGE M. TRUNK,

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PREFACE

Dr. F. Veber dedicates his book to the academic youth. Scientific research must serve truth. Mere wishes may obscure research and lead away from the truth. Purposes are not excluded. Historians serve historic truths and purposes.

Faith in God was implanted in the soul of the author by a religious education. During studies in higher schools this faith became shaky. Pantheistic and budistic ideas appeared. He entered theology, but left for the university to study philosophy and became a professor in the new university in Ljubljana, Yougoslavia. Further studies in psychology, theory of perception, ethics, esthetics, sociology and history of philosophy condensed to a necessary unity of the viewing of the world and life. Faith in God became anchored again, he was reborn and returned to the religious motherly home.

Conditions of the modern world in thinking changed. Mankind is split up. Many stress technology, economy, civilization, science with emphasis on mere reason, also degeneration. There is a bit of truth everywhere, but not the full and entire truth.

Materialistic trends engage first the intelligentia and finally reach the masses. The psychological consequence is the pursuit of mere material values, the averse from an idealistic viewing of the world and life, the struggle of materialism which finally turns into the struggle against or for God. The trend may be sharper here, less decisive there. Mankind is at the crossroad: For or against God, everything else is but on the surface. It is a hard task for a professor in a public university to write about God. But truth is the purpose of science. There needs be no fear.

The university (college) should be a unity. It is a state in itself (civitas academica). There are diversities in different faculties and branches. Where is the expected unity from? The unifying demand can originate only from the truth and God is

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—Truth. Thus becomes and can become the college the unitas Universitatis and the universitas Unitatis. To bring and promote unity is one of the main purposes of this book.

Dr. Veber does not write as a theologian, he speaks as a philosopher and uses only entirely scientific, most modern means of thinking. If you do not agree with him, refute him with scientific arguments.

With regard to the idea of God he says: "The struggle for the rational conception of God is going on for centuries and millenniums. The sensation of human prayer remained essentially the same. Single thinkers search after God, but they seldom pray. By materialistic trends uncontaminated people do not and can not care much about the correct conception of God and his connection with creation: They pray and pray beautifully. Such facts prove that prayer is not necessarily dependent from the correct rational conception of God. Turn to the fourth chapter. We are in a different relation to God, when we but scientifically search after him, than when we actually pray. Thoughts connect us with God mediately and conditionally, prayer IMMEDIATELY and UNCONDITIONALLY. Someone may have a very defective knowledge of God, but experiences the sensation of a real, perfect prayer. Searchers after God take God as they take any object of their research. He who worships God, sees God in the light of a Singularity which can not be expressed by words and not perceived by reason. We have similar relations in love which is by its nature pointed but to personal beings, as we can not love mere dead "things" neither mere "animals." The child loves in the real sense of the word, although the child has not the correct conception of the actual difference between personal life and the dead and living naturality. I do not confound the realm of thoughts with the realm of our sensations, I even assert that the sensations have an uncomparatively larger and more immediate PIERCING force than mere thoughts. The complete book has to be written, before I attained some more definite conception of man and his special place in creation: Love shows this place at once and shows it as mere thoughts could never attain this. What holds about love for man, holds also about LOVE AND WORSHIP OF GOD. Herewith is removed any objection some may experience against my book. My research does not intend to replace prayer or even to remove it. The book deals with prayer and worship, affords

and recommands it. The character of the book is merely scientific, but it can also attain the character of an educational essay. Those, to whom prayer is given in advance as the dearest and highest exaltation in human life, will welcome the book, because they will become aware that their prayer will be clearer and more worth-while, if there will be given to them also a more definite rational conception of prayer's single territory, of God. Last but not least may this book welcome also those, who would like to pray, but are of the opinion that they should not pray because of "scientific reasons."

Modern world is at the crossroad: Against God or for God. Wither are you going? Be careful, you must choose.

—THE TRANSLATOR.

CHAPTER I

FROM REALITY TO GOD.

1. Reality a fact.

It happens that we do not mind things which surround us and are for us most necessary. We distinguish between an actually and fictitiously nice weather, between a real and only imagined fortune, between things in daily life and a world appearing us in dreams. There is a difference which embraces the whole world and life and divides it in the ACTUAL world and life in the world and life ACTUALLY not existent. The reality and the unreality appear as facts which we do not mind, although we could not for a moment exist without them.

Imagine that the difference between anything real and unreal would disappear! We would have to regard unreal and but desired treasures as valuable, real values. It would not matter, if the storm we fear is real or fictitious, even the thought, if we really exist, would not be of any interest. The universe would mean something essentially different than it means. We could call with the same right real or unreal, real and unreal the actual landscape and unactual "Fountain of Youth," animals and human beings we daily observe and animals and human beings we get acquainted with in fables, happenings, about which we are reading in history and hapenings in fictions.

Where would we arrive at, if we would proceed thus with the world and life? If a farmer should not be interested, how many real or but desired heads of cattle he has in his stable? Or if a traveller would not distinguish between real trails or trails not more existent?

I call the attention to a psychological fact. We have experiences which make something appear as real, then as unreal. Viewing the landscape "with open eyes" or touching stones "with own hands" we regard the landscape and the stones as real. Such a view disappears with a hill, actually not seen, put only in mind in the midst of the landscape. The experience

would be without any meaning, if the reality would not be a fact of the universe. We have feelings and aspirings. When we rejoice about good health, success, progress, we rejoice about real good health, success, real progress. Our rejoicing would disappear or turn to sadness, if we would become aware that the good health is not real. We aspire a real success. Any such aspiration would be impossible, if there would be no difference between a real and unreal thing. Our life would be done momentary, if life would on the wholeness pass the reality or be against it.

Anyone can see the independence and the meaning for life of the reality. Why do we seldom mind the reality? We distinguish in daily life between real and unreal things, but we think only about this that appears as real or unreal, scarsely we take in mind the reality and unreailty. Reality and unreality effect the distinction between real and unreal things. The difference between Mt. Elias and "Fountain of Youth" is the difference in the reality of the first and the unreality of the second. Mt. Elias and Mt. Washington are both real, "Fountain of Youth" and "Ultima Thule" both unreal. We must distinguish between reality and unreality, and real and unreal things, between REALITY and a REAL THING and between UNREALITY and a UNREAL thing. This distinction is not easy, but indispensably necessary, if our daily distinction between real and unreal things should appear in all its weight. Some may object that the desired distinction seems to be unnecessary, because with real things is given the reality and with unreal things the unreality. I retort that with a brilliant metal is given the brilliancy and he, who knows the metal, knows the brilliancy. But who could assert that it would be not necessary an examination of brilliancy or that the examination of the brilliant metal would be the examination of brilliancy?

We must turn the attention to real and unreal things, to reality and unreality, to become aware of the essential meaning of the distinction between real and unreal things. We first consider that psychological background, without which would be the reality and unreality an empty word. Our EXPERIENCES show different phenomena of the world and life in the light of real, then unreal things. Most important is that such

experiences may be JUSTIFIED or UNJUSTIFIED and have the character of a CORRECT or INCORRECT seeming. In the first place we consider the relation of the reality to real things. The results may help us to approach the main question. This question will become more evident from the relation of reality to reality. In this relation is deeply founded the systematical conception of TEMPORALITY which is still to-day one of the darkest but most important facts of the universe. The examination of this fact shall bring us immediately nearer to God and help to discuss the essence of God from two view points: From the view of the question, what may be the reality and how leads the reality to the legal relation of reality to reality, or better of real things to real things.

To remove all uncertainities which may aggrevate the right meaning of the discussions, I meniton that I take the expression "reality" in the strictest and most original sence of the word. I define this reality as the reality of such phenomena which are by principle immediately externally and internally "perceptible." Hitherto belongs the reality of a landscape which we can immediately "see," the reality of a rock which we can immediately "touch," the reality of a rain which we immediately feel on our body, but also the reality of a joy or any other experience, immediately brought to our consciousness. Doubtlessly is this the most original meaning of the reality which was first felt by a human being and became first evident to a modern child. This is the most systematical meaning of the reality. Realities would in any other meaning of the word lose that place which belongs to them in the system of realities. I have in mind "actualities" which we shall call in the second chapter "VALUATIONS." Finally we shall see that only realities in this original and systematical sense of the word are based by TEMPORALITY.

2. The psychological background of reality.

Phenomena "appear" as real, then as unreal and there is the "point of view" of reality and nonreality. This point is an essentially psychological fact. Its essence is in experience. We immediately see a rock or touch it. We experience a REPRESENTATION of the rock and are convinced that the rock

actually exists. But we may experience a representation of a rock which does not have this view. This happens, when someone narrates about a rock, or when we see a rock in a picture. We see represented to us in both cases a rock, first thus that the rock seems to be real, secondly thus that such a seeming does not exist, or that the rock appears even unreal. We would without this difference in the representation lose any sight of the reality and nonreality in both examples. We could have represented to us anything, but the question, if this that is being represented to us, actually exists, would have for us no meaning. Important is the further question, how to define the essence of the difference between the representation which gives to phenomena the view of reality, and between the representation which does not have this view.

This difference does not touch the question, WHAT is represented to us in the first case and what in the second. The rock which someone narrates to us about and which is represented to us without any view of reality, may be entirely like to the rock upon which we stand and is represented to us with the view of reality. What is represented to us, is ONE AND THE SAME thing, but it appears us now without the view of reality, then with this view. The systematical difference in the representation is merely FORMAL, it does not touch the question, WHAT is represented to us, but the question, HOW something is represented to us. The rock is represented to us in both ways. The rock is represented to us DIFFERENTLY then, when it seems to be real, and DIFFERENTLY, when this view disappears. We have in the representation to distinguish two sides, the first, what is represented to us, the second, how anything is represented to us. The first side I call the representation BY CONTENT, the second BY FORM. The view of reality and nonreality, without which would these expressions have no meaning, is anchored in the formal side of the representation.

Both sides become clearer, if we consider the difference between them.

With the side by content of the representation is necessarily given all this, that is represented to us. The representation of a rock by its contentive side is the representation of a ROCK,

the representation of a landscape the representation of a LANDSCAPE. In advance is impossible the representation of a landscape, which would be by ITS contentive side the representation of a rock and vice versa. We say, therefore, that the representation of a rock SHOWS a rock, or is REPRESENTED to us by its own nature as a rock. The side by content of the representation is its showing or representing side. On the point of the formal side of the representation we are in a different position. This side is not a showing or representing side, because it does not decide the question, what is being represented to us. This is mediately evident from the point that this formal side is that single side which may be still "justifiable" or "unjustifiable," "correct" or "incorrect." We should not confound the question, if something is represented to us with the view of reality, with the essentially different question, if this that is represented to us, actually has this view.

This difference is very important. On the side of the representation by content there is no support for such questions. The content which the representation has decides by itself, what the representation indispensably shows or represents, and excluded is the possibility of a contrast between the content of the representation and its "object": The representation of light is by its content the representation of the LIGHT and the light is by content the given OBJECT of this representation. But by no means is this true for the formal side of the representation and especially not for the view of reality or nonreality of this that is represented to us. On the first step of the development is man ready to believe that phenomena which appear to him real are also "in truth" real, but advanced experiences show him that he had been many times "mistaken." The reader may from his own life remember cases, when something appeared to him in the light of a nearly graspable reality, but later on he found that his seeming was a mistake. Besides common representative illusions belong hitherto "halucinations" which show us their objects with an expressive view of reality, although such objects have no reality. To us all and daily appear phenomena of our environment as colored, warm, sounding, although we know that actually there are no such

things and that we have to put in the place of phenomena as are color, warmth, sound essentially different facts.*)

To make the speciality of the formal side of the representation clearer, I employed in the University the following example: Think of a man who walks blindly in the direction of a column. He does not see the column, but suddenly strikes it and stops. Seeing is the most characteristic example of imaginary representation. The man does not imagine the column, but strikes it. I must add that this example is not exact, because men experience in such cases "touching" sensations which help them to the representation of the strok object. This representation is less characteristic and never attains the clearness of the representation given with common seeing, but we can use it to illustrate the working of the formal side of the representation. The formal side is adapted to the reality of the represented thing. With this side is not represented to us the reality, we only TOUCH it, STUMBLE upon it. The man would never hit the column, if it actually would not be there. Thus the formal side of the representation shows its objects in the light of reality, but does not touch or stumble upon the reality, because these objects are not real. The formal side is not the showing and representing, but the knocking and touching side of representation.

I can not omit an interpretation of reality which is of an old origin and in essence readily employed by many modern thinkers.

To the reality is adapted the formal side of our representation which does not show or represent something, but only "strikes" or "knocks" it. There is, therefore, in the reality the question of a fact which we can not conceive, the less can it be represented to us. Is then the "reality" a mere nothingness?

*) We know from physics that color, warmth, sound . . . are but WAVING VIBRATIONS and that our sensations of "color," "warmth," "sound" are parallel consequences of the influence of such vibrations upon our organs, respectively upon the point in our central nervous system adapted to these organs. Keep in mind: Physics does not deny something COLORED, WARM, SOUNDING, but asserts that we may better attribute to it the character of vibration, warmth, moving. There EXIST colored things, but "colored" does not exist. Our senses warrant the ACTUAL character of the nature and "deceive" us in regard to the question of its immediate QUALITIES.

This abominable consequence could we avoid with an interpretation of reality that the essence of reality is the formal side of OUR representation. If we call the representation which shows by its formal side its objects as real the REALITIVIC representation, then may be this interpretation of reality as follows: Phenomena are real or unreal, means, that they are represented to us realitively or unrealitively. This is the doctrine of PHENOMENALISM which does not acknowledge any truths and regards everything as a consequence of our "seeming."

We could allege against this phenomenalism everything that we know about the striking or touching working of the formal side of our representation. This working may be effective or uneffective, the representation touches or DOES NOT TOUCH the reality of its objects, strikes the reality or DOES NOT STRIKE IT. If so, then the reality can not be given with the mere realitivic representation.

The mentioned doctrine defends tiself and pretends that there is not the question about EVERY realitivic or nonrealitivic representation, but only about the MAJORITY of such a representation. The thought that Mt. Elias is real "in truth" and "Fountain of Youth" is unreal "in truth" would have the meaning that the MAJORITY OF LIVING BEINGS thinks of Mt. Elias as real, but of "Fountain of Youth" as unreal. It would be possible that someone would think of the "Fountain of Youth" as real, but he remains in the minority and our judgment that he thinks of "Fountain of Youth" incorrectly, means that SUCH a representation is of a MINORITY, EXCEPTIONAL. But in any case would remain the doctrine that the reality of phonomena is the consequence of their realitivic representation. This doctrine adds that we have besides the view of the majority to take in account also remaining situations, when we are well rested, in the best of health, not tired and sick. The question, if anything is real or unreal, would be directly synonyme with the question, what the majority of living beings represents to them realitively or unrealitively, and if the situation is the most favorable. There is the question about a merely PSYCHOLOGICAL doctrine of reality which considers reality as realitivic representation.

This doctrine is erroneous and obtrusive. Reality can not

be the consequence of the question, if something appears or seems to us as real. Mt. Elias is not real, because it is represented to us realitively. To the contrary. We picture Mt. Elias realitively, because it is real. The nonreality of "Fountain of Youth" is not the consequence of the fact that we think of it "nonrealitively," but our unrealitivic representation is based and justified in the nonreality of "Fountain of Youth." Reality is not the consequence of realitivic representation, but realitivic representation is the natural consequence of reality.

The doctrine is erroneous also, where it speaks about realitivic representation "by majority" and "minority" and about situation. There are known examples of realitivic or unrealitivic representations "by majority" which are erroneous, and representations "by minority" which are correct. To us all is represented the moving of the sun realitively, but the moving is not real. Generally belong hitherto "halucinations" which are experienced by the majority of human beings and experienced, when their situation in life is most favorable. The nature appears as colored, sounding, fragrant, although there is today no doubt that the real nature is but the composition of powers and forces which have nothing to do with color, sound and fragrance. Realitivic representation is true or untrue, correct or incorrect. The truth depends only on the REALITY of this that is represented to us and not on the—number of all those, to which something is realitively represented, neither on the situation, in which someone experiences such representations.

We ascertained about the actual and only imagined psychological background of the reality two things. The essence of this background is in the formal side of the representing experience which differs from any experiencing content that it does not show us its territory, the reality, but only touches or does not touch it. In this double possibility is based the further fact that this formal side is justified or unjustified, correct or incorrect. Phenomena are represented to us "correctly," when we "touch" their reality, but "incorrectly," when we "miss" it. This speciality of the formal side of our experience is the consequence of the further fact that the essence of reality is not merely of a psychological character, not based in mere realitivic representation.

3. Reality and real things.

Try to distinguish between a real thing and reality and turn the attention more to reality. We speak about a "real" fortune, "real" rain, "real" landscape. But what is reality? Reality slips into nothingness, if we conside it ITSELF, without regard to this, which appears to us as real. Abstract from real fortune, real rain, real landscape "fortune," "rain," "landscape" and it will become difficult to conceive "reality." We can also in such cases think about reality, because we did not abstract everything real and exchanged subconsciously fortune, rain, landscape with different phenomena, which appear to us as real. If we abstract from reality anything which is real, becomes reality a nothingness.

This is not true in reverse. Real phenomena can be represented to us in most vivid colors, although we must not needs think about their reality. Fortune, rain, landscape can be imagined at our pleasure, lest the reality of such a fortune, rain, landscape has in any way to interest us. Neither can we object that in such a case steps in the place of the reality the—unreality and that we have for this reason to think about anything that may be represented to us as real or unreal. We can think about phenomena without the question of their reality or unreality: In fancy we may imagine ALIKE both: "Little America," which exists, and "Ultima Thule," which does not exist. Any IMMEDIATE conception of reality or unreality is in advance excluded. He, who conceives the reality, must conceive this, to where this reality leads or he ascribes it. This is the first characterization of the reality. Anything which is real or unreal, has its own nature which we can fully perceive, although we may entirely disregard the question of the reality or unreality. The reality (nonreality) has not any such own nature, respestively, loses it, if we try to consider it itself and without regard to this, to where it leads.

I ascertain: REALITY IS A SYSTEMATICALLY DEPENDENT OR SYSTEMATICALLY CONNECTED FACT.

It seems that we come nearer to the goal, if we consider both, reality and real things, if we do not separate the reality from real things. Take a real landscape and consider it in

the wholeness. There is a LANDSCAPE and a REAL landscape. Difficulties appear. We may the landscape describe at our pleasure: It has an oblong shape, is covered with green growth and houses of its inhabitants, situated at the foot of a mountainous hill streaming with brooklets. We call this the QUALITIES or DETERMINATIONS of the landscape. These give to it its specialities and separate it from other landscapes. Transfer this to the relation of the landscape to the reality. Is also the reality of the landscape such a side of the landscape as its shape, growth, situation? Evidently not. We may look over the landscape ever so carefully and search it from all sides, all our endeavour will be in vain, as long as we search on the reality for something which may characterize the landscape such as does characterize it its green growth, shape, situation. The green of the landscape is not the landscape, but a systematical part or a quality of the landscape which does not allow to call the landscape a sandy desert. The reality of the landscape is not the landscape, but this reality is also not any systematical part and not any quality of the landscape. The essence of the landscape compose most different facts, as soil, plants, shape, situation, light, but we can by no means say that a special realitivic fact would equally compose the landscape. When a storm or an earthquake destroys the landscape, can it be at our pleasure vividly to us represented. The landscape did not cease to be a landscape and to have these and these qualities, it only ceased TO EXIST. Unreal "Ultima Thule" woud with its realization not lose any old qualities and not acquire new ones, it would remain just "Ultima Thule."

What I stated on the example of the lanscape and "Ultima Thule," is generally true. The reality of phenomena is not a systematical part of these phenomena and has no connection with the question, what these phenomena are and in what they differ from each other. Neither can we object that we are speaking about some differences, e. gr., between Mt. Elias and "Fountain of Youth" so far as we say that Mt. Elias is real and "Fountain of Youth" unreal. THIS DIFFERENCE is not between "Mt. Elias" and "Fountain of Youth," but the difference is in the—reality. There is a difference between Mt. Elias and "Fountain of Youth," but this difference is the difference in the qualities which has Mt. Elias without regard to its reality

and which has "Fountain of Youth" without regard to its non-reality, not the difference in the reality of Mt. Elias and the unreality of "Fountain of Youth."

An interesting and important fact is that there is excluded a doubleness of phenomena which would be to each other entirely ALIKE, but would be one real, the other unreal. Who can think besides a stone which is actually before his eyes still about ANOTHER stone which would be to the first actual stone entirely alike, but another unreal stone? We do distinguish between real and unreal phenomena, but this difference is a pure internal "realitivic" difference and not a difference between a real and unreal thing. We can the difference in the reality and unreality transfer to a real and unreal thing at all then, when this that is real, differs also OTHERWISE from this that is unreal. Herewith is the reality being shown from another angle which forces us to regard this fact as a mysterious riddle.

We ascertained that the reality is a systematically dependent or systematically connected fact which disappears into nothingness, if we consider it itself. The reality vanishes into nothingness also then, when we consider it in connection with all this that we call a real, then an unreal thing. The reality does not give anything to this, to where it leads, and does not take anything away: A real landscape and an unreal fairyland do not differ from each other by reality or unreality, but by qualities which has the first without regard to its reality and which has the second without regard to its unreality. In full accordance with this fact is the PSYCHOLOGICAL LEGALITY proven in the former section that we can not at all think about reality itself, neither can it be represented to us, but that we have the reality to—suppose.

Let us imagine a real landscape and a fairyland. The reality of the landscape and the unreality of the fairyland do not answer the question, WHAT is represented to us in the first example and WHAT in the second, but answer an essentially different question, HOW something is represented to us in the first and HOW in the second example. The real landscape is represented to us "with open eyes" (genuinely, perceivably), the unreal fairy land only in the fancy (ungenuinely, imaginarilly). Psychologically is herewith expressed that the reality

leads to phenomena, but does not characterize these phenomena.

Similarly follows that the reality is not a determination. He, who would regard the reality of phenomena as a determination of these phenomena, would have to admit that the reality is a such singular determination, WHICH HAS NO CONTENT. Our question grows darker and less understandable. If the reality is not a determination, then it should be an independent fact which should have an own nature and should be independent on this, to where we ascribe it. Against such a conception balks everything which forced us to characterize the reality as a systematically dependent and connected fact. What follows? We became convinced that the reality disappears into nothingness, if we consider it as an independent fact and without this, to where we ascribe it. Then we became convinced that it slips into nothingness also then, when we consider it as a determination and in a systematical connection with this, to where it leads. Here is possible only one decision and may it seems to be ever so difficult: REALITY CONSIDERED IMMEDIATELY OR FROM THE VIEW OF A REAL THING IS A SYSTEMATICALLY EMPTY OR SYSTEMATICALLY NULL FACT.

To save the reality as a true determination of phenomena, we have to abandon any real thing and turn to facts which are outside of the reality and real things, but help us to understand the relation of the reality to real things. There is no doubt that real phenomena are "defined" also by their reality. In the opposite example we would not say that the reality "leads" to phenomena, that we may the reality "ascribe" or "deny" to phenomena, that we have "real" or "unreal phenomena." The reality is a determination of real things. We must, to understand SUCH A determination, take in account facts outside the reality and real things. Hitherto belongs the difference between SYSTEMATICAL and RELATIVE determinations. Phenomena have determinations which lead to them by their own nature and without regard to other phenomena, and determinations which lead to phenomena in the relation to other phenomena. Consider the landscape. It has its colors, verdure, its qualities which belong to it without regard to other landscapes. On the point of "situation" we have to take in

account other landscapes. Happenings have determinations without regard to other happenings. On the point of time we have to take in account happenings "before" or which may "follow." There is on the reality not the question about a systematcial, but about a RELATIVE determination of the real thing. This relation is the systematical essence of the reality.

We ascertained that we can not find this relation, if we pass from real things to real things. This transition is important for the deeper understanding of the reality. This will show the CAUSAL relation which is the relation of the real thing to the real thing and means that any reality includes two things: The condition for another reality (cause) and the reality conditioned by another reality (effect). The question is about the relation of real thing to real thing and of reality to reality. We deal with an essentially different relation, namely, with the relation of REALITY TO REAL THING. On this point we have reality and real things thoroughly and by principle to abandon. The transition can not be more merely HORIZONTAL, from phenomena to phenomena of the equal kind, it must be VERTICAL, from reality and real things to a fact by principle outside of the reality and real things. It seems that such a transition is well possible in the territory of the given universe. This would be the transition from the reality and real things to THAT, to whom appears something as real. This is pure phenomenalism. Phenomena are real, if they appear real. The essence of the reality would be the relation of this that may be real, to that, to whom something appears as real.

This phenomenalism is erroneous and does not touch the essence of the reality, but it shows the direction of the "vertical" transition from reality and real things and from OBJECT and SUBJECT. We have this direction in the universe. Take the difference between dead nature and life upon it. Dead nature is originally a system of mare "objects," the life upon it includes "SUBJECTS" which live and apprehend these objects. All subjects are to the reality and real things in the relation of dependence by principle, they apprehend the reality, but do not create it. On these subjects is open even the question, if they by their apprehension of the real thing only "touch" the reality or "miss" it. Man is together with all living beings not

in an exceptional position. Phenomena "appear" to subjects as real or unreal, but the reality and nonreality is not a consequence of such an apparition.

There is an objection. Subjects "create" many things, make phenomena real which had not been real and remove from real phenomena the reality. All human working has as a consequence an interrupted rising of new realities and disappearing of old ones.

This objection is not tenable. Man creates and destroys things, but this creation and destroying is effected only along ALREADY GIVEN REALITIES AND NONREALITIES. The potter creates potteries and the naughty child destroys them to the chagrin of his mother. The first could not create them, if he would not have at his desposition a REAL clay, and the second could not destruct them, if he would not have at his disposition REAL destructive means. The indisputable fundamental of such working are finished realities and the working is effected along causal relations, therefore, along relations which are of no avail for the understanding of the relation of reality to real thing. This working is more or less a successful "changing" and does not differ from the changing, as it goes on from moment to moment in the dead nature. There is not the question about the relation between reality and reality. We must understand this, without which would these relations vanish into nothingness, if we shall understand REALITY ITSELF. We do not mind the working which is only some changing or transforming, we mind a singular working which makes the realities possible, and is a real creation. Subjects change and transform, but do not create, they are to reality and real things in the relation of a dependence by principle.

Herewith is pointed out, where may have the vertical transition from reality and real things its territory. First, this is the transition to the subject, not from object to object. Secondly, to a SPECIAL subject which underangeably differs from all empirically given subjects, to the singular superempirical subject which is to the reality and real things in the position of an independence by principle and CREATES, does not only change or transform. We can about such a singular subject immediately not know anything definite. More can we speak about sucb a singular subject IN THE RELATION to given sub-

jects. Phenomena appear to these given subjects as real or nonreal and this appearing is justified or unjustified. On the point of the superempirical subject is the "realitivic" or "nonrealitivic" appearing by principle outside of justification or nonjustification. The reality or nonreality is on the point of this singular subject given with the realitivic or nonrealitivic appearing. The name of this singular superempirical subject can be only GOD.

Phenomenalism tries to identify the reality or nonreality with the realitivic or nonrealitivic apparition. This phenomenalism we disapproved. But we must add that this holds only for men and other empirically given subjects. This addition is necessary. On empirically given subjects we must distinguish besides their realitivic apparition still, if they "touch" or "miss" the reality. On the point of God ceases this addition, because for God and only for God is the "appeared" reality the "touched" reality. Old and new phenomenalism has its sound meaning with this important addition that the realitivic or nonrealitivic apparition, for which phenomenalism would remain in force, is not an empirical human, but a DIVINE apparition. This is, of course, not more a real "phenomenalism." We speak about the divine realitivic apparition in the pattern of the human apparition, whilst essentially that divine act, which gives to the reality its content and separates it from nothingness, is not a mere "apparition" or "seeming." I call it THE ORIGINAL ACT OF THE REALITY.*)

The shown relation of the reality to the divine original act makes us understand still a special side of OUR realitivic representation. This representation is correct or incorrect, touches or misses the reality. Wherefrom this unusual jump from the sphere of mere facts to the sphere of something "correct" or "incorrect," therefore, to a sphere nearer to a moral demand than to a simple actualness? Without the access of the divine essence would be THIS jump from the territory of mere facts to to the sphere of MORAL or NORMATIVE relations impossible and meaningless, but it gets its deepest proof in the fact

*) The "original act of the reality" is not the reality, but the necessary "vertical" condition that the reality gets its content. Without this act would be the reality a nothingness, but through this act becomes the reality the VERTICAL DETERMINATION of real things.

of a systematical relation of our realitivic representation to the divine, therefore, original realitivic act: When we touch with our realitivic representation the reality, then we ARE IN ACCORD with the divine act, but when we miss the reality, then we ARE IN OPPOSITION to the divine act. This agreeing or opposing of the DIVINE ACT is a deep fundamental for the access of the "moral" or "normative" side on the point of our realitivic representation. The later chapters shall show that we must on the human life speak still about moral or normative facts which essentially differ from the shown moral or normative side of the mere realitivic representation. Think about the difference between "perception" and "error" or between "merit" and "sin." We call these facts moral or normative facts IN THE STRICTER SENSE OF THE WORD. But the shown relation to the divine original act prove that these primitive ideas, as they are given with the representation, have in the broader sense of the word a moral or normative essence.

4. Reality and reality.

I mentioned that there are legal CONNECTIONS between reality and reality, more correctly, between real things and real things. We can define these connections as follows: There are examples, when with the reality of the phenomenon p-1 is "given" the reality of the phenomenon p-2, or when with the realities of the phenomenon p-1, p-2, p-3 are "given" the phenomena p-a, p-b, p-c. Lets take the causual relation between happening and happening. The shooting from a hunting gun causes the downfall of the hare. This relation can have its meaning only from the viewpoint of a REAL shooting and a REAL fall of the hare. Without the access of the "reality" would be this not a causal relation. The relation of the shooting to the hare is: With the reality of the shooting from the hunting gun is "given" the reality of the fall of the hare. This example shows on the reality a side which we have not considered and does not concern the question, to where leads the reality and WHAT ITSELF MAY BE. The point is in a different question: WHY is something real or WHERE originates the reality of something FROM? The reality has its "original" side which is the primary basis of the further

fact that on phenomena we are not only interested in the question, what these phenomena are, but also in the question, why they exist and where they come from. We do not only ascertain that the hare went down, but add that he went down, BECAUSE the hunter shot him. The causal relation is not the only example of the connection between reality and reality. With the reality of the phenomenon p/1 is "given" the reality of the phenomenon p/2, but this GIVENESS is entirely different. We do not only ask, where something originates from, but HOW something originates from something. Connections between reality and reality are "givenesses" of reality by reality. There are as many kinds of such connections as there are pertinent GIVENESSES.

We discussed one giveness and ascertained the relation of the reality to the divine act. This relation leads to phenomena, but originates from the divine original act. This singular "origin" is not a kind of the originating of the reality from the reality. It is true without exception for ANY reality and does not touch the relation of reality to reality, but the relation of the reality to God. Secondly, this origin is in a systematical connection only with the principle question, what the reality is and how it differs from nothingness. We are concerned with an entirely different question, namely, if and how originate DETERMINATED realities from other and like DETERMINATED realities. To arrive at the singular origin of the reality from the divine essence, we have, thirdly, to perform the VERTICAL transition from the reality and any real thing. The question now is about the HORIZONTAL transition from reality to reality and from real thing to real thing. This originating of the reality touches reality and reality, real things and real things and does not afford a "lifting" to a sphere which is from the first entirely different. We can, fourth, the relation of reality to reality and real things to real things immediately ascertain and this ascertainment is the basical task of all sciences which have the purpose the realities to "prove" and to "explain." The originating of the reality from the divine essence is not the task of an immediate scientific ASCERTAINMENT. The acknowledgment of this original divine act has been only the necessary consequence of the scientific DEMAND that also the reality may be essentially independent and

not only by content an empty fact. For this reason we said that the final essence of the reality is in its "vertical" relation to the divine original act and in the relation which makes at all possible also the hitherto considered, namely, "horizontal" relation of real things to real things. This proves clearly that we have the "originating" of the reality from the divine original act strictly to separate from all such originating realtions which connect reality with reality and real things with real things.*)

All realities form the realities and man became very early aware that all realitivic members of this universe were with each other in an internal connection. The most external and the faintest form of such a connection is the fact that all members of the universe are REAL and that anyone who would try to abstact a SINGLE reality would consequently have to abstract all REMAINING realities. Take a real rain and the real Washington's birth. The reality of the rain is not in an internal connection with Washington's birth, but he, who would deny to the rain the reality, would have such a reality to deny also to Washington's birth. We can in a good sense say that with the reality of a momentary rain is "given" also the reality of Washington's birth and vice versa. This is the faintest connection between reality and reality uniting all realities as realities and not dependent on the character of any real thing. I characterize this connection as follows: Realities are given by realities without regard to the question of the nature of the pertinent real thing.

We touch upon a tighter connection, if we consider the so called local character of an external or corporal "thing." A stone is on the street, before us, on the brim of the river. Herewith we mediately ascertain besides the stone still other phenomena, the street, ourselves, the river. All along, we think about the real stone, real phenomena which determine the situation of the stone. We can not think about the stone otherwise than in a determinated position. If we want to be exact, we

*) I can not dismiss this passage without the renewed request that the reader may strictly keep in mind the underangeable difference between the "vertical" origin of the reality from the divine original act and the "horizontal" origin of the reality from the reality. According to the origin becomes the reality considered "in the own essence" and A SUCH CONSIDERED REALITY affords the chances for the originating of the reality from the reality. More about this later on.

do not only say that it exists, but must add that it is somewhere ("here," "there," "above," "below"). Besides the stone there must be other phenomena to determinate the stone by "position." These phenomena are generally all phenomena of the extrnal universe, because the stone is to this universe in a determinated local relation. We are facing a connection between reality and reality which is stricter so far as it is built up in the external or local character of the real thing. It is formal and faint and touches the realities of all local phenomena and does not depend on the question, if these phenomena are otherwise in internal relations or not. With the reality of some phenomena must be given realities of other phemena. From the reality of the stone follows only that the stone is "somewhere," that there are still other phenomena, but the stone does not indicate these other phenomena. We determine this connection: Realities are given by realities in regard to the merely external or local character of the pertinent real thing.

Essentially stricter is the connection on a landscape and its parts. The real landscape has real parts and the reality of the landscape is built up in the reality of its parts. With the character of the parts of the landscape is given the character of the whole landscape and vice versa. The lanscape includes the single parts. This connection is less remarkable, merely empty. The realities are given by "themselves" and our perception of new realities is not substantial. Nobody denies that with the reality of the qualities of some thing is given the reality of this thing which has these qualities, but nobody is much enjoyed, as man is enjoyed, if he experiences a truly new and real perception. This connection is built up in the INCLUDING RELATION of a real thing: The whole landscape includes its parts and vice versa. We determine: Realities are given by realities with regard to the merely including character of the pertinent real thing.

We encounter a more remarkable connection, if we consider the relation between the heath and the spacious extent of bodies. The increasing of the heath has as consequence the increasing of the extent. Did we touch the so called "causal" connection? By no means. The cause is necessarily temporally "before" the effect, the effect "after" the cause. The relation between the heath and the local extent is doubtlessly

an example of the reality given "COTEMPORALLY" by another reality. The extent of the bodies does not increase AFTER the increasing of the heath, but cotemporally. With the reality of a higher temperature is given the reality of a larger extent and the larger extent is not the effect of the higher temperature. A striking example of this connection is the relation between the nervous system and the spirituality. This relation means that with certain changes in the nervous system are given parallel changes in the spirituality, as evident in the sphere of "sensations" which come and change parallely with the "irritation" of the pertinent sensitive centra in the core of the brain. This coming and changing is parallel, because there is no reason to contend that the pertinent working of the core of the brain would be actually and temporally effected BEFORE the parallel spiritual changes. The spiritual changes are in principle effected cotemporally with the pertinent nervous changes. With the reality of the nervous changes is given the reality of further spiritual changes, but the first realities THEMSELVES are not the cause of other realities, neither the other realities the effect of the first realities.*)

To understand better the discussed connection, we must in detail consider that giveness which we call the "CAUSAL" giveness. Again we are at the example of the falling of the

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*) He, who would try differently to interprete this relation, would have to think that the nervous changes are at least "for some moment" BEFORE the spiritual and even the spiritual BEFORE the nervous. But what then about the doubtless unity of living man, of the living bodily and spiritual being? The nervous change, to which would not be legally adapted the COTEMPORAL spiritual change, would be the change of "dead" matter. The spiritual change without the nervous would be the change of a being which is a mere "spirit" and has no body. We have to mind spiritual changes which are to our nervous side immediately adapted. They are mere parallelities and not effects of the nervous process. More about this in the following discussions. Just as I can not accept the nice thought expressed by my talented hearer V. L. The thought is: At least the first "contact" between cause and effect (e. gr., the contact of the finger with the clay) affords that BOTH are in the relation of an actual COTEMPORALITY. Also for the real causality is, therefore, the temporal parallelity not necessary. I answer that this "first" contact is IN THE WHOLENESS ALREADY ITSELF ONLY THE EFFECT of happenings which ARE BEFORE IT (e. gr., the moving of the fingers) OR ONLY THE CAUSE of the happenings WHICH ARE AFTER (e. gr., the impressing on the clay).

hare caused by the shot of the gun. For any such relation we can allege at least three essential marks. First, the reality which causes is temporally before the reality which is caused. Between the cause and the effect is the relation of temporal CONSEQUENCE. Secondly, with the substantial character of the cause corresponds the like substantial character of the effect. The relation between cause and effect is not merely ideal or abstract, but substantial and compact. Third, with the real cause corresponds ALWAYS also the pertinent effect and there is no cause without effect. The relation between cause and effect is constant. These marks are essential and sufficient. We define this connection: Realities are given by realities in regard to the constant and substantially proven consequence of the real thing. The gun goes off BEFORE the hare goes down. With the character of the bullet and its velocity corresponds the like character of the wound of the hare. This relation has no exceptions. This is only a daily example, but does not differ from those profound and subtile causal connections, as they are detected and explored by sciences which deal with causal deductions of reality from reality. These are all natural sciences from simplest mechanics up to the most complicated psychology and biology. If we compare the causes and the effects, detected by these sciences, with our example of the shot and the hare, we see that this example is only for this reason somehow merely popularly conceivable, because it alleges wholenesses there, where would to the scientific discussion appear innumerable singlenesses, and where instead of only one cause or only one effect we would have to speak about a whole line of such single causes and effects (as the ignition of the powder, the loosing and moving of the bullet). For all single causes and effects remains in force the relation of constant and substantially proven temporal consequence.

The causal connection is nearest to the connection typed out with the example of the heath and the spacious extension and the nervous working and spiritual changes. The difference is that in the causal connection are both realitivic members in the relation of temporal consequence, on the formerly mentioned connection in the relation of temporal parallelity. Both connections are substantially proven and constant. That temporal difference is important. It helps to detect a relation

between these two realitivic connections, namely, that the causal connection is systematically primary and basical, and that upon it is buil up the merely parallel giveness of reality by reality. The warming up of the bodies rests on happenings which are in a natural causal connection. This holds also for happenings observed in the form of a larger or smaller spacious extent. If we view both from the physical standpoint, we see that on the temperatural and spacious changes there is the question about essentially alike happenings. These we have to examine first to understand also the view of the "temperatural" and of the parallel "spacious" changing. The physical study of THESE happenings is the study of their causal proceeding. This holds also for the connection between the nervous working and the spiritual changes. Entirely erroneous would be to assert that the nervous working and the spiritual changing is but one happening which only appears in a double form. The real insight in this connection opens a minute CAUSAL study of the nervous AND the spiritual proceeding. This is evident from every chapter of modern physiology and psychology. It is clear that without such causal connections on our corporality and spirituality would in advance disappear the PARALLEL realitivic relation between "body" and "soul." If this relation is still to-day more dark, we must add that to-day is equally dark also the CAUSAL corporal and spiritual happening. There is only one basical reality, not a reality of mere corporality, neither a reality of mere spirituality, the reality of LIVING (spirited) corporality. This reality is the basis of the spiritual changes, but EXCLUSIVELY ONLY ON THE SCALE OF THE CAUSAL PROCEEDING OF THE FIRST AND THE SECOND.*)

The causal and, therefore, consecutive connection between reality and reality is the basis also for a constant and substantially proven parallel realitivic connection. I define it: Realities are given by realities in regard to the constant and substan-

*) I do not assert that both causalities should be to each other equal. The corporal causality may be very different and this holds the more for the spiritual causal proceeding. We shall in the third chapter touch spiritual happenings which do not allow any merely causal interpretation. The fact of experimental PHYSICS and experimental PSYCHOLOGY proves that we must besides the corporal causality speak still about the spiritually causal proceeding of happenings.

tially proven parallelity of the pertinent real thing. We call this connection the merely FUNCTIONAL giveness of reality by reality. In any case keep in mind that this connection is BY ITSELF not an ACTUAL or SUBSTANTIAL connection between reality and reality. It is only an EXTEMPORAL CONSEQUENCE of two facts: Of some common outlet ("warmed object," "living body" etc.) and of a causal happening effected upon this outlet and which we have to know to understand also the "parallel" or "functional" giveness of reality by reality. To understand this is not so easy. It affords not only a compact causal review of pertinent happenings, but a special determination of THAT COMMON fundamental, on which these happenings proceed. When shall we know the causal connections which unite the single nervous and spiritual changes? If some times would this become known, for the real understanding of the functional connections between the nervous and spiritual realities would be of no avail as long as we do not fully succeed sufficiently in answering the age-old SPECIAL question of—LIVING BODY OR CORPORAL LIFE.

Let us not forget still the connection between reality and reality best characterized by OUR WILL. When we will move, arise, sit down, we will really move, arise, sit down. As far as we really will this, we will actually do this. This principle holds without exception. Our will momentary ceases to be, as soon as we think that this that we will, can not be done. A man with paralized legs my "wish" to walk as other people are walking, but he can not have the WILL to do this. The will is directly an essentially DIFFERENT internal or spiritual side of real ACTING, different from a mere effect. Herewith is determinated a realitivic connection. There is not the question about this connection, because with the reality of the will is given the reality of this that we will. The will belongs to such spiritual acts which are by their own nature POINTED (when we will or do not will, always and necessary we will or do not will SOMETHING). We call this connection the POINTING connection between reality and reality. I define this connection: Realities are given by realities in regard to the pointing character of at least one real thing. This connection is not primary or basical, because it is built up on others known realities by realities. When we WILL lift the hand, we lift it. But

this lifting is causally immediately adapted to the irritation of the pertinent moving (motoring) nervous end of the core of the brain and not to our will: We wished "to lift the hand" and not "to irritate our moving nervous system," of which we may not at all be aware. The considered pointing giveness of reality by reality would be excluded, if it would not rest on other realities. In the example of the will is the pointing realitivic connection built up on the causal giveness of reality by reality.

5. The including system of realities.

Realities are given by realities means that realities—INCLUDE realities. We have different kinds of realitivic including. The kinds form a legal including system of realities. Keep in mind that important difference between the "vertical" and "horizontal" giveness of realities which we call the difference between the vertical and horizontal realitivic including. Realities are vertically in cluded, means that any reality is by its systematical essence the consequence of the divine act. Realities are horizontally included, means that the reality of phenomena p-1, p-2, p-3 . . . is given by the reality of phenomena p-a, p-b, p-c . . . Our interest is turned to the horizontal system of realitivic including.

All horizontal realitivic including is divided in two inequal parts. The first comprises the realitivic including as outlined in the former section, the second the remaining kinds. Hitherto belongs the fact that any reality includes some other reality without regard to the character of the pertinent real thing. Thus includes the reality of the momentary nice weather the older reality of the world war. This including is FORMAL or FIGURAL, because it has the figure or form of an including, but is not substantially proven. The giveness of the reality by the reality has the meaning that he, who admits the second reality, has to admit also the first, because both are—realities. The remaining kinds of realitivic including are different, because they are built up on the character of the pertinent real thing. The reality of the stone includes also the reality of the nearer and distant environment of the stone. The including is built up in the "local" character of the pertinent real thing.

Still more evident is this on other kinds. Take the "causal" giveness of the reality by the reality: Determinated causes have determinated effects. I call this including MATERIAL or SUBSTANTIAL, because it has not only the form of including, but is substantially proven. All horizontal including is formal or substantial.

I pass to the division of the substantial realitivic including. I mention first the PARALLEL substantial including. This kind is given with the example of the stone and its environment, of the warmth and the spacious extent and of the nervous working and the spiritual changes. The reality is parallely given with the reality. Parallely with the stone is given its environment, parallely with the increasing of heath the increased extent, parallely with the nervous working spiritual changes. The given examples show that we have two kinds of parallel including, the EXTERNAL and INTERNAL. With the reality of the stone is merely externally given the reality of its environment, because this giveness does not indicate the kind of its environment. The examples of the warmth and the nervous working are examples of internal parallel including, because with the giveness of the reality by the reality are these realities fully determinated: With the increasing of warmth corresponds the larger spacious extent, and with the nervous working correspond spiritual changes. On the external parallel including are given the parallel realities which are in content determinated only by kind (space!), but on the internal parallel including are given parallel realities which are by content fully determinated.

The second kind of the substantial including is the CONSEQUENTIAL including. This is the "causal" giveness of the reality by the reality. We can also here speak about an external and internal including. The internal consequential including is the essence of the causal realitivic giveness. Hitherto belongs the example of the shot from the gun and the falling of the hare. This including is consequential, because the falling of the hare follows actually after the shot from the gun. It is substantial, because with the determinated reality of the shot from the gun corresponds the determinated reality of the falling of the hare. It is internal, because this consequence is in the substantial essence of the realities immediately proven.

Take the example that the day follows the night or the summer the spring. This is an example of realitivic including: By the reality of the night or spring is given the reality of the following day or summer. It is a consequential substantivic including: The day and the summer follow actually after the night and the spring and with the determinated reality of the night and the spring corresponds the determinated reality of the day and the summer. But this including is evidently not internal, because it is not in the substantial essence of the pertinent realities immediately proven: The night does not make the day, neither the spring the summer, but the relation to the sun conditions the changes between day and night and the single seasons. We can, therefore, assert that this changing is an example of the external consequential including. It is also evident that the external including is towards the internal dependent and upon it built up: The change between day and night and the single seasons is built up on happenings which are to each other in an causal connection.

The third kind is the POINTING realitivic including which we characterized with the example of the WILL and of this that we wish. The pointing including is also internal and external. The will to walk is an internal pointing including. By the reality of our will that we walk is given the reality of our moving. With the determinated reality of our will corresponds the determinated reality of moving. This is a substantial including. The will is to this that we will pointed in a special way. The reality of this that we will can be immediately deducted already from our wishing. This that we will is in the majority of cases the effect of the changes in our moving nervous system and without these causal connections would our will become impossible. In the merely "pointing" meaning we "make," "realize" with the will this that we will. The will is the example of the pointing including which is built up on the internal consequential (causal) and parallel including and THIS pointing including is an INTERNAL including. The EXTERNAL pointing including will show us this still clearer and better.

I must turn the attention to the partition of the spirituality in the RATIONAL and INSTINCTIVE. The first includes "ideas" and "thoughts," the second "sensations" and

"aspirations." The will belongs to the instinctive half of the spirituality.*)

Our rational spirituality corresponds with the will in the instinctive spirituality. This is the THOUGHT, and that special thought which is called PERCEPTION. Will and perception! Both these acts have many essentialities in common. Both are "pointing": When we will and perceive, we always and necessarily will and perceive something. Secondly, both are by their own essence pointed to realities: When we will and perceive, we always and necessarily will and perceive something real.*)

Third, is by the reality of both these acts given the reality of that, to where they are pointed: The will to lift the hand and the perception that we lifted the hand, warrant the reality of this lifting. The "perception" is, therefore, directly the second example of the pointing realitivic including. The outlined comparition of the will with the perception means, that on the point of perception there is the question about the EXTERNAL pointing including. We do not make with our perception this that we perceive. We perceive realities, but we perceive only in advance given realities. The relation of the perception to the reality is, therefore, directly opposed to the relation of the will to the reality: The will pointingly produces realities, the perception pointingly subordinates itself to realities. We can call the reality the pointing consequence of the will and the pointing condition of the perception. The will is an internal, the perception an external realitivic including.

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*) The "instinctive" character of the will is taken here but figurally, because the later discussions will strictly show that the will is not an "experience," but the IMMEDIATE action of the personal subject. This is true also on the "willing" element of the perception which I will later on discuss more in extent. The substantial meaning of the present alloting of the "will" to the instinctive and of the "perception" to the rational spirituality means: The "will" is in the common sense of the word the CONNECTION OF THE WILL with the instinctive, but the "perception" with the rational experience.

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*) This holds also for the perception which has the character of so called "imagination": The imagination of a nice weather to-morrow is an imagination of the reality of this nice weather. It holds also for the "valuable" perception which I will discuss in the following chapter, where I show that the world of valuations is systematically built up on the world of realities.

Important is the further fact that we can on the point of the first mentioned figural realitivic including speak about an external and internal figural including. The difference is that we have here for this purpose to transpass the boundary of the horizontal including system of realities and pass to the vertical giveness of the reality. This giveness is formal or figural, it holds for any reality without exception and is not connected with the character of the real thing. THIS singular giveness is of no avail for the SUBSTANTIAL explanation or proof of any SINGLE reality. In any such case we must recur to this or that kind of the horizontal and substantial realitivic including. The reality of the momentary rain is by its essence the consequence of the divine original act, but this fact does not give to the reality any substantial proof, but makes it possible ONLY IN PRINCIPLE as all realities. This reality becomes proven by its horizontal contact with realities, as they are alleged by different weatherforcasters. About the vertical realitivic including I ascertain: It differs from the horizontal, but is so far as we consider it from the viewpoint of the horizontal including a figural including. There is a double figural including, the vertical and the horizontal. This doubleness is the doubleness of the internal and external figural realitivic including.

The vertical including is the internal figural including. Any reality is by its internal essence to which we never can immediately protrud given by the original act of God. The connection between this act and the reality is, and if it may in the rest remain an eternal mystery, not merely causal and external. On the other side bears the horizontal including the character of some casuality and externality: By the reality of the momentary rain is casually and externally included the reality of the past world war. This including is true under the condition that this war has been itself and not in regard to the momentary rain really true. The horizontal figural including is the immediate consequence of the vertical. Only by the power of the original divine act are realities possible, systematically essential, that the reality becomes without regard to real things sharply determinated towards mere nothingness. The realities include themselves horizontally as they are realities and do not afford any addition of that, to where we ascribe them. Between

the vertical and horizontal figural including is a threefold relation. Both includings are figural, because they do not make possible any deduction of the reality from the reality. ..Secondly, the vertival including is adapted to the internal or systematical side of the reality, the horizontal figural connects reality with reality casually and externally. Third, the vertical including is the immediate basis of the horizontal including. The vertical including is the internal figural, the horizontal the external figural including.

We arrived to the legal including system of realities. The main diagonal of this system is the boundary between the vertical and horizontal including. The diagonal of the horizontal including system is the boundary between the figural and substantial including. We ascertained three main by-kinds of realitivic including: The by-kind of the parallel, consequential and pointing including. The figural and substantial including is twofold, internal and external, with the most important addition that the horizontal figural including is an external including, with which corresponds the vertical including as the internal figural including. The remaining specialities of this including system are: The essence of space and causality is in the substantial including with this important difference that on the point of space is this including parallel and external, on the point of causality consequential and internal. The essence of will and perception is a pointing substantial including with this important difference that this including is on the point of will internal, on the point of perception external. We have not to forget on the relations between the single kinds of the horizontal including, if the internal consequential including is really an indisputable basis of all horizontal including. Most important is on the including system that it reaches at least on one point in the sphere of the vertical including, therefore, in the sphere of the divine activity. This is the point of the internal figural including. We may soon ascertain more such points and then we will speak about the WHOLE including system of realities.

We approach the system with the question: Are the single kinds of the realitivic including independent or on each other dependent? I ascertain that the entire system of the horizontal including is figurally dependent on the vertical in-

cluding. The reality becomes an own and binding fact only in its relation to the divine original act, and this divine act is necessary, if the entire horizontal including should not disappear into nothingness. Without the vertical giveness would be any horizontal giveness of realities, it means, any giveness of the reality BY the reality excluded. With regard to this dependence of the horizontal including on the vertical I have ascertained that the formal horizontal includnig is immediately and basically built up on the vertical. The dependence is twofold: Substantially internal, as it holds for the substantial horizontal including. This second dependence is formally external, because it is built up on the demand that the reality must be an own and binding fact without regard to this, to where we ascribe it. Equally important are also the connections between the horizontal including kinds. The connection will help us to detect special sides on the vertical including of the realities, therefore, on the relation of God to the whole system of realities.

I mentioned some connections. I said that the internal parallel including is built up on the internal consequential. Any "functional" giveness of realities is built up on the "causal." The parallel connections between the nervous working and the pertinent spiritual changes are built up on the internal consequential. The consequential changing between day and night is built up on the causal happenings of the action of light. The pointing including is built up on the internal parallel and consequential including. The working of the will would be impossible, if with the will would not correspond changes of the moving nervous system which in the stricter sense of the word actually "cause" this that we will. I have to add that this dependence holds also for the pointing including, as it is given with "perception." Our perception is built up on the parallely functional and consequentially causal connections of OUR corporality and OUR spirituality. This does not hold only for primary perceptions, as they appear in the ascertaining of the momentary external environment, mediately holds this also for all those later perceptions, with which we transpassed the boundary of the own and foreign corporality. All higher or ideal perception is built up on the lower and sensitive. I state with regard to the ascertained dependences between the single

kinds of the horizontal including: The internal consequential, therefore, causal including is the necessary basis of the external consequential, internal parallel and pointing including.

There remains the question of the connection between the internal consequential and external parallel, it means, between the causal and the realitivic including, as it is given with the necessary local distribution of external phenomena. The first view would be that the external parallel realitivic including is built up on the internal consequential and that all local distribution of external phenomena is, therefore, a consequence of the causal happening: That before me is the typewriter is the consequence of the fact that someone made it, that I put it on the table, that by a merely causal way I posted myself before it. But such a conception would be extremely vague and directly erroneous. Causal connections are necessary that the external phenomenon gets THIS AND THAT SPECIAL AND ENTIRELY DETERMINATED local distribution, but the causality does not help to answer the question, why are external phenomena necessarily AT ALL DISTRIBUTED, LOCALIZED. In this regard we have very important reasons to speak rather about the dependence of the causality on the local distribution, than about the dependence of the local distribution on the causality. I ascertain the indisputable fact that the external spacious world is the indisputable system and developing basis of the internal or nonspacious happening in the world. Hitherto belongs my common diagonal of the partition of the emperically given universe in the fourfoldness of the inorganic and organic external corporality on the one side and of the sensitive and (spiritual) rational internal spirituality on the other. Thus is the human rational spirituality built on sensibleness, all sensibleness on organic life, but the organic life on merely "physical" and "chemical" action of inorganic matter. The inorganic world is diagonally and developingly the fundamental, basical world. This world is directly the systematically spacious, distributed world.

After this emphasis of local distribution may somebody think that the deemed dependence of the external parallel including on the internal consequential remains further preserved, but that this holds only toward the internal consequential including of external spacious realities. With other words:

The external parallel including, conditioned by local distribution, does not depend on every, but the more on the external local and, say, merely physical causality. It was even guessed that the local distribution of external phenomena is only a special example for the physical causality. This guess is untenable. We know that at least one essential side of real causality is in the temporal CONSEQUENCE of the realities, whilst the including given by the specious distribution is the including of the temporally PARALLEL realities. It can not be said that this second including would depend on the first. We know that phenomena and happenings which may be touched by the physical causality are and must be in advance locally distributed. This is true not only for daily and so called "naive" view upon the external world, but true also for the basis of the most critical consideration of pertinent sensitive results. For example. Everyone, to who the external world is only a system of different "energetical" forces and powers, knows that all these forces are by their own nature spaciously determinated. There is, therefore, no natural pattern which would amongst its systematical members contain the spacious elements or would not be constructed from the patterns of such elements. The temporal consequence does not depend on the temporal parallelity, and the temporal parallelity not on the temporal consequence. The ACTUAL external world is the basis of both, of the parallel and consequential happening, and ON IT is impossible any parallel happening without the consequential, as also any consequential without the parallel. It follows that the external parallel including of the realities is in regard to the dependence on the same grade with the internal consequential, nay, that the first including would be primarily dependent on the second.

We have on the horizontal including system in the wholeness the following dependences: The pointing including depends on the internal consequential and internal parallel. The external parallel including depends on the internal consequential, with the addition that the internal consequential including is there, where it touches external phenomena, necessarily combined with the external parallel including. The figural horizontal including is dependent on the one side on the vertical, on the other on the substantial horizontal (parallel, consequential

or pointing) and finally on the internal consequential and external parallel. For the reason that the fundamental side of the external parallel including is the locality, the fundamental side of the internal consequential including the temporality, we add that the LOCALITY AND THE TEMPORALITY ARE THE FINAL BASICAL FACTS OF THE HORIZONTAL INCLUDING SYSTEM OF REALITIES. Thus is evident, how will the more detailed discussions of locality and temporality show, if and how lead from the horizontal including still ways to the vertical. First I turn the attention to an aperture of the horizontal including system shown by the example of the pointing including.

This including is twofold: Internal, given with the will, and external, given with the perception. Both includings are dependent on the internal parallel and internal consequential including. Thus arises the question, if we do not have a pointing including which would be entirely INDEPENDENT and, therefore, ABSOLUTE. As a matter of fact, we should speak about a double such absolute pointing including, namely, about a "will" which includes the realities without any mediation of the connections between "body" and "soul," and about a "perception," about which would besides such an immediateness hold still this that it is to the realities thus superposed, as is the will superposed to this that we will. This is a WILL which means the internal and independent pointing including, and this is a PERCEPTION which is an internal and independent pointing including. A will which is equal to the perception and a perception which is equal to the will! Man does not possess such a will and such a perception. But the outlined including system indicates clearly the direction which leads to such a will and perception. This is the direction of the vertical including. Vertical including fullfils all conditions of such a singular "perception" which is in the entirely immediate and independent including of the realities. We know about this vertical including that it is "formal" and, therefore, adapted to the reality without regard to specialities of real things. The equal "formalness" holds also for the "perception": On the point of PERCEIVED something, there is not the question, WHAT we perceive, but if we did TOUCH the REALITY. Perception points to the reality without regard to specialities of

the real thing. Secondly, without the vertical including would the reality disappear into nothingness and would, therefore, cease to be an own and binding fact: We ascertained the reality as the systematical consequence of the divine original act without regard to the question, if and how is this reality by other realities still horizontally included. For this divine original act holds both: First, that it has the form of "perception," and secondly, that it is a such perception which by itself directly systematically conditions, MAKES all realities. This divine perception underangeably differs from the human perception.

There is no doubt that we found that pointing including which has the form of a real perception and is entirely independent and internal. This is the divine original act and the vertical including of realities. It is probable that the including system affords still that second pointing including which is independent and internal, but has the form of a will and not of a perception. We know about the including system that it is in the horizontal regard finally built up on the external parallel and internal consequential including. A detailed discussion of THESE both includings must show, if the including system affords from this side still a vertical including. There is given the demand of a detailed discussion of LOCALITY AND TEMPORALITY. This discussion will bring us to the vertical including which has the form of a will and not of a perception and is entirely independent.*)

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*) I mention that I have in this section omitted in the former section given third instance of the realitivic including, therefore, the "giveness" of the reality of THE WHOLENESS by the realities OF THE PARTS and vice versa. This kind of the realitivic giveness is not of a real value for the enrichment of our knowledge. To remove this "nice mistake" from our including system I ascertain the following facts: We have an including BY CONTENT which is internal or only external. When the reality of the phenomenon p/1 originates from the phenomenon p/2 BY THE CONTENT ITSELF of the first and second phenomenon, then there is the question about the INTERNAL including of the reality by content. The example for such an including is the relation of the reality of "wholeness" to the reality of "parts." But when the reality of the phenomenon p/1 originates from the reality of the phenomenon p/2 also by content of the first and second, but ONLY EMPIRICALLY OR OCCASIONALLY, then there is the question about the EXTERNAL including by content. The example for such an including is the relation of the reality of "contact" of this that actually contacts (actual "boundary," "territory" etc.).

6. The realitivic character of locality and temporality.

From realitivic including is evident a strict connection of the reality with space and time. Without space there would be no external parallel realitivic including, without time no internal consequential. These two includings are the necessary bases for the horizontal including system of realities and the same basical place is alloted to space and time. To determine this place, I direct the attention to their doubleness. We speak about a spacious form of external bodies and say that they are round, angular, oblong, convex or concave. We speak, furthermore, about single temporal lenghts, minute, hour, day, week, month. This kind of space and time is the FORMAL locality and temporality, because it appears as some internal and systematical DETERMINATION of phenomena and happenings. We ascribe to stone angularity or oblongness, as we ascribe to it color or weight. This holds also for the "time" of its duration. Formal concept of locality and temporality is the daily concept. Formal locality and temporality would disappear into nothingness, if they would not rest on a substantial locality and temporality.

We say that some phenomenon is "here," "there," "above," "below," that something happens "now," that it happened "before," that it shall happen "later," that something is before us," "behind us," "above us," that "momentarily" lightened, that the thunder "followed." There is the question about an entirely different locality and temporality which is opposed to the formal and is basical and fundamental. This substantial locality and temporality embraces SINGLE local and temporal points here, there, above, below, before, later, which must be given in advance, if phenomena and happenings may get their local and temporal "form." This form is essentially but the consequence of the distribution of those single "here," "there," "now," "before." Without single local and temporal points would be any parallel local and temporal "form" excluded. Important is that external parallel and internal consequential realitivic including points immediately to substantial, therefore, to locality and temporality composed of such local and temporal points. That the stone is in the brook, that the effect follows the cause, means that the stone is 'here,"

the brook "there," that the cause is "before," the effect "later." Substantial locality and temporality is in immediate connection with realitivic including. For this reason is that realitivic character of locality and temporality, which we will detect, the realitivic character of substantial locality and temporality. This character helps to detect the difference between formal and substantial locality and temporality which will sufficiently prove, why I call one kind of the locality and temporality the formal, the other the substantial.

I outline the PSYCHOLOGICAL background of the substantial locality and temporality. Philosophers have been speaking and are speaking about local and temporal SENSATION which show single local and temporal points thus, as sensations of color show single colors, of sound sounds, of warth warmth. This opinion is untenable. Sensation has some degree which corresponds with the STRENGHT of its objective results. We speak about more or less strong sounds, higher or lower temperatures, on color about quality, "tone," and a double strength of its "clearness" and "saturation." Single local and temporal points are certainly given by ideas; we have local and temporal representations, but representations are without any "degree." Primary and most single local and temporal points "here," "there," are without any strength. We can a strength ascribe at the most to formal locality and temporality, we speak about larger or smaller local and temporal "distances." With this formal locality and temporality correspond ideas (e. gr., the idea of an "inch," "yard," of a "minute," "hour"). We have not to confound these ideas with the representing giveness of those single local and temporal points and, therefore, not with our representation of the substantial locality and temporality. This representation has no degree, and the parallel substantial locality and temporality no strength.

With this ungraduable character of local and temporal representations modern research of local and temporal sensations does not agree. Functional study of sensations was made possible by strenghtly quantitive relations between sensation and irritation. But also in the qualitative view we are not better off: Which phenomena should be the "singular" (adequate) irritations of the unknown "local" and "temporal"

bodly senses? I assert that on substantial locality and temporality there is the question about two BY CONTENT empty facts which have the purpose to show something, to where we ascribe them, as external or physical (unspiritual) on the one side and as "empirically actual" on the other. For this reason can we understand that ALL SENSATIONS are by their objective results locally and temporally "distributed," "localized," and that the temporal distribution is the sign for the spirituality (e. gr., the sound I hear, sounds "there," "now,,"—"now" I hear, think, sence). There can be no question about "singular" ("specific") local and temporal senses, with which could correspond local and temporal "sensations." If we would have special local and temporal senses and with them corresponding special local and temporal sensations, these sensations would have to be independent and not systematically tied to—from them—different sensations. The sensation of color is not systematically tied to the sensation of warmth, neither the sensation of warmth to the sensation of light. But local and temporal "sensations" are by principle realized only as the systematical companions of other and real sensations and are, therefore, no SENSATIONS.

The objective results of real sensations are, furthermore, SINGULAR QUALITIES which form distributed by transition special transitions (continues). The fundamental sign of such transitions is in the qualitative firmness of their single members, and for this reason I call these continues singular or qualitative. For example. The cross-section of the "transitional body" of all colors is the color grey, but both tops of each of its axis are one after the other the colors white and black, red and yellow, then green and blue. All these single points are stable, firm and this stability follows from the internal nature of each of them and not from the relation to other points of the color. Essentially different is the situation on the substantial locality and temporality. Pertinent local and temporal continues are build up on single local and temporal points, but these continues are not singularly qualitative, but only relative continues. The point "here" does not differ from the point "there," and may there be the question about such points on equal or different local directions; the exchange of the point "here" with the point "there" and vice versa would not bring

any change in the entire continue. Thus does the point "now" not differ from the point "before," neither from the point "later;" moreover, in the temporal continue passes the point "later" necessarily to the point "now" and into it, but the point "now" to the point "before" and into it, as we may take it. ("To-day" has been yesterday "to-morrow" and will be "to-morrow," "yester-day," "to-morrow" will be to-morrow "to-day" and after-to-morrow "yester-day" etc.). Local and temporal points are, therefore, not singular, but merely relative qualities, which do not form the pertinent continues by their own natures, but by intermediate "distances" and "directive" relations. We are, therefore, still before the essential difference between real sensations and the hitherto belonging primary local and temporal representations: Sensations show singular qualities which form like singular continues: The local and temporal representations show relative qualities which correspond with relative local and temporal continues.

This difference points to a side of the substantial locality and temporality which separates it from all objectively substantial products of the universe and brings it near to the reality. Substantial locality and temporality is not a REAL DETERMINATION of phenomena, to which we ascribe it. An angular stone differs from a round one, but we do not get any difference between them, if we do and only change their places. The angular stone may be "here" or "there," it remains equal to itself, as long as on it has not been performed a different, but only a such substantially spacious change. Thus differs a long-termed happening from a momentary happening, but this difference between both happenings would remain entirely equal also then, if we would imagine both happenings only substantially temporally differently distributed. The lightning of to-day would be entirely equal to the lightning of yester-day, if both would differ only by this substantially temporal distribution. Thus we discovered this difference between formal and substantial locality and temporality: Formal locality and temporality belong to real, such determinations which we need, if we should distinguish phenomena by their own nature from each other; but substantial locality and temporality is for this purpose of no avail. And with regard to our psychological question, if our primary representations of local-

ity and temporality belong to so called sensations, we can determine the above given difference as follows: Sensations offer determinations which we indespensably need, if we should get an insight in the real or at least apparent, BUT OWN AND SINGULAR nature of pertinent phenomena. Local and temporal representations offer results, which do not give to and do not abstract anything from pertinent phenomena themselves and only relatively distribute them. This fact shows the shortest way to the relativic character of substantial locality and tempoarlity.

Reality is a systematically connected fact which vanishes into nothingness if we abstract it from this, to where we ascribe it. The same is true also for substantial locality and temporality. They vanish into nothingness, if we abstract from them anything that appears to us as spacious and temporal. Reality is without the real thing a nothingness, locality and temporality without local and temporal things a nothingness, too. What should remain from points "here," "there," "now," "later," if we abstract anything, about which we say that it is "here," "there," that it happens "now," or shall happen "later?" Deny all locally distributed things and temporally distributed happenings and locality and temporality disappear. I mention that this is not true for other appearances which serve as determinations of phenomena, to where we ascribe them. We can, at will, represent to us colors, sounds, warmth, and manifold local and temporal "forms" ("geometrical" bodies, temporal "premisses"), although we have abstracted from them anything that appears to us as colored, sounding, warm, outfitted with this or that local and temporal form. These determinations are not systematically connected, but are realities which preserve their nature without regard to the nature of this that is by them determinated. Not so with reality neither with locality and temporality. Herewith is refuted the old opinion that there is on space and time the question about independent facts which we could figuratively compare with two "vessels," in which anything is and everything happens. This comparation has been rejected by Franz Brentano, who remarked that in such a case we could call—married life a "vessel," because we say that people enter "in" married state.

We must ask as on reality, if locality and temporality get

their own nature then, when we consider them in connection with local and temporal things. They disappear, as reality disappeared. Local and temporal things do not add to locality and temporality the character of an own fact. I ascertained that they are not determinations, do not add and do not abstract. The stone does not undergo any change, if we put it from one place to another, we can not distinguish between happening and happening, if one happened earlier and the other later. Abstract from phenomena of the world and life all real differences and all their formal locality and temporality and retain in them their substantially spacious and temporal distribution—and any distinction between them becomes impossible: All phenomena of the world and life would shrink IN ONLY ONE APPEARANCE and all numerical and substantial differences between them would momentarily disappear. Thus I can on the point of substantial locality and temporality speak about a principle, which I expressed with regard to reality as follows: We can not imagine two or more phenomena which would be to each other entirely alike and remain from each other only realitively different; merely realitivic diffeernces (reality—nonreality) are in advance excluded. This is true also for the differences which would be given only with substantial locality and temporality of phenomena: We can not imagine two or more phenomena or happenings which would be to each other entirely alike, but would remain substantially locally and substantially temporally different. MERELY SUBSTANTIALLY SPACIOUS AND MERELY SUBSTANTIALLY TEMPORAL DIFFERENCES ARE IMPOSSIBLE.

These new principles need some explanation. With regard to locality philosophers of former centuries adhered to the principle that phenomena which may be substantially locally equally determinated, are impossible. It seems that the trend of some scientific circles of to-day is to assert the same with regard to temporality and, therefore, to state the principle that happenings which would be different, but substantially temporally equally distributed, are impossible. This is the "principle" of impossibility of cotemporal happenings. For my part I declare that my above given principles have nothing to do with these old and new principles. By no means do I assert that in one place could not be more phenomena, neither do I

pretend that in the same moment could not be more happenings. To the contrary. In such regards seems to me the substantial locality and temporality very similar to real determinations of the world and life: Like more phenomena may have the same color, weight, local and temporal form, as may be more phenomena at one and the same place, so may happen more happenings at one and the same moment. What I do deny, is something essentially different, namely, the possibility that phenomena would be entirely alike and different from each other only by their local places, or that happenings would be entirely alike and different from each other only by their temporal places. This possibility and but this possibility I deny and not any other. I do not deny the possibility of DIFFERENT, but substantially locally or substantially temporally LIKE distributed phenomena and happenings, but I do deny the opposite possibility of LIKE, but only substantially locally or substantially temporally DIFFERENTLY distributed phenomena and happenings. This speciality shows clearly that substantial locality and temporality is not a "determination," because the essence of determination is in the limiting phenomena and there is no difference between them which would not be a determinating difference.

Substantial locality and temporality has with reality two things in common: As reality, alike vanishes locality and temporality into nothingness, as soon as we consider it itself and without connection with this, to where we ascribe it; and as reality, alike vanishes locality and temporality also then, when we consider it as a determination and in a systematical connection with this, to where we ascribe it. Is it not herewith said that substantial locality and temporality are only an affix, a branch of reality? This becomes more doubtless, if we take in mind that in the essence of reality is based the realitivic including and that by substantial locality and temporality is given the horizontal basis of this including. This basis is in the external parallel and internal consequential realitivic including. Someone may remark that this including helps to find the own essencetiality of substantial locality and temporality in the horizontal system of realities. According to this, that we said above, we do not arrive to such an essentiality, as long as we consider the substantial locality and temporality without con-

nection with this, to where it leads, but neither then, when we interprete it as a determination and in connection with this, to where it leads. But this locality and temporality gets its own essentiality when we consider it merely MEDIATLY, namely, from the RELATION of a real thing to a real thing. The essence of locality would be, accordingly, in the local relation, say, of the stone to its environment, the real essence of temporality in the temporal relation of the effect to the cause, therefore, in a "relation" or "reference," as there is the essence of difference and similarity in relation, reference. But Meinong emphasized correctly that any relation, any reference is necessarily built up on facts which are not relative or referable. This is Meinong's principle of the "lowest facts" (Princip der Infima). The difference between the colors white and black is ubilt up on the unrelative essence of the colors white and black, the relationship on the like unrelative and own essence of relatives etc. Merely relative substantial locality and temporality is built up on—unrelative and own substantial locality and temporality, as it appears then, when we consider it itself or in connection with this, to where we immediately ascribe it.

In the mere psychological aspect we can speak about such a unrelative and own substantial locality and temporality. The meaning of the expression "here" is not only in the relation to "there" and the meaning of the expression "there" is not only in the relation to "here." We have cases when something appears to us as "here" or "there" without any necessity to think in the first case about any "there," in the second about any "here." Such examples are frequent in darkness. Similarly is also the expression "now" not only in the relation to "before" or "later" and vice versa. The "remembrance" represents to us the past in the most cases entirely immediately without any relation to the momentary present and we expect the future in the most cases like immediately. The point "now" is in the most cases given ("now" we are, we are alive etc.), without any regard to any "before" or "later." There is, therefore, no doubt that we can speak about the psychological giveness of unrelated and in this sense ABSOLUTE substantial locality and temporality. Is this, only psychologically given absolute substantial locality temporality a sufficient fundamental for that ACTUAL locality and temporality, which appears in the exter-

nal parallel and internal consequential including of realities? Ostensibly not. Because now return again all those questions, which I had to put at that time on the point of substantial locality and temporality. There are two questions: The question of the "own essentiality" of the substantial locality and temporality, and the question of its like "substantial" and not merely psychological giveness. Is the own essentiality of space and time really given by its merely psychological giveness? Have we a right to speak about the psychological giveness of space and time?

We tried to give back to reality the own assentiality thus, that we first equalized it with our-realitivic representation and searched for the essence of reality in its psychological giveness. We found out that this conception is wrong, because reality is not a consequence of realitivic seeming, but makes such a seeming possible and justifiable. We can word for word repeat anything said above also about space and time and of their relation to the local and temporal representation. The essence of locality and temporality does not consist in its merely psychological giveness. There is here and there the question only about reality, there about reality itself, but here about reality as a member of the external parallel and internal consequential realitivic including. As we distinguished on the point of reality ITSELF between its SUBSTANTIAL and MERELY PSYCHOLOGICAL giveness and said that the second is built up on the first and not vice versa, thus we have on the point of the INCLUDINGLY and MEMBERLY conceived reality to distinguish between its substantial and merely psychological giveness and have to say again that the second is built up on the first and not vice versa. Merely psychological giveness of an ever so unrelated and absolute locality and temporality does not help to come to the unrelated and absolute fundamentals—to the substantial related locality and temrality. Locality and temporality is not any local and temporal conception. Any theory of space and time rested upon such an equalization is in advance wrong. This exit would be possible in that we might the single local and temporal points ("here," "there," "now," "before") not equalize with that our primal representation which only shows them so or differently, but that we regard them as our and own essentialities as they

really actually appear to us at least in the most examples. But neither this exit leads to the desired goal.

We must repeat that single local and temporal points disappear into nothingness, when we consider them themselves, but also when we take them as determinations of all that, to where we ascribe them. What remains from the point "here" ITSELF, if we detract it from the stone, of which we say that it is "here,", or from the point "now" ITSELF, if we detract it from the noise which we hear "now?" A mere nothingness. We know, furthermore, that the point "here" is not a determination of that stone, and the point "now" not of that noise. We may consider the locality and temporality from the view of its merely psychological giveness or take it as a fact which makes such a giveness possible and justifiable, we arrive only to one consequence: As long as we consider the locality and temporality merely HORIZONTALLY, thus, as we have to consider anything that appears as a local and temporal thing, so long we do not find on the locality and temporality an own essentiality, so long IS AND REMAINS THE SUBSTANTIAL LOCALITY AND TEMPORALITY BY CONTENT AN EMPTY AND VOID FACT. Thus is proven the relation of substantial locality and temporality to reality which is in the defined extent directly the relation of an equalization. We said about the reality that it remains considered merely horizontally, by content an empty and void fact and that it affords, therefore, a "vertical" including of the own essentiality. Now we see that also substantial locality and temporality remains, as long as we consider it merely horizontally, like by content an empty and void fact; also substantial locality and temporality affords, therefore, a LIKE SPECIAL, namely, VERTICAL INCLUDING OF THE OWN ESSENTIALITY. As far as substantial locality reaches, so far holds the equation: Substantial locality and temorality is reality and vice versa. Let us more strictly dismember this equation.

On any reality we have to distinguish three directions of its systematical essentiality. The first is the direction, to where we ascribe the reality. This is the direction of the stone, mountain, rain, life, briefly, the direction of experimentally given phenomena and happenings. I call it the DIRECTION BY CONTENT of the reality. We arrive to the second direc-

tion from the fact of realitivic including. This is the direction which connects reality with reality and thus all realitivic including. This direction I call the including direction of the reality. DIRECTION BY CONTENT and INCLUDING direction are HORIZONTAL directions. There remains the third, the VERTICAL DIRECTION of the reality which has two branches. The first branch is in that vertical including which gives to the reality the own essentiality, without regard to the relation to other realities and, therefore, already only in the relation of this, to where itself leads. This vertical direction corresponds with the horizontal direction by content of the reality and is the immediate consequence of that divine "original act," without which would the reality mean nothing. The second branch of the vertical direction of the reality is the vertical including which is afforded by the substantial locality and temporality and on this locality and temporality built up external parallel and internal consequential realitivic including which is the necessary basical fundamental of the horizontal realitivic including in general. This vertical direction corresponds with the including horizontal direction and is the imemediate consequence of the divine "original act," without which would be all ACTUAL AND SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTIONS between reality and reality in advance impossible.

The outlined including system of realities makes possible a definition of this double divine original actness just on the pointing horizontal realitivic including. This including is twofold: The first is given with our "perception," the second with our "will," the first is external, the second internal, but both are a dependent including. We requested, therefore, by principle such a "perception" which would be the singular example of independent and internal pointing including, and such a will which would be the singular example of independent and internal realitivic including. We have succeeded in arriving at a divine perception and at a divine will. Everyone can see that the mentioned FIRST branch of the vertical direction of the reality is the branch of divine perception, the SECOND the branch of divine will.*)

*) The first branch leads as "perception" to REALITY, the second as "will" to real thing.

7. Reality proves the primereality of God.

In these modern times is a theoretical discussion about divine existence regarded as outlived and absolete. Kant's opinion is repeated that the real sphere of reasoning is only the experimentally given universe and any move of the reason beyond this universe is in advance forbidden in spite of the most instinctive necessity and consistence. With regard to our discussions would this objection strike the distinction between the "horizontal" and "vertical" sphere of realities: The deductions might be right or wrong, on the point, where they afford a breaking off from all horizontal giveness of reality and the transition to an all experimentally given world and life by principle surpassing vertical giveness, on this very point they rebuff anything that rightly is and can be expected from reasoning. The reader may have been troubled by such a thought and it seems to me the more necessary to discuss it and to prove my first way to God from this point.

I may, first, mention that Kant did not allege neither a shadow of a proof for his contrary assertion. His standpoint of view rests on his conception of reason. We shall discover the indisputed point of the conception of reason in the coming chapter, when we discuss the difference between "reality and—valuation." The real sphere of the reason in the stricter sense of the word are not realities, but valuations. On any valuation there are two necessary directions: The direction of this that values, and the direction of this THAT anything values for. The first direction is given with THE CONTENT, the second with THE TERRITORY. Let us take the example of the "valuation" of the fact: 2x2=4. This fact values by itself and forms, therefore, the "content" of the valuation. But this fact loses any own meaning, as soon as we take it itself and take it from all this THAT it values FOR and that we regard it for, when we say, e. gr., that two times two NUTS, STONES, HILLS are four NUTS, STONES, HILLS. Nut, stone, hill is in our instance this THAT the fact values FOR, therefore, the "territory" of its valuation. Expressively I must emphasize that there is no valuation without a territory, and that the FINAL territory of all valuations which are to our reason accessible is THE EXPERIMENTALLY GIVEN UNIVERSE. Thus we return to

Kant's interpretation, but only in such a form, as can be scientifically proven and was doubtlessly known to ST. AUGUSTINE. The illustrated conception of valuation and parallel reason does not justify Kant's and the modern standpoint of view, it means, that there is not allowed any discussion by reason about things which are outside of this that is merely experimentally given. Against this standpoint of view I allege some reasons.

First, any valuation is together with its content ALREADY ITSELF outside of all merely experimentally given world and life. The way leading to valuation is essentially different from the way which acquaints us with realities. The way to valuations is the way "a priory," or the "mathematical" way. The essence of this way is the rational "contemplation," given in general by "logical" thinking. To realities leads the way "a posteriori," or the "natural" way. The essence of this way is mere experience which condenses in the given instance and may be condensed in the form of so called scientifical "experiment." The transition from reality to valuation is thus the real and essential transition beyond all that is given merely by experience. It must be clear to anyone that without this transition would be all understanding and perception of the experimentally given world and life excluded. Lo, where would natural science have remained, if it would apply only sensitive knowlege and parallel blind experimentation, but would not care for the results of such sciences, which in their working are not bound to any merely sensitive perception and experimentation? Lo, if physics had not been for a long time strictly united with mathematics! It is true that only by experience we touch realities; but when we may these realities in the stricter sense of the word—perceive and understand their LEGALITY, then we have necessarily to ascend to the sphere of pertinent valuation and, therefore, most essentialy tranpass the boundary of real things. Let us take the example of the valuable fact 2x2=4. Only experience does acquaint us with the reality of nuts, stones and hills. But the fact that two times two nuts are four nuts, is not more the task of some experience and of some SPECIAL reality, but this is the task of our stricter REASONING on the one side and of the valuation on the other. It is more than clear that without such a reasoning,

without such and like valuations we would remain in the grades of lowest animals, to which is not given any real perception, neither the perception of the world, where they actually live. Thus is my first defence against Kant given by the fact that a distinctly essential transition beyond all experience is necessarily needed for the real perception and understanding of the experimentally given world and life.

The real world and real life is the world and life, which is experimentally given or is at least merely experimentally given. Valuations are unexperimental, such givenesses which we ascertain with mere "reasoning" or at least with mere reasoning. I readily agree with Kant that valuations are finally the valuation FOR the entire experimentally given real universe. Our reasoning is finally built up on our experience. This means that only that transition from reality to valuation is right and undisputable which begins with reality and ascends on this fundamental to valuation. Reasoning, which would begin with mere valuation and would try to deduct by mere valuation all this that is or may be in the stricter sence of the word real, is erroneus. Therefore, is fundamentally mistaken that old and modern "apriorism," which does not care for experience and tries with mere rational means to fix the essence of the actual world and life. Anybody sees that my discussions have not the character of such an apriorism. I start with reality and not with valuation. The entire present chapter is dealing with reality and on this chapter shall be built up the following chapter about valuation. My first way to God, is, therefore, in truth REALITIVIC. I start with experience and ascend on the fundamental of rational discussion of this experience to the demand of a special, divine entity, which is outside of this experience, but alone effects that this experience gets its valuable content and retreats thus from mere nothingness. I turned the attention of the reader to reality and explained how the reality forms the neecssary and systematical member of the experience. Then I dealt on the reality with the question that the reality would be an empty nothingness, if we should not mind a special divine original action. Then I touched the legal relation of reality to reality and ascertained that this relation would be without that divine original action in advance impossible and by content empty. My way to God

does, therefore, not mean any violence in the reality and real things. To the contrary, it fits reality and real things in such a natural way that without this way reality and real things cease to be what they are, namely, the necessary actual and VALUABLE BASIS of all this, that still may be "something" and not a mere nothingness. Thus is my second defence against Kant given with the fact that my way to God is not in any conflict with the known and acknowledged demand that any of our rational and aprioric discussion should finally be realitively based and experimentally proven.

I said that we have in any valuation to distinguish two directions, its content and its territory. The experimentally given, real universe is the territory of the valuation. I must add that the relation of the content of some valuation to its territory might be different, immediate or merely mediate. This shall in the next chapter appear clearer in detail, but for the present I start with the example of the "valuable" difference between the colors white and black. This difference is true and is immediately based upon the colors white and black. Let us notice the difference between — this difference (between the colors white and black) and between the like "valuable" fact: 2x2=4. This difference "values" and has its immediate territory. This immediate territory is in the— difference (between the colors white and black) on the one side, and the fact: 2x2=4 on the other. The immediate territory of this difference (between "difference" and "fact") is, therefore, in facts, which themselves belong to valuation and ot the contents of valuations. THESE VALUATIONS have necessarily their territories. These territories are in the example the colors white and black on the one side and, say, nuts or stones (of which values they are, twice multiplied, four) on the other. Thus has the difference (between "difference" and "fact") two territories, one immediate and one mediate, and anyone can see that all the experimentally given, real universe is the necessary immediate OR AT LEAST MEDIATE TERRITORY of the valuation. This mediateness might be larger or smaller. With this important fact is given my third defence against Kant. Kant may still object that the conception of the divine entity is too far away from anything real in the stricter sense

of the word and that I can not appeal to the transition from reality to valuation which is, in the rest, permissible and even most necessary. I ask: Why should this transition which is everywhere permissible and necessary, be not permissible and impossible only on the point of God? As the difference between the colors white and black values, alike values my demand for the special divine entity; and that difference is deducted from the colors white and black and values in this sense "for" these colors, alike is my demand deducted from all reality and all real things and values, therefore, "for" all realities and all real things. The difference consists but in the immediateness or mediateness of the hitherto belonging "territory" and, therefore, in relations which we encounter anywhere, where we pass from real things to valuable things, from merely experimentally given things to rationally acquired things. *)

I refuse any objection by principle, but expect that anyone who may not agree with some of my findings, should point this out and prove it. I must especially repel the objection, that such thoughts belong to so called "metaphysics," therefore, to a discipline long since not more considered and impossible to be considered. I do not enter in discussions about different old and modern metaphysical teachings and express my personal opinion that without such teachings would most modern and most "possitive" scientific efforts lose this, which in essence and finally they stand for. Moreover, I most decisively emphasize that my present discussions do not have the aspect of a secrete "metaphysicality." They tend, indeed, to God, to the highest entity, discussed, I readily admit hitherto only in special "metaphysics." My discussions about these highest questions are positive, open, and anyone can follow them, if he has any sense of scientific working. These my discussions are metaphysical at best by their content, but by no means by their form. A genuine science does not differ from a false one by content, but by form, and everyone will agree in this point, if he is convinced with me that there is not and can not be any sphere, which science could not or even should not specially

*) I turn the attention to the discussions in the last chapter, where there is the necessity and the nature of this "transition" from the experimentally given world to God in all detail essence—viewingly explained and dismembered.

deal with. If I am for my part approaching even the highest, divine entity, then I have actually ascertained the UNIVERSAL character of real science, which is in regard to the content unlimited. It does not matter, what someone is SCIENTIFICALLY dealing with, but it matters, if he is really SCIENTIFICALLY dealing with something. Nobody can deny that my discussions have not this character, and this not only with regard to the question, if they may in the rest and in detail appear to him thoroughly founded or not. Herewith is given my last and perhaps, by principle most important defence against Kant's assertion that science may deal with anything, but by no means with God. From such an assertion exhales the spirit of that known tale of a girl, who was allowed to see all the rooms of the castle, but only one room she may not look in, although she had the necessary key to this room, too. Science would be very poorly appreciated and understood, if we would put such restrictions on it.

In this connection I may touch still a recognized and substantial objection, aroused, my be, also in the mind of the reader and expressed perhaps as follows: My way to God is intended to be realitivic and will deduct from reality the entity of divine essence. This can not be done, because the divine entity must, if it should be of any avail, in the first place itself be real. I tried to point out, how would the reality be without the access of the divine entity by content an empty fact; but for the reason that only the real entity could assist us here, we did not gain anything with the mere access to the divine entity: Reality, by content an empty fact, became proven again by reality, by content an empty fact. This objection does not prove anything. A misunderstanding in the expression, nothing else. There is on my part not the question about an imagined, but an actual an real entity of God. This DIVINE reality is something entirely different from the reality of all experimentally given world and life. The mentioned objection seems to be so powerful only, because the same expression ("reality") is used for two essentially different facts, for the reality of the empirically given world and life and for the—reality of God. Full clearness in this regard will bring the following chapters, where we shall become acquainted more in detail with the internal nature of the reality and its legal relation to "valuation,"

"value" and "essentiality." I may, therefore, in the following only briefly clear up, how and why the reality is as we could already ascertain it the necessary and systematical member of all our "experience," really built up on a special, but ENTIRELY DIFFERENT "reality," which I call the PRIME-REALITY OF GOD.

We know that the reality is twofold: The reality in the stricter sense of the word and the nonreality (real Mt. Elias and unreal "Fountain of Youth"). "Nonreality" is a like systematical member of our experience as reality; the experience and only the experience tells us immediately both, if something really exists or does not exist: As we ascertain experimentally that it rains momentary, that before us there is a high building, alike we ascertain experimentally that there is momentary no fair weather, that there are no green trees before us. I have expressively to add that such negative assertion are not conclusions or at least have not to be conclusions; at least finally must be entirely immediate even both ascertainments, the ascertainment of reality as also of nonreality. There is in this connection an important and interesting psychological fact that the ascertainment of a real thing is evolutionarily earlier, of an unreal later: The child ascertains first this that really exists, later that does not exist. With reality in the stricter sense of the word and with nonreality corresponds in the psychological regard the twofoldness of "agreeing" and "disagreeing" realitivic assertions. The fact that disagreeing realitivic assertions are evolutionarily built up on agreeing is a psychological reflex of the OBJECTIVE fact that any nonreality is built up on the—reality in the stricter sense of the word. This fact is proven by the known principle that but negative assertions do not permit any conclusions (e negativis nihil sequitur). From nonreality itself does not follow anything, only from real things follow real and unreal things. Reality is the basis of nonreality. Reality (in the broader sense of the word) is, therefore, a fact which has two branches, the reality in the stricter sense of the word and the nonreality, whereby leads to the first branch a LEGAL PRIORITY before the second, before nonreality.

The facts which are on the reality in the broader sense of the word twofold I call POLAR. Other examples for such a twofoldness would be: "valuable" and "unvaluable," "agree-

able" and "disagreeable," "beautiful" and ugly." Reality is not uniform, because it is primarily built up on the reality in the stricter sense of the word, on the "positive" member of the pertinent twofoldness. I call such twofoldnesses UNEQUAL (unsymetrical) or BENT twofoldnesses. We will arrive in the following chapters to a most important legality, which touches immediately such bent twofold facts. I express it briefly as follows: If we speak about bently twofold facts, then me MUST speak also about a singular fact which is UNIFORM and, therefore, outside of any contrast, but has, if we consider it from the VIEW OF BENT TWOFOLDNESS, the place of the "first," "positive" member. For this legality I allege but one instance from the fourth chapter. This is the instance of value. Value is divided in "value" in the stricter sense of the word and "non-value," the second built up on "value." For this reason is any value built up on the singular value, which is outside of any contrast, but has, considered from the view of all twofold values, the place of the "first," "positive" value and this is the value of—holiness. The point of bently twofold reality is the same. This reality affords by the same reasons a singular "reality," which is like outside of any contrast, but has, considered from the view of (twofold) reality and nonreality, the place of—reality. This is the PRIMEREALITY, DIVINE reality. Herewith is refused the objection that I am moving in an unpermissible circle, as I deduct God from reality, but forget that the question about reality is on the point of God the first and main question. I assert most decisively that my way to God does not mean any deduction of "reality" from "reality," therefore, the same from the same, but it means the deduction of PRIMEREALITY, it means, of the UNIFORM and SINGULAR reality from the experimentally given, therefore, TWOFOLD and multifold reality.

I turn attention to the difference between the experimentally given and twofold reality and the singular and uniform primereality. This difference touches the relation of reality to real thing. We shall not confound reality with real thing. Anything that is real, is ONLY EXTERNALLY REAL, it means it may be BY ITS OWN NATURE both, real or unreal. The mere objective content of Mt. Elias does not exclude its nonreality and the mere objective content of Fountain of Youth its non-

reality. I assert that on this merely external connection between reality and real thing is built up the outlined bently twofold character of the reality, which means that the reality in the broader sense of the word is divided into "reality" in the stricter sense of the word and into "nonreality." On the point of the UNIFORM primereality is the relation between primereality and primereal thing assentially different. This relation is not more merely relative and external, byt SYSTEMATICAL and INTERNAL. Primereality is uniform, therefore, by principle outside of any contrast. In primereality is reality as much as real thing and real thing as much as reality. We approach, at least externally, the unconceivable essence of God with these strict equations: Primereality—primereal thing—God. To be God, means, to be by own content, by own nature in the strictest sense of the word real. From a new standpoint of view is proven the age-old principle that God is a "being by itself" (ens a se). The sole real contrast of God would be an entity, of which would have to be true two things: First, it would have to belong to the sphere of real or unreal things and not have the character of a "valuable" or "unvaluable" essentiality. Secondly, it would have to be by its own content, by its own nature—unreal. This is the essentiality of EMPTY NOTHINGNESS. God and—nothingness! God is, who alone realitively EXISTS by his own nature, nothingness is this that alone realitively by its own nature DOES NOT EXIST. "Universe" is the intermediate, between God and nothingness swinging universe which is twofold real, thus that it may be by its own nature both, real and unreal.

I turn attention still to this speciality of my realitivic way to God: This way is entirely independent from questions, which have been in that connection put up by philosophers and are put up, and touch the relation of "limited" to "unlimited," "finite" to "infinite" things. Kant's mentioned opinion that the divine entity is outside of a real scientific consideration, relies upon enormous difficulties which we encounter then, when our minds touch the sphere of unlimitedness or infiniteness. These are Kant's famous "Antinomies of human reason—Antinomien der menschlichen Vernunft." They content amongst other things that our reason necessarily entangles in its own contradictions, as soon as it starts to consider the actual experience from the view of something infinitely (arbitrarily) large or small. I

retort: My discussions are entirely independent on any such viewpoint. I start from reality ITSELF and do not ask about the finite or infinite number of such realities. My way to God is not quantitatively relative, but qualitatively systematical. The number of single realties may be finite or infinite, reality is and remains an empty fact, as long as we do not consider it from the view of the divine original action. This is true for my relative way, which rests upon the outlined including system of realities and means that this system is horizontally built up on the external parallel and internal consequential realitivic including, therefore, on the including, which has as basis the substantial "locality" on the one side, and the substantial "temporality" on the other. I do not ask about the finite or infinite character of this locality and temporality, but ascertain that also this locality and temporality is and remains by content an empty fact, as long as we do not consider it from the viewpoint of the same divine original action. History of philosophy relates that where there was a discussion about God, there was a discussion about space and time. History of philosophy relates still this that in any such case has been an official discussion about local and temporal limitedness or unlimitedness. One of the most characteristic sides of my discussions is that they are entirely independent on any such question: External parallel and internal consequential realitivic including is and remains the consequence of the divine original action, and may the series of this including be limited or unlimited, finite or infinite. This is my last defence against Kant, but also against SCHOPPENHAUER, who expressed with regard to causality the opinion that causality is by its own nature forward and backward unlimited or infinite and for this reason does not permit any acknowledgment of God as the "first" cause. My deductions prove that God later as before remains THE FIRST CAUSE, not the first EQUAL beginning of all causal happenings, but that beginning, which gives and returns to causality, to internal consequential realitivic including and only to it, its own speciality by content and may this including be limited or unlimited., finite or infinite. *)

*) I do not doubt the limitedness of the realitivic including, and have this opinion proven with its own new views. Confer my essay about "Representing Production." Razprave Z. D. H. V., Ljubljana, 1928. There I have clearly demonstrated the necessity of the real BEGINNING of the internal consequential (causal) including of realities.

My realitivic way to God is finished. I briefly repeat it. This way includes three parts. In the first part I deal with reality, in the second with legal relations between reality and reality, in the third with the relation of reality to primereality. In the first section I prove that reality is that fact, without which would everything else fall to pieces, into nothingness. I ascertain that reality is by content an empty and null fact or the—systematical consequence of the divine original action. In the second section I prove that all realitivic including is finally built up on locality and temporality. The essence of locality and temporality is but the relative definition of reality. For this reason is locality and temporality by its own essentiality only the immediate consequence of the same divine original action. In the third section I ascertain the bently twofold character of reality. This twofold character affords that we must on the point of the divine original action speak about the uniform reality, about primereality. At the conclusion of the section I ascertained in reality three directions of its systematical essentiality, the direction by content, by including and the vertical direction. The first is the direction of this that is real, the second the direction of the pertinent second and including reality, the third the direction of the divine original action. My realitivic way to God is briefly as follows: Any reality is by its own systematical essence necessarily. 1. the reality OF SOMETHING, e. gr., of the stone, of our life, 2. the reality BY SOMETHING, namely, by some other reality, and 3. the reality BY SOMEONE, BY GOD.

CHAPTER II.

FROM VALUATION TO GOD.

8. Valuation a fact

The valuation is so strictly related to reality that somone would be inclined to give to it the same name. It values that the color red is different from the color white, that wholeness is larger than any part, that 2x2=4, that good is not evil etc. Why is more properly to speak about valuation and not about reality of the difference between the colors red and white? For the present I may mention but the most evident speciality of valuation. We have seen in the former chapter that the entire world and life is parted in halves, in the real world and the real life and in the unreal world and the unreal life. I add that phenomena of the first half may by chance pass into phenomena of the second half and vice versa. Actual warmth (unactual cold) is followed by actual cold (unactual warmth), a cheerful disposition changes with a bitter sadness, good health with sickness. Real phenomena may become unreal and vice versa. Any such transition we call changing. Any changing is necessarily temporal. Anything that may be real or unreal must be temporally defined. There is no need of such an addition on valuation. That the color red differs from the color white, that wholeness is larger than any part values without any regard to time or changing. The same is clear about the superior character of valuation. As the difference values between real Mt. Elias and real Mt. Whitney, so values the difference between real Mt. Elias and unreal Fountain of Youth or also between unreal Fountain of Youth and unreal Ultima Thule. We have examples of superior realities, but any such reality depends on the pertinent minor realities. The reality of Mt. Elias is built up on the realities of all single parts, the nonreality of Ultima Thule on the nonrealities of its parts. The valuation touches real or unreal phenomena, but is on them entirely independent. This fact proves the changinly temporal character of the reality and the unchanginly extemporal character of the valution.

Later on I shall strictly define this difference. Valuation is a special fact not to be confounded with reality. It is twofold: Valuation and nonvaluation, valuable equation—unvaluable equation, it "values" that wholeness is larger than any part, it "does not value" that any part is larger than wholeness. Evident is also the unexpressive meaning of valuation in daily life. What would become of people, if they would disregard innumerable relations which they regard as extemporally valuable? What about a surveyor who would not follow the principles of his surveyorship? What about a merchant who would not care for the actual valuation of arithmetics? We have the valuation to suppose, if we should rationally think, feel or desire. Our life would momentarily cease to exist, as soon as it would endeavor to be a life against reality and against valuation.

SCIENCE is but a systematical and organized research of reality and valuation. Natural science detects realities in the external nature, history historical facts, linguistics realities of the language, psychology psycholigical realities. But mathematics discovers valuations of quantitative relations, logic valuations of right thinking, ethics valuations of good and evil. The given examples show that the system of sciences proves our differenziation that we regard valuation as a special fact and do not confound it with reality. Hitherto belongs the difference between empirical and "aprioric" sciences, therefore, between natural sciences as psychology, history, and between mathematics, logic, ethics. Sciences of the first kind tend realities (facts), sciences of the second valuations (rules, principles). Both may or in a given case even must mingle together. Mathematically based physics and psychologically based logic are the best examples. But also in such cases remains preserved the equal difference between the empirical and nonempirical part that science in its empirical part searches after realities, in its nonempirical part after valuations, and that way is essentially different then, when it leads to reality, and different then, when it leads to valuation (obsevation, calculation). Valuation steps prominently out, because any discovery of mere realities becomes "scientific" at all then, when it tries to understand ascertained realities from the view of pertinent valuations. Physics attained the hight of science, when it began

mathematically to understand mere natural facts. Hitherto belongs the difference between a mere aggregating of some "material" and the later scientific "revision" of this material. The first is in the most cases but an immediate ascertaining of realities, the second the parallel detecting of valuations. The transition from material to the valuable revision of this material is the transition from preliminary to scientific research.

There is no doubt of a special meaning of valuation for science and scientific research. The assential task of science is to discover realities and valuations. If you deny reality and valuation, you deny science. Reality and valuation help to understand that for the system of all sciences important doubleness of empirical and nonempirical sciences. Empirical sciences tend realities, nonempirical valuations. With the first we approach more and more nonempirical sciences. This is evident in our days in the modern and nearly general effort to "mathematizise" all "experiments." In the face of such a meaning of the valuation for the life in general and for science in special becomes the more important OUR fundamental question: Has valuation not a still deeper relation to our conception of God? If this relation should appear true, then can anyone on the fundamental of this that was already said about valuation, judge the value of the opinion which pretends that he, who admits God, does not understand life and does not esteem science.

That there is in valuation the question about a SPECIAL fact, proves the special and in the former chapter mentioned difference between valuation and reality, that we have in any valuation to distinguish two facts, the CONTENT and the TERRITORY. Let us take the example of the difference between the colors white and black. Taken as a wholeness it is evidently characterized by three sides: The COLORS white and black, the DIFFERENCE between the colors white and black and the VALUATION of this difference. The color is not the difference. Colors can be represented to us at our pleasure and we have not to think also about the difference. The difference between the colors may, furthermore, be equal to the difference between sounds. He, who would try to confound the difference between the colors with these colors, would have to confound also the colors with sounds, evidently an impossible task. The valuation of the difference is not the difference. We can

think also about an nonvaluable difference. This would be the difference between Washington, D. C., and "Capital of U.S.A." We have besides valuable differences like valuable relations which are not "differences." Hitherto belongs the valuation of the fact 2x2=4, the valuation of the principle that wholeness is larger than any part, the valuation of the demand of a moral life. If you confound the valuation of some difference with the difference, then you would have also to confound the difference with the relations which are not differences. Most important is that we must everywhere, where we speak about valuation, find such a trinity, as it is given in the example with the trinity of the colors (white and black), with the difference (between both colors) and with the valuation (of this difference). The relation between the single members of this trinity is entirely legal and can be expressed as follows: The difference between the colors white and black is that fact in our trinity which values, but the colors white and black that WHICH the difference values FOR. The valuation has its CONTENT in the difference (between the colors white and black), but in the collors its TERRITORY. The difference is the content, the colors the territory of the valuation.

There is no valuation without such a valuable content and without such a valuable territory. The valuable fact 2x2=4 looks only as an example of valuation which would have its content (this is the mentioned fact itself), but would be without a territory. This fact loses any meaning and disappears into nothingness, as soon as we would take it substantially only thus, as we pronouced it and would not think about phenomena, which this fact values for (e. gr., 2 dollars X 2=4 dollars). You can see this at the best in the instruction in the normal school, where the teacher tries to obtain that the numerals may for the children not remain only empty words. The purpose of the adding-mechanism and of other alike expedients is that they turn the attention of the child to the actual territories of the pertinent numeral valuations. But to the adult disappears any numerality into nothingness, as soon as he would abstract anything, to where this numerality leads, and what he "counts" so many times or may "count." In such cases, when we pronounce but "mere" numerical facts, there is the question only about verbal "abbreviations," but we have in mind

also that which these facts value for, unless the question is, say, only about an external technic in the counting and reckoning expression. It is, therefore, evident that the valuation of such facts has still a territory which values, AT LEAST BY PRINCIPLE, or this valuation becomes the valuation of an empty nothingness. This speciality of any valuation separates sharply the valuation from THE REALITY. The reality has its content, it means, that it is the reality of something or somebody, but it is by principle without any territory. Real Mt. Elias is not also real for something alike, as it is, e. gr., the valuable difference between the colors white and black valuable for these colors. Mt. Elias has its content, but is without territory. The difference between reality and valuation is, therefore, as follows: Any reality has its content, but any valuation has its content and its territory.

I turn the attention to the PSYCHOLOGICAL difference between reality and valuation. As I could say that phenomena "appear" to us now as real, then as unreal and that we have to speak still about a viewpoint of reality and nonreality, so we have to speak about a STANDPOINT of "valuation" and "nonvaluation." The different relations appear to us as valuable, then as unvaluable or without a such point of view. Most important is the further question, how to define the essence of the difference between the representation which gives to phenomena the view of valuation, and between the representation which does not have such a view or shows phenomena even in the light of nonvaluation. There obtrudes upon us the important fact that this difference does not, at least by principle, touch the question, WHAT have we represented to us in the first instance and WHAT in the second. The difference between the colors white and black does not differ from different other relations or from the colors or from the stone or from Fountain of Youth by its valuation, but by "qualities" which it possesses as a relation (difference!) and this without regard to the question, if it values or does not value. We have represented to us something different, when we think about a difference, and again something different, when we think about an equality, only DIFFERENTLY we have represented to us either the difference or the equality then, when it sems to us to value, and again differently then, when we deny to it this valuation. Valuation and non-

valuation is in the psychological regard adapted to the FORMAL side of our representation and not to the substantial side. Reality and valuation have in common that the psychological essence of both is given by the question, how we have represented to us now this, then that, and that for the determination of the psychological essence is at all in the second place important the parallel question, what we have represented to us from the viewpoint of reality and what from the viewpoint of valuation. This commoness between reality and valuation assists us to arrive promptly to the decesive PSYCHOLOGICAL difference between them. This difference is the difference in the manner of the representation which is necessary to show something as real and unreal, and in the manner which show something as valuable and unvaluable.

This difference is in the PASSIVENESS of the realitivic and in the ACTIVENESS of the valuable representation. When we see a rock "with open eyes" or touch it "with own hands," we have represented to us the rock by reality (realitively). But such a representation has this character that it makes us in the psychological regard entirely dependent on this that is represented to us. As long as we only see the rock, so long we do not know, why it is real, how it happened to be real. We know that it is real, but this reality is in this situation somehow "forced" upon us from outside. This fact is manifested in a passive state which accompanies any such immediate ascertainment of reality: The rock appears to us as real, but we feel that this appearance is not the consequence of our "own" work and our "own" reasoning.

The situation is entirely different then, when something appears to us in the light of valuation. Any such appearance accompanies in the psychological regard a special character of some "internal necessity" or "reasonableness." When we ascertain the valuation between the colors white and black, we do not only know that this difference values, but we know that it values NECESSARILY and that here is excluded any instance that this difference should cease to exist. Psychologically means this that the valuation does not appear to us as forced upon us, but as something that we arrived at and that we "ourselves" PERCEIVED. The unpsychological meaning of

the perception of the difference between the colors white and black is that this difference values. The psychological essence of this perception is in our active state which we take in the moment of this perception towards the colors white and black (the white color is not the black color!). The valuation has two necessary directions: The direction of this that values, this is the content of the valuation, and the direction of this that it values for, and this is the territory of the valuation. In our example is the difference between the colors white and black the content, the colors white and black the territory of the valuation. I can, therefore, point out this unpsychological characterization of the legal relation of the valuation to its content and territory: The content of the valuation is the binding OBJECT of any valuable perception, the territory the binding territory of that our STATENESS or SELFACTIVENESS which is the psychological essence of any such perception.

Herewith is given the reason, why the realitivic representation is passive, the valuable active. Reality differs from valuation that it has its content, but is by principle without territory. Any immediate ascertainment of realities is a perception which has its "object." This object is given with the content of the reality with this, to where the reality leads, but no such ascertainment has a "territory," to which we have to be active. The ascertainment of valuations has both, its object, this that values, and its territory that which it values for. The activeness is given with the necessity of our "internal lifting" from the territory to the content of the valuation. As long as something is being represented to us realitively, so long we remain in the direction of the representation and of this that is represented to us, but when something is represented to us valuably, then we have to effect still an "internal transition," namely, from the representation of this that itself values for, to the transition of the representation of this that only values.

Now is evident, why reality is in the strictest connection with the aposterioric or empirical perception, but valuation with the aprioric or perception by principle. The empirical perception is "blind," "forced," some called it "brutal," the perception by principle "necessary," "intelligent," some called it "heavenly." Behind all these expressions is the PSYCHO-

LOGICAL difference between the empirical and perception by principle of mere realities and between the perception of real valuations. This difference consists in the characteristic PASSIVENESS of the first and the ACTIVENESS of the second. Herewith is mediately the difference between reality and valuation enlightened and thus anew proven that there is in valuation the question about a special fact. For the valuation as a seemingly own fact hold three reasons: 1. Reality is a changingly temporal fact, valuation an unchanginly extemporal. 2. Reality is a fact only by content, valuation a fact by content and territory. 3. Reality is a psychological passive, valuation an active fact. *)

The task of the following discussions shall be to go deeper to the essence of the valuation and its relation to reality and—primereality.

9. The psychological background of the valuation.

There is a POINT OF VIEW in valuation and a psychological background. We ascertained that the point of view has many things in common with reality. Both appearances consist only in the MANNER of representation. The representation of realities shows its object in the light of reality or nonreality, the representation of valuations in the light of valuation or nonvaluation. Most important is that the representation of valuations is still "justified" or "unjustified," "correct" or "erroneous." We must not confound the question, if something is represented to us with the view of valuation, with the essentially different question, if this that we have represented to us THIS VIEW ACTUALLY has. It happens that we regard something as valuable, but later on it appears that we were mistaken. There are also numerous examples to the contrary, when we deny valuation to principles and later find out that they fully value. Herewith is said both: That we may have

*) It is evident that the reality and valuation ITSELF is neither a passive nor an active and not a PSYCHOLOGICAL fact. Our touching of reality is passive and of valuation active.

represented to us equal facts now in the light of valuation, then in the light of nonvaluation and that the view of valuation and nonvaluation is not established in the side of the representation by content, but in the formal side. This FORMAL side of the representation is by no means a "pointing" or "representing," but a TOUCHING or STRIKING side: We found that reality itself can not be represented to us, but that we only "touch" or "miss" it. So also with valuation. The essence of OUR perception and mistake consists in the touching or missing of some valuation.

I can not disregard an interpretation of valuation which is of an ancient origin and still to-day in vogue. To valuation is immediately adapted only the formal side of our representation which does not show anything to us, but in the best case only "touches" or "strikes" it. There is in valuation the question about a fact which can not be represented to us, neither can we view it. Is valuation a nothingness? We could avoid this defeating consequence with an interpretation of valuation, if we would equalize the essence of the valuation with the formal side of our representation of valuations: Phenomena are valuable or unvaluable, would mean, if we have them represented to us valuably or unvaluably. This is the doctrine of PHENOMENALISM which does not acknowledge any actual truths and regards everything only as a consequence of our "imagination." There would be now the question about phenomenalism "in the sphere of valuations." Phenomenalism does not consider reality as a psychological fact, but the more valuation. This phenomenalism would add to its favor still a difference between the representation. I said that the representation of realities is PASSIVE, of valuations ACTIVE. When something is represented to us in the light of valuation, we are conscious that we ascertained this valuation OURSELVES and that it is the work of OUR OWN REASONING, by no means something forced upon us and blindly "from outside" perceived. Consider, how we ascertain that at the moment rains, and how that wholeness is larger than any part or that 2x2=4. If the ascertainment of valuation is indissolubly connected with our selfgiveness and with the parallel consciousness of our own "work," then is the doctrine credible that valuation is only the

consequence of our representation. This doctrine is erroneous. Against such a phenomenalism speaks the touching working of the representation of valuations. This working is successful or unsuccessful, it touches or misses the valuation. Both possibilities are realized in spite of all activity of the representation. When something appears to us uncorrectly as valuable, we have the consciousness of the same "own" working. Valuation is not given with the representation. As in reality, does not matter majority or minority, neither situation. The doctrine is erroneous and forced. Valuation can not be the consequence of the representation. The fact 2x2=4 does not value, because somebody has represented to him the fact valuably. To the contrary. The fact is represented valuably, because it values. St. Augustine was right, when he as the first in the realm of occidental philosophy ascertained that we only "find" extemporal principles, but do not creat them. Majority, minority, situation does not count. History of civilization relates many single opinions of valuations which have been in spite of their uncorrectness characteristic for centuries. We may think about mathemetical discoveries which concern mostly valuations given but to very few single persons, but directly ideally correct (Dr. Einstein!). On the point of valuation is the evidence stronger than on the point of reality. Valuation is the systematical member of perception and error. We touch the valuation, if we perceive it, and miss it, if we are mistaken. Valuation is independent on our representation, therefore, justified and proven.

There is a special side in valuation, connected with its active character. Two directions are to each other opposed: When it seems to us that something values, then we have the consciousness that we ourselves detected the valuation with our own power, but also that we only "found" and did not create it. The perception that 2x2=4 fills us with a clear consciousness that this perception is the immediate ACT of our own reasoning. We MUST think so and CAN NOT THINK differently.

The representation is active, because we detected the valuation, passive, because we are on this valuation dependent. This passiveness is connected with our refusal of the merely

psychological doctrine of valuation and, therefore, with that correctness or incorrectness which rests ON THE VALUATION of this that is represented to us, and not in the majoric or minoric character of this representation. I called in the first chapter experiences which have the character of a such correctness or incorrectness normative or moral experiences. The passiveness of the representation of valuations which effects that this representation has the character of a real correctness or incorrectness I call its NORMATIVE or MORAL passiveness. The parallel ACTIVENESS is its merely PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVENESS. It is now clear, why the mentioned psychological doctrine refers so readily to this psychological activeness.

Phenomenalism would be correct, if the representation would be psychologically and MORALLY active, but it is only psychologically active and morally passive. We must distinguish between a psychological and a moral passiveness or activeness of the experience. The difference between reality and valuation is that the representation of realities is psychologically and morally passive, the representation of valuations psychologically active and morally passive. In this moral passiveness of both is based the fact that both are "correct," "true" or "erroneous." This difference is connected with the difference between moralness in the BROADER and STRICTER sense of the word. The representation of realities is a moral experience, but only in the broader sense of the word, of valutions moral also in the stricter sense, because it is psychologically active. Hitherto belongs the consciousness that we detect valuations with our own power. This is the consciousness of our RESPONSIBILITY. The representations of realities are right or wrong, but we remain entirely passive. This "right" or "wrong" is us from outside "given" or "forced upon us." The representations of valuations are right or wrong, too, but we are active and this "right" or "wrong" appears to us as something that we ourselves "merited" or "deserved." The representation of valuations is, therefore, the immediate fundamental for perception and error in the strictest sense of the word and also for "truth" which may be counted to "our credit," and for "untruth," for which we are responsible.

This speciality of the representation indicates a conception

of valuation which I examine first on the point of reality, although it is here only mediately justified.

When I was a child, the thought came to me, what would remain, if there would be no one upon earth. Well, there would remain birds and different other animals. But what would remain, if all animals would disappear, if all beings would disappear which "see" or "hear"? Surely, I know meadows, roads and mountains which do not hear or see. Why did I not proceed in my thoughts that in this case the earth would remain with its fields and meadows, mountains and rivers? I did not proceed. I was overcome by a strange fright and it became dark before my eyes. I had the feeling that under my feet gave away and because of my asking everything around me disappeared into nothingness! I did not have a right idea of life and dead nature, nevertheless, my feeling was like the feeling I have to-day. The same feeling might have anyone else, if he tries to abstract in thought from the real world and life all real—life. What would mean reality of natural phenomena, if we abstract from it all beings, to which is the apparition the motive and the object of most different feelings, sensations and desires? I do not assert that the reality of the nature would depend on the question, if someone senses the nature or comprehends it. I refused this theory in the first chapter, where I ascertained that reality is not a mere conseguence of representation. Nevertheless leads to reality of DEAD NATURE the character of some dependence which I express as follows: Reality of dead nature becomes VALUABLE, SIGNIFICANT, THOUGHTFUL with the life upon it, but reality without life would r e m a i n VALUABLY, SIGNIFICANTIVELY and THOUGHTFULLY empty and null. (For men God created the world!) Herewith is expressed, why is the dependence OF THE REALITY ON LIFE and, therefore, on the representation of realities merely EXTERNAL or FORMAL, but not internal or basical. Representation of realities "does not make" realities, but it gives to them a meaning and a value. *)

*) I am discussing this meaning and value in the fourth chapter, where I prove, how evolutionary more independent strata of creation are in the SENSIBLY VALUABLE regard dependent on evolutionary more dependent. Common "delight" gets this its real sense from evolutionary later "love."

The dependence is on the point of valuation directly internal and systematical. Valuation has its content and territory, it means, that any valuation is the valuation of something and for something. Why not also for someone? The territory would be twofold: It would comprise anything that something values for and that, for whom something values. This conception obtrudes upon us, if we consider valuation immediately and compare it with reality. Mt. Elias remains real, if it is to someone represented or not. But valuation is the valuation FOR SOMEONE, namely, for anyone, who has the ability of a reasonable life. Reality becomes because of life valuable, significant, but valuation is ITSELF only "value," "significance" and, therefore, the value, significance OF SOMETHING and FOR SOMEONE. Daily experience shows that many things value for different people differently (quod licet Jovi, non licet bovi). When something values for anyone, there remains in this value the necessary addition that valuation is FOR ANYONE. Without this addition would it slip to the step of a mere reality or disappear into nothingness. Possible are examples for mere "expressions of valuations" of realities. We do not only say that it rains, thundered, but we can confirm this with expressions as: It is true that it rains, thundered, it is true that we desire this and that. It is clear that we do not ascertain with such expressions any "new" reality besides that we touch with the perception of the rain, thunder, desire. In such examples appears valuation as an addition to reality and confirms it. Reality becomes thus for us "confirmed," whilst it would be erroneous to think that reality would FOR ITSELF need or allow any confirmation besides valuation. Valuation appears as a fact which would disappear into nothingness, if we should think away this one, who must conform himself to it, if his actions should be "correct."

Valuation is in systematical connection with the APRIORIC OR PERCEPTION BY PRINCIPLE. Perception is SELFACTIVENESS of the one, who experiences such a perception. It is built up on the psychological activeness of representation, without which valuation would only be an empty word. With the valuation on the sphere of this that we thus perceive, corresponds the selfactiveness on the sphere of perception. This

selfactiveness is OUR own and it is impossible to look FOR IT in something outside of the one, who has it. Valuation is, therefore, on one point attached to the one, to whom it is as a rational being destined. This point affords that we come to valuation by our own activeness. So called valuable (and unvaluable) PRINCIPLES are not something that would be outside of rational beings "realized," and there may be the question about principles of life or of the external nature. There are "nowhere" natural principles, these principles are guidances of the natural viewpointness. Natural perception must be active or have a point of view, or it ceases to be a perception and remains only a sensitive and passive imitation of the natural phenomenon. Any perception has two essential axises. The first comprises this, because of which we perceive something, the second the one, who perceives. The first axis concerns the empirically given MATTER or MATERIAL of our perception, the second OUR OWN WORK which we have to perform on this matter. Valuation is the SINGLE IMMEDIATE OBJECT of perception and on the side of the material the pushed unpsychologival "reflex" of OUR own working which is afforded by perception. There can be no doubt that valuation is not only the valuation of something and for something, but also FOR SOMEONE. This fact follows from four reasons: 1. from the immediate viewpoint of valuation, 2. from the contentive and territorial character which means that valuation as the valuation of something and for something is still the valuation for someone, 3. from the possibility of an expression of facts which are not valuations and 4. from the psychological activeness of the representation of valuations.

This extraordinary speciality does not oppose the ascertained fact that valuation is not a consequence of our viewing, but that any such viewing becomes proven and justified. We have the question, if valuation is the valuation for someone, who must notice it and act accordingly to it, not to confound with the essentially different question, if the one, for whom something values, is THE ONE, WHO MAKES THIS VALUABLE. I deny the second question and affirm the first. Secondly, this speciality is in the strictest connection with the twofold active and passive character of the representation of valuations:

This representation is "psychologically" active, but "morally" passive. Moral passiveness means that valuation is an independent fact and not a mere consequence of representation. Psychological activeness means that any valuation is a valuation for someone, namely, for the one, who has the character of a "rationally active" subject. Third, any valuation has its territory which comprises anything that "something values for." This territory is twofold and essentially different. The first territory is this that something values for, the second the one, FOR WHOM something values.. To separate this second territory verbatim from the first, I call it the necessary DOMAIN of valuation. We have examples, where the domain of some valuation is its territory. These are all valuations which concern by their content human rational beings (it holds that man is a rational being, not an animal, that an Englishman differs from a Frenchman). One and the same person takes a double place, the place of the territory and the place of the domain. I am this THAT something values FOR, and I am the ONE, FOR WHOM this values. The reader may easily understand this, if he considers that this "for" has in the first case an essentially different meaning than in the second. This double territoriness means that valuation is not the mere consequence of the consideration of valuation and a merely psychological conception of valuation is not true, but any valuation is the valuation "for someone" and without the consideration of valuations would the valuation disappear. The first side rests in its TERRITORY, in this that something values for. This territory must be given first, in advance, we do not create it. The second side rests in its domain, in the one, for whom something values, and which can become for him only because of his own activeness the territory of valuation.

We ascertained about the actual and only seemingly psychological background of valuation: The essence of this background is in the formal side of our representative experience which differs from any contentive experience that it does not show or represent to us the valuation, but only touches or does not touch it. In this double possibility is based the fact that the experience of valuations is still justified or unjustified, correct or incorrect. We have represented to us phenom-

ena "correctly," when we touch their valuation, but "incorrectly," when we "miss" it. This speciality of the formal side of our experience is the consequence of the fact that the essence of the valuation is not of a merely psychological character and we have not to look for it in the mere representation of valuations. As the representation of realities, so is the representation of valuations a morally passive experience. The representation of valuations has beside this the character of a psychological activeness and this character effects that this experience is in the stricter sense of the word moral, normative and leads to it the character of a real internal and not only external correctness or incorrectness. Therein is based the special side of valuation, namely, that any valuation is by it own essence a valuation for the one, to whom it is destined as to a rational being.

10. Valuation and valuable things.

From the present discussions is clear that we must distinguish in the valuation more directions of its essence. These directions are the valuation itself, the content, territory, domain and the valuable representations. The following discussions will concern the VALUATION and its CONTENT. This is the relation of the valuation to that which values. In the valuable difference between the colors white and black this relation would be the relation of valuation to difference. We distinguished between reality and real things. Difficulties and questions arrise. We speak about a "valluable" difference, "valuable" equation, "valuable" reality. What may be valuation besides difference, equation, reality? Valuation disappears, if we consider it without regard to this that appears to us valuable. Abstract from valuable difference, valuable equation, valuable reality "difference," "equality," "reality" and it will be impossible to preceive the "valuation." What remains in the "valuation" of the difference between the colors white and black, if you abstract difference? A mere nothingness. This is not true vice versa. We can represent to us valuable phenomena, lest to think about their valuation. The objection that in such examples steps in the place of valuation—nonvaluation is erroneous. On the sphere of phenomena which are not real, but value, our imagination tells us that we may represent to us

such phenomena without regard to their valuation. In imagination we may represent to us relations which actually value and relations which we purposely "imagined." Empirically based, it means, to the actual nature immediately intended, and fictive, it means, only theoretically arranged "mathematical physics" is the best example for this fact. Someone may object that we represent to us valuable relations easier than unvaluable, say, the valuable difference between the colors white and black and the unvaluable equality between them. This objection is not essential, because it does not concern this that values or does not value, but only this that something values or does not value for. The TERRITORIES of the valuation, the colors white and black, begin to dwindle, if we may have represented to us the "equality" between them. This difficulty is, secondly, only a difficulty in larger or smaller "viewness" of representation. How could we approach modern mathematical physics, if could not be represented to us this that values without the viewing giveness of this that anything values for! We do not mind the territories, but the contents. We have for these contents a special imagination for their representation. An immediate perception of the valuation is impossible. We arrive to the first characterization: What values has its own nature which we can perceive, but not so valuation. VALUATION IS A SYSTEMATICALLY DEPENDENT OR CONNECTED FACT.

Of no avail is the valuable thing. Take a valuable equation. Difficulties arise. Consider the equation, the single members, the direction of its internal development, its determination and qualities. Is the valuation of the equation also such a determination, a such quality of the equation? Evidenly not. The essence of the equation is composed of single facts, but not of a special VALUABLE fact. It differs from other relations by qualities, but these are not "valuations." The equation is not the difference, although both value. Impossible is a doubleness of phenomena, one valuable, the other unavaluable. We distinguish between valuable and unvaluable relations, but this difference is internal, not between valuable and unvaluable things.

With this fact is in full accordance the psychological le-

gality that the valuation can not be represented to us, we have to suppose it. When we say that the equation values and the difference does not value, we answer but the question, HOW is represented to us equation and how difference. Psychologically is herewith said that valuation leads to phenomena, but does not characterize them. Valuation as a determination is void. The question becomes darker. Is valuation an independent fact with its own nature? This conception is erroneous, because valuation is a dependent and connected fact. What follows? A such consideration is unsufficient, because it would not accord with the meaning which it has for the world and life. Valuation can not be by content a null fact. To arrive at the essence of the valuation, we have to take a step BEYOND valuation and beyond this, to where we daily ascribe it, BEYOND VAUABLE THING.

We must in the valuation distinguish between "systematical" and "relative" determinations. Valution is not a systematical, but a RELATIVE determination of valuable things. To determine this relation is most important. Hitherto belongs the philosophical inheritance of my teacher, Alex Meinong, who distinguished between "content" and "territory." Meinong speaks about a special relation between content and territory which is the relation of an "internal" or "objective structure." The difference between the colors is an object of a "higher order" which we have not to confound with the colors. The difference is on the colors built up, "founded," the colors are not the difference, but the necessary "objective bases" of the difference. So for all objects of such a higher order. It seems that there is pointed out the direction of that relation which we need to penetrate to the essence of valuation. It would be the relation of content to territory, the relation of this that values to this that something values for. The difference between the colors would mean that the difference between the colors is constructed on the colors, originates from the colors. The territory would be both, the objective structure and this that determinates the question, if this content values or does not value. The "equality" between the colors is "constructed" in these colors, but this structure does not prove the valuation of this equality. The difference between the colors is constructed

on these colors thus that is values, but the equality between the colors thus that it does not value. It seems, therefore, that we arrived at the point which abstracts from valuation the shown character of a contentive null fact. But such a theory would be a gross illusoin.

The outlined Meinong's thoughts miss our main question. These thoughts concern a special side of the valuation which I will discuss later on in detail and which is in a strict connection with the "including" character of reality. We distinguished in the reality two questions: What reality may be and where reality originates from, it means, the "essentialitive" and the "provable" question. In such a manner we must in the point of valuation determine both questions: What it may be and where it originates from. Meinong's thoughts answer only the second question, if the valuation is also "proven," actual. The difference between the colors is true, but the equality is not true. That difference is true IN ACCOUNT of the colors or with other words: The colors prove and afford that the equality between them is not true. This and nothing more tells us Meinong. Later on we will see that such thoughts are essentially only conditionally or partly true. In the present connection there is not the question about such thoughts, namely, how to determine and prove the valuation, but how to classify and to define it. We do not mind the essentialitive, neither the provable question of valuation. Valuation is and remains something that we ascribe to its content and not to its territory. We do not say that the colors are true, but we do say that the difference between them is true. The territory of the valuation is the point which "explains" and "proves" and this only in the most favorable instance the valuation, but this territory is not a mediate nor an immediate "bearer" of the valuation. We have above clearly seen that valuation becomes a nothingness, when we consider it itself or in a systematical connection with this, to where it leads or we ascribe it. This or that may value (going deeper we will see that it does not value). The assertion that with the territory is given the full proof of the valuation would remain in any case a very strange proof, namely, the proof of an—empty nothingness. Valuation is an empty nothingness! Meinong's thoughts may be of avail, but we must ab-

stract from the valuation the shown character of its contentive emptiness and nothingness. Meinong's proof "by territory" does not abstract from it that character.

The transition from content to territory is of no avail, but it is important for a deeper understanding. This will show "valuable including" which concerns the relation of valuable thing to valuable thing and means that valuation may by still twofold: The condition for another valuation and the valuation conditioned by another valuation. We call in the first case the valuation the "reason," in the second the "consequence" and are concerned in the relation of VALUATION TO VALUABLE THINGS. *)

In this relation we have to abandon both, valuation and valuable thing. The transition can not be merely "horizontal," it has to be "vertical," to a fact which is by principle outside of valuation and valuable thing. It seems that the transition is possible at the sphere of the given empirical universe. This would be the transition from valuation to THAT, TO WHOM something appears or seems valuable, therefore, TO THE DOMAIN of the valuation. This is valuable phenomenalism, valuation would be the representation of valuations.

This phenomenalism is erroneous and does not touch the essence of the valuation, but it indicates, in which direction must be effected the "vertical" transition. This direction is of OBJEST AND SUBJECT. The question is about a singular "subject" who gives to the valuation what does not give to it its content, territory nor its domain. All empirically given subjects drop, because they are to the valuation in the relation of a principle DEPENDENCE. These subjects perceive the valuation as far as to them leads the character of rational subjects, but they do not create it. Only man has the power of a representation of valuations. This representation differs from the realitivic representation that it is psychologically active. The discussions of phenomenalism showed that this assentially

*) This relation is directly the basis for any relation of valuation to valuation and of valuable things to valuable things. The example of the considered relation is THE VALUATION of the difference between the colors in the relation of THIS RELATION itself (without regard to its valuation).

human representation is NORMATIVELY OR MORALLY PASSIVE, it "touches" or "misses" the valuation. We have been on the point of reality speaking about some view of human "creation," but it appeared as mere "changing" and "transforming" which can be performed only on the basis of given realities. On the point of valuation can not be any "changing" or "transforming," because the most important difference between valuation and reality is in unchangeable extemporality of the first and changeable temporality of the second. For the reason that reality is in the relation to real thing a temporally changeable fact is effected that view, as man would "create" something. On the point of valuation which is in the relation to valuable thing an unchangeably extemporal fact, drops any changing and transfoming. In full strictness is true here Augustine's sentece that man only "finds," but does not "create." All empirically given subjects are not only to reality, but also to valuation in the relation of a principle dependence.

The vertical transition has its territory in the transition TO SUBJECT. Secondly, this is the transition to a most SPECIAL subject which undisplaceably differs from all emperically given subjects in regard to the relation to valuation. This is THE SINGULAR SUPEREMPIRICAL subject which is to valuation in the relation of a principle independence, and CREATES and does not only change and transform. About this singular subject can we speak only IN THE RELATION to the empirically given subjects, about which both value: Phenomena appear to them as valuable and this appearance is justified or unjustified. On the point of the superempirical subject is this "valuable" appearance by principle outside of justification or unjustification. Valuation is on this point given with valuable appearance. A such singular appearance MAKES the valuation and does not only "touch" or "miss" it. We call our human appearance essentially "rational." How unconceivably deeper is the RATIONALITY of that singular valuable appearance which does not find valuations, but MAKES them! I call the superempirical subject of such an appearance of valuations—GOD.

Valuable phenomenalism tries to identify valuation with appearance. Such a phenomenalism we refused. I must add

that we could do this only in the relation to man and to empirically given subjects, because these subjects, so far as they have the powers of an appearance of valuations, permit the question, if they also "strike" the valuation or "miss" it. This addition ceases on the point of God. For God and only for God is "appeared" valuation "touched" valuation. Old and new phenomenalism has its meaning, but with this important addition that the appearance of valuation, for which this phenomenalism would remain in force, is not an empirical, say, human, but a DIVINE appearance. This is not real "phenomenalism." We speak about divine appearance because of human pattern, whilst that divine act which alone gives to the valuation its content and separates it from nothingness, substantially is not a mere "appearance" or "semblance." I call it THE ORIGINAL ACT OF THE VALUATION. Herewith is refuted the objection that my proof suffers from an evident inconsequence, because I attribute to same phenomenalism which I reject on the point of man the old power and glamour on the point of God. This objection does not hold, because the divine subject differs from the human as much as this differs, who by principle only "gives," from that, who by principle only "accepts." Phenomenalism pretends that anything values that to someone SEEMS to be valuable. I contend that anything is valuable that the divine essence MAKES valuable. God is not the empirically psychological, but THE SUPEREMPIRICALLY ESSENTIAL ORIGIN of the valuation.

The shown relation of the valuation to the divine original act makes understandable still a special side of OUR representation which means that the representation is—correct or incorrect, that it strikes the valuation or misses it. We have to ask again: Wherefrom this jump from the sphere of merely rational relations to the sphere of a special "right" or "wrong," therefore, to a sphere which is nearer to a moral demand than to a simple actualness? Without the access of the divine essence this jump would be from the sphere of mere facts to the sphere of MORAL or NORMATIVE relations impossible, but it gets its deeper proof that we can speak still about a systematical relation of our representation of valuations to the divine, therefore, to the original act of valuations: When

we touch the valuation with our representation, we AGREE with the divine original act, but when we miss the valuation, we CONTRADICT the divine original act. This agreement or contradiction is a sufficient and deepest fundamental for the access of a normative or moral side on our representation of valuations. This side has in such a representation its emphasis, and this in account of its PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVENESS. When we touch the valuation, we ACTUALLY agree with God Himself. When we miss the valuation, we ACTUALLY contradict God Himself. Who does not see also the most important difference between the representation of valuations and the representations of realities? The representation of realities is not only morally, but also psychologically passive. This representation effects, as we have seen, that we agree with the divine original act or contradict this act, but all our agreement or contradiction is PASSIVE, FORCED UPON OUR essence from outside. On the point of the representation of valuations is this agreement or contradiction ACTIVE, made by ourselves.

Thus may the reader more easely understand, how and why is all our consideration of valuations in THE STRICTER SENSE OF THE WORD a normative or moral experience.

11. Valuation and reality.

The question is about stricter connections between valuation and reality which may decide our main question of the superempirical giveness of the divine essence. Any valuation has its territory, the final territories of valuations are real empirically given phenomena. Take the valuable difference between the colors white and black. This difference values unchangeably, extemporally and the valuation of the difference does not depend on the question, if the colors are real or not. He, who follows modern physics and denies any real character to the colors, has to agree that "white" differs from "black." The white color is not the black color, but it must be the one or the other: The color is real or unreal and the territory of the valuation. We may find between the territories of valuations such phenomena which have not a real character, but only value. Hitherto belongs the difference between the "difference" which separates the color white from the color black and some "equality." The equality is not the difference, the dif-

ference between the equality and the difference values. But the territory OF THIS VALUATION is the differnce and the equality and something that only values or does not value. In our example this (special) difference (between the color white and the color black) values, but the equality (from which this difference differs) values or does not value. I could mention in the former chapter that we have in such an example to distinguish between immediate and mediate territories of the valuation and that the empirically given and real universe is FINALLY THE MEDIATE territory of the valuation. This important fact requires an examination.

I mentioned the difference between the—difference and the equality. This difference values, the second difference and the equality is only the immediate territory of its valuation. This territory is a phenomenon which values and affords thus still a territory of this valuation. In our example this territory would be given with the colors white and black, but in regard to the equality with its single "members." The color belongs to phenomena which are only real or unreal, and is, therefore, the FINAL territory of the original difference and the equality given with the realitivic facts. This is true also from the part of the equality. The valuation of the equality has its immediate or mediate territories, as it may be seen on the example of any "numerical" equality. The immediate territory are the "numerals," therefore, phenomena which only value and afford still territories of their valuation. If we proceed, we see that the final territories of such valuations are real or unreal phenomena. The numeral 3 values, but disappears, as soon as we abstract anything that may be "three." This may be three differences or three equalities, briefly, something that only values. In such cases are afforded special territories of the valuation and this way protracts as long as we do not arrive at facts which do not afford any special territories. These are only realitivic facts. This is necessarily the FINAL territory of the valuable difference between the equality and the (special) difference in phenomena which are real or unreal and not "valuable" or "unvaluable."

The reality has its "content" (all this is "real"), but is by principle without territory. I express this important relation:

The final territories of any valuation are real phenomena, reality is the final fundamental of valuation. On the other side is reality the final fundamental of unreality. Remember the "bently-two-fold" character of reality. If reality is the final fundamental of valuation and reality the final fundamental of nonreality, then is the reality and but the reality the final fundamental of the valuation. We know that the reality is the systematical member of all our "experience." Real phenomena are given merely empirically. Consequently, the theory that the valution is finaly the valuation of the empirical universe is true. This important fact appears clearer, if we examine the "bently-two-fold" character of the reality. This character is in connection with the relation of valuation to reality. I have in mind the possibility of a valuable expression of facts which are not valuations, but a valuable expression of—reality.

We can corroborate the reality of phenomena in that we call it VALUABLE: It values that we are living, it values that Mt. Elias is real. The possibility of such an expression rests upon the relation of valuation to reality, of which we untill now did not know anything. We know that we have in reality and valuation to distinguish a direction of their content which is one the point of reality given by "real things" (with this that is real), but on the point of valuation by valuable things (with this that values). If we transfer this to the sphere of the valuable expression of the reality, we see that reality may be the content of valuation. It values that we are living, it values that Mt. Elias is real, means, it values the reality of our living, the reality of Mt. Elias. In such an example we have to distinguish a double content: The content of the reality and the content of the valuation. The content is our living, Mt. Elias. The reality is the content of the valuation. This fact throws a special light upon the relation of reality to nonreality. This is the relation of the bent-two-foldness which means that reality has a priority before nonreality. Which is the real meaning of this priority? One of my hearers expressed the opinion that NONREALITY is only a special valuation. Should reality be an "activeness' ("objectiveness") BESIDES reality? Can we speak about a NEGATIVE activeness? Does it, therefore, not seem that nonreality is only a kind of valuation and

that we may come by this way to the real meaning of the bently-two-fold character of the reality? This would mean that only reality has its full "realitivic" essence, but that nonreality is a kind of "valuation."

The fact that nonreality is a systematical member of our experience would speak against such a conception of nonreality. Only experience tells immediately both, if something really exists, or does not exist. This objection is fictitious. This shows the proven relation of reality to valuation, namely, that any reality has its content, but that it is also the content of the pertinent valuation. This relation assists us to uncover on nonreality although we may consider it only as a kind of valuation, the empirical, therefore, "realitivic" substance of its essence. This we attend then, when we consider any reality as a reality which values, but any nonreality as a reality which does not value. Thus have reality and "nonreality" really a common realitivic basis which is given with the REALITY. But in the first case of the so-called positive reality, there is the question of a VALUABLE REALITY, in the second OF A NON-VALUABLE REALITY. Understandable is both that nonreality as reality is a systematical member of real experiences, and not an immediate contrast of the reality, because the boundary is the pertinent valuation and nonvaluation. The systematical member of the twins: Reality and nonreality is only the reality, nonreality is the valuably connected reality, namely, the reality which does not value. We come to such a conception of nonreality also then, when we take in mind the moral or normative character of the realitivic representation which means that the representation is still "correct" or "incorrect." This correctness or incorrectness is the moral reflex of the reality or nonreality of this that is being represented to us. If the nonreality would be on the same grade with the reality, then had to be the difference between them entirely parallel with the pertinent moral difference between the correctness or incorrectness of the realitivic representation. In this case had reality to prove "the correctness" of this representation, nonreality the "incorrectness."

The realitivic representation may be correct or incorrect, any may be this that is represented to us real or unreal. He,

who represents to him Mt. Elias in the light of reality, represents it correctly, he, who would represent to him it in the light of nonreality, would represent it incorrectly. One and the same reality of Mt. Elias proves, therefore, the correctness, then the incorrectness of the realitivic representation. Or he, who represents to him Fountain of Youth in the light of nonreality, represents it correctly, he, who would represent it in the light of reality, incorrectly. One and the same nonreality of Fountain of Youth proves the correctness, then the incorrectness of the representation. The reason is that in the realitivic representation there is the question, HOW is represented to us anything with the view of reality or nonreality. Real phenomena may be represented to us with the view of nonreality, but unreal phenomena with the view of reality. In both examples prove reality as nonreality only the—incorrectness of such a representation. The difference between reality and nonreality is by no means the difference between the correctness and incorrectness of the representation. Reality and nonreality may prove both. We have thus a doubleness: The first the objectively actual which comprises the members reality and nonreality, the second the moral which comprises the members correctness and incorrectness. The correctness—of the realitivic representation—IS THE POSITIVE member of this second moral doubleness, but the incorrectness the NEGATIVE member. For the reason that both these members may be proven, either by reality or by nonreality and, therefore, by BOTH members of the first objectively actual doubleness, is clear that in this doubleness THE NONREALITY is by no means the "negative second" member. We may together call the correctness and incorrectness the correctness in THE BROADER SENSE OF THE WORD. In this example we call "the correctness" the POSITIVE correctness, the incorrectness THE NEGATIVE. We can not call the "reality" the positive reality, neither the nonreality the negative, because the reality may prove the negative correctness and the nonreality the positive. Here fits in the mentioned opinion (of one of my hearers) that any actual "correctness," "truthness," "factiveness" "OBJECTIVITY" IS BUT SINGLE AND NOT DOUBLE. Such being the case, then the nonreality is the "bent" second member of the objectively

actual doubleness. We can not interprete this bentness otherwise than as we did above that we regard nonreality as—reality, but as a reality WHICH DOES NOT VALUE. *)

I ascertained a double relation of the valuation to the reality, namely, that the reality is the final fundamental of the valuation and the immediate content of "valuation" or also "nonvaluation." In the first case there is the question about the reality in the stricter sense of the world, in the second about the nonreality. Both relations show still a third relation which will help to arrive from the view of valuations to a SECOND solution of our main question of the divine essence. With regard to the reality I have in mind the phenomenon of "realitivic including." It seems that we have also on the point of valuation to speak about a VALUABLE INCLUDING, when valuations are given by other valuations, as are realities given by other realities. Seemingly affords also the valuation a double question: WHAT is it itself and WHERE does it originat FROM? These are questions about the essence and the proof. We decided the first question in the former section, where we ascertained the ESEENCE of the valuation as the immediate consequence of the divine original act. On the point of valuation we must speak also about a VERTICAL including. The shown "giveness" of the valuation by the divine original act is the first and systematical branch of the vertical valuable including. We are interested more in the HORIZONTAL valuable including, because in it we can decide the question of the vertical valuable including which will not touch the immediate essence of the valuation, but its relation to—valuable things. The boundary between the horizontal and vertical valuable including is like the boundary in the realitivic including. It is here and there effected by the relation to God. Horizontal will

*) The reality is thus still the content of the valuation or nonvaluation (e. gr., the reality of Mt. Elias values, the reality of Fountain of Youth does not value), but essentially different is the relation of the reality to its valuation than to its nonvaluation. In the first case "decides" THE REALITY which becomes by the valuation "enforced," but in the second THE NONVALUATION which we immediately perceive. That the valuation (in the broader sense of the word) is divided in "valuation" (in the stricter sense of the word) and "nonvaluation", follows from its systematical relation to our rationality (§12) which is either "agreeing" or "refusing."

be all that valuable including which we can escertain without the necessity to consider the divine essence. Our first task is to examine this horizontal valuable including and to decide the proving question of the valuation. There appears a difference between reality and valuation which is given with the difference between the horizontal realitivic and valuable including.

In the horizontal realitivic including holds without exception the giveness of REALITY BY REALITY and excluded is that some reality would be given horizontally by facts which are not realities. Not so in the valuable including. We have includings of valuation BY VALUATIONS. Ancient and modern logic alleges systematical forms of human "conclusions." Take so called "barbara" conclusion: If a-b values and if b-c values, then values a-c. Valuations of single relations and facts may be "given" by valuations of other relations and facts. *)

In valuation we have a horizontal giveness of the valuation by facts which are not valuations. Take the valuation of the difference between the colors white and black or of the fact 2x2=4. The valuation of the difference is "given" with the colors and the fact 2x2=4. The color and the fact is not the valuation, but the territory of the content of the valuation. With the colors is given the valuation of the difference between them, with the numerals the valuation of the fact. The colors help us to PROVE the valuation: The difference between the colors "values" in account of the colors. The same is in the fact 2x2=4. Change colors with numerals. There are examples of a valuable including and there are no such includings in the reality. I must add that this including is merely a "horizontal" including, because we can easely ascertain it without any thought of an act of God. Who would think about God, when he ascertains and proves the difference between two colors or the valuation of a numerical relation?

Valuable including it two-fold, the including of valuations by valuations and the including by facts which are not valua-

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*) This "giveness" of valuations by valuations differs from the "giveness" of realities by realities. This will show the following distinction between the "auxiliary" and "main" including of valuations.

tions. To separate these two kinds I call the first AUXILIARY valuable including, the second the MAIN including. Auxiliary valuable including corresponds with the horizontal realitivic including and is built up on the main including. Auxiliary including would be the fact: a-c given by a-b and b-c. The valuation of the fact a-c originates from the fact a-b and b-c by ITSELF, without regard, if we can this immediately perceive or not. If a-c would not be true, at least one of the first facts a-b and b-c could not be true and impossible any discours of the including of the fact a-c by the valuation of the facts a-b and b-c. What is a valuable "proof," e. gr., the mathematical proof that the sum of all angles of Euclid's triangle is 180°? The essence of such a proof is in the deduction of the valuation of this mathematical fact from the valuation of other mathematical facts which we can immediately perceive and ascertain. Such "proven" mathematical fact values by itself, this fact does not value ONLY, BECAUSE other facts value, but the valuation of this fact is based in its immediate system, in the essence of Euclid's triangle. Everyone can perceive this without regard to the question, if HE can immediately perceive this fact or not. The essence of valuable proof is that it shows MEDIATELY, what by itself and immediately values. I distinguish, therefore, between an auxiliary and a main valuable including.

The ascertainment of the valuation is an act of our "rationality," "reasonableness." This rationality is larger or smaller, if it posseses a larger or smaller power of an immediate ascertainment of the valuation. The necessity of a proof is a sign of some restriction of the rationality. In an ideal example all our perception should be immediate, not restricted by the necessity of a mediate deduction of valuation from valuation. This is confirmed by great mathematicians who have an extraordinary ability of an IMMEDIATE perception of facts which others can perceive but mediately. A great mathematician perceives "without proof" what to us must be still "proven." Immediate perception of the valuation is based upon the main valuable including. Auxiliary valuable including is the necessary basis of the valuable proof and upon such a proof resting mediate perception of the valuation. For the reason that the

mediate perception is only some substitute compensation of OUR own inability of the immediate perception, becomes clear, why I call this including auxiliary, but the valuable including which is the necessary basis of the immediate perception the main including. Valuations which would not be given by themselves, by the contents which value and by the territories, for which these contents value, could not be given by other valuations, they would cease to be valuations, would become non-valuations. In the realitivic including there are no such relations between the immediate and mediate giveness of the reality and between the parallel our own ascertainment of such realities.

We can ascertain realities immediately or mediately. The immediate ascertainment is a mere "ascertainment," not a "proof" of the reality. We know, if there is something real, but we do not know, why there is something real. Any proof of the reality starts with the mediate ascertainment and this on the system of single kinds of the realitivic including. The character of this including determines the larger or smaller actuality and depth of our own proof of the reality. Any such mediate ascertainment is the including of reality BY REALITY, but not by facts which are not realities. This is based upon the situation that any reality is the reality OF SOMETHING, but that no reality is "given" with this, to where it leads: The content of the reality is by principle no includer of the reality. The content is sufficient to "ascertain," to "touch" the reality, but when we try to prove this reality and to "perceive" it, then we have to transpass to another reality and to another content. The difference is clear. Whilst including of valuation by valuation is built up on the including of the valuation by the content and the territory of the valuation, is the including of the reality by principle only the including of reality by reality and not by the content of the reality. For this reason is all mediate perception of the valuation an auxiliary substitute for the immediate perception, whilst all real PROVING PERCEPTION of the reality is by principle only a mediate, not an immediate perception. When "mathematician" proves something, he proves something which in the ideal instance should be by itself and immediately perceivable, but when "naturalist"

proves something, then he proves something which is by its own nature and only "provingly" perceivable. I conclude: All valuable including is in a sharp contrast with the realitivic including still auxiliary and main, the main the necessary basis of the auxiliary. Other reciprocal specialities are not of such an importance, but help to a better understanding of the given fundamental relations of the valuation to the reality.

In this connection is worthwhile to mention the fact that not only the reality, but also the realitivic including may be the content of the valuation. As realities value, so values the including of the reality. In this case is our own ascertainment of the realitivic including not empirical, forced upon us from outside, but unempirical or by principle. That the reality of the happening h/1 is the "cause," but reality of the happening h/2 the "effect," this tells no "experience," this we must ascertain by our own "rationality," and any such ascertainment is not an ascertainment of some "reality," but of the valuation, namely, of the valuation of the including of the reality of the happening h/2 by the reality of the happening h/1. I do not say that ANY realitivic including is such an IMMEDIATE content of the valuation, because we have doubtlessly examples of realitivic including which are only "real" and because OF THIS REALITY valuable. Hitherto belongs the "functional" (internally parallel) realitivic including. With regard to the relation of the reality and the realitivic including to the valuation I state: Any reality is the immediate content of the valuation and values. Realitivic including may be only real or immediately valuable. In the first case its the ascertainment merely empirical, in the second by principle. This does not concern the validity of the fact that the horizontal realitivic including is finally built up in the external parallel and in the internal consequential realitivic including, it means, in the including of the reality, as it is conditioned by substantial locality and temporality of the real thing. *)

*) The immediate valuation of the realitivic including is not the example of the "main" including. This valuation is realitively empirically conditioned. With the "rationality" I ascertain that the hare went down, BECAUSE the hunter hit him. But that the hunter hit him and THAT the hare went down, I ascertain empirically.

I did not mention one kind of the realitivic including, when I outlined the including system of realities. It assists to understand the essential specialities of the valuable including. This kind is the including of the reality of the entire landscape by the reality of the single parts, or also of the single parts by the reality of the entire landscape. It is not important. This kind is seemingly in the sphere of the main valuable including. The difference is that in the main valuable including there is the question about the including of the valuation by facts which are not valuations, in the realitivic including about the including of reality by reality. Both includings have an important common essence. In both examples we must distinguish two objective contents which are in the relation of objects of a "lower" to objects of a "higher order" or vice versa. The entire landscape is toward its parts the object of a "higher," the parts of a "lower" order. The difference between the color white and black, whose valuation is given in the sense of the main valuable including, is toward these colors the object of a higher order which corresponds with the colors as the objects of a lower order. Where there we speak about the realitivic or the main valuable including, we meet a relation between (Meinong's) "objects of a lower and higher order." This relation is decisive for the access of the realitivic or valuable including. I call this the including BY CONTENT. It is twofold: Realitivic and valuable. The realitivic is given with the including of the reality of the entire landscape by the realities of the single parts, the valuable the main including. The fundamental difference is that the realitivic including by content is for the entire including system without meaning, but the valuable the necessary basis for all valuable including. This we proved. We have still to prove THE OPPOSITE relation. The reality of the entire landscape or single parts would be impossible, if these realities would be not conditioned by realities alleged by geographs, geologs and other searchers of the surface of the earth. This means that the realitivic including is built up on the causal giveness, therefore, on the internal consequential including. Because of the local situation there is

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also a external parallel including. The including is dependent on the "functional" ties between (geological) realities. *)

The including which is in the realitivic including secondary and dependent is in the valuable primary and fundamental.

I touch the POINTING valuable including. I referred at the phenomena of our PERCEPTION and WILL. Perception is strictly valuation. We perceive, because it values. The "will" is immediately adapted to the REALITY (I will arrise, speak, walk . . .). In the next chapter we shall arrive to the deeper conception of the "will" and see that the perception and the will are systematical members of BUT ONE OUR ACT, of our PERSONAL ACTIVENESS. Both include in their way the valuation. The realitivic pointing including is built up on the internal consequential and external parallel including, the valuable on the main including. How could any valuation become the object of our PERCEPTION, if this that we perceive would not value by principle? We do not create the valuation, we only find it. Our willing appears as an "acknowledgment" and not as a "making" of the valuation. The pointing valuable including is dependent on the main including. This consequence is necessary as long as we remain on the HORIZONTAL including system of valuations, because this system is built up on the main including.

This fact points out the direction for further conclusions. There appears the question of such a singular pointing including which we could consider from the view of our perception and will, but would not be dependent. It has to be a fundamental valuable including, opposed to the whole horizontal including system. This is the vertical, by God given including which has two branches: The first concerns the essence of the divine perception, the second of the divine will. We detected the first branch, when we defined the essence of the valuation as the immediate consequence of the divine original act. What the valuable "perception" by principle means on the point of man, this means the original act of the valuation on the point of God. On our valuable perception there is not the question, WHATSOEVER we perceive, but only, IF whatsoever we real-

*) I made clear this fact with viewpoints in my essay: "The Problem of the Representing Production." Razprave Z. D. H. V. Ljubljana, 1928.

ly perceive. Thus does the original divine act not decide the question, whatsoever values, but if an obligeable content leads to the valuation, and if anything can "value." This directs us to the point, where we must search for the SECOND BRANCH of the vertical including. This is the direction of the whole HORIZONTAL including of the system of valuations and, therefore, the direction of the main valuable including, upon which is the horizontal including built up. The discussion of the main including will demonstrate the necessity of a second branch of the vertical including, and of the distinction of a divine perception and divine will which makes that the valuation is THE VALUATION of SOMETHING and FOR SOMETHING.

That this important discussion may be to everyone more accessible, I allege these main relations of the valuation to the reality: 1. the reality is the final basis of the valuation. 2. the reality is the immediate content of valuation and nonvaluation is but the reality which does not value. 3. the horizontal realitivic including is real or immediately valuable. 4. all, also the horizontal including, is built up on the external parallel and internal consequential including of the reality, but all valuable including on the main or on the including by content. 5. on the main valuable including is built up the horizontal pointing including which affords two branches of the vertical including of valuations. 6. only the main valuable including shows the way to the second, to the branch of the will of the vertical including of valuations.

12. Valuation and rationality.

Valuation is the immediate supporter of rationality. The manifestation of rationality is twoford, the ascertainment of the valuation or an actual doing which the valuation requires. The first rationality leads to perception, the second to facts which value. Perception of mathematical facts is the manifestation of the first rationality, execution of vocational duties of the second. This difference is in a strict connection with the partition of the experience in the rational and instinctive experience. The main psychological basis of the first kind is the rational experience, of the second the instinctive. This holds in all details, if we add to the rational experience besides "repre-

sentations" and "thoughts" such feelings and aspirings which work thus that they do not drive us to pertinent actions, but by sample of mere representations only represent to us special phenomena, namely, all kinds of "values" or "shallnesses." *)

The instinctive experience comprises feelings and aspirings which have not the task to acquaint us with "new" phenomena, but enable us for actions in and upon the "world" which shows it to us as the rational half of the spirituality. In a broader interpretation we can in all strictness assert that the rationality of the first kind is immediately built up on the rational experience, of the second on the instinctive. I call the first kind the MENTAL, the second the INSTINCTIVE rationality. Most important is that both are immediately based on the valuation of this, toward which they objectively manifest them and to which they are pointed. The fact 2x2=4 value. For this reason is the ascertainment of this fact "rational." The demand of vocational duties values. For this reason is the actual practise of vocational duties "rational." Both rationalities correspond to both, the mental and instinctive "nonrationaliaty" which is based on the relation to valuation or nonvaluation of its objective territory. This relation is alike to the CORRECT or INCORRECT valuable representation to the valuation or nonvaluation of the objects of such a representation: This is the relation of harmony or disunion between the representable "view" of the valuation and between the actual valuation of this that we have represented to us with thi view. Mental and instinctive "nonrationality" is but the sign of our disunion with the seemingly and actual valuation.

The further important side of the rationality is in connection with the fact that the valuation is the valuation of something and for something, it means, that we have to distinguish in the valuation the "content" and the "territory." The rationality manifests it toward both: Toward this that values and toward this that the first values for. The territory of the valuation is this, because of which the rationality actually manifests it, but the content this which we with the help of this rationality immediately perceive. The valuation of this content is the

*) Contained in detail in my essay "System of Psychology."

warrant, if we really "perceived" the content and did not "erroneously" ascertain it. The territory of the valuation is the necessary territory of the rationality, whilst the content is the like immediate—object of the rationality. The valuation of this content is decided by the question, if the rationality is really "rationality" or "nonrationality." Rationality manifests it in the ascertainment of ACTUAL valuations and nonvaluations, nonrationality of NONACTUAL. The idea of actual and nonactual valuation and nonvaluation is like the idea of PROVEN or NONPROVEN valuation and nonvaluation. The fact 2x2=4 values, means that it values NECESSARILY and that the valuation of the opposed fact is excluded. Thus we arrive to the phenomenon of the valuable including, therefore, to the "main" including. We are again faced with the question, if this including means the real and most final, such a PROOF of the valuation which alone would justify us to regard our distinguishing between "rationality" and "nonrationality" as thus SUBSTANTIALLY proven. If any valuation should be "given" with this and by this, to where we ascribe it, and with this and by this that the first values for, then is inevitable the further question, if THIS giveness is really the most final giveness which gives to our mental ascertainment the character of an ENTIRELY PROVEN ascertainment and, therefore, the character of a real PERCEPTION, as is on the sphere of the reality excluded. We have the including on the sphere of reality and valuation. The valuable including should be so far singular that it is originally merely based by content. For this reason is a discussion of this "by content" based including necessary.

The main question is: Does the main valuable including really mean the final "proof" of the valuation? This question is the main question of the present section and THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION OF THIS BOOK. No wonder that ancient thinkers have been working on this question, although anyone, who knows the evolution of human thought, readily agrees that the way I am starting to decide this question, is more adapted to modern technic of a scientific research. The real historical fathers of this question are doubtlessly Plato and Augustine. To decide this question, we have to keep in

mind the relation of the valuation to the reality, namely, that the final territory of the valuation are only real phenomena and that the reality is the final fundamental of the valuation. I can start with thoughts known to ancient Plato and to later Augustine which intend to show, how and why THE TERRITORY of the valuation alone can not fully PROVE the valuation. Keep in mind the difference between reality and valuation. Reality is a changeably temporal fact, valuation an unchangeably extemporal. Real phenomena start, change and disappear. What values, values without regard to time and changing. Real things are unstable, passing (Thou are dust and to dust Thou shall return). Valuable things are unpassing and steady. The mentioned two thinkers have, therefore, for this reason distinguished between a double perception, between the perception of real things, passing things, and between the perception of valuable things, unpassing things and added that the first perception IS ITSELF but a passing, momentary value and that the second perception is general, without exception or absolutely valuable.

With SUCH A PROOF of this difference between the first and the second kind I can in the wholeness not agree. We called the difference between the perception of reality and valuation the difference between "empirical" and the perception "by principle." It values that the empirical perception is the perception of the passing reality, the perception by principle the perception of unpassing valuation. This difference is only the difference in THE OBJETCS of the perception and does by no means justify us plainly to transfer it to the pertinent perception ITSELF. The ascertainment, e. gr., that it rains momentary is the ascertainment of a passing reality. This ascertainment is in spite of this unpassingly, unchangeably, absolutely TRUE: The reality of ever so momentary a rain proves the extemporal unpassing CORRECTNESS of OUR ASCERTAINMENT of such a rain. This ascertainment is not less unpassingly correct, than would be the ascertainment of the fact 2x2=4.

Like Plato and Augustine I, too, distinguish between the empirical and the perception by principle. I do not prove this difference from the viewpoint of the transientness of real things and the untransientness of valuable things, but from the

viewpoint of the question, how the reality becomes BASED, PROVEN and how the valuation. I think here about the basical difference between the horizontal realitivic and valuable including. This including means that all realitivic including is the including of reality by reality and there is no realitivic including which would be the including of the reality by the mere content of the reality. Valuable including is built up on the including of the valuation by the mere content of the valuation. For this reason both value: That the perception of real things may be like untransiently or extemporally true as the perception of valuable things, but that only to this second perception by principle follows the character of the internal "insight" or "understanding." This understanding is the consequence of the including of the valuation by this, to where we in the moment of such a perception ascribe it. Thus we returned to our basical question, if this and at least this including of the valuation means the full and most final "proof" of the valuation. We could with a much better view of credibility follow Plato and Augustine.

All real things are changeable, transient, all valuable unchangeable, intransient. How can something that from moment to moment changes and alters at pleasure PROVE SOMETHING that unchangeably and extemporally values? We have principles, to which we ascribe an unchangeable value. These are principles of the world and life, value extemporally. This is a fact. How can THIS world and life which manifests it so unsteadfastly and changes so manifoldly be THE PROOF of principles which value for this world and this life without regard to time and change? Thus we arrived to the old decission of our main question. The main including of the valuation does not mean the full proof of the valuation, because this would be the proving of an unchangeably and extemporally valuable thing by the changeable and temporal nature of the real thing. Such a proof is impossible: What changes by its nature can not substantially prove something that should be by its own nature unchangeably valuable.

If I agree with such a solution of our main question, shall be evident, when I allege my reasons which induce me that in the main valuable including I do not see the expected and re-

quested full proof of the valuation. This proof should be the proof of the valuation of this that values by this that the first values for, should be the proof of the valuable thing by the territory of the valuation. Against this speak first strictly the difference between the valuation and the common or final "territory" of the valuation. We know that we can not by principle have represented to us the valuation itself and for this reason still only "touch" it. The valuation is not a fact by content. This does not value about the territory of the valuation, at least not about the final territory which necessarily has its objective content.

Let us take the difference between the colors white and black. We touch the valuation of the difference, but we ourselves represented to us both colors, for which this difference values. How should these colors, these objective contets, prove some valuation which is without any objective content? How should something that we may have fully represented to us prove something that we may in the best case only touch and that we can not have represented to us? We have in our example a phonomenon by content which is really built up on both colors and by both colors proven: This is the difference between both colors which we may have fully represented to us and in the stricter sense of the word view. There is for us not the question about the difference, but about the VALUATION of the difference. We have in our example to distinguish a trinity of both colors, the difference between both colors and the valuation of this difference. The colors and the difference are objectively facts with a content, but the valuation of the difference is without any content. For this reason we can and must speak about an objective "constructiveness" of the difference upon both colors, but we can not speak about a like constructiveness upon the difference or upon the colors which concerns the difference. The colors prove the difference between them, but they can not prove the valuation of this difference. Hitherto belongs Meinong's distinguishing between "objects of a lower and higher order" which has been in essence

known to Augustine, if I may not mention the later Thomas Aquinas. *)

This relation means that the objects of the higher order are by their content built up on the objects of the lower and finally on the objects of the lowest order. For the valuation this does not hold and can not hold, because the valuation is in general objectively not any contentive fact neither of the higher nor of the lower order.

Herewith is concluded my FIRST proof against Meinong's opinion that the valuation of the difference between the colors white and black would be by these colors fully and finally proven. The universe of facts accessible to our perception is parted in halves. The first comprises such objective contents which we can have represented to us or otherwise view. The second half is given with the reality and valuation, therefore, with facts which we by principle can not view, but only "touch" or "miss." We can "touch" or "miss" the reality and the valuation, but not have them represented to us, as we can have the objective contents only represented to us, but by principle not also "touch" or "miss" them. For this reason is all experience by principle outside of any correctness or incorrectness, as long as we view it only as the representative of the pertinent objective content, but it becomes at once correct or incorrect, as soon as we consider it from the viewpoint of the question, if it touches or misses the reality (valuation) of the represented objective content. For the same reason is the relation on any reciprocal and merely objective proof possible only between objective content and objective content (e. gr., between "colors" and "difference"), but is impossible between objective content and reality or valuation. On any main valuable including there is the question about the giveness of the valuation of the objective content of the higher order by the objective content of the lower order, but such a giveness of the valuation can not be at the same time the expectd and requested and final PROOF of THE VALUATION. We could speak more cor-

*) It seems that the first move for this distinction came from Plato and Aristotle. The first started this move with his "order of ideas," the second with his distinction between "content" and "form" ("materials" and "form").

rectly about such a proof of the valuation in one known example, namely, when the reality itself comes forth as the—content of the valuation (e. gr., it values that it rains momentarily). Only here there would be the question about the proof of the fact (of the valuation), which we may only touch or miss, by another fact (by the reality), which we may also only touch or miss, but for this reason is this not any objective proof, not any proof "by content."

We arrive at the same conclusion BY ANOTHER WAY. Take again the valuable difference between the colors white and black. We say that there is the question about the difference. But I can show that such an opinion is only conditionally justified and would even lose any meaning, as soon as we would take it as we pronounced it. That the white color is different from the black color, means essentially THAT THIS THAT is white is different FROM THIS THAT is black. The white color is different from the black color, means that THE WHITE THING is different from the BLACK THING. THIS FACT WHICH IS HERE, MAY BE, PRONOUNCED FOR THE FIRST TIME, MUST BE TAKEN IN THE WHOLE IMPORTANCE WHICH IS ATTRIBUTED TO IT. We know that the difference between the white and the black color values, if the colors are real or not, it means, if there is realized this, to where we ascribe them. We must get the true and only possible meaning of the distinction between both colors. The color is by its essence only a DETERMINATIVE, such a fact which serves us to determinate with its help this, to where we ascribe it. The question, if the colors are realized or not, is directly synonyme with the question, if there are realized SUCH PHENOMENA which should be determinated by these colors. If modern physics says that there are actually no colors, then has this only this meaning that there are NOTHINGS or PHENOMENA which we could call colored things or colored phenomena. What holds for the question of the reality or nonreality of the "single colors," holds also for the question of their reciprocal "differences." The tenet that the white color is different from the black color, is synonyme with the tenet that the "white thing" is different from the "black thing."

The reader will perceive this the easier, if he abstracts

from "color" all that which seems to him to be colored, although itself is not the color. Abstract from the colors ANYTHING "colored," take the colors as "own" essentialities, which would not be any "determinations" of this, to where we ascribe them. In this case becomes impossible any distinguishing between this and that "color." He, who would speak about a "difference" between the colors white and black, would utter empty words. I do not assert that in this case would hold the "opposite" judgment and that we had instead of the "difference" between the colors white and black to put the—equality between them. I assert that in this case there is not more the question of a "judgment," of "convictions," but that in both cases there are but verbal sentences which are without any substantial meaning and sense.

I repeat: The tenet "the white color differs from the black" gets its sense only then, when we give to it the meaning of an entirely different tenet, namely, that the white thing differs from the black thing. I state a new principle: The distinguishing between "colors" is and can be only the distinguishing between "colored thing."

A like legality appears in any other example, say, in the example of the valuation of different numerical relations. Take the valuation of the sum: 5+7=12. This equation has the meaning that 5+7 phenomena (stones, nuts, apples) are 12 phenomena (stones, nuts, apples). This equation loses any meaning as soon as we take it thus, as we have pronounced it, as a mere sum of sole "numerals" and not as the sum of this, to where we ascribe the numerals. In this case we could not say: 7+5=12, but 7+5=2, namely, 7+5 ARE TWO PHENOMENA, TWO NUMERALS. All numerical, mathematical equations get, therefore, their actual meaning and because of this meaning the character of their valuation or unvaluation only under the condition that we do not take THEM THEMSELVES, but consider them FROM THE VIEWPOINT, WHICH THEY STAND FOR AND WHAT THEY VALUE OR DO NOT VALUE FOR. This alone, what the numerals value for, it no numeral, and, nevertheless, is the numeration of the numerals possible only because of this what the numerals value for. When we really count the numerals themselves, we have to take them as

they would not be "numerals." The shown difference between the sums 7+5=12 (e. gr. apples) and 7+5=2 (PHENOMENA) is for this fact the best example.

I state a new principle: Numeration of numerals is and can be only the numeration of "numerable thing."

The main including of valuations is not a full and final proof of the valuation from the mere territory of the valuation.

We can not speak about the difference between the colors white and black. This is only the difference of the white and black thing. How should this that is white or black itself prove the difference between the white and black thing, if it becomes because of these colors different from each other? Take the example of a white and black hat. How should these two hats THEMSELVES prove this difference, if they are only by these colors different from each other? We are confronted by a DIFFICULTY OF ANY VALUATION BY PRINCIPLE AND SO FAR DEEMED BY NO ONE. This valuation is and must be proven. It is and can not be proven in the colors white and black, because we have seen that any such proof would mean only the uttering of empty words. This valuation is and can not be proven neither by both hats, because these hats should differ from each other by their colors. It can, therefore, not be any discourse of a special proving of this valuation by MERE OBJECTS AND CONTENT.

This holds also for the example with the numerals. The relations of numerals value. This valuation could be, therefore, proven by objects only by the pertinent numerals or by this, to where we ascribe these numerals. The first is impossible, because these relations are actually only the relations of this, to where we ascribe the numerals, neither is possible the second, because this, to where we ascribe the numerals, is only by these numerals in such special relations. All this holds in any other example and in general everywhere, where we may have the valuation and, therefore, a content and a territory of the valuation.

I can, therefore, express anything so far said in the form of a SPECIAL and to us HITHERTO STILL UNKNOWN relation between the content and the territory of the valuation. Whatsoever is or may be the "content" of the valuation, it is

and can be ONLY BECAUSE OF THE TERRITORY of the valuation. The "difference between the colors white and black" is the difference between the white and black thing. Whatsoever is or may be the "territory" of the valuation, it is and can be ONLY BECAUSE OF THE CONTENT of the valuation. The white thing differs only because of the color from the black thing. Neither the content nor the territory of the valuation gives a final "proof" of the valuation. It follows an entirely new and most important general principle: The expected and requested special proof of the valuation is and can not be any PROOF BY OBJECT AND CONTENT.

We have a THIRD way leading us to the same perception. This is the way of the "rationality" and its relation to the valuation. Hitherto belongs the known fact that we have in any valuation besides its content and territory also to distinguish its SUBJECT (field-sphere of working), which is given by that, for whom anything values. This "that" is any rational being and the essence of any rationality is that anything that values, values FOR IT necessarily. This fact shows that with the mere territory can not be given the final proof of the valuation, because for this purpose the subject of the valuation is necessary, as there is necessary the actual "rationality," on whose regard and for whom alone can all this that values actually value. I can return to Meinong's opinion that the valuation is contentively proven, because the real perception of the valuation is internal, proven by itself and appears in that our "insight" or "intelligence" which accompanies the perception. But I will show, how this character of the perception testifies for THE OPPOSITE FACT. This side of the perception is but the consequence of a SPECIAL ACTIVITY which shows that the valuation is not like the reality upon us from outside obtruded, but that we arrive to it with our own activity, with our own rationality. If the valuation of the difference between the colors white and black would be proven by the objective substantiality of the colors, then could our perception of this difference not have the character of OUR OWN WORK, our own giveness. In this case would the valuation appear to us as from outside obtruded upon us, by the objects of our experience pushed on our rationality. The objective proof would take from

the valuation this that it really is, namely, the necessary valuation "for someone" who has to ascertain it with his "own power" and has "himself" to PERCEIVE IT. The merely objective proof would have as consequence that we would be and have to be towards it psychologically dependent and passive, as we are without doubt towards the reality. Thus is Meinong's opinion that we have the insight, the intelligence in the valuation the best proof that the valuation can not be objectively proven.

We "view" the territories of the valuation, but we only touch the valuation. Meinong's opinion could we express that the "touching" is given and proven by the mere "viewing" of the territory. This opinion is doubtlessly untenable. Any "touching" is correct and corresponds with the "missing" as the pertinent incorrect psychological action. The mere viewing is by principle outside of any contrast, outside of any genuine "correctness" or "incorrectness." The mere viewing alone can not prove any touching or missing. It is, furthermore, one of the most dependent side of our spirituality, because it is decided only with the essence of this that we have represented to us. We can not view a melody, if we do not view the single sounds, or the difference between the colors, if we do not view the colors. Why not? Because the OBJECTIVE essence of melody and colors affords this: Melody rests on sounds, difference on colors and we can not view melody and difference, if we do not view their "objective fundamentals." I can only wonder about the opinion that touching should be proven by viewing. How can one of the most dependent side of our soul finally prove something that is an assential reflex of our most clear activity and independence? Touching and missing is our work, is the action of our rationality (nonrationality), but such a work can not be proven by this that characterizes us as entirely dependent beings. Meinong's opinion rests upon the hypothesis that viewing is itself the proof of touching. This hypothesis is not true, neither is true Meinong's opinion.

Obtruding upon me is the FOURTH way. The final territories of the valuation are real phenomena. An important partition of our spirituality appears. Human spirituality is a double one, SENSITIVE AND MENTAL. The essence of the mental

spirituality is in the rational and instinctive RATIONALITY. The sensitive spirituality is in the "objective" regard immediately adapted to the reality, to the empirical giveness of phenomena, the mental to the valuation and to this what we call the "principle side" of the world and life. Mental spirituality is EVOLUTIONARILY built up upon the sensitive, this upon the corporal side of our essentiality. Corporality is the developing territory of the sensibility. Herewith is evident that creation is the final territory, but not the final proof of the valuation, because in the opposite case would be the sensitive spirituality, which is immediately adapted to phenomena, not only the developing territory of the mental spirituality, but its DEVELOPING ORIGIN. In this case would not only hold that the spirituality which is like immediately adapted to the valuable principle side of the world and life evolves upon the fundamental of the foregoing and cotemporal sensitivity, but it would be true that we can and must ORIGINALLY DERIVE FROM MERE SENSIBILITY the spirituality. The sensibility would not be the condition of the spirituality, but its "cause," the spirituality would have in the sensibility not its necessary "developing basis," but would be by this sensibility fully and finally PROVEN. This is not true. In different writings I stated a similar relation between the sensitive spirituality and the corporal nature as it manifests it in the central nervous system. I ascertained that the nervous system is the basis of the sensibility, but we can not deduct it from the nervous system. Sensibility is the basis of spirituality, but not its ORIGIN.*)

It becomes clear, how we have to interpret the parallel relation on the "objective" part, namely, on the side of the natural creation and the valuation destined to it. We must regard creation as the final territory of the valuation, but not as its actual origin. As our spirituality develops only "upon" our sensitiveness, but does not originate from it, so value the contents "for" creation, but by no means originate from it. The main including is not the final proof of the valuation, as evident from four reasons: 1. the valuation is not an objectively contentive fact and can not be objectively proven. 2. the content of the valua-

*) My essays "Philosophy" and "St. Augustine."

tion is conditioned by the territory, but the territory by the content, the mere territory can not be its final proof. 3. the objectively contentive proof of the valuation can not be combined with that selfe-giveness which is the sign of perception. 4. the contentive proof does not agree with the fact that sensitiveness is the developing basis, but not the origin of the spirituality. Somehow I agree with these old thoughts. Temporal or changing phenomena are the final territory of that valuation which by its contents has nothing to do with temporality or changeableness. Temporal phenomena can not prove extemporal phenomena. On this point Plato is right.

The including of valuations is built up only on the main including. The valuation is extemporal and can be by content proven. Real phenomena are the territories of the valuation and the main including is the including of valuable things by real things, but it can not be the final proof of the valuation. We covered all points of the HORIZONTAL system of the valuable including: We considered valuation, its content, territory and subjectness. It follows: As long as we remain only on the horizontal including, SO LONG CAN NOT BE ANY DISCUSSION OF A FINAL PROOF OF THE VALUATION. Needed is the transition to the VERTICAL including which gives to the valuation the final proof. Again is given the request OF THE DIVINE ORIGINAL ACT with the difference that it has not the task to separate the valuation from nothingness, but to give to it the real proof. In connection with the first chapter we have the parallel: God is the vertical origin of reality and real things and of VALUATION AND VALUABLE THINGS.

13. Valuation proves the primereality of God.

Someone may object that the special transition from the horizontal valuable including to the vertical, as requested on the conclusion of the former section, is unnecessary, because we can obtain what we here expect from the divine original act with our own rationality. Our rationality as the shown necessary "subject" of the valuation gives to the valuation what can not give its content, nor its territory, namely, the

final proof. Against such an opinion is everything what we alleged against valuable phenomenalism which pretends that valuation is only the consequence of our valuable representation. Rationality built up upon the representation is a sign of our selfgiveness, but has doubtlessly the character of NORMATIVE OR MORAL PASSIVENESS. Rationality says clearly that we "find" the valuation, but do not create it. There is no difference between reality and valuation. Both are not "effects," "consequences" of the rationality. The difference between the reality and valuation is that our "striking" of the valuation shows the valuation in the light of an internal, extemporal "necessity," but also this "necessity" we only "find," do not create it. Thus it is clear that the rationality does not help us to find the full and most final proof of the valuation. There is given the direction to the goal. The direction is not to the OBJECTS, neither to the HUMAN SUBJECT and his rationality, but to the DIVINE subject, to the DIVINE RATIONALITY. Devine rationality appears as the ESSENTIAL ORIGIN of human rationality: Whilst the human rationality is towards the main including of the valuation a normatively or morally passive, dependent fact, is the divine original act on this point a normatively or morally ACTIVE, INDEPENDENT FACT. For this reason follows from this act the name of a singular or "creative" "rationality." *)

I return to Kant's opinion, which tries to make from such viewpoints impossible any scientific way to God. This opinion was effectively turned down by Meinong's "Theory of Objects." I turn from my side attention to the decisive and hitherto unobserved error of Kant's conception of "rationality."

Kant's phenomenalism says that the perception of valuations is only the consequence of distinct "forms of the rationality." These forms, asserts Kant, are to rationality inborn and only make that our perception of valuations appears to us necessary, thus that we can change it by our will. These forms of the reason are, furthermore, says Kant, connected to us like given "forms" of the sensuality, which make that the consideration of the world and life, so far as such a consideration

* Ancient philosophers call it "Intelectus archetypus."

may be legal, is necessarily a—local and temporal consideration. The connection between these forms of the reason and the sensuality, says Kant further on, is so strict that the "forms of the reason" without the "forms of the sensuality" would remain EMPTY, but the "forms of the sensuality" without the "forms of the reason" BLIND. Kant calls these forms "aprioric" and adds that in account of the relation between these forms is any ascertainment of mere empirical facts (realities) by no means any perception, but that on the other side is any real perception of valuations only the perception of the empirically given world and life. This appearance of such a perception and the appearance of to such a perception immediately determinated valuation can, therefore, be of no help that we may come in a real scientific way to a special divine existence which should be not only real, but expressly superempirically real or primereal. The difference between experience and valuation is only "formal" and not also objective. Thus Kant.

Against such a conception of the perception of valuations I allege some reasons. Given forms may be justified, but they can not have the meaning, as we would "make," "create" valuation and valuable things by our reason. Against this speaks expressly the morally or normatively PASSIVE character of the representation of valuations and the upon this representation built up perception. It is well known that by Kant's philosophy came psychology pretty brief. No wonder that Kant assigned to the psychological activity of our representation the place of a moral or normative active fact. This holds similarly for Kant's forms of the sensuality. Secondly, I am of the opinion that the valuation has its territory and that the final territories of the valuation are only real and empirically given phenomena of the world and life. I declared that the valuation is finally the valuation for the world and life, as it is offered to us by daily and outdaily experience. Our examinations of the valuation showed us that we have in the valuation besides its territory to distinguish the direction of its ORIGIN, and that this is the direction of the singular divine original act. We have seen that this "original side" of the valuation has a double meaning: Only the original side gives to the valuation its systematical essentiality, separates it from nothing-

ness and effects that the territory of the valuation is the real and most final "proof" of the valuation. Thus appears this characteristic contrast between Kant's and my cenception of the question: Whilst Kant asserts that the perception of valuations does not lead to God, because the valuation is only the valuation for empirical phenomena, affirm I the contrary that these empirically given phenomena are by God the final territories of PROVEN and not only blind or casual valuations. I assert that valuations accessible to us are immediately or mediately valuations FOR the empirically given phenomena, but I add that the experience alone can not prove these valuations.

Someone may oppose my way of valuations to God, because it will deduct from mere valuation something that actually should be, exist, be not only real, but even PRIMEREAL. This is not the case. I declared several times that only experience can tell us, if something is real or unreal. A merely fundamental calculation can not do this, and may it be ever so correct and strict. Erroneous is that old and new "aprioriism" which tries by the way of valuation and valuable things to find all real things, and may be the question about real, empirically given creation or about primereality of God. Mere "thoughts" may help us that we get a deeper insight of the internal nature of the real thing and that we detect the different legal relations between real things and real things, but if this, to where leads the nature, and what is in such and such legal relations, is a REAL THING or may be even a PRIMEREAL THING, this can not tell "mere thoughts," "mere principles," "valuable" researches: this we must first "see," "hear," "reach" or somehow "experience." The conception of God loses any value, if it is not the conception of a REAL, ACTUAL God, but the way to such a God can not be in mere valuation. I dealt with this objection, when I concluded the former chapter, in the discussion of my realitivic proof for the primereality of God. I may allege only the following: My way of valuations to God is by itself the way by realities, the empirical way, because I affirmed several times that the reality is the final base of the valuation. The mentioned objection would affect me then, if I would start from some 'deemed," but not from the real, such a valuation which alone is the necessary support of actual and

real or fundamental perception. Such a valuation nobody can prove, but must the more suppose, or the conception of real perception or error is only an empty word. As the reality, affords also the valuation a double acknowledgment of the divine essence: Only God takes away from the valuation the character of an empty and null fact, and only God effects that this valuation is by its empirically given territories finally proven. Valuation becomes an internal necessity.

Who could say that I try to attend with mere thoughts what only the experience may justify? I work with thoughts, but my thoughts go only so far as it is in accord with empirically given phenomena. He, who calls such a research an unpermitted apriorism, may consider that such an apriorism is unavoidable everywhere, where there is "science" and not a blind accumulation of single empirical facts. Such an apriorism in necessarily characteristic for physics which is the doctrine of material. Modern theoretical physists are apriorists as we seldom find them amongst philosophers.

My way by realities showed the divine essence in the light of a singular reality, in the light of primereality. I can say the same about my way by valuations. Consider what we found as systematically essential behind the real and not imagined valuation. There are four directions: The direction of the content, territory, subjectness and origin of the valuation. The content is anything that values, the territory that anything values for, the subject that, for whom anything values for, but the origin He, by whom anything values. The single members are not in a like relation. Territory is more adapted to the origin, content to the subject: This that anything values for requests that, by whom this second values for the first, but this that values requests him, who may from his part this conceive. *)

The territory of the valuation is the universe, the content the object of the perception of valuations. The valuation is that line which separates the divine essence from creation on the one side and the perception of valuations from its objects on the other. From the actual character of the perception

*) God makes us by the first relation the perception POSSIBLE, but by the second relation is given us the duty that we take care of the perception. God offers us the perception and we should reach for it.

follows nothing for the like "real" character of its objects (the objects of the perception may be to one's liking outside of real and merely valuable fact). The more follows from the actual character of realities of the final territory of the valuation AT LEAST A LIKE ACTUAL, REAL CHARACTER OF ITS ORIGIN. How should the real, actual universe become the basis of the valuation BY A FACT, which itself would not be actual or be only valuable? What does not exist, or what only values, can not in such a degree reach into this that actually exists, that by this that actually exists, and so far, as it actually exists, would the valuation become proven. The superempirical and to the human reason from the outside accessible working of the divine essence does not only request an ordinary and, therefore, in the former chapter so called bently-double-folded reality of God, but from this working itself follows the superempirical and singular reality, the primereality of God. If God should give to all the empirical, bently-two-folded reality such a character that because of THIS reality the valuation becomes finally proven, then it is clear that the DIVINE REALITY is itself SUPEREMPIRICAL, such one, which is ABOVE all empirical, bently-two-folded reality and, therefore, really THE PRIMEREALITY in the strictest and most unconceivable sense of the word.

Thus requires my valuable way really a like reality, the primereality of God. This primereality of God is as much as the SUPERVALUABLE REALITY.

In conclusion I mention: My valuable way may not entirely eradicate, but substantially smooth the characteristic historical contrasts in civilization, as they appeared on the horizon of human thoughts. These are different interpretations of for history of philosophy so important question, how do we arrive from merely empirical and "unreal" perception to the fundamental and "real" perception, how do we arrive from the ascertainment of mere realities to the ascertainment of parallel valuations. Some assert that this transition is made possible by experiences and that entire valuation is included in the reality and by it proven. This would be, if I judge rightly, the direction of Aristotle and his followers. Others say that this transition is effected by an immediate divine enlightening of the hu-

man reason and that we do not arrive at valuation and valuable things because of reality and real things, but immediately because of a "spiritual aglowing" of the soul from the side of God. This would be the direction of Plato and his followers. But the third group asserts that valuation is the consequence of OUR consideration of valuations and that WE are who in any regard and with our own power effect, create this transition from real things to valuable things. This is the direction of ancient and modern phenomenalism or psychologism which regards the valuation as a merely psychological fact. History of philosophy testifies that the mentioned trinity of these interpretations is repeated and renewed in the cultural development of western thought for more than two thousand years, although not always in such sharpnesses as they are above pointed out. *)

My way is the MIDDLE WAY and most credible. With Aristotle I acknowledge the importance of reality and the importance of experience. Only reality is the basis of valuation. In opposition to Aristotle I assert that valuation is not in reality included and can not be by reality proven. I acknowledge with Plato the unconceivable place of God for the understanding of valuation and parallel perception. I showed that with valuation is given a double, "essential" and "territorial," request for divine reality. Opposing Plato I assert that perception is by no means always an immediate and divine "enlightening" of the soul, but the consequence of that our activity which makes us on the point of perception and error now "meritorious," then "responsible." I agree with old and modern phenomenalists on the psychological importance of the valuation and emphasize the psychological activity of representation and shall emphasize it with the PERSONAL activity in the perception. In opposition to all phenomenalists I affirm that valuation is in spite of this activity not a mere consequence

*) St. Thomas Aquinas's school point out that first direction, St. Augustine's the second and Kant's the third. The historical father of entire phenomenalism is the Greek sophist Protagoras ("Man is the measure of all things, of those which exist, THAT they exist, and of those which do not exist, THAT they may not exist"). Protagoras endorsed this phenomenalism expressly to mathematics, therefore, to the sphere of mere valuations.

of the consideration of valuations, because this consideration is and remains by all its psychological activity MORALLY or NORMATIVELY passive. My way is thus directly culturally-historically in the middle and the most credible way.

The essence of my way is that without reality and valuation would be by principle no activity and objectivity and anything, to where we would ascribe this activity, would slip into nothingness. Abstract them and you abstract everything. Reality and valuation disappear, if we consider them themselves or in connection with this, to where we ascribe them. From this point forward valuation appears as a fact essentially different from reality. Valuation has its content, territory and subjectness. The territory are phenomena of the world and life, but the subjectness all human beings as the alone empirically given rational subjects. Another difference is that the valuation is in connection with its content and territory internally necessary and merely "objectively" proven.

My way to the acknowledgment of the divine essence by reality and valuation is as follows: Both ways resemble and are different from each other. With the valuation is given a double request for a divine original actness. First is this divine act necessary that the valuation gets its own systematical essence, without which it could not have in the universe of phenomena that place which actually belongs to it. Secondly, this divine act is necessary that the valuation becomes fully, most finally and not only imaginately proven. This, the subjectivic side of the valuation, is in a systematical connection with human rationality (unrationality) and the divine actness is necessary that this rationality becomes to us understandable: This rationality separates man from the remaining life upon earth and this rationality requests decisively the acknowledgment of God.

I conclude my way of valuations to God with these legal sides of the valuation: Valuation is in the essence: 1. the valuation of something, e. gr., of the difference, numerical relations, 2. the valuation for something, e. gr., for colors, for different things, 3. the valuation for someone, for all human beings and 4. the valuation by Someone, BY GOD.

14. From reality-valuation to primereality of God. Logos—Etos—Nomos.

Amongst the phenomena of the world and life, in the universe, in this that we can immediately or only mediately perceive, belongs a special place to two singular facts, without which all other things would disappear into nothingness. This is the fact of reality and valuation. Without reality and valuation would not only cease all real and valuable things, any perception of unreal and unvaluable things would be excluded. Reality and valuation disappear into nothingness, if we consider them by themselves or in connection to this, to where we ascribe them. We face a world-wide fundamental puzzle: What itself may be an empty nothingness, should separate other things from nothingness! With this puzzle is given the first request of the superempirical existence of the divine essence, which gives to reality and valuation their systematical substantiality and makes possible that because of them become other things sharply separated from nothingness.

The reality and valuation are on the other side in legal relations to real and valuable things. In these relations rests the difference between them. The relations result from the including difference. The basis of the including of realities is the essence of substantial locality and temporality, the basis of the including of valuations the including by the territory of the valuation, whereby is the real world and the real life the final territory of any valuation accessible to us. Substantial locality and temporality appear to us as an empty nothingness, whether we consider them themselves or in connection with this, to where we ascribe them. Thus is given the second request of a divine original act, which is not more the original act of the reality, but the ORIGINAL ACT OF ALL REAL THINGS. The Including of valuations is an including, which disappears into nothingness, whether we consider it itself or in connection with the necessary territories of the valuation. This we have to say about the main including of valuations, therefore, about the systematical relation of the valuation to valuable things. Thus is given the third request for a divine

original act, which is not more the original act of real things, but the ORIGINAL ACT OF VALUABLE THINGS.

We can distinguish on God, as far as we consider him from the viewpoint of empirically given creation, three sides of his unconceivable essence: Divine Logos, Etos and Nomos. These are old Greek expressions, which remind us of "Thought," "Work and "Law."

I expressed between the lines my convinction that the nature of God surpasses anything, whatsoever human reason could understand and think out. I repeat this my conviction and in this sense may be taken the following discussions, where I show some internal sides of the divine essence. These discussions may be taken, furthermore, as a PERSONAL CONFESSION OF A MAN, TO WHOM A MERELY SCIENTIFIC EFFORT AGAIN RESTORED THE FAITH IN GOD, IMPLANTED ONCE IN THE HOME OF A MOTHERLY EDUCATION, AND WHO BECAME SCIENTIFICALLY CONVINCED THAT ONE OF OUR FIRST AND SYSTEMATICAL DUTIES IS TO PROVIDE FOR THE REAL INTERNAL OR PERSONAL RELATION TO THE DIVINE ESSENCE. If we succede in this, all other thing will be really "given" to us!

The request for this relation is in the essential regard equally valuable to the request that we may consider God Himself and this in a manner, as we would from merely scientific standpoints know Him as That, whom we have to suppose, if the empirically given creation by its existence and legal internal structure should become to us understandable. If this scientific way to God, although only in the sense of some mediate reflexes, does not forbid us to ascribe to God a manifoldness of his own essentialities, the better. Thus may be understood that I ascertain on God a threefold essentiality of divine Logos, Etos and Nomos. The expressions testify that I am in company with the greatest thinkers of the west and east, although their way was pretty different from my way. My may is far away from any unscientific and merely mystical way of thinking. Anyone can follow it, if he sees in science the highest value of life, or he has its unjustification scientifically to show and to prove. No one can say that this way does not want to be especially refuted, because he, who starts on this way, does not

work with scientific means. The experience forces me to mention this expressly. Thus, namely, treated in my own homeland my writings persons, who did not study these writings. The judgment of such people is substantially meaningless, but for all should be this expressly said.

Why did I select the expressions "Logos," "Etos" and "Nomos"? The reason is in the reality and valuation and their relation to real and valuable things. Reality and valuation are systematical members of the "perception," because the perception deals firstly with the question, if this that we perceive, is "real" or "valuable," but in the second place with the parallel question, WHAT is real, and WHAT does value. We can, therefore, the divine original act of reality and valuation call the act of DIVINE perception, of divine PRIMEPERCEPTION. For this reason I call this act LOGOS. The question arrises, why I distinguish divine acts on the point of real and valuable things. This distinction is proven in the systematical difference between reality and valuation. Reality is a fact by content, valuation a fact by content and territory. Reality is in an essentially different relation to real things, than valuation to valuable things. This difference requests a double consideration of the divine original actness. There is the question on "real thing" about that which is realized or ACTUAL. Without real thing would be creation an empty nothingness. The divine original act of real thing is DIVINE actness, PRIMEACTNESS. For this reason I call this ETOS.

The valuation has necessarily its territory. The final territory of the valuation accessible to us is creation. Creation becomes because of the relation of the valuation to valuable thing rationally ordered and LEGALLY REGULATED. Creation is not a heap of merely blindly together thrown or chained single facts. Divine act of valuable thing is divine ACTION, divine PRIMEACTION. I call this action NOMOS. In regard to the systematical relation of God to OUR essence I can characterize the superempirical fundamental trinity as follows: Logos is divine primeperception which effects that we can PERCEIVE anything, Etos divine primeactness which makes that we can perceive SOMETHING, but Nomos divine primeaction which

effects that we can have a true perception and action, for which we are "responsible," responsible to God. *)

I express some thought about the question, if to the outlined conception of God and his essence belongs the character of "primehuman" and ANTHROPOMORFIC viewing. I ascertain that anything men are doing or thinking is so far human as men are this doing. Such an anthropomorfism can not be avoided in all spheres of human activity and is not only the sign of some definite philosophy, but accompanies the most positive natural mathematical trends of thoughts. We can not escape ourselves and this goes for the philosopher as well as for the mathematician. Neither does this anthropomorfism contain any danger for the attaining of our goal: This anthropomorfism is in connection with the question, WHO is thinking or working, but not, if THIS that someone is thinking or working is actually justified. This is but an ORIGINAL anthropomorfism which touches any theoretical thinking and actual working. But we are interested in the CONTENTIVE question of our thoughts, namely, if this that we are think and doing values. The question is about the CONTENTIVE anthropomorfism which would with regard to the given conception of God mean that we brought the divine essence too much near to the essence of—man. Such an anthropomorfism does doubtlessly not stand to this conception. This shows the fact that our human reason is to its objective subject in the opposite relation than the divine. The fundamental support of rationality is but reality and valuation. We have, moreover, to add that we only "touch," "find" them and this would be impossible without the original actness of God which MAKES reality and valuation. We call for this reason the actness of God the singular rationality in the most exclusive and single sense of the word. This is PRIMERATIONALITY of God which alone gives us the full right to speak about some single human, therefore, exnatural, "bent" shadow of divine primerationality of a human rationality.

The difference between both is clear. Whilst our ration-

*) Perception and action gets by Logos the "form" of the perception and action, by Etos the "content" and by Nomos the "binding" character.

ality is on reality and valuation by principle dependent, is the divine rationality independent, because it is the singular and necessary ACTUAL ORIGIN of both. Our rationality is in account of its dependence a double one, rationality in the stricter sense and UNRATIONALITY. Divine rationality is by principle outside of any contrast, outside of any doubleness. What I said about the relation of empirical "reality" to superempirical "primereality," holds also about the relation of our empirical rationality to superempirical divine primerationality. Our rationality has the character of a "bently-double" rationality which supposes the existence of the singular and uniform rationality, of the superrationality as primereality, so is primerationality outside of any contrast, but has considered from the viewpoint of OUR rationality the place of the POSITIVE member. I can make this difference clearer as follows: Rationality is the single NORMATIVE or MORAL fact of life. Our rationality is normatively or morally PASSIVE, but the divine rationality is the singular and normatively or morally ACTIVE rationality. No one can say that my picture of God is merely "human" and thus erroneous. According to my assertion there is no transition from the divine reason to our human reason. We can not speak about a SIMILARITY between divine and human reason. Divine reason is the singular SOURCE and IDEAL which justifies us to speak on the point of men about the rationality as about a SPECIAL FACT not found in the living and dead nature. The setting up of such an ORIGINAL and IDEAL RELATION between divine and human reason is something entirely different from any unallowable "humanizing" of God. More clearness will bring the last chapter, where we start the "essence-viewing way" to the acknowledgment of God. There we shall see God even in the light of an essence-viewing IDEAL of universal fullness, independence and peculiarity.

CHAPTER III.

FROM PERSONALITY TO GOD.

15. Reality, valuation and personality.

We may be many times overcome by the doubt, if anything really exists and if everything is not only a delusion and a play of imagination. Especially may such doubts be manifested towards external phenomena. We may be afterwards conviced that such phenomena had been phenomena, with which did not correspond actual things. Hitherto belong different sensitive illusions, from most common merely seeming hearing to hysterical realitivic representation of whole landscapes which really do not exist. The external nature appears daily with attributes which we have not to regard as real attributes of the nature, so far as this should be the system of actual and from us independent things and happenings. Think about different sounds, colors, lights, temperature, tests and scents, which we so many times ascribe to external phenomena, although to-day the pupils of the higher grades of the normal school know that there are actually no such things and we have to put in the place of such phenomena in the actual nature entirely different facts. This fact may arouse the suspicion that the entire external nature is only a mere "apparition." Can we speak about some REAL world of external apparitions and happenings? Sounds, colors, lights, temperatures, tests and scents are phenomena which alone effect the immediate connection with the nature. Without these phenomena would never come to our minds to speak about the nature as about some special world which is "outside of us," and which we only differently perceive. If to such phenomena does not belong the character of an actual reality, then is also justified the doubt of the reality of the nature itself, which is given only because of those phenomena and has because of these phenomena a meaning. I am not pretending that the question of natural reality would be hereby in advance decided. I could prove, how and why mere phenomena help to protrude to some

actual nature, and why the nature is really actual and not imagined. I am only affirming that on the point of nature are doubts more easely possible, respectively, that such doubts are by no means in advance impossible. It is true that the external nature appears in the light of realities only immediately and that we can not in any way also mediately "prove" its reality. However is this appearance here such that still a special discussion can and must clear it up and more or less confirm it in its credibility. In brief: The reality of the external nature remains in any case more or less credible, but in no instance this reality is and can not be by principle doubtless.

Such doubts St. Augustine experienced in his youth, but these doubts led him to the ascertainment of the reality, and by principle no one can doubt them. Suppose that there are only phenomena which force upon us the thought of an external nature, suppose that we mihgt doubt the reality of this nature. Who can doubt that something appears, that we have "appearances" of external phenomena and happenings? Phenomena are first given by OUR SENSES. These senses deceive us many times. But Augustine asks: Do our senses deceive us also that we AT ALL sense? We do not know, if the world is as it seems to be, but we know that this world actually seems to be such. Our doubting may touch what our senses offer and show on the external nature, but our doubting can not touch our senses. This doutbing can say that the world is not such as our senses represent it to us. This doubting by principle can not eliminate the sensations, it supposes the fact of such sensations: Our sensations may be ever so illusive, they must truly EXIST. We may be mistaken, if the stove seems to be warm, but we can not be mistaken in the ascertainment that we have THE SENSATION OF WARMTH. The stove may not be warm, but it is true that we feel its warmth. Herewith is evident that there are not our sensations that fact which deceives, but that fact is only OUR REASON and ITS RELATION to our sensations. To someone the sensations may not be very credible, but he can only with the help of his reason ascertain and demonstrate, how he can not rely too much upon sensations. Sensations offer different phenomena, but there is the question of reason, if with such phenomena corresponds

some actual world or not. Our reason tells that we have in our sensations to distinguish, what they offer on the outside, in the external nature, and what THEY OFFER THEMSELVES. The doubting touches only the first side of these sensations, but any such doubting shatters by principle on their second side, namely, on our sensations themselves. We can extend this also to our remaining experiences. We do not know, if our thoughts in a given instance are justified, correct, but we know that we have thoughts, that we really think. Augustine had still a special thought about doubting that we can and must doubt anything. Can we also doubt that we are thinking? He, who ascertains the doubt, says Augustine, ascertains the truth and does not more doubt about this that he did ascertains the truth and does not more doubt about this that he did ascertain. Therefore, has everyone, who does doubt, in himself the truth which he can not doubt. We express all this as follows: Our experiences effect that different phenomena of the world and life appear now in the light of "real things," then of "unreal things." If our experiences are from this part in any regard justified, we do not know, moreover, we must in the given instance this very strongly doubt. But in any case remains outside of any doubt that we are experiencing something, representing to us something or that we are thinking, sensing and aiming.

Because of a such doubtless reality of the experience we arrive to a like doubtless reality of THAT who actually has the experiences. I can not doubt that I am sensing, thinking, doutbing, that the sensation, thought, doubt and a similar experience is actually verified. Thus I can the less doubt that there is the question about my sensation, my thought, my doubt. This addition is expressly necessary, if the doutblessnesses of the experience demonstrated by Augustine should not again disappear. If SOMEONE ELSE has like experiences, thinks, senses, doubts like, this I can never strictly know. The reality of this is at least in the essence doubtful like the reality of the external nature. We can in a like manner doubt about both, about this that our experiences show to the outside, but also about the reality OF THESE EXPERIENCES, IF THERE IS NOT THE QUESTION ABOUT OUR, BUT ABOUT OTHER

PEOPLE'S EXPERIENCES. The shown doubtless reality of the experience has only a RELATIVE meaning. It holds only from the viewpoint of that who has the experiences, of the SUBJECT of the experience. In this most important relative meaning becomes by itself doubtless that with the shown doubtless reality of the experience is given the like doubtless reality of this who has this experience, briefly, given the reality of the subject of the experience. If I can not doubt that I am sensing, thinking, doubting, then I can not doubt that there leads a like reality also TO MYSELF who am sensing, thinking, doubting. We can even say that this second doubtlessness is the necessary condition of the first, that the doubtless reality which I ascribe to myself is indispensably necessary, if the pertinent experience may appear in the light of a doubtless reality: I said that TO ME can in such a light appear only—MY EXPERIENCE, and that with that doubtless reality would undispensably disappear the doubtless reality of "my experience." That doubtless reality, about which speaks Augustine, is, therefore, in the first place and undispensably only the reality of that who has the experience and in the second place the reality of his experience. Thus we arrived at the first main point of the present section. Amongst all actual experiences of the world and life has a realitivic essence and truth only one fact, namely, THAT who has the experience, THE SUBJEST of the experience. I intend to speak about a realitivic essence of the PERSONALITY, of the HUMAN and not merely animal or even vegetable subject. But I can prove that we can about the outlined "special" realitivic essence speak only from the viewpoint of a like special, namely, HUMAN or PERSONAL subject.

I said that the doubtlessness of the experience has but a "relative" meaning, it means that the experience is doubtlessly real only in regard to that who has the experience. Also on the point of "himself" returns this relation, because ONLY I can not doubt neither that I am something experiencing, nor that I actually exist: To someone else may be doubtful both: THAT I AM EXPERIENCING AND THAT I AM EXISTING. HEREWITH IS PROCLAIMED A FACT, PRESENTED BY MANY, BUT BY NOBODY YET CLEARLY EXPRESSED, al-

though most important for the correct understanding of the human, personal subject. With this fact I express first that without the "relative" viewpoint we can not speak about any BY PRINCIPLE DOUBTLESS REALITY. If we decline this important addition that something "is for me," "for you," "for him" by principle doubtless, then are all realities, the realities of ALL experiences of the world and life and with them the realities of "our experiences" as of ourselves—realities of the same degree and not any of them has such a precedence before the others that it would be BY ITSELF DOUBTLESS. There is no empirically given phenomenon which would be a phenomenon BY ITSELF, the reality of anything is only the reality "by something else": The reality of the phenomenon p/1 is given only by the reality of another phenomenon p/2, and there is not any empirically given phenomenon p/3 which would be by itself real and have the character of a SYSTEMATICALLY and not only relatively doubtless reality. Nothing on earth has a such systematical doubtlessness, neither our experience nor we ourselves who have this experience: Our experiences and ourselves belong to realitively conditioned members of the universe. But amongts all phenomena of the world and life has our experience and ourselves at least the character of a relative realitivic doubtlessness and our task is more exactly to determine this relation. Herewith I arrive at the second part of the above ascertained special fact.

If it is true that by principle I can not doubt the reality of my experience neither the reality of myself, then must be the reason in the character of my personal essence which enables me to ascertain this doubtlessness. We shall also on the point of zoology speak about an animal spirituality, an animal experience and subject of this experience. But who could think that to the animal subject could its experience and itself appear in the light of some fundamental (by principle) doubtlessness? Animal life and spirituality is empirically given, real, but this reality is systematically conditioned, therefore, systematically doubtful. This animal spirituality can not get the character of a relative realitivic doubtlessness, because the animal subject has not the capability of an ascertainment "by principle," neither the capability of that IMMEDIATE CON-

SCIOUSNESS of the own experience and of itself which is in man the indispensable condition that he can not doubt the reality of HIS momentary experience and of HIMSELF. Animal is living, as we say, by the day and to it never dawns that light which gives to US the character of personal and responsible beings: Animal is in all its activity only "pushed," "forced." Man alone is capable and conscious to "push" or to "force." This consciousness is in an essential connection with that parallel and only to man given SELFCONSCIOUSNESS which effects that to man appears his experience as he himself in the light of a doubtless reality. We arrived at the "realitivic truth" of personality. Amongst all phenomena of the world and life has only the experience and the subject of the experience the character of some doubtless reality. This holds only for the subject, of whose experience there is the question, and the doubtless reality is primarily dependent on the like doubtless reality of the subject of the experience. All this is finally true from the viewpoint of a very special subject which has the power to ascertain something as "doubtless," "undisputable." I shall intensively discuss the essential side of such subjects. I call them personal subjects. This brief disposition of the "relative" realitivic doubtlessness I express as follows: This doubtlessness holds only for the personal subject and for his experience, for himself and no other personal subject.

I call the realitivic truth of personality its PERCEIVING realitivic truh, because it tells, how the personal subject perceives his experience and himself. The realitivic truth of the personality is substantial, essential. What means this truth? In younger years I was thinking about my parents and my dependence on them. Momentarily it came to my mind that I can not be in every regard dependent on my parents as the pot is dependent on the potter who made it. It might be that everything that I see and feel within myself is entirely dependent on different invironments, that all is made only by others and by other things. Suddenly came over me a doubtless consciousness that something remains within me that by its own nature can not be "made." What is this? This is MYSELF (my ego!). I was at that time occupied with different Darwin's doctrines and had a presentiment of a such thought.

Directly absurd seemed the thought that "I" would be a mere effect of different former happenings, as this might be for anything else within me and around me. I discovered myself in the light of some mystical independence, for which I did not know any real reasons. Later on I discovered that we can only upon this fundamental our parents LOVE, but not only rejoice about them, as the hungry rejoices about food. This happening in my youth remained untill to-day decisive.

The question is about the reality of the PERSONAL subject. This reality appears in the light of such a SINGULAR EMPIRICALLY GIVEN—reality, as it holds for all REMAINING realities of the empirically given world and life.

This place of the reality of the personal subject is not contrary to the fact that these realities are dependent, conditioned realities. With the instance of the mentioned happening I intended to say that personal subjects do not result thus, as anything else in the world is resulting. It is, therefore, credible that the resulting of the personal subject is not more any "natural" resulting, and that we have for the understanding of that dependence which is characteristic also for all empirically given personal subjects (I (ego) am not "made," but I did "not make" myself) to rely to outside and beyond all empirically given creation. Nobody may take me wrongly. I do not exclude the most different dependences of man from his nearer and remoter natural and human environment. Everyone in modern times feels and experiences these dependences daily within himself. But in spite of all can everyone ascertain that most internal fact of his essentiality. If he looks it well and unpartially over, he might agree that it is nothing "caused" or from anything else "made." This fact is HE HIMSELF. And if he proceeds on this way, he will soon see that he has just then, when he may also himself realitively deduct and fully understand, to relinquish all empirically given creation and rely upon the superempirical action of God. A human being is, therefore, on the moment, when he CONSIDERS HIMSELF, very near to this that we call real RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE, as I do not doubt that the fundamental psychological root of religion is in this double consciousness of man: That we ourselves are not a mere effect of natural happenings and that for

this reason leads from OURSELVES an immediate way to God. This consciousness accompanies all human life, and against it does not prove anything the fact that we encounter people who refuse any thought of a supernatural essentiality. Such people are acting so only in their theoretical conception of the world and life, but atheists overcome moments, when they become conscious of themselves and glare in amazement: In such moments are all their theories gone! The common consequence is two-fold. These atheists may "convert," as we like to say, or they begin to doubt everything and live struggling only for momentary advantages. *)

Most important is, furthermore, that we have besides the shown realitivic fact of the personality still its special and double VALUABLE TRUTH. Hitherto belongs first the fact that only personal subjects "valuably" live and act. Only to the personal subject can appear something in the light of valuation, whilst the boundary of any perceiving of all animal subjects is given with mere reality. The personal subject has the power to "perceive" something in the real sense of the word or to "err" about something. Only real perception and error touches immediately the question, if something values or does not value, not the question, if something exists or does not exist. If valuation should be a fact besides mere reality (and we have been speaking about this clearly in the first and second chapter), then we must grant that this valuation is accessible only to the human, personal subject. For this reason we can only on the point of man speak about a normative or moral development. We say about man that he lives and acts now as he SHOULD live and act, then again as he SHOULD NOT live and act. Who could something the like ascribe to animal and even to vegetable life? All that "Thou shall" or "Thou shall not" and all from this "shall" or "shall not" originating RESPONSIBILITY of man is finally based in the fact that only human personal life "values" and that this valuation is only to man perceivably accessible. Thus we can speak about a perceivable valuable

*) He, who relinquishes HIMSELF, relinquishes also God, and he, who forgets God, forgets HIMSELF. It remains for him only the tragedy of successes which become null the more approaches the last hour of the life. There are such happy-unhappy people everywhere, I am sorry to state.

fact of personality. This truth makes valuation a fact besides reality accessible only to a person. It is in the strictest connection with the perceivable fact of reality.

The doubtlessness of reality is essentially and immediately the doubtlessness of valuation, namely, the valuation of my conception that I am experiencing that I am existing. Reality is outside of any doutblessness, but we may still doubt, if our ascertainment of the reality is also valuable. The doubtless reality is the doubtless valuation of the reality.

The personality is, furthermore, a substantial valuable truth. The valuation has a subjectness, and this is the personal human subject. There is no valuation which would not be the valuation for someone, who has to care for it and act accordingly, if his life should be correct. The connection between the valuation and the personal subject is a substantial valuable fact of the personality. The valuation would cease, if the subjects, the human persons would disappear.

In the first and second chapter I proved that a strict view of reality and valuation leads to the acknowledgment of the divine essence. Reality and valuation are strictly connected with personality. Besides the shown way by realities and valuations we have to grant a like PERSONAL way to the acknowlegment of God. This way we start in the following section.

16. Accidental and substantive.

The teacher in the normal school explains to the pupil the difference between "substantives" and "atributives" and adds that the first mean THINGS, the second QUALITIES of these things. Stone, rock, lawn, hut, chair are instances of "things," color, form, weight, density, temperature, hight instances of "qualities." We express qualities attrabutively, e. gr., the stone is grey, oval, angular, heavy, high. This difference appearing from the different linguistic use has a deep essential meaning. Thing and quality! The distance between both is so deep and broad that we have it not only on the external nature, but transfer it in a good sense daily to the sphere of own and other people's spirituality, although it may have its natural place only on the point of the external nature and appeared to man

here at first in its speciality. Man observed on the sphere of external phenomena the actual meaning of this that possesses qualities, but is itself no quality. He observed, how these phenomena change, but that such changes do not touch their own existence. Thus came to his mind that there is necessity to distinguish between phenomena themselves and something "in them" or "because of them," what belongs to these phenomena and defines them, but is in itself something entirely different and from those phenomena essentially distinct. Moreover, man soon observed that those phenomena may be actually different, not as they appear TO HIM. He could more easier distinguish between the phenomena and anything he ascribes to them. Thus was upon man impressed on the point of the external nature from the beginning of time the doubtless importance of the present distinguishing between things and their actual or only imagined qualities. By and by man transferred this by similar dispositions to the sphere of his own or other people's life, where he observed important intercourses of life and such changes of life which do not abstract from the pertinent life its own existence. Man observed even, how may appear to him also other people's or his own life in the light of specialities which actually do not belong to it. He began on the point of life very early to distinguish between something that we may call "life itself" and between its actual and imagined specialities and qualities. Very early were used so called "surnames" which point to the part of life, where life has in fact qualities, but is itself no quality. In the further development were added linguistic expressions for this that we call our or other people's "experiences" or "spiritual" specialities of life upon earth. Think about expressions as "seeing," "hearing," "desiring," and in still further development about expressions as goodness, meanness, sense, nonsense, diligence, laziness etc. Thus distinguishes the common people and this distinguishing points to our distinguishing between "thing" and "quality" or is to this distinguishing very strictly related.

There is the question about a new distinguishing and our first task is to try to define the real meaning of this distinguishing. It seems that this distinguishing is exhausted with the question, WHAT and HOW something is or may be. On the

point of "thing" we would answer the question, WHAT something is or should be, but on the point of "quality" the question, HOW this is or should be. Briefly: THING would be the WHATNESS of the phenomenon, its QUALITY the HOWNESS. I may add that we find everywhere, where there is the question about things and their qualities, this relation between "what" and "how" realized. For example: When we say that the phenomenon before us is a "mountain," we express what we see. When we say that this mountain is high, scraggy, we express WHAT SORT of a mountain we see. This fact is not true in reverse. The question, what and how something is or should be, concerns only the relation between the thing and its qualities. We say about color and sound that they have such and such qualities, about color that it is light or dark, about sound that it is high or low. In such examples we answer both questions, WHAT do we see and HOW is this that we hear or see: This is "color" or "sound" and this color or sound has these and these "qualities." It is evident that color or sound are NOT THINGS, but something that can be only a quality of the thing and that we ascribe to things, when we speak about the green pasture or the murmuring brook.

What follows? Evidently the fact that where there is the question about thing and quality, we have a "what" and a "how," but that this is not true in reverse, because we have this "what" and "how" there, where there is the question about "qualities," but not about things. The reason for this fact can be proven. We have "qualities" which are "whatnesses," and "whatnesses" which are "qualities." Such a whatness is anything that may be "anything" and not a nothingness. For our distinction between things and qualities are of importance only such "whatnesses" which by principle can not be "qualities." "Things" are such whatnesses. The pasture has its qualities, but itself is no quality. We can not ascribe the pasture to something thus, as we ascribe to it color, extent, form. Similarly for mountain, stone, table, generally for all that we call—thing.

Qualities are all hownesses, but things only such whatnesses which are not qualities, hownesses of other phenomena. This conception of thing seems to be still too broad. Fountain

of Youth does not exist. It is a whatness which can not be the quality of another phenomenon. We can not ascribe to it something thus, as we ascribe to it color, extent, form. But who could call it a thing? There exists not only a linguistic difficulty, but we are restricted to regard it as a thing. We call things phenomena as they seem to be actual, real. The reality must be taken as the actual, empirical giveness of phenomena. Excluded are "valuable" facts, valuations. We have amongst phenomena which only value "whatnesses" of both kinds, whatnesses which are qualities, and whatnesses which can not be qualities. Take the example of "numeral"! The numeral is a valuable fact, it can not be real, it values. But numeral is a whatness which has its qualities and differs by them from such phenomena which are not numerals, and it is a whatness which can not be a quality. On the street is a certain number of stones. This number belongs to these stones, but it is not a quality of these stones. Who would for this reason call numeral a "thing"? The use of the name "thing" would be here less proper than in Fountain of Youth. There is no Fountain of Youth, but it is at least POSSIBLE, it is something that by its own nature does not exclud that it may be actually realized. Searchers for Fountain of Youth would be very happy, if they would somewhere actually find a Fountain of Youth. In this case would it become a "thing" as such things are other real fountains upon earth. Numeral is something that by its own nature only values, can not be real, it is not a thing.

My definition is: Things are whatnesses, of which are true two tenets: That they are not qualities and empirically given, real. I insist that the second addition is essentially and not only liguistically necessary. I confirm this fact with the example of Fountain of Youth still psychologically. We can be to Fountain of Youth in a double psychological relation. Only one of these relations allows to consider it from the viewpoint of a thing. This relation is realized, when Fountain of Youth is in the imagination represented to us thus that we remain only on its "superficies," see its "color," "form," "width," "depth," and "fountain itself" appears as some composition of color, form, width, depth. Such a fountain has not yet the character of an existence, to which we would ascribe that color, form, width,

depth, neither it is the mere CONSEQUENCE of such or similar qualities. As long as we consider Fountain of Youth thus, can we not call it a thing. But the same Fountain of Youth we can consider differently and we do this, when it is in the imagination represented to us thus that we do not remain on its superficies, but go to its "depth." It appears suddenly as an entity which has the qualities, but is not a mere consequence of these its qualities, it is something "behind" these qualities, something that APPEARS because of its qualities and may this phenomenon be justified or only imagined. It is in the first case something essentially different from the second. The merely superficiesive psychological viewpoint gives to Fountain of Youth the character of something which is upon color, form, width, depth and similar things built up, but the psychological viewpoint by depth a view as of a fact which ITSELF has these colors, form, width, depth or appears thus. Fountain of Youth steps out in the first case as some mere and timeless consequence of the qualities, in the second it is the actual or imagined BEARER of these qualities. Only in this second meaning we would call it a thing, if it would be actually realized.

In the following section shall be this distinction between whatnesses which are not things, and whatnesses which are things more enlightened and proven. I will there make more clear my standpoint to the opposite Meinong's conception of things. According Meinong's conception could be possible but one, namely, that second and in the example of Fountin of Youth outlined merely "consequential" conception of things. In this connection may suffice for the opinion that it is better to give to that mentioned basical relation between "thing" and "quality" a more convenient name as it is in history of philosophy common. The thing we call SUBSTANTIVE (substantia), its qualities ACCIDENTALS (accidentia). These expressions are better, because they tell linguistically both, how we have to proceed, if some howness should appear as quality of the thing, still because of these hownesses to the "depth," untill we touch "behind" these hownesses something, to where these hownesses actually or seemingly lead or belong, but is in its own essence not a mere consequence of such qualities. Things are substantives and substantives are real whatnesses which

are not qualities. The perfomed transnaming of thing is, furthermore, recommandable, because it adapts to the undisputed fact that we have this difference in life, in the spiritual world and not only in the external nature. This difference is in the psychological world directly ideally realized. From this viewpoint appear all external natural substantives in the light of some substantial imperfectness and defectiveness. I appeal to the example of "surnames" which means that the difference is also for the spiritual world characteristic. E. gr., "I" am to my experience doubtlessly in the relation of some substantive to its accidental. I am representing to me something, thinking about something, perceiving, apisring something, briefly, I am "eperiencing" this and that. But my consciousness tells me that I AM not any of these experiences, neither a sum of different timeless consequences of such experiences. I have experiences, they lead to me, but I am not an experience. When we look upon our neighbor, is forced upon us the same sharp difference between "him" and his "experience," and may be even so strictly true that HE appears only because of his experience.

We can ascertain a full parallelness between substantives and accidentals, as we have them in the external nature and in the spiritual world. The spiritual substantive must be first a whatness which is not a quality. "Santa Claus," "Robin Hood," "Hiawatha" are not spiritual substantives, we consider them as mythical or in the imagination of the people living persons. Such persons would become substantives, if they would be realized. "To me" leads the experience, but myself I can not ascribe to something as I ascribe this experience to myself. My experience is my accidental. I ask: "WHAT AND WHO AM I AND HOW AM I? The first question I answer: I AM, the second: So and so I am LIVING. This is similarly true for you, for him, for any person. We can Robin Hood ascribe to nobody and to nothing thus as we ascribe to him this and that experience.

The parallelness is complete. We encounter whatnesses which are not qualities and they become substantives, if they are real. This parallelness goes still further and becomes important there, where such spiritual whatnesses appear from the viewpoint of the consideration by superficies and depth.

We consider such whatnesses as consequences of experiences or as entities which have experiences, but are not experiences, neither a sum or an affix of experiences. I can also "myself" consider thus only from the viewpoint of the experience, and if I do so, I seem to be some ordered or unordered "connection" between the experiences. This consideration is superficial, external, and in this case I can not ascribe to myself a substantivic character. But I can consider myself thus that I "sniff" myself after my experience and go to the depth of my essence. In this case I become conscious of myself. This consideration is to the depth, to the centrum, thus I become a real substantive. As on the point of external phenomena, so is on the point of life the question about the direction, if we consider ourselves superficially, externally, or by depth, centrally. The difference is that upon both spheres is forced upon us more the superficial consideration from entities which actually do not exist, but from actual entities more the central consideration. For this reason appear actual living beings as substantives, unactual as groups of the experience. As we call Mt. Elias a substantive, but say about Fountain of Youth that it would be a substantive, if it would be real, so we call "ourselves" substantives, but say about Robin Hood that he would be a substantive, if he would not be only a product of folklore. In regard to this comparition between externally natural and internally spiritual substantives anyone can see, why I linguistically changed my primary conception of "thing" to the conception of "substantive." The reason is in the decisive difference between them which forbids to call spiritual substantives, as me, you, him, mere THINGS. It fits the language that we call centrally considered external phenomena, as Mt. Elias, coal, stone, THINGS, but we would force upon the language a violence, if we would call internal centrally considered phenomena "things."

This new differenziation is broader than the first between thing and its qualities. Only external substantives are "things" (res, Ding). Internally spiritual substantives would deserve a special name, but later discussions will show that they are PERSONAL beings. Further on we will become scientifically-theoretically convinced that the basical essence of

PERSONALITY is the essence of the internal spiritual SUBSTANTIVE. All substantives, it means, all centrally considered entities are divided in "things" and in "personalities." *)

Herewith is given the direction for further discussions, but also a clear connection with basical thoughts in the first and second chapter. Keep in mind the "realitivic" character of the substantive. We must examine the essence of mere "thing" and its relation to pertinent qualities. We will have to show the thing from the viewpoint of the central consideration and what remains of it, if we consider it only superficially, externally (formally). Then we must discuss in detail the internal substantive, therefore, this that in the given life appears as a "personality." Here we will have to turn our attention to the viewpoint of both considerations, by depth and by superficies. The further question will be, if there are still important and legal TRANSITIONS between things and persons. The reader may get a presentiment that our study of such transitions will be in the essence equal to the most important question: Which place has "zoology" and "botany," what about "animal soul," is it a thing or near to person?

17. The essence of substantiveness and accidentalness.

Let us consider some natural thing, say, a stone in the street! On the wholeness of the stone we distinguish two things: The stone itself and what makes the stone a stone and separates is from other things. We distinguish between the stone as a "thing" and its "qualities." These qualities are its color, hardness, form, extension, density, temperature. Some of these facts are appearently not real qualities of the ACTUAL stone, but without the stone these qualities could not be realized. How could extension or hardness be realized thus that this thing "has" it? We distinguish between extension and extent thing, between hardness and hard thing, and extension and hardness can be realized only as the extension and the hard-

*) This differenziation is basical for the present writing, and history of the human race is essentially the evolution of the ACTUAL appreziation of the basical difference between mere things and real personal life. Vide my "Philosophy."

ness of—something which itself is no extension or hardness. This legality holds: The natural quality can be realized only as the quality of something which is not this quality. We can even say that the realization of the quality is but the realization of the "thing" which is defined by this quality: That there EXISTS somewhere extension or hardness, means, that there EXISTS an extent or hard thing. We can from the stone in the street remove all its qualities and can picture these qualities still very vividly. Colors can be given without any connection. The most primary "sensations," upon which is evolutionarilly built up the experience, are experiences which correspond with natural qualities and not with natural things (e gr., senastion of "color," "temperature," "sound"). How then, when the qualities seem actually realized, how about the REAL extension, the REAL hardness? I answer that in any case the fact remains that the conception of extension or of hardness is the conception of an extent or hard THING. The reality of the quality is but the reality of the thing, the reality of the extension or hardness of the stone the reality of the extent or hard stone. We revert now this tenet and ask: In which relation is thing to its qualities? In answered this question twice, in my "Introduction in Philosophy—Uvod v Filozofijo" and in my "Philosophy—Filozofija." *)

This answer I have essentially to correct. I wrote in my "Philosophy" as follows: "Try in the instance of the stone in the street to remove from the stone all its qualities, its hardness, determination, color, weight, form. If you fully remove these qualities, then there would be nothing left of the stone. This is generally true, iron, sugar, wood become a nothingness. All things are dependent on their qualities and this dependence is more immediate, more internal than the dependence of the qualities or things. Things disappear if we remove their qualities into nothingness, without regard that without these qualities they can not be realized."

According to my conception at that time hold two things: Qualities would be on things entirely independent, it means,

*) "Uvod v Filozofijo" 1921, Tiskovna Zadruga, Ljubljana pag. 75-87 and pag. 177-182. Then "Philosophy" pag. 91-95.

they would be and remain these qualities, colors, sounds, temperatures, although they would not be realized as qualities of things, but things would be on the natural qualities by their own extemporal essence so dependent that without them they would cease not only to exist, but to be something. This conception affords a far reachnig correction. Remember the discussions in the former section. We can consider things in two ways, SUPERFICIALLY OR BY DEPTH, INTERNALLY. My former conception of thing which regards it as some extemporal consequence of its qualities rest upon superficial conception. This fact requests an enlightening and proof. Keep in mind that important and double spiritual relation in thing which has been with regard to the superficial consideration of the nature outlined in the former section on the example of Fountain of Youth. Internally considered stone is an entity by itself which is not a mere consequence of the qualities which WE ascribe to the stone.

Each of these considerations we must examine separately. Superficial consideration starts from single qualities, colors, sounds, forms, but does not remain on these qualities. It ascends "above" them and arrives at phenomena which we call "things," although there is the question about the superficial consideration of things which regards things as some characteristic "groups" or "wholenesses" of qualities. We call this spiritual way to the thing the FORMATIVE way and my teacher Meinong asserted that there is no any other way. This way is similar to the way we start, when we ascend from single sounds to "melodies," from single colors and shadows to "pictures." About the thing at which we arrive by this formative way holds both: A "thing" is together with the qualities given merely BY CONTENT and belongs to "objects of the higher order" which are built up upon objects of the "lower order," in our example, on objects (single colors, sounds, temperatures) which we call "qualities" of these things. Thing steps out as the extemporal consequance of its qualities which must be given by content. The qualities are represented to us and together with them are represented "things" which WE ourselves have formed with the help of those qualities. Such things are objects of the higher order, because they are upon their qualities built up, as melody

is built up upon sounds. Still one thing is characteristic. We can never because of ONE quality come to thing, we must have MORE such qualities, colors, sounds. We can only single givenesses "gather" and "form." What follows? Things obtained thus are generally not REAL THINGS and the single qualities are not real qualities of these things. Who could call sounds qualities of melody? Melody is by its qualities distinct from objects of the higher order (picture, mere relation). Single sounds are not qualities of melody, they are not qualities at all, but the necessary fundamental or SUBSTRATUM of melody. This holds for all formally obtained "things" towards their entirely incorrectly called "qualities."

Meinong's formative consideration of thing becomes less credible. Touched is herewith also OSTWALD'S fundamental defect of the conception of things, although this naturalist inspired me that I embrassed for a long time the similar Meinong's conception. I was of the opinion that the naturalist has to speak there, where there is the question about natural things. I was mistaken. Ostwald's instance shows, how naturalists go astray in an empty and fruitless "philosophizing" and "speculizing" then, when they try to give FUNDAMENTAL expressions of the nature which essentially transpass all this that the physical experiment is able to do. This happens, when there is the question about STRICTER PERCEIVINGLY THEORETICAL and PSYCHOLOGICAL questions of the external world. Therefore is, to allege only one example, one of the most feeble "conceivable theory" which appeared years ago amongst naturalists in the writings of MORITZ SCHLICK. Against the formative concept of thing speaks, moreover, a special, I may say, EVOLUTIONAL viewpoint. The conception of thing is not only scientifically but also for life ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND NECESSARY CONCEPTION OF THE HUMAN RACE. A being who would not have the view for real things, would be left to the mercy of many times ruinous influence of his environs. We desire real food, look for actual paths. As long as nature would be represented to us as something that we have ourselves formed and has the value of facts, of whose nonreality to-day we do not doubt, so long would be that for the successful enduring of

man uncondiitonally necessary acting and doing impossible. The conception of thing belongs to the most primary conseption men must have then, when they have not a developed capability of own forming of natural phenomena. Experience shows that the child ascertains all kinds of things in the period, when it is still blind for those entities which we call "pictures," "melodies." It points with the finger to different phenomena, ascertains first things. The fight for existence requests even from animals to ascertain things from their environment. Nobody will ascribe the capability of a forming of audible and visible givenesses to animals.

We distinguish between the formative superficial and the touching central consideration of natural things. The second is basically and evolutionally original. The formative is leading to things only upon the fundamental of more single phenomena, one phenomenon would be by principle of no help. In the central is true the contrary. One phenomenon suffices. We hear one sound and ask: "What is there sounding"? We feel a bit of warmth and progress to warm thing. So from color to colored thing, from fragrance to fragrant thing. Anyone can ascertain this fact and will agree that such a transition from "qualities" to something that has to have these qualities is basical and original. Such a transition appears as a "touching," "central," "intensive" consideration. When we are aware by this way of something, we descend to the depth and touch upon something that is BEHIND those single qualities. It is by depth, because it does not lead "above" phenomena and does not show these things as something that may be built up upon them by content, but leads BEHIND and BELOW them and shows things as something that these qualities has or BEARS them. It is touching, explaining, not only representing. Phenomena assists us to come to thing, we touch, find it, it is not represented to us. When we see the color or hear the sound, we touch the colored or sounding thing. The evolutionary precedence of this touching consideration by depth is even proven by civilization and history. A consequence is that man of the mythical period searched BEHIND all natural phenomena for mysterious powers which made him visible, audible and otherwise sensible natural manifestations so mysterious and

somehow fatally demonical. If man of those times had at his disposition the evolutionarly later and own forming of phenomena, then had appeared to him the nature "clear" and in any regard fully "dismembered." It leads finally to REAL and not only so called THINGS, to SUBSTANTIVES. I call it SUBSTANTIVIC, the second formative, the superficial merely SUPERSUBSTANTIVIC consideration. It immediately helps that may be represented to us supersubstantivic entities which are not things.

The costumary conception of thing must be corrected. The basical outlet is the place which immediately leads to phenomena in the wholeness of all so called nature. These phenomena form the boundary between things and facts which are mere consequences by content of such phenomena. Those things are real substantives, but those facts are mere supersubstantives which value, but are not realitivic entities. With this position corresponds the double internal psychological relation to all immediately sensitive phenomena. In both cases we start from these phenomena, but when we have to come to things, then our consideration must be by depth and touching, whilst the superficial consideration leads only to supersubstantivic wholenesses which are not things. We see colors, hear sounds, sense warmth. Our further way may be a double one: From these colors, sounds, warmths we go in the direction of this that appeared to us colored, loud, warm. This way is the evolutionarily original and basical. If we go to depth, we explain, touch the thing. Or we go from the phenomena in the direction of this that is upon them extemporally built up and what we ourselves built up upon the substartum of these phenomena. This way is later and different. On this way we arive at supersubstantivic entities, it means, to Meinong's "Objects of the higher order" which are not things. I essentially correct my former conception of the BASICAL RELATION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE TO ITS QUALITIES. I have been speaking about the systematically extemporal dependence of the thing on its qualities and ascertained that also the thing would disappear into nothingness, if we would abstract all this that we daily ascribe to it. Now is evident that this conception holds only for the superficially formative consideration. Into nothingness would

disappear only supersubstantives. They are real things, our means to touch the things. He, who would abstract them, would remove the possibility to come to things. The removing is different from the thought that in such a case would disappear things, substantives THEMSELVES.

Other specialities obtrud upon us. The first is in a strict connection with the difference between REPRESENTATION and TOUCHING. Represented to us can be only real and valuable things, reality and valuation we touch. This is true for any substantive. We can represent to us phenomena, colors, sounds and supersubstantivic entities, pictures, melodies, forms. Phenomena and products of the formative consideration of nature have the value of a full representation. Not so for the products of the consideration by depth. For any thing or substantive is true: Substantives are basical facts of creation, we can touch, but not represent them to us. Thing and reality are one and the same. Without both there would be not any empirical world. On thing appears a "realitive" truth and in this truth we have to search for reasons that nonactual, nonreal entities are by principle not things. This undisputable realitivic essence of things allows an enlightening.

We discussed the SUBSTANTIAL and FORMAL locality and temporality and their difference. They are strictly connected with the reality, moreover, any definition of them is only their realitivic definition. To be here, there, earlier, now . . . means TO BE, TO EXIST. When we define phenomena, we do not answer the question, what they are, but IF THEY ARE, HOW ARE THEY. The basical essence of locality and temporality is the relation of reality to reality. This is not true for the FORMAL locality and temporality, which is to the contrary a real "definition" and helps answer the question what phenomena are (this is something oval, an oval thing, this something protracted, a protracted thing) and not the question, IF THEY EXIST. We ascertained that we are "viewing," "is represented to us" only the formal locality and temporality, whilst the substantial definition is unviewvable, merely touching, as it holds for any consideration. A new fact appears. Without the substantial local and temporal definition would be the central consideration impossible. When we will from color,

sound, warmth come to colored, aloud, warm thing, then we have color, sound, warmth locally and temporally to DISPLACE ("there" it lightens, "here" is warm.) Without this local definition we would view, discover colors, sounds, but never would come to our mind this that appears colored, aloud. We can observe this mediately on the child.

There is a connection between the central or substantivic and the substantial local and temporal consideration of phenomena. Single phenomena open the way to things. This way is effected because of the parallel substantial local and temporal definition of phenomena. SUBSTANTIALLY LOCAL AND TEMPORAL LOCALIZATION makes possible the central consideration and leads to things. Herewith is given also the place of the formal locality and temporality. The internal way may be by depth or superficial. The first is ALWAYS AND NECESSARY connected with the cotemporal substantivic local or temporal consideration, the second USUALLY with the formal.

I may give my new conception of natural thing. Thing is a WHATNESS and a SELFWHATNESS, it can not be a quality or an accidental. Secondly, thing is a real giveness. The reality of accidentals is the reality of things, to which we ascribe these qualities. Things can, thirdly, not be represented to us, we only touch them. How should we prove the difference between reality and thing? The difference is psychological, about the central consideration of single phenomena. It leads to things and realities. Thing becomes centrally considered reality. The fourth sign is the subtantivic character, the fifth the perceptively conception and independence on given phenomena. These phenomena are helpmates to come to things, but they do not attain their essence. The substantivic consideration is indissolubly connected with the substantially local and temporal definition of things, whereby follows, sixth, that the systematical essence of things is a local and temporal defined whatness.

Briefly: Thing is a real substantivic whatness, selfwhatness which we immediately find upon the substratum of the substantivic consideration of phenomena, and which is on these

phenomena beingly independent, but by the own essence substantially and temporally defined. *)

18. The personal substantiveness and accidentalness.

With the question of the personal substantive we abondon the sphere of dead, mechanical nature and enter the threshhold OF LIFE. This fact we must hencefort keep in mind that may not disappear important specialities which are characteristic for living substantives. The reader is aware that the question about personalities is the question of the highest point of life which is life, not only some poetical metamorphosis. The common and shortest way to that life is doubtlessly the way of our EXPERIENCE. Experiences are sensations, representations, thoughts as also feelings and aspirings. They are abundant in daily life, but no experience is in the external nature. Poets are used to say that nature feels, thinks, senses and aspires, they tell, how the earth rejoices in summer time at the moisture of rain and in winter time at the cover of snow, but these are but beautiful comparitions which have their origin in times of a mythical viewing of the world and life and have no fundamental. All such comparisions rest upon an act of human life, upon the innate effort of men to put in their environs anything that they experience, that bothers and torments them. This effort has as consequence the known PERSONIFICATION of facts which have nothing to do with life.

I ascertain that my conception of personal substantive rests upon the request and acknowledgment of a sharp boundary between the world of the external, visible and unsensible nature and the world of the internal, visible and sensible, but nevertheless, actual life, between the world of external and dead CORPORALITY and the world of internal and living SPIRITUALITY. I do not deny the different legal connections

*) This definition proves, why the systematical accidental conception of PHYSICS is the conception of WOVING. Physics is the science of things and has in the accidental regard to repose primarily upon phenomena which are in a systematical connection with the substantial locality and temporality. "Moving" is by its own nature SUBSTANTIALLY LOCAL AND SUBSTANTIALLY TEMPORAL CHANGING.

between these two worlds, but decisively assert that only the sphere of life, only the sphere of spirituality is that sphere, where we find PERSONAL substantives and PERSONAL accidentals.

The most characteristic side of life is the EXPERIENCE. This side leads to so called "person" or "personal substantive." I mention first that experiences are entities which by principle can not be actually realized. Experiences would vanish, if should not be realized also HE, WHO has experiences. Wheresoever appears a sensation, representation, thought, a feeling or desire, there appears and must appear that who senses, to whom is something represented, who feels and desires. Without this addition the experience necessarily would collapse. Experiences, if we compare them with pertinent phenomena of the external and dead nature, belong to such accidentals which by principl can not be realized. The former discussions convinced us that the reality of single and sensitively given natural phenomena is the reality of pertinent THINGS, to which we the phenomena ascribe or which appear in the light of such phenomena. Thus is also the reality of the experience substantially and finally only the reality of THAT, WHO has the experience. There is an essential difference between those externally natural and these internally life-accidentals. We will see that experiences are not mere "PHENOMENA" which may help us to arrive at that, who has them, experiences are actual entities. For experiences hold both tenets: The actual entity of experiences is dependent on the actual entity of that, who has experiences, and it is by them defined. Experiences are real ACCIDENTALS, whilst that, who has experiences, is by principle not an "accidental." When we say that we sense, that something is represented to us, or that we think, feel and aspire, then we ascribe to us experiences. We ascribe them also to our neighbor. But who can "himself" or his "neighbor" to anything or anyone ascribe thus? Experiences are accidentals, but those, who have them, are real SUBSTANTIVES.

This important fact is immediately evident. Experiences are accidentally defining entities. But the realizing of the accidentals is the realizing of this that should be by that accidental defined. It follows that the final territory of the accidental or

definition is a fact which is not an accidental, not a definition. The realitivic territory of experiences is those who have them, to "him" they lead and "him" they define. "He" is by his nature not an accidental, not a definition, this "he" is a substantive. Important is the distinction between the externally corporal and the internally spiritual world. "He," who has experiences, is not something externally corporal, this "he" belongs to the internally spiritual world, he is a REAL INTERNAL SPIRITUAL SUBSTANTIVE. He, who would intreprete this differently,would have to think that the "body" experiences,that our brain senses, sees, thinks, feels and aspires. Such a conception would mean an entire denying of any difference between the corporal and spiritual world. In scientific circles is this conception defeated. The externally corporal nature does not experience, is not that "he," who should be by the experience defined and whom have the experiences as their necessary substantive. This "he" is of an internally spiritual character. I call him the SUBJEST or PERSON of the experience. Subjects, persons are substantives. For years I have been of the opinion that a substantivic character leads only to HUMAN, but not to animal and plant subjects. I have to correct my former opinion. *)

The experience is the accidental defining entity for any experience, human or animal. The realization of both is bound to the realization of the pertinent subject, to a substantive. There are human and animal persons. The discussions later on will open a deeper view upon this distinction. It goes parallelly with the differences between human and animal experience. The human subject has experiences which in all crdibility the animal subject does not have. There are deeper differencs which touch these subjects not only their experiences. My standpoint is that there is no transition from man to animal and that man is by all his commoness with the dead and living nature an essentiality the like is nowhere in creation. But contrary to my former view I am now of the opinion that THIS systematical and underangeable difference between animal and man is not a SUBSTANTIVIC difference, is not the difference that

*) See my "Philosophy" page 91-98.

only human subjects would be real substantives, whilst animal-plant subjects may be spiritual SUPERSUBSTANTIVIC entities which would be built up upon pertinent experiences. This my view was consistent, because I denied then to things the character of substantives and regarded them as upon phenomena extemporally built up supersubstantivic entities. But my way "by depth" showed that the external corporal things are substantives. For the same reason I have such a character to ascribe also to animal and even plant subjects. Man and animal have both the externally corporal and the internally spiritual essentiality. Both are THINGS, corporal substantives, both SUBJECTS or PERSONALITIES, spiritual substantives. This fact does not destroy the systematical difference between the human and animal subject. In account of this difference I call the human subject a singular empirically given and real PERSON. There is still an immediate way to the "subject" and to the human subject. We start this way, when we are CONSCIOUS OF OURSELVES. This happens in daily life, when someone praises or blames us, when we are full of pride or repentance of committed deeds, when we are conscious of our own might or ar beaten down by the feeling of our own imbecillity. In such and similar instances we are stepping suddenly IN FRONT OF OURSELVES and "discover" ourselves. We express this to the world and exclaim: "I" did this, why did "I" not omit this!" The like with our experience. Such an immediate consciousness of pain induces us to call the doctor, to retract the hand from the fire, to turn the eyes from the burning sun. Daily experiences make us immediately conscious of our experience and ourselves. It makes no difference, which consciousness is evolutionarily at first, although may be first the consciousness of the experience. When we become aware of our experience, we become aware of ourselves and express this with words like "it aches ME . . . it burns ME . . ." We have also examples of the immediate consciousness of the experience without such a personal addition, but they are not mere examples of a PURE consciousness. They help to find us in our environs, in the world of our own corporality. We express our inside state customary entirely different and say "HERE aches," "HERE burns," "HERE pains." The consciousness of

ourselves which alone leads to ourselves, to the substantive, is a systematical and main immediate consciousness. This fact helps to understand, what we should regard as real spiritual substantive and what with such a substantive corresponding spiritual accidental. Immediate consciousness aims to man and to his experience, to a spiritual substantive and with it corresponding accidental which we call the singular empirically given PERSONAL substantive and the singular empirically given PERSONAL experience. Man can become immediately conscious of HIS experience and HIMSELF. Substantive and accidental must be real. Of what we become conscious immediately, about this we can not doubt that it really exists.

The way to the spiritual substantive can be made still easier. I allege the experiensivic difference between the superficial and central experience. This show a mere "sensation" and a real "consideration." We may have both. Consideration is to ourselves NEARER. Sensations are somehow forced upon us, but thoughts come out from ourselves. This difference can be seen still better on the sphere of feelings and desirings. We may experience a fine feeling eating a juicy steak. We performed a good deed and rejoice of a silent delight. There are two experiences, but far distant from each other. The first (fine feeling, pleasure) is a superficial, the second (rejoicing, delight) a central experience. Pleasure is something from outside, delight from ourselves. Such examples are numberless. Pain-grief, desire—longing, dancing—joy are experiences. Any first is superficial, any second central. The difference goes through all human experiences and shows clearly the distinction between the experience and ourselves as the subjects of the experiences. Without a substantivic subject would be the distinction between the more or less superficial and more or less central experiences excluded. The systematical meaning of this distinction is in the RELATION of the experience to those who have it. This relation is, expressed figuratively, the relation of larger or smaller DINSTANCE. Our superficial and central experiences are OUR experiences, but the superficial are from us more distant, the central us nearer. This distinction is possible and necessary only on the point of human experience. On animals it is excluded. The human subject is a

PERSONAL subject. We have in human life a spiritual substantive and a corresponding spiritual accidental.

I allege, secondly, for the same purpose the difference which appear on the sphere of our feelings and aspirings. I call it the difference between SUBSTANTIAL AND PERSONAL EVALUATION. More in the next chapter. Here may suffice some examples adapted to our present purpose. An example of substantial evaluation is DELIGHT experienced by successes, regaining health, returning to home land, and that APPRECIATION, with which we judge the quality of wine, meal . . . but also the artistic valuation of a work of art, the merit of a scientific research. Examples of personal evaluations are feelings, as LOVE, REVERENGE, PRAISE, ADMIRATION. The reader sees, where I am aiming at. In the first sense we rejoice at SOMETHING and value, appraise, can appreciate SOMETHING, but in the second sense we love SOMEONE, honor, praise and admire SOMEONE. We are delighted about things and appreciate them. Persons do we love, honor, praise and admire. We can not love, admire . . . EXPERIENCES. We do not love good deeds and do not hate bad deeds, we do love and hate him, who performs such works. We may rejoice or have sorrow also about such things then, when we consider them from the viewpoint of their expediency or hurtfulness. We may, vice versa, be delighted or sorry for persons in the common sense of the word. In this case persons take the place of things or means to attain the things which would delight or sadden us.

There are examples, when we think that we love or hate animals. These animals tak the contrary place of persons, we "personificate" them. Thus remains the differenziation between the substantial and personal evaluation preserved. The first points to the world of actual, deemed, imagined and dead or living creation, the second to the world of actual or imagined "persons." This difference vividly supports the substantial justification of the distinction betwee human experience and with this experience corresponding human, personal substantives.

If man would be by his spiritual essentiality only a mere group of single experiences, then we may ourselves or others still further substantially evaluate, but any personal evaluation

of man would be impossible. We may personally evaluate imagined persons, but such an evaluation rests upon parallel "personification" of things. How should come a being which is itself not an actual person to such a personification of the thing? Only a being which is an actual person can personally evaluate without regard to the question, if this that he evaluates thus, is itself a real person or not. Man has both abilities, the ability of substantial and personal evaluation. To man leads, therefore, from both viewpoints the character of a real personal being: Man is a person, so far as he personally evalutes, and man is a person, so far as he is the only natural territory of personal evaluation, which does not afford from the part of that, who may this territory thus evaluate, a personification of impersonal things. If the reader protruded to this important difference between these both values and followed the examples which I alleged for both values and which are many times realized in daily life, then will be for him the easier to protrud from any of his own experiences to this that itself is not an experience, but a substantive of the experience: This is HE, of whom thinks anyone else, when he loves or hates him, honor or despises, praises or blames him. In the next chapter more in detail. For the present may suffice the fact of mere LOVE and mere REVERENCE for the underangeable conviction that the spiritual essentiality of man is by no means exhausted with the experience. Who could an experience love or hate, even revere or despise? There would be no love without loving and no hate without hated. We do not love the love and do not hate the enmity (the first is us only "agreable," the second "disagreable," it means, we are delighted with the first, sorry about the secondy), but we love him, who loves, and hate him, who hates.

Thirdly, belongs hitherto the systematical meaning of expressions which we daily employ and which are in the strictest connection with the NORMATIVE or MORAL evolution of man. I have been speaking about this partly in the first, but especially in the second chapter, when I dealt about the "correctness" and "incorrectness" of our mental as also of our instinctive experience. I think of examples, when we call someone "reasonable" or "unreasonable," "intelligent" or "unintel-

ligent," "honest" or "dishonest," "noble" or "worthless." All such specialities of man point to sides of his experience, namely, to the correctness or incorrectness of his experience: Reasonableness appears in right thoughts, unreasonableness in wrong thoughts, honesty in the correctness of that feeling which leads man to "honest" deeds, but dishonesty in the incorrectness. But the discussions in the second chapter showed that such a merely experiencing correctness or incorrectness does not help to get the correct meaning of the mentioned and similar criticism of ourselves and others. Some thought may be even so correct, true, but as long as there is not decided the question, HOW we ARRIVED at this thouht, if it has been only from outside forced upon us, or if it came from our own personal essentiality, we are not justified to speak of our reasonableness or correctness. Just so about feelings and aspirings. I may turn attention to the example of the difference between mere "sympathy" and real "love": The first is some kind of a sensitive feeling of an experience from outside forced upon us, but the second swells out from ourselves and we participate in it. I distinguished, therefore, between merely external and internal correctness and incorrectness which necessarily afford a systematical participation of that, who has the experience. About such an internal correctness or incorrectness we think, when someone seems to us to be reasonable or unreasonable, intelligent or unintelligent, honest or dishonest, noble or worthless. There are not the THOUGHTS reasonable, intelligent, and there are not the FEELINGS honest, noble, worthless, but all such names lead only to THAT, who has such experiences and who himself is not an experience.

We will see that there is the question about specialities which we find in human personal life, but not in animals. This is the essentially human normative or moral development which corresponds with the human rational, but also with the sensitively aspiring RESPONSIBILITY of the human being. The given examples help on the point of human life to find the transition from the experience to those, who have the experience, from the spiritual accidental to the spiritual substantive, it means, to the real human PERSONAL SUBSTANTIVE. We think about this human personal substantive, when we norma-

tively or morally judge ourselves or others. If I briefly sum up, I can say that the reader, who would not be too enthusiastic about theoretical discussions, has at his disposition a tripple way leading to the same goal. First, the way of the difference between the "superficial" and "central" experience accessible to anyone, secondly, of the difference between "substantial" and "personal" evaluation, and finally of the normative or moral criticism of himself and his neighbor. All three ways afford besides the experience a definite acknowledgment of an inexperiencing and substantivic spiritual essentiality which has the character of a personal substantive. We could without such a personal substantive in the first case not speak about a "central" experience, in the second not about a "personal" evaluation and in the third not about a "normative" or "moral" criticism. All examples are many times realized in daily life.

The given examples allow a comparition of the spiritual personal substantive with the thing, as outlined in the former section. We said that to things leads the central consideration of single phenomena. Along the superficial consideration we arrived at the supersubstantivic entities. I may first ascertain that life may become the territory of such a superficial consideration. In such examples we start from single experiences which we FORM and along these formations we come to entities which are not substantives, but have experiences for their fundamental. Such a superficial consideration of life gave the reason for the opinion which sees in the "soul" only some harmony, but some concert of single experiences. In this sense of the word is the soul a supersubstantive entity as any natural phenomenon, to which leads our own formation of single natural phenomena. Such a soul has no experience and is not alive, because it is built up upon the experience and is only the extemporal consequence of the experience. But keep in mind that such a superficial and formative consideration of life is actually possible and many times realized on the point of human and animal life. These considerations are characteristic for artists, and we can not blame them, if they thus cheat themselves and others then, when they should detect the systematical essentiality of life. Our discussion of things showed that we have besides such a superficial formative consideration

of single phenomena to distinguish their central touching consideration and that this is on the point of life possible and realized. This fact is proven by the central experience, personal evaluation and normative or moral criticism. Central experience forces us with an elemental power to consider ourselves touchingly not only superficially or formatively. The same holds, when we ourselves or our neighbor personally evalue, worth, love or rever. Moral judging (criticism) which is in many regards a kind of personal evaluation is directly basically connected to the central consideration of that, whom we thus critisize.

The clearest example of such a touching central consideration of life is the immediate CONSCIOUSNESS OF OURSELVES. To get conscious of ourselves and to touch immediately ourselves is one and the same. I mentioned that we may immediately become aware of our experience, but such a consciousness goes along the personal consciousness, or it loses its own clear "consciousnessivic" character. Only immediate consciousness of ourselves is a clear consciousness, whilst any other allows both, the superficially formative and the centrally touching consideration. We may consider our own life superficially, formatively and regard ourselves only as some harmony, some concert of single experiences. Such a harmony or concert on the point of our own life we REPRESENT TO US, VIEW IT, but by principle we can not immediately become aware of THUS AND ONLY THUS conceived "ourselves": As far as we become aware of ourselves, so far we are not any experience, neither a harmony of experiences, but the only substantivic fundamental (substratum) of this experience as of all upon this experience built up concert or disconcert.

Thus holds that both halves of creation, dead nature and life upon it, allow a double consideration, a superficially formative and a centrally touching. The starting points for both are on the point of dead nature single and sensitively given natural phenomena (colors, sounds, warmths, scents), on the point of life single EXPERIENCES. From these phenomena and these experiences we proceed in two different directions: We may them form or we may abandon them and press to this that is appearing in their light (things, natural substantives), or even

has them (subjects, spiritual substantives). In the first instance is our consideration of nature and life superficial, formative, in the second central, touching. But I agree that the final clearing of these questions affords still a discussion of the systematical difference between "dead thing" and "living thing," between externally corporal and internally spiritual thing. It is clear that the central consideration of life will be different from the central conisderation of dead nature: This difference will detect the difference between the personal and nonpersonal substantive.

19. Specialities of the personal substantive.

If we diligently examine our experiences, we find in them a side which appears important for further discussions. Experiences are in some strict sense of the word PASSIVE or ACTIVE. This is evident from original "sensings" and evolutionarily later "aspirings." When we experience sensations, is our experiencing state passive, when aspirations, active. The difference is merely psychological. There is no real passivity or activity in the dead nature. We have in the nature different startings, ceasings and parallel changings, but all this has not the character of passivity or activity. Poetical metamorphosis which attributes to the external nature the character of a passive, then of an active state, is built up upon the endavor of man to introduce into nature its own and even personal life. But physics warrants that all that happening in the nature is merely mechanical, thus that substantially it does not permit any admixture of facts which are characteristic for life. I turned attention to this fact in other publications. *)

It may here serve as the systematical starting point for further discussions. The difference between the active and passive experience is characteristic also for animal life. We

*) This fact is emphatically pointed out in "Philosophy-Filozofija," where there is proven that passivity and activity belong to the most systematical psychological phenomena and that for their understanding does not suffice the conception of physical "energy." Later on we will arrive at the conception of such a general "workingness" which comprises everything, the externally corporal and the internally spiritual "working."

ascribe to the animal, too, primitive sensations, aspirations, disirings. But in our human life we find a passivity and activity which touches ourselves. I call it personal passivity and activity. Take "passion." For a passionate man is characteristic a strong aspiring, say, for wine, nicotine, opium. Passion is the example of an extraordinary experiencivic activity. But the passionate man turns often to himself and becomes aware of a relation of his passionate aspiring to himself. If he does, he may become aware that he is but a plaything of his own aspiring. He sees that his aspiring is driving him like a ball on the water. In such instances he discovers besides such an activity an expressive passivity which is not more a passivity of an experience, but the passivity of this, who has the experience.

There is besides an experiencivic passivity and activity a personal passivity and activity and the experiencivic activity corresponds with an expressive personal passivity. We can this difference view still from the standpoint of the superficial or central consideration of ourselves. Take again passion. The superficial consideration of man's spiritual essentiality shows the passionate man in the light of an extraordinary activity. If we consider him by depth, we see on him the contrary passivity. Superfically formativingly considered life appears in the light of experiencivic passivity or activity, central touching consideration of life leads to personal passivity or activity. We know that the relation between the experience and the one who has the experience, is the relation of the spiritual accidental to the spiritual substantive. We call, therefore, experiencivic activity the ACCIDENTAL, personal the SUBSTANTIVIC passivity and activity. The immediate experiences of OUR HUMAN life show that we have to consider this life from the standpoint of both passivities and activities, accidental and substantivic. Passion testifies for the personal substantivic passivity, OUR WILL shows the personal and substantivic ACTIVITY. Man driven by a passionate desiring discovers himself in the light of some extraordinary passivity, but man discovers himself, if he WILL something, in the light of a distinct ACTIVITY. Real will, real desire is the personal activity of life: TO WILL and be HIMSELF active is one and the same. Modern psychology errs, if it sees in the human will and desire only an "aspiring,"

an EXPERIENCE. To will, to desire is not an experience, but the action of THAT, WHO has the experience. This fact is clearly confirmed by the view of the superficial and central consideration of ourselves. Just then, when we as desiring beings catch ourselves, we view us centrally, whilst the merely superficial consideration opens the view for different desirings and aspirings, but the will, the wishing, remains to this view for ever veiled. Consciousness of our own will, of our own wishing, is the consciousness of OURSELVES.

We must on the point of human life distinguish between the experiencivic and personal, accidental and substantivic passivity or activity, and this doubleness justifies this distinction. Important are the further discourses about the legal relation of the proven personal substantivic passivity and activity to the experiencivingly accidental. Daily instances show that the personal passivity or activity appear only in the face of the parallel experiencivic ACTIVITY. Think of a human being which would have but passive experiences, only sensations. Such a being could towards these his sensations not be neither passive nor active, at least not in that sense of the word, as someone would discover himself in the light of an expressive passivity towards its active aspiring. This fact is connected with the relation of the superficial to the central experience. The consciousness of his own or substantivic passivity and activity appears upon the stratum of his OWN harmony or contrast to his OWN experience. Superficial experiences and sensations are in this regard on the sideline. The subject may bcome aware of them, but HE is to them in an internal or intimate relation. The subject can, therefore, towards such experiences not appear in the light of his own passivity or actiivty. But our superficial experiences are our passive experiences. The larger or smaller experiencivic superficialness is as much as the larger or smaller experiencivic passivity. The fact that the human subject can towards his passive experience not appear in the light of his own passivity or activity, is of an extraordinary importance. It means that in thus conceived personally substantivic passivity or activity there is the question about such a passivity or activity which represents the actual realization of the subjectivic relation to the experience of the subject and which I call the ACTUAL OR RELEASED personal passivity or activity.

The real meaning of this name will give the instance of the active experience, to which alone may be the human subject in the relation of an own passivity or activity.

Take active aspiring. Only towards SUCH AN activity may man become aware of his own passivity or activity and he becomes aware then, when he discovers, how this activity of his aspiring is CONTRARY TO HIMSELF, but of his activity then, when he discovers, how with that activity of his experience is he most characteristically AGREEING. We have on the side of the human subject expressly to speak about his and only his STANDPOINTNESS which is a double one, namely, the standpointness of "harmony" or "contradiction" with his own, but merely experiencivic ACTIVITY and the standpointness of HIS OWN CONTRADICTION against this activity. Passion is an example of the experiencivic activity, to which is the pertinent subject in the relation of his own (but too feeble) resistance, but the WILL is in the majority an example of the aspiring, to which is the subject in the relation of his own (and thoroughly victorious) agreeing. The essence of the personal activity and passivity is in the personal "agreeing" or "resistance," in the personal agreeing to the experiencivic activity or in the personal resistance against this activity. All this helps to define the WILL. Old thinkers, it seems, had a presentiment of this definition, I mention Augustine, Scott, Cartesius. *)

THIS DEFINITION WILL BE GIVEN IN THIS SHARPNESS FOR THE FIRST TIME.

We MUST DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A DOUBLE WILL, BETWEEN THE WILL, WHICH IS AN EXPERIENCE, IT MEANS, AN ASPIRING, AND BETWEEN THE WILL, WHICH IS NOT AN EXPERIENCE, NOT A MERE ACCIDENTAL OF THE SUBJECT. The will in the first sense is an ASPIRING of man, to which man HIMSELF AGREES, to which man PERSONALLY ASSENTS. The will in the second sense is just the mentioned agreeing of the subject, therefore, the PERSONAL AGREEING or also the PERSONAL RESISTANCE of the subject. The subject has the will, as he himself "agrees" with the activity of his experience, or as he himself "resists" this activity.

*) See my essary "St. Augustine," page 58-75.

Only this is the will in the clearest meaning of the word, that will which is not an experience, but the SYSTEMATICAL ACTIVITY OF MAN HIMSELF, his systematical PERSONALLY SUBSTANTIVIC ACTIVITY.

Now it is clear, why I am above speaking about an "actual" or "released" personal passivity or activity. Both rest upon the SYSTEMATICAL personal ACTIVITY which appears to man now as his personal (but "released") passivity, then as his personal (but "released") activity. The systematical personal activity appears to man as the personal "passivity" then, when its essence is in the personal RESISTANCE against his merely experiencivic activity, but as the personal "activity" then, when its essence is in the personal AGREEING to his merely experiencivic activity. Man appears to himself in the light of his STRONGER personal passivity, the STRONGER there is his merely experiencivic activity and the WEAKER there is his personal resistance against this activity. Vice versa appears man to himself in the light of his STRONGER personal activity, the STRONGER there is his merely experiencivic activity and the STRONGER there is his personal agreeing to his activity. For example. He, who is doing something only under the influence of his passions, as also he, who is doing something in the sign of a conscious wishing (in the above mentioned first meaning of the word), is characterized by the "systematical" activity. In the first case appears his activity in the personal resistance which is subdued by the merely experiencivic activity, but in the second in the personal agreeing, to which is the pertinent experiencivic activity only an expedient. We have, therefore, besides the actual or released personal activity and PASSIVITY really to speak about SINGULAR SYSTEMATICAL personal ACTIVITY. This and only this activity appears to the pertinent subject in two ways: Now thus that the subject appears to himself "active," but then thus that the subject appears to himself "passive." The actual or released personal passivity is only a reflex of the systematical and singular personal activity and means substantially two things: That this personal activity is in the contrast to the pertinent experiencivic activity and that this experiencivic activity is stronger. We must finally speak about the SINGULAR ACTIVE character of any

personal substantive. This systematical activity we call the LATENT or RESTING activity of the personal subject which appears in two forms, in the form of the actual released personal passivity, or in the form of the actual released personal activity. We have very well to keep in mind that the systematical essence of any personal subject is, accordingly, in his latent or resting ACTIVITY.

This fact helps to detect the deepest meaning of that development which is an essentially human development found no where else in creation. This is the NORMATIVE or MORAL evolution of the human being. It is in a strict connection with the experiencivic CORRECTNESS and INCORRECTNESS. It is twofold: Merely external or also internal, given with the relation of the experience to its "theme" or "object," or that it needs for its systematical meaning still the cooperation of the concerned SUBJECT. The discussions in the first chapter proved, how our representations may be correct or incorrect. They are correct, when we touch the reality of their objects, but incorrect, when we miss this reality. But we have seen that THIS AND SUCH a correctness is merely external and has nothing to do with the "reasonableness" or "unreasonableness" of the concerned subject. It is characteristic for animal life. The discussions in the second chapter showed an essentially different and internal correctness or incorrectness of the experience which alone is a systematical sign of reasonableness or unreasonableness, reason or unreason of the subject. This was evident from our THOUGHTS and how we arrive at them. Thoughts, too, may be merely externally correct or incorrect, when their correctness or incorrectness is only their "truth" or "untruth," for which that who has thoughts has HIMSELF not any "merit" or any "fault." Such thoughts experiences the pupil, when he accepts true or untrue thoughts from his teachers, but himself does not understand them, he is to them in the relation of no any of his own activity. Such thoughts are by all their truth or untruth neither HIS "perceptions" nor HIS "errors." But perceptions and errors become these thoughts as soon as that, kho has them, cooperates with them HIMSELF, as soon as that, who has them, cooperates with them HIMSELF, with his personal activity. In such a case become primarily

merely true thoughts real PERCEPTIONS, and primarily untrue thoughts errors. Only such thoughts are internally correct or incorrect. In all the empirically given life are such thoughts found only on the point of—man!

These are but examples. They directly challange some closed theory of their psychological background.

We know that the human subject has the character of the singular systematical activity, furthermore, that this activity expresses itself in the form of personal activity or passivity, finally that this expression is possible only in the relation to the concerned experiencivic activity, but that all the passive experience leaves the systematical activity of the subject in the state of a latent resting. It is clear, WHY the perceiving representation is necessarily merely externally correct or incorrect, but WHY our thoughts may be or become still internally correct or incorrect experiences. This fact is based upon the undisputable PASSIVITY of that REPRESENTATION and upon the undisputable ACTIVITY OF THINKING. Toward our perceiving representations we are neither passive nor active, but the more our thoughts are a sign of our own and, therefore, personal passivity or activity. The first case is realized, when there arrise in us thoughts, convictions which we can not keep off, although we OURSELVES do not agree with them. Think of a partisan who is many times in the situation that he has also such convictions of the party, but which he in person and, therefore, himself discriminately rebuks. The second case is realized, when we not only have such and those convictions, but accompanies us along them a special consciousness that WE agree with them and that they come from our own personal essentiality. Only such convictions are our real "perceptions" or our real "errors," the first, when they have the character of a merely external correctness, the second, when they are externally incorrect. Any perception or error is but the necessary consequence of two facts, namely, of the merely external correctness or incorrectness of thoughts ("truth" or "untruth") on the one side, and of the released PERSONAL ACTIVITY on the other. The first instance shows, how we may already on the sphere of thoughts find something that on the sensitively aspiring sphere appeared in the form of so called "passion."

Hitherto belong such convictions, towards which we are in the relation of the released personal passivity. The essence of mental "fanaticism" is in such experiencingly undiscriminate active, but personally passive convictions. Such convictions are still externally correct or incorrect, true or untrue. But those convictions are by all the experiencivic activity not also internally correct or incorrect, therefore, neither perceptions nor errors. We can on the point of such convictions not speak about a real mental RESPONSIBILITY of that, who has them: This responsibility is essentially less, as is essentially less the responsibility in sensations and aspirings, if someone is acting only under the influence of a too strong passion.

These examples afford that we transfer the theory of the internal and external experiencivic correctness to the sphere of sensations and aspirings. Amongst them we find such which are entirely passive experiences, or towards which we can be in the relation of a personal passivity. Such are so called "hedonic" sensations and aspirations, as we experience them, when we eat and drink, or when we are tormented by hunger or thirst. For this reason can such hedonic sensations and aspirations THEMSELVES not mean any "normative" or "moral" evolution of our personal essentiality. *)

An entirely different place has the substantial and personal valuation and all upon such a valuation built up valuable aspiring. Hitherto belongs amongst sensations common "pleasure." Pleasure appears, if we compare it with the simple hedonic comfort of mere delight as an active sensation and towards such a delight we may be in the relation of a released

*) This fact is not at all opposed to the prohibitions and requests which touch upon our "hedonic" sensations (e. gr., Thou shall not be a drunkard, not an adulterer, Thou shall be moderate . . .). These prohibitions and requests turn immediately but to our parallel substantial and personal VALUATION, to OUR WILL, with which we are agreeing or disagreeing to such our "hedonic" enjoyments at least mediately (namely, along the parallel substantial valuation). There is in morals not the question, if and in which degree we are PERSONALLY striving after such goods. In the connection with the following discussions is necessary still an essential correction of my former opinions about sensations. I have been formerly (according Meinong's pattern) of the opinion that all sensations are passive experiences, but I consider that we have also amongst sensations representatives of an expressive activity.

personal passivity or activity. The first happens, when pleasure overcomes us entirely and we are, as people are used to say, "crazy with pleasure," the second, when we become somehow aware, how this delight is originating from our own personal essentiality, it means, how we are with regard to this delight also ourselves personally active. Only in this second instance this pleasure is in the stricter sense of the word correct or incorrect, goes on the account of our own (valualizing) reasonableness or unreasonableness: Only such pleasure is in the sphere of sensations an instance of this that we ascertained in the sphere of thoughts as real "perception" or "error." Another instance of this kind is the relation of mere "sympathy" to genuine "love." Sympathy is merely a passive or at least such a sensation, to which we are neither passive nor active, or only releasedly passive. For this reason is not our personal matter the question, if someone is to us sympathic or not, but directly foolish would be the request that someone, who is to us not sympathic SHOUD be to us sympathic. If we compare from this standpoint mere sympathy with real love, we see that there is in love not the question of a sensation which would be forced upon us from outside, but which originates out from ourselves. We may also love call a sympathy, but a sympathy to which we are personally active. This important addition effects and proves that love is not more a mere fact, but a normative or moral COMMANDMENT, in truth, as the Gospel teaches, the greatest commandment.

All these instances induce us to show a still more detailed development of the theory of the experiencivic correctness. Hitherto belongs the difference between the correctness of the experience which is outside of the real moral development, or concerns at most such a development in the broadest sense of the word, and between that correctness of the experience which shows such a development in the stricter sense and is, therefore, the singular moral development. We distinguish in this development single grades. It is twofold, either "merely moral" or really MORAL. Legal instances of such correctnesses are first merely externally perceiving representations, secondly internally correct convictions and third sensations and aspirations which characterize us as moral or ethical entities.

Externally perceiving representation is in the most favorable instance but externally correct, it means, the correctness of this experience is exhausted with the mere relation of the concerned representation to the reality of its object, but excluded is any personal cooperation of the subject. The internal correctness of our convictions decides the relation of these convictions to their objects. These convictions have to be true, it means, must be proven in the reality or valuation of this, of which we are convinced. But here is necessary our personal cooperation, or they would be only externally correct. The internal correctness is the consequence of two facts: Of their merely external correctness and of our personal cooperation. The third and highest grade is the internal correctness which excludes any external correctness and is independent on the relation of the experience to the object and exhausted with the activity of the subject.

We have instance of the internal correctness in the sphere of our moral or ethical effecting. Take the conception of the Gospel of real GOODNESS or real WICKEDNESS. A good man is unboundly good, a wicked unboundly wicked. A good man does not ask, why he should be good, if his neighbor does deserve this goodness, if a dilligent conscious man is good. He distributes the treasures of his goodness without regard to all such questions, if his love of neighbor is OBJECTIVELY based. This goodness is the most internal and clean property of the good man HIMSELF. The same holds about real wickedness. But the essence of wickedness is something that nobody can "merit," without the question, if he himself is also wicked or not: We must a wicked man indiscriminately disqualify, but towards a wicked man we should not be—wicked. On the point of wickedness appears a such INTERNAL INCORRECTNESS of the experience, for which is any correct relation of the experience to the object of no systematical meaning, and which is entirely exhausted with the personal acting of the subject. I grant that in daily life we may scarsely encounter clear instances of such a goodness or wickedness, but daily life shows that man may approach such a pure goodness or wickedness. My unimportant experiences brought me in contact with people which I could call ideally good, but also ideally wicked.

Remember the word of our Lord that we should love also our enemies and that "to him that striketh thee on the one cheek, offer also the other." This is a pure goodness which is given with the personal activity and does not know any substantially objective admixture. With this instance of the Gospel of the true goodness corresponds the "example" of the real wickedness given, if I may remain again in the spiritual world of the Gospel, with the idea of the "devil." *)

The personally substantivic activity is important. It makes possible the moral development of man. Man is the alone HISTORICAL being in the world. The science of the development of humanity for hundreds and thousands of years can by principle not be compared with the sciences which deal with the development of natural things. These sciences are not HISTORIES.

We have legal by-kinds of the human normative development. Consider the external correctness of the experience which follows from the relation of the experience to its object. There are three grades of normativeness which may in daily life interweave with each other undiscriminately, but are pure and elemental forms of the normative development. The first is the external correctness, not mixed up with any personal substantivic activity. This is an unreal normativeness of life, given also to the animal being, a normativeness in the broadest sense. A classical example is the external perceiving representation. The second is the internal correctness of the experience and the personally substantivic cooperation. This is a true normativeness of life, but not entirely pure, it is mixed up with the merely external correctness, a normativeness in the broader sense. Classical examples are convictions, called perceptions or errors. The third is the internal correctness not connected to any external correctness and originating from our own personally substantivic activity. This is the true normativeness of life originating immediately from the substantivic essence, the per-

*) We have in daily life more of a "betwixt," it means, OBJECTIVELY based "goodness" and "wickedness." The example for the first is the love of the "benefactor," for the second the enmity against the "fiend." Hitherto belongs also JUSTICE which is by a proportional personal or unpersonal "reciprocity" proven love.

sonal morality of man. The first grade manifests it towards the passive or active giving experience, the second and the third only towards the active experience. The third grade may be undiscriminately connected with its second grade or vice versa. There are in life realized "betwixt"—forms of normativeness, but they are by principle more of a collateral meaning. Betwixt-forms are convictions, giving experiences, only externally correct. They are neither perceptions nor errors, but we are worse off, when we have externally incorrct convictions than, when we have externally incorrect and PASSIVE experiences. Towards externally correct convictions we can be personally active, but on the point of the passive experience is this excluded. The second betwixt-form is that morality which rests upon the different substantial necessities either of that, towards whom we are realizing this morality, or towards ourselves, who are penetrated by such a morality. Hitherto belong all good deeds, whose basis is the sense of justice, or all that effecting which we are concerned with in our own interest and which has without regard to this an expressly "moral" character, as there is the care of our own wellbeing, of our own health etc. Very interesting is, furthermore, the fact that with the above mentioned trinity of the pure forms of normativeness is connected an entire parallel trinity of like PURE forms of the normatively moral JUDGMENT or criticism. The palest form appears, when it touches the untrue moralness, the passive experience. There is no question about reasonableness, goodness or wickedness, this judgment does not "hurt." Different is the situation, when the experience is internally and externally correct. We judge the reasonableness, if we are intelligent, we feel us hurt, not to the bottom, because the reasonableness is only half dependent on ourselves and depends on the THEME or OBJECT of our experience. This judgment has the broader form. The third has the broadest form and is the clean MORAL judgment. We have in mind the personal essentiality of man in all extent and depth, not only partly and collaterally. Thus we judge a man, whom we call good or bad, generous or wicked, an angel in the human image or a devil upon earth. When someone judges us thus, we feel hurt to the core.

The pure forms compete in daily life with the betwixt-

forms. The personally substantivic activity is our reasonableness, goodness or wickedness. The intelligence of man is divided in two forms, as far as it is connected to the external correctness or by principle on it independent. In the first case there is the question about man's rationality, in the second about his goodness or wickedness. If all our experiences would disappear, especially all active experiences, man could not be reational or irrational, but man would remain by his essentiality —good or bad. Man is the singular empirically given MORAL BEING UPON EARTH, entirely independent on all his experiences, and on all themes and objects of his experience.

Anything said may help to proceed with the discussions mentioned in the beginning of the chapter. The question is about a stricter insight in the difference between "personal" and merely "substantivic" substantive, about the basical difference between real person and mere thing. This difference shall show the place which takes towards Thou and the mere thing the—animal.

20. The classification of the legal substantivic trinity: Thing, living being, person.

We have been viewing in our discussions in detail a double substantive, the substantive which deserves the name of a thing, and the personal substantive. The personal substantive is the human substantive. The reader may have asked, whereto belongs in this grade of mere things and true persons that life which we encounter in zoology and botany. In life there are given actual and real entities. To these entities, too, we ascribe a substantivic character, these are not mere "accidentals." Any reality is a "substantivic reality" and the reality of the accidental is the reality of the pertinent substantive. If daily life testifies that we have to speak about accidentals which are a sign of animal and plant life and discussed by zoologists and botanits, then there is no doubt about the animal and vegetable substantive. To distinguish this substantive from the substantive given with mere natural things, the object of research by naturalists, but also from the personal substantive empirically given by man, object of research by philanthopists, I give to

that animal or vegetable substantive the name "živ" (Lebewesen) living being. *)

Thing, living being and person would be the trinity of substantives discussed in the present section. That person, personal substantive, is different from mere thing, is outside of doubt. The main question would be the question about living beings—živi, about animal and vegetable substantive. This substantive and real person is underangeably distinct from mere thing. In both substantives there is the question about LIVING substantives. In contrast to mere thing compose living being and person a wholeness. With this wholeness is given the basical boundary between this that is living and dead, external and internal, spiritual and unspiritual. This partition of creation, this so called "psycho-physical dualism" of the universe, comprises persons and mere living beings on the one side and things on the other. Living being is essentially different from person. It seems that living beings, as far as we judge them from the viewpoint of things and persons, are kinds of "middle" substantives, something more than mere things, but less than persons. We find in them something that is in things and persons, but in any case remains preserved the underangeable difference between them. This impression results from daily experiences, when we observe animal and vegetable life and compare it with manifestations of dead nature and human life. It is, furthermore, in a scientific meaning a direction for our discussions, which will not burden us with hurtful prejudices and similar wishy-washies. The exact insight in the internal nature of the thing will help us to make the differenziation between thing and person sharper and definite. That trinity of things, living beings and persons will appear in a scientific theoretical way a limited trinity of substantives. For methodical reasons I keep to the discussion of the human personal substantive. Why? I have in mind that ancient comparition of man with creation, that man is a "world in a small way" (mikrokosmos), therefore, this that creation is in "a large way"

*) I add that I mean with this expression only the animal SUBJECT, it means, the immediate "bearer" of the animal experience, but not the "living body." My meaning of "živi" is merely psychological and not taken in the sense of natural sciences.

(makrokosmos). In man we encounter the images of that large world and more. This relation was presentimented by ancient Greek Anaximander. *)

We must take man as a wholeness and as he actually exists. Actual man is both, a corporal and a spiritual being and his corporality and spirituality is a double one. In his corporal side man is a part of inorganic nature. We have in the human body basical elements of inorganic matter, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, natrium, iron. The corporal side is also a part of organic nature. Hitherto belongs the physiological side of the human corporal essentiality. The human body is a system of cellular and cellular-nervous organic matter, as it is given with albumen, fat, sugar, brain. The nature is divided into inorganic and organic half. This holds also for the corporal essentiality of man. If I pass to the spirituality, to life, is clearly evident that we have in man basical elements of a merely animal or vegetable life, as they are given with the most primary organic and external sensations, immediate knowledges, sensings of hunger and satiety, sexual instincts. Man is by one half of his spiritual internal nature only a special and living animal. Animal life of man may differ from the life of a real animal, but these differences are not essential and touch the question, in what degree are the single reflexs of such a life in man developed, if they have on the point of man a special meaning, as they do not have it in animal life. Our discussions show that there is in man a spirituality, a special life as nowhere in nature. This is the essentially human and real normative or moral development. This development testifies, why is man the empirically given "rational" being upon earth. I distinguished between "animal" and "spiritual" half of spiritual essentiality. *)

Animal half points to life, common with the animal or vegetable life, spiritual half to "personal life." To personal

*) This historical example of man as a "world in a small way" is not synonyme with MY example. I find in MAN something unknown to natural creation.

*) Vide: "Idejni temelji slovanskega agrarizma—Fundamental ideas of Slavic agrarism"—Ljubljana, 1927.

life belong all human, spiritual experiences which are not forced upon us with the immediate necessity of animal instinct, for which we have "reasons," are in them "personally" interested. Man can ascertain that this and that happened here, because something different happened there, or that this and that case shall occur here, if this and that different case shall occur there. We may think about love given only to man, so characteristically different from sympathy or apathy. Sympathy or apathy is found also in animal life, but love or hatred knows only man. I conclude: Human nature comprises the basical elements of ALL dead and living nature, but surpasses it essentially. Man is a "world in a small way" and a "world" found nowhere else.

Nature and life upon it affords a substantivic consideration and we must distinguish between the substantivic part of all this that is in world and life forced upon us in the form of single natural and life-phenomena. If we transfer this conception of human nature, this nature appears very clear from the viewpoint of merely substantivic and personal substantive. The corporal side of man is in him this that we have in the external nature in the point of natural things. Our body is a thing amongst things. THIS thing comprises in man this that to the outside appears in the form of his organic corporal constitution. This is merely "external," DEAD and on these points would nobody speak about life, if he would not have in mind the very different EXPERIENCE which is with the acting of such an organic matter in an indisputable connection, but is not a systematical member of this matter. Our brain may work exactly, also it would belong to the system of dead external nature, if there would not value the fact that parallely with such a work of the brain run different EXPERIENCES OF THAT, who "has" the brain. Everyone agrees that these experiences are not a part of the brain. In vain would scrape for such experiences he, who would even dissect and explore the brain and only the brain, experiences you can not dissect. If the biologist ascribes to the brain "life," then we have to keep in mind that "life" is taken in the broader sense of the word and a figurative expression to separate linguistically organic nature from inorganic. Both these natures are from the life, as it is

given by experience and starts with our SENSATIONS, like apart. The corporal side of man is his substantivic side, the body but an instance of the nature of things. The other extreme point of man's whole substantivic essentiality which is the singular empirically realized PERSONAL substantive is also clear. We have been nearly exclussively discussing hitherto this side of man and have seen that with this side is touched man himself, that man, who has alone a "normative" or "moral" development. Man considered from this side is not an inorganic nor organic body, but the "subject" or "personality" of the experience, but experiences in a manner not found on the point of zoology and peculiar to a "rational" or "irrational" being. He appears as some empirical composition of a DOUBLE, substantivic and personal, substantive.

What about man considered by that side of his life which is particular also to the animal and vegetable kingdom? This life affords also a substantivic consideration. It belongs to a substantive which is not a mere thing, (a thing does not live, does not experience), neither a real person. Whereto should we put man from the viewpoint of LIVING BEINGS? Any living being is not a body, it is a "subject" or "personality" which lives, experiences, but only thus that we can not consider it from the normative or moral viewpoint. "Sensations" and "feeling" are a classical example of life and experience, as it is for the living being particular and essential. Should we in the point of man speak about a tripple substantive, say that substantively considered man is a "body" a "person" and a special "person"? Most certainly not. Our clear consciousness balks against such an interpretation. Everybody is conscious that he is, as he is living and experiencing, THE ONE AND THE SAME. The one and the same are Thou who feels warmth, hears sounds, but whatsoever Thou think, feel and aspire. This fact is clear to anyone, if he keeps in mind that there is the question in any living being of a real subject, real substantive which lives and experiences. Who may or could think that he himself (who lives and experiences) is a double one, a real person who normatively develops, and a living being which is merely animalically living? Our consciousness expressly tells to the contraty that we are and remain the one and the same

who have mere sensations or deep moral experiences: Thou are tormented by the sensation of cold, feel warmth, Thou are agitated by the sensation of love or hatred. "Thou" yield to merely animal life, and "Thou" act but spiritually. The body is something entirely different from man and his experience and his experience can not be mixed up with him. It is, therefore, not necessary to discuss that "I," who have experiences, am in a connection with the corporal side of my empirical essentiality. I am not a double, am not "I," who would live merely animalically and still a special "I,", who would have a spiritual, personal life. I can transpass to further theoretical examinations.

From the substantivic viewpoint has man the character of a double substantivity, of the substantially external and personally internal substantivity. Man as personal substantive lives in the true sense of the word and lives thus that he has the capability for both lifes, for life, as it is for a personal substantive primarily characteristic, and for life, as it is primarily characteristic for such spiritual substantives which we call living beings. The human subject is both, a living being and a real person, a living being as far as he has the life of such beings, but a real person by the immediate essentiality of his essence. We can understand the possibility of such a relation otherwise. Both, the mere living being and person, are internal or spiritual substantives which have in common that they live. It is impossible to think that man should be as a corporal and spiritual being one and the same substantive, and would on the one side live, and on the other appear to us in the form of its external specialities. Against this thought speaks the emphasized boundary between the externally corporal and internally spiritual world which definitely affords that we have to regard both these worlds as equally defined in the substantivic viewpoint: The externally corporal substantive can never be the internally spiritual substantive and vice versa. *)

*) The substantive appears to us in the light of its accidental. But there is impossible that ONE AND THE SAME substantive would appear in the light of corporal moving and then in the light of experiencing. The immediate "touching" of the external substantive is different from the immediate "touching" of the internal substantive; we STRIKE THE THING, but we become IMMEDIATELY CONSCIOUS OF OURSELVES.

Experience teaches that the accidental essentiality of man comprises both, the externally corporal and the internally spiritual accidentals. The same experience affords that we have to speak on the point of man about a double substantiality, of a substantivic doubleness—OF BODY AND SOUL. This request is by no means necessary in the point of that doubleness of human life, which is manifested in the difference between the animalically brute and the personally spiritual life of man. Both accidentals are internally spiritual, such accidentals, which characterize real SUBJECTS and not mere "things." With regard to this question is given a threefold possibility. We can think without restriction about subjects with but an animal life, e. gr., animals. Such subjects would be mere living beings. We can, furthermore, think about subjects with only a spiritual life. Such subjects we do not find in the empirically given creation. These are "pure spirits which have a reason and a will, but no body." Finally we can think about subjects, which are accidentally defined by both lifes, animal and spiritual life. These are all human subjects. The human subject is neither only a living being not a pure person, but is both, a living being and a person. This doubleness is but experiencively accidental, but not also SUBSTANTIVELY ACTUAL. The real essence of the human subject is personally substantivic, with this difference that this and such a personally substantivic subject has also the power and the necessity of an animal life.

Man requires both considerations, the accidental and the substantivic. As far as we consider man accidentally, we find upon him phenomena, which we find, when we view the external dead nature. These accidentals afford a substantially substantivic essence of his nature. Man is a thing along things. The accidental consideration uncovers internal accidentals, as they are given with his experience and these accidentals afford a spiritually substantivic essence of man's essentiality.

Man considered from this side is not a thing, but a subject or personality. The accidental consideration tells, furthermore, that his experience is a double one, given to living being and to "person." This accidental doubleness affords only seemingly a substantivic doubleness of his spiritual essentiality. A subject which is a person CAN HAVE the essence of a sub-

ject which would be a mere living being, but a person is able besides his spiritual experience to have the power and necessity of an animal life. Man is that singular empirically given internally spiritual substantive which is a real person and has accidentals of mere subjects of "living beings." This fact is evident from the view of those specialities of the personally substantivic subject which I discussed in the former section. Think about the outlined doubleness of the merely experiencing and personally substantivic passivity or activity of life. Man has passive and active experiences and is towards his active experience in the relation of passivity or activity. We have to ascribe to the animal the capability of passive and active experiences, but the essential side of human personal subject is in his personally substantivic activity, which is the essence of human WILL in the strictest sense of the word and gives to man the character of the essentially human normatively moral development. Human subject must be both, a real person and a being which has the ability of a merely animal experience: A subject which is active CAN have in his experience the essentiality of mere subjects of living beings, it means, the personally substantivic subject CAN have a double experience, active AND PASSIVE. As a personally substantivic subject we consider that subject which is to the living being in the relation of the STRONGER subject: Only a person can perform, what primarily the animal performs, and what the animal can not perform. Man is by his deep essentiality not a living being, but a real person, and this person has also the power and necessity of impersonal live of living beings.

On man appears a sharp delineation between the merely substantial living being and personal substantive. He is a double-one, a substantial substantive, it means, a mere thing and a personal substantive, it means, a substantially existing soul. We touch the first, when we have in mind man himself, who lives and is in an actual relation to "his" corporality. He has the character of a living being so far as a personal substantive has the power and the necessity of the life of a living being. We must compare man as a person with man as a thing. There appears the fact that the thing is outside of a "passivity" or "activity." This contrast is a particular sign of animal and

spiritual life, not found neither in the external nature, nor in human corporality. Things are by principle neither passive nor active, therefore, outside of any OWN or SUBSTANTIVIC ACTIVITY. Passivity and activity of our experience becomes true because of the relation to ourselves who have this experience. All that our experience is passive, to which we are not passive nor active, and active towards which we are in the relation of the own substantivic passivity or activity. Our experience comprises the accidental side of our substantivic assentiality. I can, therefore, the relation express as follows: Where there is by principle abstracted the accidental real "passivity" and "activity," there is abstracted by principle the possibility and necessity of a substantivic working. Things are substantives which are in the accidental regard outside of any true "activity" or "passivity," therefore, without any own, substantivic working. This new conception of "working" is realized on the point of things, although it is by no means any activity or passivity. Things have the character of such a working as it is evident from old and modern physics which we call the science of such a working of things.

This working is buil up upon that empirically uncontended changing of natural things, manifested in different forms. Physics interprets this working as the consequence of MOVING. With any moving is effected some "work" and moving is a classic example for the naturally substantial working. How to interpret moving also from the viewpoint of the substantivic consideration of natural things? I answer: Moving comprises but the accidental side of natural substantives and their working is ACCIDENTAL moving. On the point of our spirituality we can compare it with starting, changing and disappearing of our experience. *)

Man also has the character of a working which characterizes him as working and may be contrary to experiencing working. This is the substantivic working. If we compare

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*) Physics is protruding TO THINGS because of moving, psychology to SUBJECTS along the experience. Why are moving and experience the BASICAL ACCIDENTAL CONCEPTIONS of physics and psychology, I shall show in the last chapter, where I deal with substantively accidental "order" of the universe.

the mere thing with ourselves, who are substantively working, appears that the thing is by principle outside of a substantivic working. Who would think that a thing could by some working "contradict" its merely accidental activity as manifested in its moving, and contradict it, as we may contradict our desire? Someone may think about the phenomenon of so called "perseverance." But this perseverance holds generally without exception for anything that actually exists. All substantives and all accidentals necessarily persevere, as long as there does not appear from somewhere a pretext which excludes this perseverance. Where from comes such a pretext? Natural substantive, thing, perseveres and perseveres as long as from somewhere does not come an impulse which shifts this perseverance. Only our will is such a fact of our substantivic essentiality, with which WE OURSELVES "shift" perseverance.

Perseverance of things means some merely formal, logical side of creation which does not justify us to speak about a substantivic working of natural things. Things would substantively work if they could balk against THEIR OWN perseverance. Such thought is on the point of natural things excluded. We can this fact put directly in front of modern and most modern physics.

The working of things is an accidental working. It is a double-one HETEROGENEOUS OR AUTOGENEOUS. A mere thing moves as far as it was "moved." It means: The working of any mere thing is necessarily only the LOOSENED WORKING OF ANOTHER THING. We see in nature different combinations of single things which makes the impression that they are working. The working of any single member is but the working loosened by the working of another member. This is a heterogeneous working. Things work heterogeneously accidentally. There are in the external unspiritual nature mere things which have the character of an heterogeneous and autogeneous accidental working. These are ORGANISMS, therefore, in the biological sense "living" substantives. We can interpret the working of organisms as "moving," with this difference that organisms "move" in twofold way. They move as far as they have been moved, and as far as this moving is the expression of their own accidentally

moving essentiality ("growing," own "reaction" to the environs, "assimilation," "secretion" etc.). This working is merely accidental, parallelly visible and with external expedients accessible to the searcher. Organisms can this their accidental working not oppose. This fact is evident from biology. The accidental working of organisms is an autogeneous working, too. The external, unspiritual nature is divided in halves, into the inorganic and organic matter. To the first half belong things in the stricter sense of the word, dead things (stone, water, iron), to the second things in the broader sense of the word, organisms or living things (baccilli, plant, animal body). I define these halves: Things of the inorganic and organic world are outside of any substantivic working, both things have the character of a merely accidental working. This working is on the point of inorganic things heterogeneous, on the point of organic things heterogeneous and autogeneous.

We pass to the sphere of life, to subjects and to experience. I mentioned that the border of inorganic and organic things is the border of the external, corporal nature. Beyond this border begins the world of spiritual phenomena, the world of life in the real and not only biological sense of the word. We can give some common substantivic characterization of life. The external nature is outside of any substantivic working, for the world of life is the substantivic and not merely accidental working characteristic. The example is human and personally substantivic life. One point is so expressive that we could call it the essentially human will. Human life is the most expressive life in the empirically known world. We speak about characteristic grades of life: Human life takes the highest grade. There is an animal life, an essentially human spiritual life. The higher point is in the spiritual life. Any life has theoretically the character of a substantivic working, but human life is the example of life in general.

Substantivic working is two-fold, heterogeneous and autogeneous. Human life is AUTOGENEOUS substantivic working. Man can "influence" his active experience, or can "OPPOSE" this experience. The working of the human subject is "substantivic." That it is "autogeneous," is evident from the autogeneous accidental working of organisms. Human experience

forms the accidental side of the human subject, but the human subject influences this experience, he agrees with his experience or opposes it. This movement is a clear example of the autogeneous and substantivic working of the human subject. We characterized this "movement" as "will." The definition of will in the strictest sense of the word is: Will is the autogeneous substantivic working and vice versa. The heterogeneous substantivic working is characteristic for animal life, therefore, for subjects of "living beings." We can not observe such subjects immediately, because we are not substantives of living beings. But there are in our human life plenty examples for manifestations of a subject which are the expression of its substantivic, but heterogeneous working. We are many times overcome by a strong feeling, to which we "submit." In such an example we do not willingly agree with this feeling, neither do we willingly oppose it. If we would in such a case observe ourselves, we would perceive some substantivic activity, some our working. This working is not the working of our personal "agreeing," neither of our personal "opposition." This is but the working of some "submission" to something that belongs to us, but forms but the accidental side of our personal essentiality. Poets may see us in this position, when they appeal to us that we "submit" to zephyrs. Interesting is that such a position of the subject is independent on the question, if the pertinent his experience is active or only passive. Think of a man who is terribly tormented by a toothache; like one out of his mind he runs hither and tither and shows signs of some extraordinary personal activity. He is in this situation substantively working, but this working is forced upon him: This working is but the "substantivic reflex" of sensitive aching. Such examples prove that we must speak about a substantivic, but HETEROGENEOUS working.

I give a definition of subjects of living beings. They are subjects with a hterogeneous substantivic working. We can see this immediately in the point of zoology. Animal has not that autogeneous substantivic working, that it may agree with its doings or oppose them. Animal, considered as a spiritual substantive, is not a person. But animal is more than a substantial substantive, more than a thing or an organism. Animal

works "itself," directs "itself," but such "ITS" working and directing is only a "reflex" of its experience. It "submits" or "surrenders" to its momentary active or passive accidentally experiencing position. We can "drill" or "dress" the animal, but we can not "educate" it. Education rests upon the willing cooperation of that, whom we may educate. Without this cooperation educational works are but a "habit" a "fear" of disagreableness, a blind turning of attention to some extraordinary phenomena etc. On the child is possible a "forced" accostuming to this and that, real education begins, when we think that the child has a real, selfwilling personal life. There are connections between the personal subject and the subject of a living being. Man is a person, not a living being, but this person has the ability and necessity of expressions of a living being. The child is a true person, but this person realizes himself in the pattern of a living being, his accidental side comprises an experience, which is for living beings exclusively characteristic. The personal subject has both, the essentially ("spiritual") EXPERIENCE and the experience of the living being (animal experience). The first is by DEVELOPMENT built up on the second. The same human subject has also BOTH OWN substantivic workings, the autogeneous and the heterogeneous, and here also is the first built up on the second. The human child is in his spiritual evolution a classic example of a personal subject, which has the character of the experiencivic accidentalness of living beings and the character of the heterogeneous substantivic working of living beings.

With the given thought is indicated my NEW THEORY of the substantivic consideration of creation. I touch still one gap. Discussing the human spirituality I considered it from the view of the experiencing and personal activity and passivity. Then I passed to the broader conception of "workingness," encountered also on the point of externally natural phenomena. Finally I considered the personal substantivic passivity and activity only from the view of this "workingness." Was I justified? Without doubt. The experiencing passivity and activity is but an example of the accidental workingness, which appears to us as "passivity" or "activity," because it corresponds with the—substantivic workingness. The subjects are

working, therefore, their experiencing workingness appears in the form of passivity and activity.

Externally natural phenomena are outside of any passivity and activity. The reason for this fact is that natural things are outside of the substantivic workingness. This fact proves both, that these things have the character of accidental workingness, but it has not the character of any passivity or activity. We can without any restriction transfer our distinguishing between heterogeneous and autogeneous accidental workingness to the spiritual sphere. Passive and active experiences of subjects express their merely accidental workingness, with their passive experience is given their heterogeneous accidental workingness, with the active the autogeneous. *)

The connection of the legal system of creation is accomplished. This system is divided in halves, in the half of externally natural things and in the half of internally spiritual subjects, in the half of external nature and in the half of life. The first half has two parts, the first comprises inorganic things, the second organisms. The second half has again two parts, the first comprises subjects of living beings, the second personal subjects. The underangeable border between external nature, inorganic things (organisms) and life in the strictest sense of the word is, that external nature is outside of the substantivic workingness and that life is substantively working. Both worlds have the character of accidental workingness. Accidental workingness of inorganic nature is heterogeneous, of organic nature heterogeneous and autogeneous, whilst living beings and personal subjects have both, the heterogeneous and the autogeneous accidental workingness, namely, the passive and the active experience. The underangeable difference between living beings and personal subjects by principle is that the subjects of living beings have the character of the heterogeneous substantive working, the personal subjects the heterogeneous and autogeneous. A collateral consequence of these discussions would be that the systematical relationship of subjects of living beings to the personal in the world of life

*) Passivity of the experience is an "accidental violence" on the subject, activity comprises an "accidental freedom" of the subject.

is similar to the like systematical relationship of inorganic things to organisms in the world of external nature. The difference is that here, on the point of external nature, is this relation "accidental," there, on the point of life, "substantivic": Organic things have only an heterogeneous, organisms an heterogeneous and autogeneous ACCIDENTAL working; living beings have but an heterogeneous, personal subjects an heterogeneous and autogeneous SUBSTANTIVIC working.

Very interesting are the legal developing relationships between these single accidental and substantivic sections of creation. Organic nature is evolutionarily built up on inorganic, it means, that autogeneous accidental working is built up on the heterogeneous. Personal life is evolutionarily built up on the animal life of living beings, but animal live of living beings on the manifestation of organic nature. This means, according to our definitions, that autogeneous substantivic workingness is developingly built up on the heterogeneous, furthermore, that autogeneous accidental workingness, as it manifests it in the form of active experience, is evolutionarily built up on that accidental workingness, as it is manifested by passive experience, and finally, that this accidental workingness and with it passive experience finally evolutionarily built up on the autogeneous accidental workingness of organic matter. Organic matter is evolutionarily built up on inorganic. From those viewpoints is, therefore, proven that the inorganic world is by principle the evolutionarily system of dead and living creation. Don't mistake me. I add that my allegement of these evolutionarily relationships is but by principle and does by no means touch the question, if these relationships are in any example equal or not. It is evident that evolution which leads from inorganic things to organisms, may be pretty different from that which should lead from organic matter to life, and at all that which leads from life of living beings to personal life. I speak about this in the following section. For the present I ascertain but the general fact that the existence of empirically given personal life is doubtlessly somehow dependent on the existence of the life of living beings, the existence of the life of living beings on the existence of organisms, and the existence of organisms on the existence of inorganic matter.

Let us return to man. He is a mikrokosm, comprises the essentiality of creation and essentiality surpasses it. This fact we can express in an analitic exactness. Man is in his corporal side an inorganic and organic substantive with an heterogeneous and autogeneous accidental workingness. On his spiritual side is he a personal substantive which has the character of a heterogeneous and autogeneous substantivic workingness. As such a spiritual personal substantive he has a passive and active experience, which forms the heterogeneous and autogeneous accidental workingness of his personally substantivic essentiality. With his passive experience is by principle given his heterogeneous accidental workingness, with his active the autogeneous. The further important relationship of his personally substantivic workingness to the experiencing accidental is that his heterogeneous personally substantivic workingness manifests it equally towards his passive and active experience, but his autogeneously personally substantivic workingness appears by principle only towards his active experience: Heterogeneously personally substantivic workingness is the "substantivic reflex" of both, of the heterogeneously and autogeneously experiencingly accidental workingness, but his autogeneously personally substantivic workingness can be realized only towards the equally autogeneously experiencingly accidental workingness. Expressly I may here emphatically add the parallel collateral fact that man is by his spiritual side not a "living being," not a substantive of a living being, but a person, a personal substantive WHICH HAS THE ACCIDENTAL ESSENTIALITY OF A SUBSTANTIVE OF LIVING BEINGS. Important are also the EVOLUTIONARIC relationships between the single substantivic and accidental sections of the whole human essentiality. These relationships are as follows: The organically corporal substantiveness of man is evolutionarily built up on his inorganically corporal substantiveness, and his autogeneously corporally accidental workingness on his heterogeneously personally substantivic workingness, but thus that in the parallel experiencingly accidental regard is his autogeneously experiencingly accidental workingness evolutionarily built up on his heterogeneously experiencingly accidental workingness, THIS ON HIS AUTOGENEOUSLY CORPORALLY

ACCIDENTAL WORKINGNESS AND WITH THIS WORKINGNESS COMBINED ORGANICALLY CORPORAL SUBSTANTIVENESS. If we would in these evolutionaric regards try to give a scale, whose any following member should be evolutionarily higher and but in such a general meaning of the word more dependent, then would have this scale this aspect: Mere thing (inorganic substantive) with the pertinent heterogeneously corporally accidental workingness—organism (organic substantive) with the pertinent autogeneously corporally accidental workingness—heterogeneously active personally substantive with the pertinent heterogeneously experiencingly accidental workingness—the same heterogeneously active personal substantive with the pertinent autogeneously experiencingly accidental workingness—the same, but autogeneously active personal substantive with the pertinent autogeneously experiencingly accidental workingness.

21. Man's essentiality by principle supernatural, metaphysic.

Man has an exceptional place in creation. I characterized this position and called man an "exnatural" and "supernatural" being in the world. We know on which side of human essentiality is this supernatural character immediately founded. This is the phenomenon of human WILL. Human will is man's personally substantivic activity, his autogeneous activity. To make this important fact clearer, we must define the true meaning of "naturality" (Naturhaftigheit). Natural happening is necessarily real or realitivic. The world of nature is the world of EMPIRICALLY GIVEN phenomena and happenings. This characterization of nature is evidently too broad. In man is empirically given this that characterizes him as a supernatural being. The fact of our will is empirically given to man, therefore, real. The difference between the natural and supernatural world is not, that the first world would be real, the second outside of reality. We must distinguish between the world of realities and THE WORLD OF VALUATIONS. The world of valuation si by no means the contrast to natural world. We found the natural world also on the point of the human personal essentiality. This essentiality is empirically given, real.

This is clearer from the point of valuation. Valuation is not merely a natural fact, it is different from reality, but with reality in such an internal connection that without it valuation would disappear. The real thing is the necessary territory of the valuation. The world of valuations is in the same relation to both worlds, to the world which comprises "nature" and to the world which is empirically given, real, but is without the natural, therefore, outnatural, supernatural. This exnatural world is like the natural the "territory" of the valuation, and I call it the METAPHYSICALLY supernatural or the metaphysic world. Personal essentiality is a part of metaphysic world. *)

Natural and metaphysical world must be sharply defined. That my way may be to everyone accessible and from the viewpoint of science solid, I follow that SENSATION which is given us in our experiences in life and in the wisdom of life of our ancestors. Sensations tell this that may be regarded as "natural" or otherwise. These sensations demand that we attribute to nature the world of dead nature, it means, the world of inorganic matter. The same sensations demand that we attribute to nature vegetable and animal life. The farmer tells you that the cow and the land belong to nature. We must attribute to nature many things which we find in ourselves, our corporal essentiality and many forms of our spiritual vital manifestations. The farmer knows that he has as a living being many things in common with his domestical animals, how the cattle is "satiated," then "hungry," "rested," then "tired," how the animal appears in high, then in low spirits, more obedient, then stubborn. We find in ourselves many things as nowhere else. Does the farmer not know that he is something different from the dead and living nature around him and how he must differently deal with the neighbor and differently with the domestical animals? Man overcome by such sensations sees himself momentarily in face of nature in the light of some mysterious solitude which extorts him the acknowledgment:

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*) For our mutual understanding: "Metaphysicality" as here conceived may be empirically given and is, therefore, nothing "unnatural" or even—contranatural. There is the question about the difference between things, which are in nature and there is not the question between "natural" and "unnatural." Everything is natural!

There dead and living nature, here man. This sensation is as old as the human race. It explains why primal man dreamed about a supernatural world and why in single points (potentates, emperors, heroes) or he himself regarded as descended from this supernatural world. Think about slavery which proves the existence of this general human sensation. The difference is that here they ascribed real and in this sense exnatural humanity to some groups, but regarded the remaining humanity as a systematical member of merely naturally animal life. *)

The world of nature reaches from mere inorganic matter along the vegetable and animal life to man. But in the sence of that sensation is just in man still an important relic which reaches out of the natural manifestation. This is the PERSONAL essentiality of man. That generally human sensation is followed also by SCIENCE, as far as it is here interested, it means, as far as it is dealing with single sections and manifestations of creation. I think about the difference between so called "natural" and "spiritual" sciences (Naturwissenschaften-Geisteswissenschaften). This difference is not only centuries old, it comes more and more to the foreground in modern times and may turn our attention to the exceptional place of man in the whole creation. The world of the nature reaches as far as reaches this, with which deal natural sciences. The extent is the extent of this that sensation characterizes as the world of mere naturalness. Natural sciences deal with inorganic and organic matter (e. gr. physics, chemistry, mineralogy, geology, anatomy, psysiology etc.) and with natural life. From this standpoint belongs to their objects human nature (biology, anthropology, natural psychology). Basical and ideal natural disciplines are those which immediately deal with inorganic matter (physics!). But natural sciences come, when they be-

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This is true only with regard to the social spirit of these times, not to the PERSONAL judging of neighbor. The slave in those times could reach the highest honors—and we are today not without slaves. Christian religion abolished ancient slavery and accomplished this with the emphasis of the supernatural essence and goal of ALL mankind and all mankind, slaves and "lords," followed actually this teaching. That they may follow also TODAY!

gin to deal with the corporal and spiritual essence of man, to a boundary, where they have to retreat and to leave the further work to entirely different, namely, spiritual disciplines, as they are given in the system of so called positive sciences, e. gr., with linguistic, literary history, general history, jurisprudence, different social sciences. Such and similar disciplines are originally and finally centered in man, and in manifestations of man as found nowhere else. For this reason cease here the systematical and methodical viewpoints, common to all natural disciplines, but into the foreground step forcefully special interests and methodical viewpoints common to spiritual disciplines. These interests and viewpoints are directly to each other appart. The interest and viewpoint of natural disciplines is given with the conception of "universal nature," on account of which has man a subordinate place; man also is a part of natural creation and an insignificant one. The systematical interest and viewpoint of natural disciplines is COSMOCENTRALLY KOPERNICAL. But the interest and viewpoint of spiritual (of so called philologically-historical) sciences is given with the conception of "man" found nowhere in natural creation, leading to him by all his dependence on nature, which surrounds him, some special and superordinate place, anyone acknowledges or knows, directly or subconsciously that man is really a "mikrokosmos," who comprises the essentiality of all remaining natural creation, but has on the other hand an essentiality found nowhere else. The systematical interest and viewpoint of spiritual sciences is ANTHROPOCENTRALLY PTOLOMAICAL.

The actual composition of sciences proves a like doubleness of the merely natural and special supernatural world. In the sense of this composition is the personal essentiality of man the only point, where becomes the actual supernaturality empirically accessible. We can, therefore, return to our former discussions and ask: How may we interpret this so deeply incising doubleness of creation from the viewpoint of this that we know about the hitherto belonging structure of empirically given phenomena? Creation appeared to us separated into inorganical and organical things, natural living beings and personal substantives. This legal substantivic trinity appeared

legitimately defined by its accidental essentiality. The speciality of such an accidental essentiality showed that we must distinguish between the inorganic, organic and living substantive and that this tripple substantivity is in an underangeable distance from the personal substantive. I assert: The world of nature comprises from such viewpoints the trinity of the inorganic, organic and living substantives. Personal substantives, human subjects, form a point which is the point of the actual, but entirely exnatural world. I corroborate this fact. ..For inorganic and organic nature is most important that it has the character of a but ACCIDENTAL workingness. This workingness is in the point of inorganic things heterogeneous, but on the point of organic things heterogeneous and autogeneous. We recognized the essence of natural life in such a being which has the character of a substantivic WORKINGNESS, but only of a HETEROGENEOUS such workingness. Heterogeneous substantivic workingness is in essence but an echo, a mere consequence of accidental workingness. Thus is with such a heterogeneous substantivic workingness of natural life in nature itself inserted a manifestation, as we do not have it in nature anywhere (in the point of inorganic and organic matter). This speciality of natural happening is only theoretically significant, practically it has no meaning, because THIS speciality of nature is but the consequence of its accidental workingness. We touch only on the point of the personal substantive, only on the point of man an actual being which has the character of an AUTOGENEOUS, therefore, such a SUBSTANTIVIC workingness which is not a consequence of the accidental working, but with such an accidental activity in a most important relation, namely, that it "agrees" with it, or "contradicts" it. The fact of such an autogeneous substantivic workingness is the fact of an ORIGINAL, DYNAMIC workingness. Nature does not know such a dynamic workingness.

Creation is from our viewpoint divided in two parts, in the part which is accidentally working, for it the decisive working, and in the part, which is autogeneously substantivic working and whose working is by its actual self-existence out of the system of natural working. This second part is given by man. Our human WILL is the exnatural working of our essentiality.

This partition agrees with the partition indicated by our human "sensation." Sensation is no science, but disciplines in natural and spiritual sciences give us the same partition. The personal (autogeneous giving substantivic) essentiality of man is that world, which is distinct from remaining creation. We must sharply distinguish between inorganic, organic, then nature of living beings, and human personality. This distinction was formerly forced upon us, now it is theoretically clear. We know that this IS so, and know, WHY this is so. The final reason is in the difference between the NATURAL AND EXNATURAL WORKINGNESS. Nature works but accidentally, the person substantively, thus that it becomes by its meaning and influence exaccidental or contraaccidental. The essence of the natural and psychological EXPLANATION coincides with this partition.

The natural explanation proceeds by the principle of "causality," which touches the accidental half of the partition. To explain something naturally, means, to deduct accidental from accidental. The moving of the body a/1 causes the moving of the body b/2, the falling of rain causes the humidity of the soil, the growth of temperature "causes" the growth of the spacious extent etc. "Cause" and "effects" are always and everywhere but some "changing," "happening." The natural explanation comprises seemingly immediately things, substantives. This view is given, when there is the question about the natural explanation of the ORIGIN of things. But there is the question only about "new" accidentals and it would be afforded a special CONCLUSION, if with accidentals would correspond new things. The natural consideration, how stones originate, is the consideration, how do originate "forms," "thicknesses," relations in "weight," "dissections" etc. That with such accidentals correspond things or substantives, is not the task of the natural consideration or explanation. This accidental viewpoint manifests itself everywhere, where there is such a consideration justified, therefore, not only on the point of dead inorganic and organic nature, but also on the point of natural life, moreover, also on the point of human dead and living naturality. If we proceed from elementary physics along organic chemistry and physiology to modern experimental psychology,

we see these disciplines rest upon the principle of natural causality which has different forms, but touches the systematical question, how originates accidental from accidental, "moving" from "moving," "connection" from "connection," "irritation" from "irritation," "happening" from "happening." The psychological explanation has a different aspect. The explanation may rest upon the principle of causality and must do this, when it deals with natural manifastations and happenings. The natural consideration steps out as an AUXILIARY expedient for psychological means. In this relation are experimental phonetics to linguistics, geology and geography to history, chemistry and technology to social disciplines. This viewpoint becomes different then, when spiritual disciplines arrive at their own sphere, at the sphere of human, personal life. The deduction of changing from changing, happening from happening, ceases. SPECIAL changings and SPECIAL happenings concentrate upon facts which are not changings, happenings, in general not "accidentals." Such facts are given only with the fact of singular human, PERSONAL subjects. "Language" as a phenomenon of civilization can be understood only on the fundamental of the personal human essentiality. Literary works must have the appreciation of the personal essence of their authors, historical facts could not be understood, if there would not be behind them historical persons, social life depends on the question, in which relation we as personal spiritual beings are to our corporal sensitive needs etc. Scientifical explanations become upon such points essentially different. In natural sciences the natural explanation rests upon the causal deduction of happening from happening, change from change, accidental from accidental. But the psychological explanation of psychological disciplines rests upon an entirely different deduction of happening, changing FROM THAT which conditions this changing, happening. There is the question there about the deduction of the "accidental" from the—SUBSTANTIVE, from the personal human substantive.

Natural explanation is merely accidental, psychological is accidentally substantivic. This systematic difference between natural and psychological disciplines clearly proves our partition of creation in the world of dead nature, living beings and

human personal essentiality. The world of nature reaches as far as reaches the world of accidental working, or as far as this working is a decisive workingness. With the world of man, personal essentiality, is given the world of a decisive substantivic workingness. This parallelness between the conception of creation and the work of all sciences, proven by experiences of centuries, becomes more delicate in singularities. The world of inorganic nature is the world of accidental workingness, but organic nature is autogeneously accidentally working. Natural life has also the character of a substantivic workingness, which is some consequence of the accidentalness of life. The single mere accidental work steps on the scale from inorganic nature to natural life in the background and it appears the direction of some substantivic manifestation. In the point of man is the working independent. Physics is a classic discipline of inorganic nature and natural science. The accidental viewpoint is in inorganic nature absolutely in the foreground. This viewpoint dvindles above organic nature and natural life till it disappear entirely into the point of human personal life. Sciences in the empirical world become less and less "natural," till they lose this character. This point in the system of sciences is attained in the scientific examination of personal human life, and in all external "products" of human life. On this point step forward exnatural and spiritual disciplines.

These thoughts prove and strenghten the exnatural and metaphysical essentiality of man. Three other facts lead to the same goal. First belongs hitherto the fact of HUMAN LIBERTY. The essence of liberty is in the autogeneous substantivic giveness of the human being, in human WILL. Will is by its own nature free and must be free. The reason of this fact is in the partition of workingness in the accidental and substantivic working. Accidental working means the deduction of accidental from accidental, changing from changing, happening from happening, experience from experience. The accidental is conditioned by another accidental and in the circle of accidental conditions we can not speak about a stern liberty of the—substantive. Dead and living substantives are not free entities, as long as we consider them from the viewpoint of an accidental originating changing and disappearing. Upon this

fact is built up the principle of natural causality. Causality comprises the accidental or such a working, towards which is the substantivic working only a consequential fact. It embrasses dead nature, natural life upon it and a part of human essentiality, so far as this essentiality is accidentally working. In the point of human will we touch a working, where there is not the question about the origin of accidental from—accidental, but about the origin of a giveness from the SUBSTANTIVIC essence of the human personality. On this point ceases the originating of happening from happening. In this point there is the singular empirically given originating of the happening from its—own substantivic bearer. The accidentals discover only the "outside" or "superficial" consideration of the substantives. We arrive at these substantives with the help of the "central" or consideration "by depth. The accidental side of the entities is their "outside" or "superficial" side, with which corresponds their "central" or "depth-side." This side is in their substantiveness. The causal and, therefore, not free process is an outside or superficial process and it is characteristic for creation with the single exception of the human personal willingness. THIS WILLINGNESS PROCEEDS CENTRALLY OR BY DEPTH. Our will is by its own nature free and the origin of our will is substantively central or by profundity. *)

Secondly, belongs hitherto the fact of HUMAN NORMATIVELY MORAL DEVELOPMENT and with this fact combined human RESPONSIBILITY. Our experiences are correct or incorrect. This correctness or incorrectness is a double one, external or internal. Only the fact of internal correctness is the fact of our true normatively moral development. We proved in detail that our experiences become internally correct or incorrect because of our own personally substantivic giveness, because of our will in the most narrow and strictest sense of the word. Here is the question about our own "personal" effort,

*) I must mention that this origin is not only naturally causal, but also EMPIRICAL and allows a "legitimate," e. gr. STATISTICAL consideration of its manifestation. For this reason does the fact of "criminal statistics," not speak for the naturally causal proceeding of the will; the SUBSTANTIVIC origin of the will has the character of a legitimate origin. Determinists (see note 46) appeal wrongly to statistics of human moral.

about our agreement to our given experience or our resistance against this experience. This agreement or resistance effects that our experience becomes internally correct or incorrect, has the character of perception or error. The internal correctness or incorrectness is a double one, in the broader and in the stricter sense of the word. The internal correctness or incorrectness in the broader sense appeared as the consequence of TWO facts: Of the external correctness or incorrectness and of our personally substantivic agreement or resistance. Hitherto belongs the example of real perception and error. The internal correctness or incorrectness in the narrower sence of the word appeared as that correctness or incorrectness, which is on the external experiencic correctness or incorrectness by principle independent and in the entire extent defined by the access of our own personally substantivic agreement or resistance. The clearest example of such a normativity in the strictest sense of the word is given with "goodness" or "wickedness' of man. We are, as we thus develope normatively morally, necessary also RESPONSIBLE. A directly systematical member of this development is our personally substantivic giveness. This giveness is as our own giveness free and makes us necessarily FREE. The normatively moral development is thus necessarily the FREE AND FREELY RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT. Man is the only empirically given being, who has the character of such normatively moral and for this reason such free and freely responsible development. *)

The normatively moral development of man si a double one, broader and stricter. Broader and stricter is man's true freedom, too. We are in the broader sense of the word free then, when we "perceive" something, or "err" about something. This is a true freedom, because here must step in our own and personally substantivic giveness, but perception or error depends on the question, if our experiences are externally correct or incorrect, founded only in the objective side of our experience and so far on our personal essentiality independent. We are free in the strictest sense of the word then, when we manifest ourselves in the sign of real "goodness" or "wicked-

*) See my essay "St. Augustine," page 76-99.

ness." This freedom is true freedom, because it is the access of our own and personally substantivic giveness, and the essence of our goodness or wickedness is fully perceived and exhausted by our personally substantivic giveness. Our responsibility is also a double one, broader and stricter. We are in the broader sense responsible for our perceptions and errors, but in the strictest sense for our deeds which testify that we are good or wicked. The singular place of man amongst all empirically given beings is characterized by the legitimate trinity of his broader and stricter normatively moral development, freedom and responsibility.

The fourth fact follows. I call it the fact of the VERTICAL CONDITIONING OF THE HUMAN SINGLE PERSON. Remember the "horizontal" and "vertical" giveness of phenomena. The single empirical reality is a horizontally by another reality given reality, but the SYSTEM OF REALITIES of creation affords the transition to a VERTICAL giveness. We found the essence of this giveness in the conditioning of creation by the original act—by God. Later we extended the vertical giveness to the system of valuations, and came to the conclusion that the universe of realities and valuations is immediately the universe, given and created—by God. We have even seen that the divine working, viewed from the standpoint of the system of realities and valuations, appears in a tripple light: In the light of God Logos, who gives to the reality and valuation the character of real essentialities, in the light of God Etos, who is immediately conditioning the system of all real things, and in the light of God Nomos, who is immediately conditioning the system of all valuable things. We arrived at the acknowledgment of the supernatural divine essence from the viewpoint of the entire system of realities and valuations. The same acknowledgment is put upon us also by that PARTICULAR PART of creation, as it is given with the exnatural and supernatural essentiality of the single human being. This is the personally substantivic essentiality of man which differs from all remaining creation, that it has with this creation in common only the character of the empirical giveness, but is from this creation so remote that it forms a special world, the supernatural metaphysic world. In this point and only in this point of

creation is undispensably necessary a transition to the vertical giveness and to the parallel divine working. Such a transition would be here only then unnecessary, if someone would assume the viewpoint that this personally substantivic essence of man is itself the special essence of—God, a senseless thought!

Such a thought could be begotten but in the mysteriously drunken head of an Angelus Silesius, but deserves from any soberly thinking man only a pitiful smile. *)

Man is but a part of creation, the ENTIRE MAN, man as a natural being and exnatural person, as body and soul, SOUL AND SPIRIT. We are in full extent of our essentiality in many ways dependent on natural creation. When we do not mind that our dependence and descend immediately to this that unmovably separates us from the remaining world, to the personally substantivic essence of our nature, we become clearly conscious that this our essence is conditioned, that "we did not create ourselves." Thus, our second consciousness is the consciousness of OUR IMMEDIATE CONDITION by the DIVINE orgidinal working and only by this working. We will deduct anything that is natural in us from natural workingness. But we can not do this in the point of that essence of our nature which has with regard to all natural creation the place of a metaphysical exceptional fact. This essence is conditioned, too, therefore, immediately conditioned by God.

At the beginning of the section we asked, if there is not with the empirical fact of man given the like empirical fact of a metaphysically supernatural world. I think that there is no doubt that this question must be answered positively. General is the sensation that man has a special place in creation. The same fact is evident from the division between natural and psychological disciplines which would be impossible, if man would be in the entire extent of his essentiality only a part of natural creation. The natural viewing of the world and life is, thirdly, different from the psychological. Natural philosophers must deduct man from nature, but they can not succeed in the wholeness. Psychologists accede who see in man the singular

*) My essay entitled "Baruh de Spinoza" (Dom in Svet, 1932). Spinoza and HIS PERIOD was humanizing God and deifying man!

former of phenomena which natural philosophy can not deal with at least not scientifically. All this is, fourthly, founded in the essentially different working, as it is peculiar to all natural phenomena and as we find it only on the point of man. The first working is accidental or but the consequence of the accidental working, the second personally substantivic. This second working effects that man is the singular "historical" being in the world. We could without man not speak about "civilization" in the broader and "culture" in the stricter sense of the word. All this is finally expressed with three facts, charracteristic only of human nature, with the fact of human normatively moral development, human freedom and with this human freedom undissolubly united human personal responsibility. These three facts afford and prove the fact of the immediate vertical giveness of any human person. Immediate vertical giveness says that any SINGLE MAN IS in his personal essence an immediately by God given, created being. This goal may serve this my final sentence: Man, do not resist supernatural metaphysic discussions, because Thou are a supernatural metaphysic being!

22. Personality proves the primereality of God.

The theory of human personality comprises a supernaturally metaphysical world and affords a transition to God. It may arise strong doubts in the minds of thinkers who claim some perfect unity of creation which forbids such a partition of creation in the natural and directly metaphysical world. I retort that I have nothing against the uniform conception of creation, but that the question remains open, if this unity has not boundaries which nobody can disregard. Nature is something essentially shattered. There is a difference between dead and living nature, between inorganic matter and the world of life. Between these two worlds are legitimate connections, but no internal transition. This is that important dualism energetically started in modern philosophy and expressly pointed out by myself. This "spychophysical dualism" is best characterized with the contrast: There external nature, here internal life, there corporal externity, here spiritual internity. We have not

to think about man, if we acknowledge such a psychophysical dualism. Any animal being is an expressive composition of both worlds. Animal lives, senses, feels, desires, it is a corporal and spiritual being. This, to which nobody denies a real naturality, has two different part, and between them there is no internal transition. We speak about some "uniform" structure of creation. It follows that with such a unity is by no means given the request for the elimination of the real and directly unsurmountable DIFFERENCE between single phenomena of all manifestations.

Some may object that such a correctly conceived unity of creation can be sharply and strictly defined. The objection would mean that the true conception of the unity is the conception of the UNIFORM NATURAL LEGALITY without regard, if such a legality is actually to us known or not. In any case is this uniform legality manifested in the known fact that through all natural originating, changing and disappearing follows the one and generally valuable principle of NATURAL CAUSALITY. Our theory of the human personal essentiality will regard this essentiality as such a uniform point of creation, on which the validity and the application of the principle of natural causality entirely ceases. Against such a partition of creation anyone must revolt, if he cares for a scientific conception of the world and life. Humanity must be thankful that the principle of general causality became that principle which entirely removed the former mixed up and chaotic conception of creation and made the later and present organized and scientific conception possible. Anyone proceeds, therefore, directly backwardly and reactively, if he searches in creation for facts, for which the general valuable principle of causality would not value, in spite of such splendid names for those facts, as there is the name of human "personality." Thus the objection.

I openly and decisively agree with this objection. I am with my theory of human personality stepping out in the open with a dualism of creation, for which the principle of causality generally values, and of a creation, for which this principle does not value. For the reason that there is in this dualism the question, how is in creation all the originating, changing and disappearing effected, and for the reason that this dualism

touches the DYNAMIC or ENERGETIC side of creation, I may distinguish it also linguistically from the mentioned psychophysical dualism and call it the "dynamic" or "energetic" dualism of creation. I pronounce with this dualism that this creation is divided in two parts. The first comprises the naturally causal originating, changing, the second the exnatural happening. So far I agree. The rejection of this dualism of the world is unscientific, because it is proven by important arguments. I proved this dualism. I showed, how it is working, how is this working in the personal subject distinct from the causal working. I turned attention to the undisputable FACT of such a personal working and explained, how and why the MANNER of this working unamoveably differs from the causal working. With regard to my discourses and proofs could the objection have the meaning that the theory is preventing the acknowledgment of the causality on that sphere, where the principle of causality is in full force. If this objection should be taken ernestly, it could have but this wording: We can not acknowledge in creation any personal and exnaturally causal happening, because with such an acknowledgment would be made impossible the causal conception of creation. This objection has been pronounced with the thought that also the "will" must run causally, because in the contrary instance would be in account of the undisputable connection of the will with creation the changing in this creation only consequences of the will, therefore, not real "effects." For example. I wish to lift my hand and the hand rises. If the will would be an exnatural and metaphysical fact, then we would have to regard the natural lifting of the hand as a happening which is supernaturally, metaphysically, but by no means causally conditioned. Or briefly: All natural happening is merely causally conditioned, we can, therefore, not speak about an excausal personal working which would such a happening especially condition. *)

This form gives to the objection some scientific value.

*) This is the main tenet of so called DETERMINATION of the human will and my teacher Meinong regarded this standpoint as exclusively correct.

Many and bulky books have been written about this question. All this work was an unsuccessful Sisifus's effort, because it was not founded in the true or not enough sharp definition of genuine causal working and real personality. We know this definition and it will help effectively to rebuff the objection.

Causal working is a merely ACCIDENTAL working which is the legitimate originating of ACCIDENTAL FROM ACCIDENTAL. Personal working is a SUBSTANTIVIC working which is the originating of the "accidental" from the SUBSTANTIVE. THIS from the substantive originating "accidentalness" is different from the real natural and from the accidentalness originating accidentalness. This is the "will" and this will is by no means an accidental, as is "desiring" or any other "experience." We called the accidental working the SUPERFICIAL WORKING, the personal the WORKING BY PROFUNDITY, DEPTH. On both workings there is an "energetical" or "dynamical" side of the world. We must distinguish between a double energetic dynamic of the world, between the accidentally superficial dynamic and the substantivic dynamic by profundity. These two dynamics are so far to each other opposed as their origin is different, but this contrast is only formal or logical, NOT ACTUAL. The accidental dynamic is like ESSENTIAL as the substantivic. The first is the dynamic of the natural, the second of the personal world. There is no internal transition between these two worlds, and there is no transition or transfusion of the dynamic of the first sort into the dynamic of the second and vice versa. The natural dynamic conditions the originating of the accidental from the accidental, the personal the originating of the WILL from the willing personal substantive. The natural dynamic is the dynamic of natural superficies, the personal the dynamic of substantivic depth which has only the personal subject. Both dynamics have a different ORIGIN and an essentially different DIRECTION: The origin of natural dynamic is in the accidental and its direction is but the accidental. The origin of personal dynamic is in the substantive and its direction in the will, in this singular and real substantivic working. There can not be any contrast between the dynamic of the first and second kind: Both dynamics do not touch each other, by no means can they be to each

other of an hindrance or could make each other impossible. Between both there is a very important connection, but this connection is not actually essential, it is NORMATIVELY MORAL.

Remember the discussions in the first chapter, where I outlined the including system of realities and mentioned the POINTING including of the reality by the WILL, with which we will this reality. The reality is by the will INCLUDED, but it is not a true "effect" of this will and belongs, as far as we consider it as an effect, to the content of naturally causally conditioned realities. I mentioned the example of the will to rise the hand. We wish to rise the hand and the rising is some consequence of the will actually to perform it. But this relation is not a real naturally causal relation, because for the real cause of the rising we have to search in that part of the core of the brain, where there is the concours of the moving nerves which are pertinent to the rising of the hand. Only from this changing in the brain leads the true causal way to the rising, BUT NOT FROM THE WILL that we actually perform this rising. We wish this rising and not the changing in the brain, of which we do not know at all. I mentioned, therefore, correctly that the connection between the will to rise the hand and between the rising is POINTEDLY CONSEQUENT, but not actually causal. In other words: Personal dynamic, as it is manifested in the will, is to the pertinent natural dynamic in such a relation that it is at all possible on the fundamental of the later, and by no means hindred or made impossible. If between the rising of the hand and with this rising corresponding changing in the moving nerves would not be a real causal connection, then would be of no avail the will to rise the hand, moreover, any such will would be excluded: He, who has a paralysed hand, may "wish" to rise the hand, but he can not WILL, not WISH this.

In full accord with these facts are those discussions in the former section, where we characterized the psychological essence of personal dynamic. This dynamic is in our own PERSONAL "consent" to our giving experiencic giveness. When we are approached by some desiring, there remains open the question, if WE "consent" to this desiring, or if WE "resist" it.

This desiring belongs to the causal system of natural happenings and there is no any real causal way from this desiring—to our own will. This desiring is given us naturally causally by our corporal necessities, by the environment, in which we are living, by our predecessors. Real natural causes are necessary, if such a desiring should disappear. There is necessary a different and stronger but contrary desiring, necessary a more or less continued "exercise" in the opposite performance, necessary a fear of the consequences of such a desiring. But all this has nothing to do with the important fact, if WE, therefore, in the sense of a personal dynamic "consent" to such a desiring, or if WE "resist" it. THIS CONNECTION between our desire and our personal willingness is not more causal, but pointedly soncequent, better, NORMATIVELY MORAL.

This important fact reveals one of the deepest truths, given by the teaching of Christ that we shall have only "good will" and all things else would be "given to us." The essence of this teaching is in two facts which I pronounced and which are so important that they should be for anyone directly the main and chief maxim of all his action. The first is the fact of our own will, it means, of our own FREEDOM that we consent to our experiences or that we resist such an experiencing giveness. This personal consent or resistance characterizes us as rational, moral beings and for such a personal consent or resistance we are responsible. The second fact is the causal succeeding of happening, to WHICH BELONG THOSE GIVING EXPERIENCES, to which we should with our own will consent or resist them. The succeeding is not in any regard dependent on our will. To the contrary. Our will would without it lose the real meaning. The Gospel strictly asserts on this point that this causal connection of happenings shall "us" decisively strenghten or entirely ruin. We are strenghtened, when we have from our part the right will, we are ruined, when we wrongly consent to this causal succeeding of our experiencivic essentiality, or when we wrongly resist. For example. You are tormented by a passionate and ruinous desire. There is not the matter of your personal resistance that you should remove with it causally this desire. If you really personally resist this desire, shall the remaining be given to you and that desire shall by ITS

CAUSAL WAY disappear like the shadow disappears before the sun. In other words: The connection between the merely natural and true personal dynamic of our essence is normatively moral, such one that the first is performed independently on the second, but NEVERTHELESS THUS that already the first dynamic is the expression of our own correctness or incorrectness of life. Everyone can see, how on this point harmoniously cross and ramify both mighty pillars of our spirituality, our SCIENTIFIC endeavour and our RELIGIOUS experience, PERCEPTION AND FAITH.

This question can be positively answered only on the fundamental of our discussions. In our days is doubtlessly one of the most important questions of human life the question of the HEREDITARY AND OF THE SINGULAR PERSONALITIVIC part of the human essence. Man is by one part of his entity a merely natural and causally conditioned being and this part is the hereditary part of his nature. Hitherto belongs the human corporality, but also his spirituality, so far as it does not touch his personally substantivic essence and with this essence undissolubly connected personally substantivic giveness. This essence of man is the singular excausal point of the human nature, where heredity does not count. This point is the point of man's personal freedom and with this freedom indissolubily connected personal responsibility. For example. Take a man who is living steadily in a corrupted society and is by his predecessors, as we say, heavy "hereditarily burdened." We can say that "man can not help himself," if he is again and again tormented by bad thoughts and ruinous desires. This accidental or superficial side of his life is but from outside forced upon him by the causal way, put upon him but by his predecessors and strenghtened by his environment. The fact of this superficiality of life is a merely natural fact and the will can not approach it. Different is the question, how this man personally consents or resists. This depends on his will, freedom, any "hereditary burdeness" disappears. Man decides in freedom, this decision can be and must be demanded from him. He may be "burdened," but he has an INDIVIDUALISTIC essence and becomes aware that he is RESPONSIBLE for his relation to his passions which he can not avoid. He can resist and should re-

sist the passions. If they disappear, is not his business. To the contrary. This is the question of his confidence, of his FAITH, and his faith will be strenghtened the more he will do what is in his power, it means, the more he resists with his personal dynamic and the more he acknowledges BOTH facts, the indisputed fact of human heredity and the fact of undisputed human personality: The first is the natural dynamic realized on man, the second the essentially human and exnatural personal dynamic. *)

I step out with my third, the PERSONAL, proof for the primereality of God. It has two parts which touch the shown legitimate STATIC and DYNAMIC diagonal picture of creation. The static picture shows the accidental and substantivic half of creation. The substantivic side is the realitivic side, the accidental comprises phenomena, whose reality is the reality of the substantives defined by an accidental essentiality. The substantivic creation is again divided in halves, in the corporally external and in the spiritually internal substantives, in "things" and "subjects." The accidental essence of things is in single phenomena, of subjects in their experience. This is the psychophysical dualism of creation. From the merely static viewpoints are both halves divided in two parts. The corporally external substantives comprise the inorganic and organic substantives, it means, things and organisms, the spiritually internal and the living beings and personal subjects. The single sections of creation are on each other legally dependent, organic substantivic creation on inorganic, living beings on organic, personal on living beings. The inorganic substantivic creation is the fundamental of creation, but not its exclusive origin. This static diagonal picture is complete with the dynamic, which is a double one, accidental and substantivic, both heterogeneous

*) Professor Dr. A. Usenicnik remarked once that to him seems the shown connection between natural and personal dynamic too "weak" and proved his conviction. I agree. I chiseled out but the truth and what suffices for the purpose of this writing. I have some thoughts which may strenghten this dynamic, but they are not yet clear enough to serve scientific Public. The system of my thoughts would be in a relation of the personal, CENTRAL dynamic to the natural, FORMAL or SUPERFICIAL. The first is with the second in an "rectangular" internal connection and can, therefore, not differently quantitatively change it.

or autogeneous. The dynamic partition goes parallely with the static so far as the corporally external substantivic creation is only accidentally working, the spiritually internal accidentally and substantively. The accidental working of inorganic substantives is but heterogeneous, of organic substantives heterogeneous and autogeneous. The parallel substantivic working of living beings is merely heterogeneous, of personal subjects heterogeneous and autogeneous.

The accidentally dynamic relation on the point of dead and living beings is similar to the substantivic dynamic relation on the point of living beings and personal subjects and both have the heterogeneous and autogeneous accidental working. The parallelity of the dynamic and static diagonal picture returns in the legitimate dependences between the single static and dynamic section. The autogeneous accidental working is built up on the heterogeneous, the heterogeneous substantivic working on the autogeneous accidental and the autogeneous substantivic on the heterogeneous substantivic. In other words: In the static depending relation of inorganic substantives to organic, of organic to living beings, and of living beings to persons corresponds a depending relation of the heterogeneous accidental working to the autogeneous, of the autogeneous accidental working to the heterogeneous substantivic and of the heterogeneous substantivic to the autogeneous substantivic, but with this important addition that autogeneously working substantives, therefore, human subjects, are not immediately built up on heterogeneously working substantives, namely, upon subjects of living being, but upon the heterogeneous and autogeneous accidental working of these subjects. The heterogeneous substantivic working, characteristic for the subjects of living beings, is but a mere consequence of the accidental working.

We come thus to a special dualism of creation. According to this dualism is creation divided in halves, in the half which is merely accidentally or only thus working that its accidental working is exclusively its decisive working, and in the half which is autogeneously substantively working. This is my dynamic dualism of creation. Creation is divided into dead and living NATURE and into the exnatural world of PERSONAL subjects. The fact of the accidental working of dead and liv-

ing nature (of organic and inorganic things and of subjects of living beings) is the fact of general natural causality, the fact of the autogeneous substantivic working of personal human subjects is the fact of exnaturally causal and, therefore, metaphysically exceptional FREEDOM.

The dynamic partition in creation affords that we rise from this creation to the acknowledgment of a special entity. Such an entity assisted in the first and second chapter to solve the realitivic and valuable side of creation as a selforiginating and binding fact of anything that may be something and not a mere nothnigness. This transition from creation to the decisive acknowledgment of God is now forced upon us from two viewpoints. The first is that with the human personality is given the fact of an exnaturally causal and even "contracausal" course of happenings. For the reason that on the other side the human personality is built up on the natural causality, that man as a personal being is developingly built up on the naturally causal part of his essence, is clear that this human personal essence affords TWO DIRECTIONS, namely, the direction of the natural creation and the direction of the SUPER-EMPIRICALLY DOUBTLESS DIVINE ENTITY. The first direction indicates that the human personal essentiality is by its existence dependent on the existence of the natural creation, the second that this personal human essentiality has in spite of all its developing dependence on the natural creation an own dynamic. No such dynamic is found in all the natural course of happenings. The personal essentiality of man is that single and BOUNDARY POINT of creation which affords a partition of the ACTUAL UNIVERSE into two worlds, into the world of the empirically given naturality and into the world of the super-empirically given divinity. The human personal essentiality would without the parallel naturality cease to be HUMAN, and this essentiality would without the parallel divinity cease to be PERSONAL. This boundary place of the personal human essentiality attests that this essentiality is on one side a real SUPERNATURAL, on the other a true and subdivine fact. Man appears as the "crown of creation," but man is this only by his immediate relation to the divine essence. Man is the crown of creation so far as this creation attains on the point of man the

supercausal form of his actual development, but the same man is on the other side but a faint image of God, so far as his place is in creation by God immediately realized. *)

Nature, man and God is that metaphysical trinity of the universe which is on its boundaries in important legitimate relations of a mere COPY to the pertinent IDEAL: Humanity is the "ideal" of naturality, divinity the final "ideal" of humanity. The legality of nature is causal, the legality of man is causally free, but the legality of God is BUT FREE. This legality of God creates both legalities, the natural causal and the human causally free. The absolute freedom of God is the original and final condition for the principle of the natural causality and for the fact of human will.

Another viewpoint is connected with the static and dynamic diagonal picture of creation.

Creation has the character of some systematical and internal incompletness and essential defiency. Inorganic nature is the necessary static and dynamic FUNDAMENTAL of creation. On this fundamental is gradually built up the organic nature, the life of living beings and finally the personal life. There is also a GRADUATION of the "clearness" or "expressiveness" of the energetic dynamic of creation. The autogeneous accidental working is a clearer and more expressive dynamic than the heterogeneous, and the substantivic working a clearer and more expressive dynamic than the accidental. The static transition between the single sections of creation which leads from the single developing fundamental to the pertinent and upon it built up stratum, is the transition from the "mixed" and "unexpressive" dynamic WHICH BECOMES IN EVERY FOLLOWING POINT MORE AND MORE CLEAR AND EXPRESSIVE, till it attains in the point of the autogeneous substantivic working, in the point of human will, that highest grade, above which "creation" by principle can not reach. This fact points to the MOST IMPORTANT AND SO FAR BY NOBODY ASCERTAINED INTERNAL CONTRAST OF CREATION, whose single sections are built up on each other, but is

*) The essenceviewing way to God shall this "place" of man between the nature and God "essenceviewingly" clarify and clear up.

in account of this its upbuilding a such system of phenomena and happenings that any CLEARER AND MORE EXPRESSIVE dynamic development depends on THE THINNER AND FAINTER: In this system is the heterogeneous accidental working the faintest natural dynamic, the developing fundamental for the access of the autogeneous accidental working which is in the like developing relation to the heterogeneous substantivic working, this to the autogeneous dynamic, as it is given only by our personal substantivic giveness. In other words: The dynamic side of creation develops in the sign of a legitimate gradual evolving dependence of the clearer and more expressive dynamic on the thinner and fainter. The thinnest merely natural dynamic is the fundamental of the remaining and of the exnaturally personal dynamic manifestations of creation. This fact shows that creation is in the wholeness systematically deficient and affords a transition to a special and SINGULAR DYNAMIC OUTSIDE OF THE EMPIRICALLY GIVEN RELATION which conidtions the dynamic of creation and makes creation actually possible. This is the exnatural and supernatural dynamic of the DIVINE ESSENCE.

The delineated twofold static and dynamic transition from creation to God makes possible a definition of this singular divine working. Creation has a double, an accidental-substantivic appearance. The substantivic character of phenomena steps on any following and evolutionarily higher grade in the foreground. The statical distance between both ends of creation appears in inorganic things on the one side and in the personal essence of man on the other. With the statical graduation goes parallely its dynamic graduation. On any following higher grade steps in the foreground the substantivic dynamic. These dynamic ends appear in the heterogeneously accidental working of inorganic things and in the autogeneously substantivic working of human beings. We arrive at the divine essence SO FAR AS WE CONSIDER THIS ESSENCE FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF CREATION to the point which is the SINGULAR POINT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE AND OF THE SUBSTANTIVIC WORKING. Here ceaces by principle any possibility of an independent "accidentalness" or also the possibility of an heterogeneous substantivic workingness. God appears

as the singular SELFSUBSTANTIVE and as the singular SELF-SUBSTANTIVELY AUTOGENEOUS GIVENESS. So far as we consider God statically, we observe him as the substantive which is not limited by any accidental. So far as we view God dynamically, we perceive him as the substantivic giveness which is not limited by any accidental workingness. Only such an entity is the reason by principle and the condition by principle of the delineated static and dynamic TWOFOLDNESS of creation, as it is manifested in the accidentally substantivic character of anything that this creation actually constitutes.

To this singular picture of God leads still a special consideration.

I ascertained in the first and second chapter HOMOGENEOUSLY AND UNHOMOGENEOUSLY ("bent") TWOFOLD phenomena. I called "agreeableness" and "disagreeableness" the contrast of homogeneous twofoldness, because no any member of this contrast has a systematical nor evolutionary precedence before the other. "Disagreeableness" is contrary to "agreeableness," but both are in the same "hight." As an unhomogeneous twofold contrast appeared the contrast between "reality" and "nonreality." Nonreality is not only opposed to reality, but is on it dependent. Nonreality is, measured by the relation to the reality, systematically a "lower" fact which is by its own essentiality bound to the reality. We could in regard to such an unhomogeneous twofold contrast ascertain a principle which we expressed verbatim as follows: Where there is such an unhomogeneous twofold contrast, there is justified the request for a snigular fact which, measured by the view of this contrast, belongs to the first, it means, "positive" member, but is itself outside of any own contrast. The "reality" and "nonreality" of the actual and nonactual creation includes the request of the singular—PRIMEREALITY of the divine essence.

Let us look at the accidentally substantivic character of creation!

Here also is the question about a contrast. This is the contrast of the "acidental" with the "substantive" and a contrast of an unhomogeneous twofoldness. The substantive is "contrary" to the accidental and vice versa. On the first sight is

evident that in this contrast is the "substantivic" member more independent, more original, the "accidental" more dependent, less original. The substantive is the true "bearer" of the accidental, the accidental but a special "definition" of the substantive, the substantive a systematical fundamental of the accidental upon such a fundamental built up "superficies" of the substantive. We know also that the substantivic side of creation is its side "by depth," the accidental its side "by superficies." For this reason we said that the reality of the accidental is in essence only the—reality of the pertinent (and by this accidental) defined substantive. On the contrast between the accidental and the substantive is a contrast of an unhomogeneous twofoldness and in this contrast the substantive takes the place of the FIRST (independent, original), therefore, POSITIVE member. This fact proves that with the substantively accidental structure of creation is given the request for a singular fact which, measured from the view of the structure, belongs to the point of a substantivic member, but is outside of any other and contrary member, it means, without any accidentalness. The "reality" and "nonreality" of creation includes the request for the singular—primereality of the divine essence, the substantively accidental character of creation includes a like request for the singular—PRIMESUBSTANTIVENESS of the divine essence. God is primesubstantiveness, it means, the real substantive which is outside of any accidentalness, the singular perfect or ABSOUTE SUBSTANTIVE.

This statical picture of God allows a dynamical perfection.

With the unhomogeneous twofoldness of the statical contrast between substantiveness and accidentalness corresponds the unhomogeneous twofoldness of the dynamical contrast between substantivic and accidental working. With this contrast is given the request for the singular—PRIMEWORKING of the divine essence. This is the action or operation of the singular primesubstantivic being, therefore, the working which by principle is not limited and can not be limited by the access of any merely accidental working, the singular PRIMEGIVENESS, the singular ABSOLUTE GIVENESS, the singular PRIMELIBERTY, the singular ABSOLUTE LIBERTY of God.

The systematical purpose of the present section is the PER-

SONAL proof for the PRIMEREALITY of God. God appears as the singular personal, therefore, PRIMEPERSONAL being on the one side and as the singularly real, therefore, PRIMEREAL being on the other. Both these proofs are actually given. We found the essentiality of the human personal essence in the SUBSTANTIVIC character of the human subject. Only man is amongst all empirically given beings autogeneously substantively active. About God we can say that He has the title of a singular primesubstantive, therefore, of such a substantive which is by principle outside of any accidentalness and any accidental operation. For this reason is this primesubstantivic and primegiving essence of God by itself his PRIMEPERSONAL essence and it makes no difference, if we call God the absolute substantive, the absolute giveness, the absolute entity or the absolute person. We can in regard to the relation of the human and accidentally limited substantiveness to the divine and accidentally unlimited substantiveness speak about human personality only because of the IDEAL of the singular divine personality, respectively, that only the divine absolute personality is the point which FINALLY justifies us to speak about the relative human personality. The primepersonal character of the divine essence is by itself his—primereal character. The reality is the reality of the substantivic essentiality, it follows by itself that the primesubstantive and but the primesubstantive is the primereality and vice versa.

There exists a sextet which helps to consider the essence of God from different viewpoints, although it means substantially one and the same. This is the sextet of "God," "primesubstantive," "primegiveness," "primeliberty," "primepersonality" and "primereality." A very stronge equation exists: God — primesubstantive — primegiveness — primeliberty — primepersonality — primereality. Who can doubt that only thus defined BEING really responds to all the requests of that Being which is by principle that singular normative governor of all empirically given creation?

Concluding this section I mention that the delineated characteristics of the divine essence are not in the same hight. There are but three amongst them which have substantially an entitive meaning. These are primesubstantiveness, primegiveness

and primeliberty. "God" is but a linguistic expression for the Being which is primesubstantivic, primegiving and primefree. Essentially holds the same for "primepersonality" whose substantial meaning is defined by parallel primesubstantiveness, primegiveness and primeliberty. It would remain but "primereality." I must point out that in the course of the discussions of the first and second chapter we found in the reality a fact of the universe which we have not to confound with "real thing": There is something different "Mount Washington" and something different the "reality of Mount Washington." Reality conceived thus is without any content and so far but some merely superficial or formal fact of the universe. "Reality itself" is by no means a special "what," but only some "how." The reality does not help to decide the question, WHAT something is, but "how" it is, namely, IF something exists. This fact was leading us to the transition to such a divine action which alone can take away from "reality itself" the character of a contently empty fact. Turn attention to the discussions in the present third chapter and to those points, where we discussed the relation of the reality to the—substantivic side of phenomena. We have seen that creation is only as much real as it is substantivic, and the reality of its accidental side is only the reality of its substantivic essentiality. We must in the substantiveness and but in the substantiveness search for the real substantially entitive meaning of the reality. The reality is substantially entitively the substantive, whereby we have to think about a real and not about a fictitious substantiveness. In this fact are not shaken the discussions in the first chapter, because for the substantive holds anything that we found characteristic for the reality: The substantive can not be represented to us, we only "touch" it. In the shown relation of the reality to the substantive corresponds a like relation of the PRIMEREALITY to the PRIMESUBSTANTIVE, and this fact proves that the primereality of God is substantially entitively only his PRIMESUBSTANTIVIC character. The REAL AND SUBSTANTIALLY ENTITIVE characterization of the divine essence is threefold: God is the primesubstantive, the primegiveness and the primeliberty. THESE THREE signs are substantially entitively and not only verbally different.

The substantive is not the giveness or action, but any substantive is the necessary FUNDAMENTAL of the substantive giveness or action. There is in substantiveness and substantivic working the question about two different facts, the second dependent on the first. The substantivic action is not the liberty of the substantive, but there is in this liberty the question about the MANNER of the substantivic working. The fact that the personal substantives are working "by freedom" is in connection with the question, HOW are the personal and HOW the merely real substantives working. We can say that till now is us known a threefold manner of the actual "action." We know the merely accidental action, as it is characteristic for "natural" happenings: This is the NATURALLY CAUSAL manner in the course of happenings. We know that substantivic action which is manifested in human will and built up on the natural causality of creation: This si the NATURALLY BOUND FREE MANNER in the course of happenings. We know finally that primegiveness of the divine primesubstantivic essence which is by principle the singular cause and condition of the naturally causal as also of the naturally bound free course of happening: This is the PRIMEFREE MANNER of the divine action without which would be any other operation of the world and life, natural and personal, in advance excluded.

There is still a special working manner which we may call the manner of CASUAL working. I characterize it as the manner which by its own nature can not be realized. It is very interesting that the formerly mentioned threefold manner of working strictly differs from such a merely casual operation. We call the mentioned threefold operation the ORIGINAL action, because this operation does not "come to pass," but "ORIGINATES" in the real meaning of the word. Natural causal operation is the originating of the accidental from the accidental, naturally bound free action the originating of the accidental wishingness from the substantiveness, but primefree divine action is a deeper originating from the primesubstantivic essence of God. The mentioned "casual" operation would be

an operation which would "come to pass," but would not "originate." Such an action is impossible. *)

The conception of so called chance is opposed to both manners of action and to all upon this action built up happenings, to the naturally causal and to the supernaturally free. Both are pointing to LEGITIMATE originating, changing and disappearing and both exclude any casual happening.

Entirely erroneous it, therefore, the assertion that the conception of a FREE HUMAN WILL would be the conception of a will which may be illegitimate and only "casual." We could assert something the like only about a will which would "come to pass," but would not "originate." Our will originates as all happenings with this important difference that the originating of natural happening is accidental and naturally causal, the originating of human will substantivic and supernaturally free. Both originatings are "legitimate."

We can speak about a threefold working legality: The legal natural causality, the legal human liberty and the PRIME-LEGAL divine primeliberty. Primelegal is this divine primeliberty, because this legality is the singular cause and condition for the remaining legality of the universe, for the legality of natural causality and legality of supernatural liberty.

From these thoughts is clear that the substantially entitive characterization of God is essentially threefold: God is the primesubstantivic, primegiving and primefree Being. Remember the discussions in the last section of the second chapter. There we tried to descend into the essence of God and ascertained a characteristic TRINITY of the divine essence. It appeared as the trinity of divine LOGOS, ETOS and NOMOS. Logos appeared as divine "primereason" (the divine origin of reality and valuation), Etos as divine primeact (the divine origin of all real things), Nomos as primeworking (the divine origin of all valuable things). The ascertainment of this trinity was possbile from the viewpoint of the substantively accidental character of creation. All this returns to the viewpoint of the substantively accidental character of creation, especially to the

*) Nothing is by chance! If someone would be more interested in these thoughts, I would recommend him Meinong's writing "Zum Erweis des allgemeinen Kausalgesetzes." 1917.

viewpoint of the personally substantivic essentiality of the human being. With the trinity of divine Logos, Etos and Nomos delineated there corresponds in all details in the present section outlined trinity of divine primesubstantiveness, primeworkingness and primeliberty: Logos or Primesubstantive, Etos or Primegiveness and Nomos or Primeliberty are those triplets. Any of them means substantially entitively one and the same. Logos is the primesubstantive, Etos the primegiveness and Nomos the primeliberty and vice versa. May I briefly show this fact: The discussions of the human personally substantivic essentiality proved that this essentiality is the sole substantial fundamental of all this that we call the "rationality" of man in the stricter and broadest sense of the word. There is no rationality without the personal substantive, in general no normatively moral effectiveness. Therefore is the singular PRIMESUBSTANTIVENESS the singular PRIMERATIONALNESS which is outside of any contrast, and in the sense of the discussion in the first and second chapter to any TRUTH in the relation of CREATING LOGOS. Etos appeared as the divine origin of all real things. The systematical side of Etos is that divine giveness which conditions not only the extemporal meaning of any truth in the strictest and broadest sense of the word, but conditions that ACTUAL REALIZATION of such truths. Therefore is the most characteristic side of Etos in the singular giveness, in the primegiveness of the divine essence. This giveness is also singularly legitimate. This essentiality of this legality is in the singular liberty of the primesubstantivic giveness: The primesubstantivic giveness is primefree and for this reason primelegal, such a one that without it would all remaining "legalities" sink down into nothingness. We have seen in the second chapter that the essentiality of all these legalities is in the relation of the valuation to valuable things, it means, that creation is the final necessary territory of all to us accessible valuations. Therefore is the Primeliberty of God the immediate condition of all "valuable things". Nomos and Primeliberty are one and the same. *)

Our personal way to God assists us in the acknowledgment

*) Liberty is the prime source of the—necessity of the law!

of the singular divine trinity of the primesubstantivic, primegiving and primefree essence of God. This trinity corresponds with the trinity of divine Logos, Etos and Nomos. All this holds with those restrictions, I mentioned in the second chapter: God Himself can not be conceived by any human mind. Any descending into the essence of God is by principle merely formal, a such one that it is valuable ONLY FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF EMPIRICALLY GIVEN CREATION. The real meaning of this "formalness" I shall demonstrate in the last chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

FROM VALUE TO GOD.

23. The realitivic, valuable and personal essence of the value.

We discussed hitherto the reality, valuation and personality. Now we are on the way from the value to God. Which are the relations of the value to the reality, valuation and personality? The relations are evident. Speaking about value, I have not in mind any value, but an entity as we ascribe it to an agreable pear, to assets, money, to a beautiful picture, to a scientific discussion. The agreableness of the pear or the beauty of the picture is a value, an entity, but the "value" of the pear and the picture is something different. The value is regarded here as an independent value, which is built upon other values, in our example upon the agreableness and beauty, but does not allow any confunding with other values. The value is in a ligitimate, systematical relation to the reality.

The phenomena are valuable so far as we view them from the point of the reality or unreality. They may seemingly be defined by another value, but as long as we do not know, if this value is actually realized or not, can we not view it from the viewpoint of value. We can imagine a wonderfully beautiful picture defined by a beautiful value. As long as this picture is only imagined and given but to the internal view of the creating artist, so long it remains without any value, so long it hasn't any "price." Actually non existent fine treasures are without value. Persons depicted in novels and fictions by novelists may be endowed with different personal values, but to the life of such persons we can not ascribe any "value," as long as we regard them only as mere creations of the artistical imagination.

By fiction created persons no one can love, hate, neither despise nor esteem. Who could hate or love a "hero" in Charles Dickens "Oliver Twist?" But we would at once experience such a feeling if such a "hero" would actually exist. We cannot value the life of a fictious hero, but we would do this on any actual pattern of such a hero. I do not contend that the phenomena would value or be valueless as they are real or unreal. I contend that the access of the reality is necessary if we should ascribe to them the value. Besides the reality is necessary still the access of other facts. In the example of the pear and picture, are necessary two things: The reality of the pear and picture and a value, which is on the pear given with its "agreeableness," on the picture with its "beauty." I contend only that the value is in a legitimate connection with the reality. Phenomena are valuable or valueless as they are real or unreal, but the reality or unreality is not a sufficient reason for their value. Anything is outside of the value, if it is outside of the reality.

We must go deeper. We do not ascribe to "Fountain of Youth" any value, because, it does not exist. Is this unactual, unreal "Fountain of Youth" by this reason a valueless thing? To the contrary. "Fountain of Youth" is so far as it does not exist outside of any value.

How may we understand the assertion above that we can value phenomena only as far as they seem to be real? I mentioned in the first chapter that to the reality leads some primary place opposite the nonreality. From real things follow unreal things. The nonreality is not an independent fact, but some "unvaluation" of the reality. This primary character of the reality returns in the relation of the reality to the value and to parallel evaluation. We value primarily real phenomena, the unreal only so far as would their reality independently arouse in us an evaluation. We value the actual health and do not value the actual sickness. We may upon this fundamental "not evalue" the unactual health and "evalue" the unactual sickness, we may be sorry because we are not "in good health," or may rejoice because we are "not sick." Thus is evident, why we do not value "Fountain of Youth" and why we do not value its unreality. The conditions in the world are such that no-

body expects the reality of a fountain which would give youth. Such a fountain would make any other well useless and finally destroy life. But if a man would be for himself in such circumstances that his luck would depend on such an actual fountain, this man would evalue its unreality, he would be very sorry that there is no such a fountain. For that man would be this unreality valuable, because, the reality of such a fountain, of "Fountain of Youth," would be for him of much value. The value leads primarily to the reality and because of it to the nonreality.

Important is the relation of the value to the valuation. We must distinguish between the true and false, the actual and imagined value. The distinction is necessary. We ascribe many times to something a value, but later on find out that it is valueless. How should we define the conception of the true or actual value? From our discussions is clear that the world of the actual and only seeming phenomena is divided by two facts: Reality and valuation.

"Real things" and "valuable things" are something "actual," objective things, and distinct from all unactual and seemingly things, subjective things. On the sphere of the value is the actual true objective value, the REAL or VALUABLE value, the disbanding fact the "reality," or the "valuation." The value cannot be real so far as it is real this to where we ascribe it. Take a beautiful picture made by an artist and thus realized. The picture has a special value. Who could be of the opinion that this value of the picture has been realized thus, as is realized the picture? The picture is empirically given and realized. Its value is the necessary and extemporal CONSEQUENCE of two facts, of its "beauty" and its reality. The value is not any realitivic fact, it only values.

No one can say that the value of the phenomena is sometimes so or not so, as he can say that now it rains or formerly it did not rain.

The value is a kind of valuation. We discussed that. The reality steps out as a content of the valuation, when we say that the reality "values," e. gr., it values that Mt. Washington is real. This expression means a confirming of the pertinent reality. The valuation, too, may become "confirmed." Take

again the picture, which has a "value." The value only values. But also the reality of the picture values. It values that this picture is real. We encounter a double value, the value of the reality of the picture and the value of its value. But we cannot speak about a double value, about a first value, which differs from the second. We can speak only about ONE but still especially CONFIRMED value. The reality of the picture values, but "values still especially," because, it is the reality of a beautiful picture, therefore, a so called "valuable" reality. The sentence, it values that something exists, may have a double meaning. Either it means a confirmation of the pertinent reality (this or that "doubtlessly exists"), or a different confirmation of the pertinent value (this is something valuable). The value is a kind of the confirmed valuation. This becomes clearer, when we consider the negative value. Something is valueless, means, it does "not value." When we are sick, is to us the reality of the sickness very valueless, we become sorry, indignant. We say: "Why are we sick? This should not be. This does not value." We cannot doubt the reality of our sickness, therefore, also not the true valuation of this reality. In such an example is forced upon us the thought that there is not "right" that we are sick, and that from this viewpoint our sickness does really "not value." We must distinguish between a double value of the reality, between its positive part which confirms the reality, and between its negative part according with the reality does not value. I express the relation of the value to the valuation as follows: The value is but the "especially confirmed" VALUATION of the pertinent reality, but the negative value is to this and such a valuation corresponding valuation. For example. The value of real health is only the especially confirmed valuation of this reality; but the negative value of the real sickness is the unvaluation of this reality. Briefly, the value is but the confirmed valuation of the reality or the immediate contrast of such a confirmed valuation. *)

We come to the legitimate relation of the value to the PERSONALITY. The connection between the value and personality

*) The value is immediately only sensitively perceptible. The same is true about the "confirmation" of the valuation which may be the value of a real thing.

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is so strict that many thinkers to-day regard the personality only as a kind of the value. There is not any real personality, actual is only human life which may be the life of human "subjects." All this can not give us the right to speak about the existence of some "personality." The personality of man is only a value of his life. Thus these thinkers.

This opinion is extremely excentric. We discussed the personal subject. If the essence of the personality would consist only in the value, we would have to discuss the value.

Our discussion of personality did not show any trace of anything that values. The personality is an ACTUALLY ENTITIVE and not a worthingly valuable fact. The systematical conceptions leading to the personality are conceptions of "accidental and substantive," of accidental and substantivic operation. These conceptions are in no immediate connection with the "value."

There is a sound psychological aspect which is in a CONNECTION with the personality and value. Personality is not a value, but the most noble territory of the value. This fact is proven by the discussions in the former chapter. Man is as a personal being the single empirically given NORMATIVE or MORAL entity upon the world. Man perceives or errs, performs acts which are good or wicked. But the points of the perception and error, of good or wicked are points, which most expressively value or do not value. The normatively moral side of the human personal essentiality is his WORTHWHILE side. Man is systematically the single empirically given normative or moral being and the SYSTEMATICALLY WORTHWHILE BEING.

The legal relation of the value to personality is not the relation of a synonyme, it is the relation of a systematical DEFININGNESS. Personality is systematically defined by the value. There is besides this ESSENTIALLY-ENTITIVE connection a legal perceptively entitive connection between both, similiar to the perceptively entitive connection between the personality and the valuation. Like the valuation is also the value a fact which is by principle ACCESSIBLE but to man, to a personal being. The animal doubtlessly knows different values and merely agreeable hedonic values. The food is to the animal

agreeable. The animal has from the psychological viewpoint "corporal" or "sensual" comforts or discomforts which show to it different phenomena in the light of a hedonic value.

But who can think that the phenomena would be to the animal clear in the light of some value, because these phenomena seem to be agreeable or disagreeable? The food is to the hungry animal agreeable, but the animal cannot for this reason the food "value."

This difference between animal and man is essential. The animal knows but some systematical "values," surely the agreeable value, but cannot rise higher that the phenomena would on the fundamental of such values, so far as they are realized, "value." Man has this ability. Only man evalues the phenomena of the world and life, he has not only the capability of a common "agreeableness" or "disagreeableness," but also the capability of a real "appreciating," "honoring" and even "worshiping." We will all this discuss in detail.

Personal beings "see" the phenomena and judge, if they value. Without personal beings would be this judging impossible, lose any meaning. I do not pretend that man makes "that the phenomena value," but assert that without man the phenomena could value. Man does not make the value, but the value is meant only for him and to him. Personal beings only can perceive if something values and this perception is meant for them and to them.

The legal connection is a double one: Essentially-entitive, which means that man is a systematical territory of the value and perceptively-entitive, which means that the value is accessible but to the human, personal being.

There is no doubt that we can speak about legitimate systematical connections between the value and the outlined systems of the world and life. The question is about the legal and systematical relations of the value to the reality, valuation and personality. The purpose of my writings is to prove the ancient faith in God. For this reason I attend to possible relations of the value to the divine being. Is not the conception of God the conception of the most valuable being, the conception of the being, who affords by his own nature that we may be to him in the true merely rational, but also in the SENSITIVELY-

ASPIRING relation? What did we ascertain about God?

We ascertained that God is the singular reality and the singular personality, it means, the "primereality" and "primepersonality" the singular "origin" of the valuation, of the "primevaluation," of the own "primereality" as also of all remaining and to us immediately accessible valuation of creation.

From the legal relations of the value to the reality, valuation and personality is by itself evident that God has by his own nature the character of a "singular" value of—PRIMEVALUE.

God as the singular primereal, primevaluable and primepersonal being is neecssarily the singular primeworthwhile being. We will still see that the essence of this "primevalue" is that holiness, which we can attribute only to the devine being. The way from value to God has a proven fundamental.

24. The psychological background of the value.

Our senses show us the world and life in the light of values. A being without sensations would be just blind for values. Sensations effect that something is to us agreeable, then disagreeable, beautiful, then ugly, valuable, then valueless, good or wicked, even holy or a mere nothingness. I do not assert that such values would be as much as our sensations, but I assert that our sensations make us such values actually visible.

He, who would not have the gift of hearing or seeing, would be blind for sounds and colors. He, who would not have the gift of "sensing" would be blind for values. Daily life presents for us many examples of such a sensing. What a pleasure, when we are hungry and eat a juicy pear, what a delight, when we are listening to beautiful melodies, what a rejoicing, when we meet a good friend, what a satisfaction in our heart, when we perform a good deed, what a humble exaltation, when we are in deep prayer!

Such sensations show that, to which they are pointing in the light of values, in the light of delight, beauty, goodness, even holiness. Important is the known partition of all our experiences in "rational" and "instinctive" experiences. The sensations are the fundamental system of instinctive experiences. With any sensation corresponds in regard to the point-

ing the view of the pertinent value. We can, therefore, assert: The immediate psychological background of the value is but in the pertinent our sensation. The question, how we define single sensations, coincides with the other question, how we define the pertinent values. The sensations show the values in general as also single values. With the nature of our momentary sensations is resolved the question, how this sensation makes some special value "sensible" and "visible." I turn attention to the sensing and give a definition of the sensation, which is significant for the definition of the "value."

We have sensations which rest immediately on the rational experience, on the senses and on higher ideas. The sensations of agreeableness or disagreeableness rest immediately upon the sensing of the temperature, light, hardness, the sensations of beauty or ugliness upon parallel higher ideas, upon the ideas of landscapes, pictures, melodies. Sensations of agreeableness or disagreeableness experiences the worm in the softened and trenched soil or in the hard and parched clumps. We experience sensations of beauty or ugliness outdoor in the free nature or upon the nerrow and filthy streets of slums, suburbs, or viewing an artistical picture or a product of an impotent diletant.

We have sensations which are built upon other sensations. A hungry man would not enjoy the food if it would not give him the enjoyment of an agreeableness, and a poor man would not be sad about the winter's cold, if it would not bring him a disagreeableness which shows him the cold as very uncomfortable. We would in the position of the worm experience not only the feeling of agreeableness or disagreeableness, but some entirely different feeling of delight and joy or or sadness and sorrow.

We are "delighted" and "enjoyed" about a beautifully arranged concert, but an arrangement which is by no means successful may raise in us a "sadness" and bitterness." It is interesting that this second feeling, as it is manifested in delight and joy or in sadness and sorrow, effects what we call the "happiness" or "unhappiness" of man. If we should experience but the feeling of agreeableness or disagreeableness and not the parallel delight or sadness, we would not feel happy, neither appear happy or unhappy to others. This sensation

overcomes us when we are "delighted" or "sadned" on the fundamental of agreeable feeling.

We must distinguish between the sensation which is immediately built up on the rational experience and the sensation which is built up on the sensation of the first rational kind. This first sensation is developing originally first (the sensation of the agreeableness goes before the feeling of "delight"). We call them sensations of the FIRST GRADE or PRIMARY sensations, the sensations of the second kind, sensations of the SECOND GRADE or SECONDARY sensations.

This partition is important for the conception of values. Values are divided in two groups, in the values in the broader and in the stricter sense of the word. Values in the stricter sense are values of phenomena of the world and life. Values in the broader sense are immediately adapted to our primary sensation, values in the stricter sense to the secondary. As far as we enjoy the pear merely agreeably, is the pear agreeable; but as far as we are delighted about this pear, becomes it valuable and worthwhile. The picture is beautiful from its beauty, but valuable, if we are about it delighted or gladened.

Agreeable and beautiful enjoyment are examples for the primary sensation, the parallel delight and sadness for the secondary. Agreeableness and beauty are examples for values in the broader sense of the word, the value of agreeable or beautiful things and the negative value of this agreeable and ugly things for values in the stricter sense. This difference between the values is the difference between the primary and secondary values.

Very important is that we are to primary values, in a different relation, if we experience the secondary sensation or not. When we enjoy the pear only agreeably, but are not delighted about it, appears the pear in the light of its agreeableness. This agreeableness does not "touch" our own personal essentiality. When we are delighted with the agreeable pear, becomes this agreeableness for us "remarkable" and raises our "happy" feeling. Similarly with the disagreeableness, beauty and ugliness and all primary values.

This fact affords an important perfection. The primary sensation "shows" the primary values "blindly" and we blindly

perceive them. But when we experience on the fundamental of primary sensations parallel secondary sensaitons, then we "conquer" or "appropriate" these primary values with the consequence that these values "appear" from our primary sensation, and become for us "remarkable" from our parallel secondary sensation. I state: We feel with the primary sensation primary avlues, with the secondary we touch these primary values. We can only in our secondary sensations search for the immediate psychological essence of the experiensic "happiness" or "unhappiness" of man. *)

Between the primary and secondary sensation is this difference: Only the second sensation helps us to both, that we appropriate the blindly shown primary values and that we look upon the happenings of the world and life, defined by such values, from the viewpoint of "value." For this reason I call this secondary sensation the singular true evalution.

In a strict connection with this evalution are two other kinds, which I call the IMPRESSING and the true CRITICICING evaluation. We are hungry and eat a good roast. The possession of the roast gives us a "delight" and we evaluate it. Such an evaluation, forced upon us by the agreeable enjoying of the roast, is an impressing evaluation, only "impressed" is upon us a worthwhile view of this that we evalue. On this point holds the old saying: "De gustibus non est disputandum." But we may the same roast evalue differently. We ask, if it is a master-piece according to the principles of the culinary art. We criticize the roast, prize and praise it. This prizing is built up on our agreeable enjoying of the roast, but is different from the ordinary delight. The prizing is not forced on us, but originates from our own personally rational essentiality. We prize the roast and we are for our judgment personally responsible. For this reason we regard this prizing for others obligatory, what we prize, should prize others. Such a prizing shows us the objects as valuable, it is, therefore, a real value. This is the second criticizing evaluation.

The criticizing evaluation is by development built up on

*) Confer my essay: "The emotional structure of human personality", Ljubljanski Zvon 1928.

the parallel impressing evaluation and vice versa. The child is delighted or sad about many phenomena, but much later on does he these phenomena prize or praise. I enlighten this on examples of the primary sensation. We enjoy the roast agreeably, but the picture beautifully. We encounter on the beautiful enjoyment of the picture both evaluations, the impressive and criticising. We are about the picture only "delighted," or valuably criticise and thus sensitively "praise" and "prize" it. Our judgment about the picture will be different, if it is built up immediately on impressing evaluation or on criticism. In both cases we ascribe to the picture a value. In the first case holds the judgment only for us, not for others. In the second instance, when our judgment appears to us as a criticism, we expect anybody to agree with us. Impressing evaluation makes the picture but for us subjectively valuable, but criticism for anybody objectively valuable. There is a collateral, but important difference between the "agreeable" and "beautiful" example of the impressing and criticising evaluation.

We are more delighted about agreeable phenomena, than we prize them, but beautiful phenomena we prize more than we are delighted about them. This difference is in connection with the "high place," which leads to the single primary values. Agreeable values are lower, beautiful higher; the first incline us to the impressing evaluation, the second to the criticising. The value of agreeable things appears to us as a value "for us," the value of beautiful things as a value for "everyone." Another difference touches the question, to what is pointed the primary sensation, to what the secondary.

Remember that the phenomena of the world and life are divided in the substantivic and accidental or supersubstantivic halves. Thus is the stone a "substantive" or "thing," which we are only "touch" and a substantive, which is built up on the single accidentals of the stone, and to which we arrive on the way of an own "forming." Similarly also all human life: I am the substantive and have experiences which are built up upon the accidentally supersubstantivic side of my substantivic essentiality of the world and life, whilst the secondary sensation, it means, the evaluation is immediately adapted but to the substantivic side. Agreeable are "qualities," "softness," "quality"

of the meat, its "freshness." These sensitively given statements inable the immediate transition to the actual roast, to its substantivic essentiality. Still clearer appears this from the beautiful delight. We must in a picture distinguish: The picture before us and the picture as a work of art. Our delight is but on the work of art, the immediate bearer of the beauty. We must pass from single and sensitively given phenomena "upward" to arrive at the pertinent work of art.

We enjoy the art, the supersubstantivic essentiality of the picture, whilst this enjoyment would momentarily disappear, if we would pass from single colors and shadows downward. Agreeable enjoyment is the accidental, beautiful the supersubstantivic. The supersubstantivic character of the substantive is immediately built up on its accidental side. For this reason we call the substantiveness, manifested in a work of art, as also relativeness, "numeralness" the mediate accidental of the pertinent substantive. We must, therefore, speak about an accidental sensation, which is by its own nature pointed to the accidental essentiality of the world and life. Accidental sensations are primary sensations.

We can see this also mediately from the secondary sensation, from the evaluation. We do not enjoy an agreeable roast and a beautiful picture, we value them. This evaluation is built up immediately on the agreeable enjoying of the roast and on the beautiful enjoying of the picture. But we are delighted about an ACTUAL roast and an ACTUAL picture; we evalue but the substantivic side of this that by its accidentality causes in us either the agreeable or beautiful comfort. We have, therefore, when we enjoy the agreeable roast or the beautiful picture, to go from the single and sensitively given phenomena, from the "quality" of the meat or from the color on the picture, "downward" to come also to the actual roast and to the actual picture, which we value and thus "with regard" to its by the agreeableness or beauty defined accidental essentiality. Anyone will grant this fact, if he considers his internal trend then, when he agreeably or beautifully enjoys something, rejoices about it and cheers it. In the first instance leads his sensation in the direction of this that he may call his own or superficial side of the phenomenon, in the second instance leads his sen-

sation to "the deepth" and tries from his part to touch this that may be actual and real. We have, as a matter of fact, also then, when we agreeably enjoy the roast or beautifully enjoy the picture, before us the actual and not only imagined roast and picture.

But as far as we enjoy the roast only agreeably, the picture only beautifully, we remain in the first instance on the sensitively given phenomenon of the actual roast, but in the second on that art which we formed on the fundamental of the sensitively shown picture. But we can be delighted only about this that we regard as actual and that we "touch" thus, that we go from the single phenomena to the "depth," namely, to this that actually exists and appears to us by the sensitive accidentalness. "Agreeable" are to us but the sensitive givenesses and beautiful are to us but those "higher objects" which we build up on the fundamental of such sensitive givenessess, but valuable, worthwhile is us anything that permits to the single actual and, therefore, to the real substantivic side of such sensitive givenesses and of the pertinent and on those givenesses by ourselves built up higher phenomena. We call, therefore, the secondary sensation or the real evaluation which shows us the secondary values or the values in the stricter sense of the word, the substantivic sensation by the secondary evaluation as shown by the substantivic values.

I mentioned expressly that this characterization of the evaluation holds for both kinds, for the impressing and for the criticising evaluation. When we prize the meal or the picture from their agreeableness or beauty, we have in mind the actual thing or the actual picture and also him, who has the meal actually prepared and the picture actually made. More about this later on.

There is still this important difference between the impressing and criticising evaluation. When we rejoice about something, we think about the actual object, but are not interested in the question, where this object originates from, or how this object has been performed. When we prize something, then we think about the actual origin of the object, about "him," who has made this object. The true territories of prizing are but such objects, which are products of human work, but

not merely natural effects. We rejoice about thit that is effected by the way of the naturally causal happening, but we prize all this at all then, when we think that on this happening participated also the human will. Thus is the real prizing of the natural objects by its deepest essentiality only the prizing of that, who performed these objects by his will.

The prizing of the picture is the prizing of the artist who performed the picture. This important difference between the impressing and criticising evaluation shows that we have to regard the criticising evaluation as the real—substantivic sensation. The criticising evaluation leads us from the accidental qualities to this that actually has these qualities or appears to us in their light, and still to him, who has actually given to this, that we thus prize these qualities. We do not prize the agreeable look of the roast, or the beautiful look of the picture, but we prize the roast and the picture on account of their agreeable or beautiful appearance. This may suffice to convince us that both, the impressing and the criticising evaluations, have the character of the substantivic sensation.

The psychological background of the evaluation is herewith sufficiently outlined. The systematical essence of this background is in our sensation. The sensations are pointed experiences, which show us their objects in the light of values. With the different kinds of the sensation correspond different kinds of values.

The difference between the primary and secondary sensation is significant. The secondary sensation is developingly built up on the primary. With this difference corresponds the difference between the primary and secondary values. The secondary values are built up on the primary. Only the secondary sensation is the real evaluation. The immediately to it adapted value touches the evaluation in the stricter sense of the word. There are more differences between the primary and secondary sensation. We conquer or appropriate only with our secondary sensation primary values which delight or saden us. With the primary sensation we only "feel" the primary values, but with the secondary we "sense" them.

Secondly is the secondary sensation divided, opposed to the primary, in the impressing and criticising evaluation. With

the first evaluation is the value of this, that we thus value from outside forced upon us, but with the second evaluation appears this, that we thus value in the light of such an obligation, that anybody must acknowledge it. The impressing evaluation makes this, that we thus value, valuable, worthwhile only "for us," the criticising shows this, that we thus value, valuable, worthwhile for "everyone." Third is the primary sensation a merely accidental sensation, the secondary substantivic. The difference between the primary and secondary evaluations is, therefore, the difference between the accidental and substantivic values. The primary sensation values immediately for the single sensitively given phenomena or for upon such phenomena built up supersubstantivic entities, but the secondary sensation is immediately pointed to the real substantivic essentiality of the world and life. For this reason we call the sensation—evaluation, with this difference that the primary sensation is the accidental, the secondary the substantivic evaluation. The accidental evaluation is the evaluation in the broader sense of the word, the substantivic in the stricter.

25. The special position of the personal evalution and personal value.

This section deals with a peculiar sensation. We would be with regard to the discussions above in a dilemma, if we should rank it among the primary or secondary sensations, it means, among the valuation in the broader or in the stricter sense of the word. This is the sensation of LOVE AND SCORN. We may be astonished by the fact that we can not love or hate something in the true sense of the word. We are delighted about the roast or the picture, but we can not love them, as we love ourselves or others. When we ascend from dead things to living beings, we do not arrive at the immediate territory of true love and hatred. We can not love or hate animals. The immediate territory of love and hatred are essentially human entities, PERSONAL SUBJECTS. We love or hate man, a person, whilst everything else is the territory of an entirely different sensation which we wrongly call love or scorn. When we say that someone loves good meals or hates certain kinds of

cooking, we would have rather to say that he is delighted about good meals and disgusted about cooking. Who would love or hate some food, as he loves his friend or hates his enemy? We call love and scorn PERSONAL SENSATIONS, whereby has this name a double meaning. We can love or hate only persons and only human beings, personal subjects, can love or hate. The animal sensation is outside of love and hatred: ANIMAL IS NEITHER THE ORIGIN, NOR THE TERRITORY OF LOVE. We are used to say that the hen loves her chickens, but the instinctively blind "sympathy" is exchanged for the different and essentially human conscious love. Primarily and originally does also the mother love her child as the hen her youngs. As long as the mother remains on the grade of such a love, is she like the hen prepared to fight for her child till death. But this is not that love of the child which is peculiar but to the human mother and is praised in folklore and folksongs. The human motherly love is undissolubly connected with the consciousness OF DUTY to such a love. The hen can not know a "dutiful" consciousness. Personal beings are both, the origin and the territory of true love. *)

Love and scorn are SUBSTANTIVIC sensations. We can not love nor hate even the most human experience. We do not love thoughts, feelings, aspirings, but we do love him, who has such thoughts, feelings and aspirings. When we observe that someone is friendly or unfriendly towards us with his feelings, we do not love or hate his feelings, but we love or hate JUST HIMSELF. His feelings are the occasion for the rising in us of love or hatred. We must correct a linguistic expression as we would love or hate experiences. Experience may delight or saden us, but love or scorn is pointed to the person, responsible for those experiences. We proceed from the experience to the subject, from accidentals to substantives. I call this the PERSONIFICATIVIC proceeding. Substantivic love is built up on the personificating of this that we love.

Love and scorn are evaluation, secondary sensations. When we love someone, we evaluate him, he appears us as a value. The name is GOODNES OR WICKEDNESS for scorn. These

*) Only man LOVES, and only MAN loves a man!

are substantivic values. Experience can not be good or wicked, only a person can be good or wicked, love and scorn are personal substantivic values. Delight and sadness show the value of things, love and scorn the value of men, personal substantives. Delight is a common, love a personal evaluation. Between them exist a parallelity.

Personal evaluation is IMPRESSING AND CRITICISING. Love is merely impressing, a "private" evaluation, goodness a private value. Especially is love connected with the desire to remain private: He, who loves, hides his love and does not want to share it with others. We are astonished, when we detect that someone else hates the person we love or in reverse. The criticising personal evaluation corresponds with the substantial prizing of natural phenomena and denotes the feeling of REVERENCE and CONTEMPT as given to everyone. Reverence and contempt are personal evaluations, we revere but persons, not experiences, thoughts, feelings, and are real values. As we love but the good, so we revere only the good, or hate and contempt but the wicked. Love shows the value of an impression, reverence of a criticising, love is private, reverence general, for anyone.

Criticising evaluation is built up on the impressing. The child is first delighted about phenomena and prizes them later, loves his neighbor and reveres him later. Love is evolutionarily first, reverence later as clearly seen on a child. We can not say that the child could not love, as long as he has not the ability of prizing, but he must have this ability, if in his soul may develop on the ground of love the ability of personal reverence. For the psychology of the child would be of an remarkable advantage, if such and similar evolutionary relations between single kinds of the childish evaluation would be thoroughly investigated. I mention this to turn attention to this question.

Important is the evolutionary relation between the "positive" and "negative" member of evaluation, between delight-sadness, love-scorn. On the point of mere substantivic evaluation we can not speak about a legal evolutionary priority neither of the first nor of the second member, but on the personal evaluation is the priority in the first POSITIVE member. When the child begins to evaluate, depends from momentary

chances, if his first substantivic evaluation is a delight or a sadness, whilst the child in any case first loves and then hates. This is not so clear on the criticising evaluation, on positive or negative prizing and on reverence and scorn. Substantivic criticising evaluation approaches somehow the personal evaluation. The child prizes first positively natural phenomena, later also negatively. The systematical evolutionary scale which would show the human evaluations has this face: Delight or sadness—love, scorn—positive substantivic prizing—reverence —negative substantivic prizing—scorn.

We come to a side of the personal evaluation which sharply separates this sensation from the substantivic evaluation. I called it the secondary sensation. Personal evaluation does not allow such a restriction. We do not love someone for the reason of a primary enjoyment. The neighbor may offer us different primary comforts, agreeable and beautiful enjoyings. But the relation between love and the parallel enjoyment is essentially different from the relation between delight about the pear and the agreeable enjoyment of the pear. The agreeable enjoyment of the pear is not a merely occasional reason for delight, but this delight becomes by the agreeable enjoyment of the pear on the whole line PROVEN AND JUSTIFIED. The emphasis is not on delight, but on agreeable enjoyment. Entirely different is this situation on the point of love. Here appears the primary enjoyment only as an occasional reason which somehow eases to love the neighbor. Love is pointed to the person, WITHOUT REGARD TO ANY PRIMARY ENJOYMENT. The emphasis is not on the primary enjoyment, but on the love. This holds so legally that love begins to dwindle as soon as the emphasis of the sensation moves to the primary enjoyment: If someone becomes for us remarkable only so far as he may afford for us pleasures, becomes the love more and more imaginary and disappears. I do not assert that love could not be combined with different and primary pleasures of the person whom we love. I emphasize that this primary sensation

is not a decisive fact and that love disappears, if the primary enjoyment steps in the forground. *)

There is an essential difference between the substantivic and personal evaluation. Delight is given by enjoyment, primary sensation, goodness of man but by—love. On delight decides the sensation for the access of delight, on love has the sensation, if it is realized, only a collateral and occasional role. The same relation returns on the point of values. Substantivic value is shown by delight, goodness by love. Primary values and but these values decide the substantivic evaluation. Primary value is first, substantivic evaluation the consequence. Goodness of man do not decide primary values. Man is not good, because he gives to a hungry man to eat and to a thirsty man to drink. To the contrary. Man is this doing, BECAUSE HE IS GOOD. Goodness is not the consequence of primary values, but these values step out as consequences of goodness. Primary values have only the meaning that we can EASELY SEE the goodness of man, but from these values his goodness does not follow. For example. To help the poor may be a sign of goodness, but also the sing of a quality which is not a goodness. This happens, when it is done out of ambition and for private advantages. Love may be connected with primary enjoyments, but they have a subordinate place. Primary enjoyment may raise in us the thought that the person MAY BE GOOD and worth of love, but when we are of the meaning that there is not so, then love disappears or changes to scorn.

The relation of the love to the primary sensation and of the goodness to the primary values is as follows: Primary enjoyment may raise love and primary value may be a sign of goodness, but the enjoyment is not the necessary condition of love, and goodness is not the consequence of the value. Enjoyment does not prove the love and the value does not prove the goodness. The same is true for hatred. The outlined examples

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*) An outstanding example is the love between man and wife. This love dwindles more and more, if the emphasis on but "bedonic" enjoyment of the sexual relation becomes too strong. But this love becomes stronger and stronger, if this emphasis steps in the background and the love becomes free and cleared. This love is not against this enjoyment, but becomes impure, if it tries to be founded but on it.

concern the impressing evaluation (delight-love), but this does not disturb our conclusion, because the criticising evaluation (prizing-reverence) follows evolutionarily the impressing evaluation.

The speciality of the personal evaluation affords a correction of the PSYCHOLOGICAL definition of the evaluation, as given in the former section. We said there that evaluation is a secondary sensation which affords for its immediate fundamental the parallel primary enjoyment. This definition holds only for the substantivic evaluation, not for the personal. We can be delighted or sadened by things as their accidental side raises in us a comfort or discomfort. Persons we love or hate immediately and the accidental enjoyment has a merely collateral role: Enjoyment is for the access of love or hatred not indispensably necessary and may be, if realized, to love and hatred in both relations that is supports love or hatred, or even hinders them. The substantivic evaluation is a mediate, the personal an immediate evaluation. The value of natural things leads to these things, but is based upon values which concern but the accidental side of these things. Personal goodness or wickedness leads to persons, but it is based only upon the substantivic personal side of human life.

These views show the deepest side of ANY real evaluation. This side does not touch the question, if the evaluation is necessarily based still on a sensation or not. In this regard differs only the substantivic evaluation from the personal. Both evaluations are SUBSTNTIVIC evaluations which do not touch the accidental side of the world and life: Substantivic evaluation leads to "things," personal to "persons." The basical side of the evaluation which separates the evaluation from the sensation, which is not an evaluation, is given with the question, TO WHAT is the evaluation pointed, and TO WHAT the sensation. The valuation is pointed to the substantivic essence of the world and life, the sensation to the accidental.

This important fact requests that we return to the discussion of sensations and values and give the UNPSYCHOLOGICAL definition of the system of values.

26. Religious evaluation and religious value.

The present discussions demand an adequate extending of the legal system of evaluation and value from the psychological and unpsychological viewpoint. The first showed that the substantivic evaluation is built up on primary enjoyment, the second assisted us to characterize the evaluation as a substantivic sensation. On our way furtheron we ask, if we do not find from psychological views sensations which may be evaluations, although different from the substantivic and personal evaluation, then, if we do not have substantives, which the substantivic and personal evaluation does not and can not touch.

There appears a double sensation, the impressing and criticising evaluation, different from the substantivic and personal. We call them PRAYER AND WORSHIP. The essence of prayer and worship is by all means a sensation: To experience prayer and worship means to experience sensation. It is different from the substantivic and personal sensation. Who could exchange prayer for delight or love, who worship for substantivic prizing or personal reverence? Prayer is on the other hand to worship in the relation similar to the relation of substantivic delight to substantivic prizing or of personal love to personal reverence. Prayer is an impressing, worship a criticising evaluation. Both have a view of substantivic sensation and are near to personal evaulation. As we can love or revere someone, so we can experience the sensation of prayer and worship toward SOMEONE. We can not adore things, neither divinely worship. This is not opposed by idolatry. Idolatry is but external, an internal idolatry, an internal experience of the idolater, is impossible. Prayer and worship are sensations man experiences in moments of his realization of religion and faith. There is no religion or belief in the world, originally and finally not based upon the acknowledgment of superhuman, but nevertheless PERSONAL beings. This is a matter of fact also for the belief of the Far East which rises the opposite view only then, when we take it as but some theoretical, philosophical consideration of the world and life. A such considered belief would never incline man to an ACTUAL prayer and ACTUAL worship. We can, therefore, understand,

why millions of adherers of the oriental belief enter then, when they actually religiously express them with this that they adore and divinely worship in no less immediate PERSONAL relations. We arrive to the same conclusion, if we consider prayer and worship immediately and compare them with the sensation experienced by the idolater. The golden calf was to the idolater not what it is to us, namely, a piece of metal. The idolater did not worship the "metal," but this metal was for him a "living and superhuman" being which rules the world and life and must be FOR THIS REASON adored and divinely worshiped. In a similar relation is the idolater toward other natural phenomena, also toward human beings. Rulers adored and divinely worshiped by their subjects were for THESE SUBJECTS not common men, but superhuman and divine personal beings or beings originating immediately from divine essence. Evident is that real prayer and true worship is necessarily built up on a psychological relation to this, toward which may man experience it. This relation is quite similar to known "personification" of dead things and living beings with this important difference that this personiifcation, as it is necessary for the access of prayer and worship, adds to this that man is THUS personificating the character of some superhuman or singular and divine personality. This personification is deification, the parallel evaluation manifested in prayer and worship.

Interesting are other specialities of religious evaluation in regard to the substantivic and personal evaluation.

I emphasize that religious evaluation is a real evaluation, a real substantivic "sensation." This follows from the fact that only God or a deificated entity is the possible or immediate territory of religious evaluation. This territory is in principle substantivic and not accidental. We ascertained in the former chapter the divine essence as the singular and absolute substantive. For this reason is the religious evaluation the clearest and singular SUBSTANTIVIC SENSATION. Religious evaluation is doubtlessly evolutionarily the latest and the HIGHEST. Sensation appears before the religious evaluation and is to it only appearently similar. Prayer must be saparated from "petition," and may petition point to the human or to the divine being. Genuine prayer is not petition, but a sensation in the

relation to God as love is to the human person, delight to the natural thing. The difference between the substantivic or personal and the religious evaluation is based on the difference between the substantial, personal and divine substantiveness. What corresponds in the sphere of evaluation with the HIGHEST place, with the singular divine substantiveness, corresponds in the sphere of evaluation the EVOLUTIONARILY HIGHEST place of the religious evaluation. The child is first delighted, then loves, later prays. The child is delighted about SOMETHING, loves SOMEONE and adores SOMEONE. Religious sensation is furthest from the substantivic evaluation and in this line nearer to the personal evaluation. Religious evaluation is higher than personal evaluation and takes the place of a SINGULAR and SINGLE personal evaluation.

I proceed to the differences between religious, personal and substantivic evaluation.

The first difference is in the VALUE of the religious evaluation. This is not the common "value" we ascribe to natural things, neither that personal value manifested in the "goodness" of man. These value show the substantivic and personal evaluation—HOLINESS. Religious evaluation is the point of holiness. Holiness is an independent value, neither substantivic nor personal. Against this does not speak the fact that different nations have their "saints" or "holy" persons which they revere or evaluate. This evaluation of "holy" persons is more than a common love or reverence. We can see this mediately. With that evaluation corresponds a nonevaluation given with the relation to such persons which people regards as "eternally damned" or reprobated. The nonevaluation of "devil" and of him "subordinated" is more than a common hatred or scorn, but not a "negative"-religious evaluation, because the religious evaluation is in its essence the LONE UNPOLAR sensation appearing to us as positive, if we compare it with the remaining sensation, but essentially without any "negative" affix. There is no negative prayer, neither negative worship. The outlined discussions admit but this acknowledgment that we have between the common personal and the religious evaluation "intermediate" evaluations experienced by man toward single persons but only then, when man interpretes these

persons along the pattern of human beings and puts them outside of the boundaries of creation. Such intermidiate evaluations can not disturb the view on "genuine" evaluations. We shall in the evolutionary transition from the substantivic to the personal evaluation, therefore, from common delight to real love touch a similar intermediate evaluation called the "evaluation of life." What is true for the evaluation, is true for the value, also for the value of holiness.

The value of holiness appears as a genuine value, as the HIGHPOINT in the entire system of values. On this value also reflects the relation between the impressing and criticising religious evaluation, between prayer and worship. Prayer renders us That, Whom we adore, holy but "for ourselves," worship shows this holiness in the light of a general obligation. No wonder that prayer readily associates with "petition" which always has a "private" character, and may this petition include temporal or supertemporal, your or other people's matters. Worship has never a private character, because its systematical centrum is not on us who experience it, but on That, Whom we divinely worship. For this reason is prayer evolutionarily before worship. We can easily observe on a outgrown child, how oppens for him the sense for prayer, when the parallel worship is for him still an entirely unknown experience. Religious evaluation is, furthermore, impressing and criticising and the first goes evolutionarily before the second. On the point of religious evaluation has this fact its culturally historical confirmation. I mentioned that the religious life of the human race is the most expressive cultural historical realization of the religious evaluation. The evolution of religious life shows two characteristic grades, the grade of CULT and the grade of MYTH. On the grade of cult is man to God in the personal and private relation, and especially is heer pushed to the foreground the sensation of the pertinent faithful. On the point of myth steps out the religious thought and the parallel philosophical viewing upon the world and life. With myth begins, what we may call to-day the dogmatical side of religious life. It is evident that the systematical essence of religious life is on both grades in the religious evaluation, but on the first grade is the centrum of this life PRAYER, in the second WORSHIP. For

this reason is the second grade of religious evolution the beginning of rites and ceremonies, whilst on the grade of cult such a ritual ceremonial life of the religiosity is undeveloped or very little emphasized. We may justifiably doubt, if ancient man, when he invigorated the first beginnings of human cult and human myth, experienced genuine prayer and worship, as experiences them the modern christian. I mentioned that the evolution from the personal evaluation to the religious follows sensations which are only appearently similar to prayer and worship. The cultural effecting of man is essentially nearer to prayer, the mythically-dogmatical to worship. Modern christianity shows that the immediate psychological essence of ITS natural side is prayer, the immediate psychological of ITS "ritual" essentiality worship. Historically is for the past and the future a matter of fact that the cult of religious creeds is evolutionarily before the mythically dogmatical and not vice versa. The evolutionary relation between prayer and worship as the impressing and parallel criticising evaluation is culturally-historically proven. *)

I mentioned that the religious evaluation is nearer to the personal than to the substantivic evaluation, but the religious evaluation has also in this point a special character. We may love and revere different persons. The territory of the personal evaluation has the character of PLURALITY. We love or revere SOMEONE, but this "someone" may be very different: We love a friend, companion, benefactor. If we compare from this view prayer and worship, we observe that the immediate territory of the religious evaluation is "someone," a "personality," but a personality which excludes by its own nature that we could consider Him from the view "of plurality." We can adore and worship but a SINGULAR SOMEONE, so singular that the mere thought of more representatives of such a territoriality of religious evaluation would take from this evaluation its genuine religious character. We adore ONLY GOD and ONLY GOD we devinely worship. There exists a legal SINGULARITY of the religious evaluation which is the singu-

*) See my essay "Starogrška filozofija in Slovenci," I. Ljb. Zvon, 1933, further "Psycholoical bases of National mentality"—"Odmevi," 1932, and the preface of the essay "Sokrat," Mladina, I—III.

larity of its immediate territory by principle. "Polytheism," as it is characteristic for the heathenish creeds, is not against this fact. This polytheism is for the immediate psychological background of the religious expression but appearent. All religious effectings afford first the acknowledgment of some "chief" divine being which man may adore and worship. But the chief "god" of any religious expression is substantially the Single God, who does not know besides himself any equal.

Secondly, we must take in account the fact of the "intermediate" evaluation which is more than the personal evaluation, but, nevertheless, not the real and genuine religious evalution. For this reason are in the psychological viewpoint the heathenish creeds both: In these creeds was realized the genuine religious evaluation which has been in them the adoration and worshiping of the "single" chief divine personality, or in these creeds was realized the intermediate evaluation which has with the personal evaluation to-day in common that it may be pointed to different human and "superhuman" personalities. Most credible is the hypothesis that the pagan experiences in an ideal example the genuine religious evaluation, but only toward his "chief" god, whilst the pagan evaluated other "gods" as the christian is to-day evaluating saints and angels. By no means does historically witnesed polytheism shake my basical assertion that this idea of this that alone we can in the real sense of the word adore and worship is the idea of an entity BY PRINCIPLE AND SYSTEMATICALLY SINGULAR.

In the following chapter we shall arrive to the definition of this systematical "singularity" and see that it is from other standpoints the necessary attribute of the divine and only divine essence. For the present I ascertain but this fact from the PSYCHOLOGICAL standpoint. The psychological essence of the religious evaluation affords ITSELF that we ascribe to its legal territory, the divine essence, the character of a systematical singularity by principle. We adore and worship THE SINGULAR. The idea of monotheism is proven not only from logical, perceptively theoretical and metaphysical considerations, monotheism is an unrefutable request of the psychological nature of the religious evaluation.

With the outlined singularity corresponds the singularity

of the religious VALUE. We ascribe holiness to a singular entity, besides which we can not think about someone and something that may with it form some "plurality." There is here the question about the "holiness" in the strictest sense of the word, as point to this meaning the known words of holy Writ: "Holy, Holy art, Thou, o Lord!" This holiness differs from that "holiness" which we ascribe to "saintes" and even to human persons. A such "holiness" will be something more than the personal value (goodness), but this holiness is by no means the genuine holiness, because it has with the personal value in common that it is A VALUE BY PLURALITY. This holiness in the broader sense of the word corresponds with the "intermediate" evaluation, it is the religious evaluation in the broader sense of the word. The point becomes clearer, if we distinguish between the personal, intermediate and genuine religious evaluation on the one side and the intermediate and religious value on the other. Personal and intermediate evaluation have in common that they are for their immediate territory and value by principle PLURAL evaluation. Genuine religious evaluation is for its territory and value by principle a SINGULAR evaluation. We adore and worship "The Single" and "The Singular" and we give but to "The Single" and to "The Singular" the attribute of genuine HOLINESS. The religious evaluation has opposite to the personal a double speciality: It shows on its territory a special value (holiness) and gives to its territory from two viewpoints the character of a characteristic singularity, namely, from the viewpoint of its own psychological essentiality and from the viewpoint of value immediately adapted to this essentiality.

In a strict connection with this facts are two specialities of the religious evaluation which we call the substantial "unpolarity" and "immediateness" by principle. The remaining evaluations are "positive" or "negative." With delight corresponds sadness, with love hatred, with reverence scorn. We search in vain for a feeling which would include both: That it may be on the same level as prayer and worship and would have to prayer and worship a relation, as hatred and scorn to love and reverence. It seems that we could speak about a "negative" religious evaluation. Such a seemingness arrises,

if we search for the "negative" religious value, therefore, for a value, as it is nonvalue to value or evil to good. It seems that we have a special expression for this negative value, so called NULLITY (vanitas). Holiness and nullity are twins which afford a distinction between a positive and negative value: Holiness is the absolute value of God, nullity the absolute negative value of nothingness, holiness appears by the positive religious evaluation, nullity by the negative. I admit this thought so far, as I shall in the following chapter outline a strict definition of nothingness and of its systematical relation to the divine essence. There we shall be able to understand that the point of nothingness is the point of genuine "nullity," whilst the remaining universe swings in the valuable regard between these utmost valuable points, namely, between the real and single holiness of God and the real and single nullity of nothingness. Allover, we should not forget that nothingness is and remains just —NOTHINGNESS, therefore, that single point which by principle we can not IMMEDIATELY perceive. "To perceive immediately nothingness" would mean to PERCEIVE NOT AT ALL. Herewith is said that any real evaluation of nothingness, positive or negative, is impossible. "To evaluate nothingness" would mean, to evaluate not at all.

The question has a deeper background. Evaluation is the substantivic sensation. The character of evaluation is the clearer, the clearer is the substantivic nature of this that we evaluate. Nothingness is the point of the clearest unsubstantiveness, of the clearest substantivic emptiness. We can arrive at nothingness, when we intentionally "remove" from it anything. Thus disappears the accidentalness and the substantiveness and remains only unsubstantiveness by principle. There is nothing on this point and nothing that we may in the accidental regard connect with a substantive, and may this connection be done in the most immediate way and by the most intermediate steps. "Numeral," for example, is neither a substantiviness, nor an accidental, but we can mediately connect it with the pertinent substantives. We do this, when we "count" the substantives. There is no such way from nothingness to nothing. Nothingness breakes by principle from the sphere of any valuation in the strictest and also broadest sense of the

word. We have still a special evaluation which we experience, when we TRANSFER TO NOTHINGNESS THIS THAT IS NOT NOTHING. We experience in this case a feelig which we may call a SHUDDER. We feel the burden of this shuddering, when we try to put in thought OURSELVES on the point of nothingness and "anihilate" ourselves. We are overcome with the feeling of an undescriptive horror. We may be not better off, when we proceed thus with any other phenomenon, think us in the position that, say, the stone in front of us may suddenly cease, not only to exist, but to be still something. We experience a characteristic DEVASTATION of "nothingness." Such facts prove that there is some negative evaluation of nothingness, but we must add that this negative evaluation is by its own nature only TRANSPORTED AND RELATIVE. We can nothingness negatively evaluate only so far, as we think on its place phenomena which are not null. This fact affords an important interpretation of the religious evaluation in relation to the remaining evaluations.

Empirically given universe is an intermediate universe, enclosed on the one side by the singular point of God, on the other by the point of nothingness. God is the immediate territory of the religious evaluation, nothingness would be the IMMEDIATE TERRITORY of the singular "negative" evaluation. We can this point evaluate only relatively, namely, with regard to the relation to creation. Creation is the territory of both. Still more important is the further fact that we may this creation evaluate in both ways, immediately or merely relatively. Substantivic and personal evaluation manifested in delight and love is the immediate evaluation of creation. The merely relative evaluation appears, when we evaluate creation IN RELATION TO GOD OR IN RELATION TO NOTHINGNESS: In the first case we deny any value to creation (before God is "everything null"!), in the second we evaluate creation in a "particular way" (the smallest creature is not a "nothingness!"). Religious evaluation appears in a double way singularly absolute: It is singular and absolute by its own territory and it is singular and absolute, because, there is outside of it no any valuation which would be "absolutely positive," as we can IN RELATION TO THE TERRITORY OF THE RE-

LIGIOUS EVALUATION to anything else the valuation only deny.

With this relatively negative evaluation of creation corresponds a similar relative evaluation of creation, but only in the relation of—nothingness. The relative negative evaluation is only the relative consequence of the RELATIVE evaluation of creation. We can deny to the point of nothingness any evaluation so far as we evaluate in account of it creation. We can relatively deny to creation any value, as we absolutely evaluate God. With the immediate and absolute evaluation of God corresponds the immediate or only the relatively positive or negative evaluation of creation, but with this relatively positive or negative evaluation of creation only the RELATIVE negative evaluation of nothingness. Religious evaluation is that singular our sensation which is by principle outside of any "negative pole." We evaluate God immediately, but negatively we evaluate nothingness so far as we evaluate everything else. We can for this reason not regard the religious sensation as "positive." Religious sensation has this (positive) character so far as we consider it with the relation between the remaining and the positive and negative sensation, with the relation between love and scorn. Religious sensation considered from this point has the character of the "first," namely, positive member. The positivity of the religious evaluation does, therefore, by principle not admit any negativity, it is the absolute positivity. (Prayer is—absolute love).

I pass to the IMMEDIATENESS BY PRINCIPLE of the religious evaluation. The substantivic evaluation is so far merely mediate, as it is built up on the "primary" sensation. The delight about the picture affords an esthetical enjoying of the picture. The personal evaluation is more immediate and for the raising of love is not necessary the access of a primary enjoying. This immediateness of the personal evaluation is not perfect and absolute. It is positive or negative, love or scorn. Why do we now love, then hate? This does not perform the "person himself," but something else in him and around him that inclines him now to love, then to hate. Our love or hatred may be greater or smaller. This would be impossible, if the personal evaluation would have the character

of a perfect immediateness by principle. Furthermore, we love or hate different persons and different persons we love or hate differently. Herewith is said that the personal evaluation is to that, whom we thus evaluate, pointed only mediately. We love or hate "himself," but this love or scorn goes necessarily BECAUSE OF FACTS in him which are not with him identical and define him opposite OTHER persons (e. gr., he is our benefactor or OUR enemy etc.). The personal evaluation is but in the relation to the substantivic immediate, such that it does by principle not afford the primary enjoying. But BY ITSELF is this evaluation mediate, because, it is built up on SPECIAL sides of its territory, to which is itself not intendet: We love the BROTHER, not "brotherhood." If we compare the religious evaluation with the personal, we touch an evaluation which has the character of an absolute immediateness by principle. This fact follows from all the hitherto given specialities of the religious evaluation. Hitherto belongs the "singular" and "unpolar" character. If the religious evaluation would be based in regard to its territory, it means, in regard to That, Whom we evaluate, merely mediately, then we could not speak about a real "singularity" of this territory and not about a "singular" value of this territory. In this case we would have to distinguish on God sides which would incline us to the religious evaluation, although this evaluation is not meant for them. But on the point of God are such sides by principle impossible. On God is everything "one and the same." The religious evaluation is, therefore, in any regard by principle immediate or it ceases to be a religious evaluation.

Man may evaluate God, as he evaluates another man or even natural things. He does this, when he expects from Him something that may offer him human persons or natural things. Man may evaluate God merely personally or merely substantively. But such an evaluation is for this reason NOT A RELIGIOUS EVALUATION. He, who evaluates God thus, puts God in a place, in which are persons or natural things. It is a more or less mediate evaluation, but not a real religious evaluation, nor real prayer and true worship. For the religious evaluation holds but the tenet: ONLY GOD can we worship and God can we ONLY WORSHIP. The first part of the tenet has been

confirmed, when we said that real prayer rests necessarily upon the parallel deification of that, whom we may worship. The second part has the meaning that anyone, who evaluates God differently and not religiously, in truth DISDEIFICATES God: God becomes to him a human person or a piece of natural creation. The objection that we can only man love and that we can man only love, is untenable. We may love different men and men we may love differently and we may hate men. On the point of love is necessary some adjusting fact which effects that we love "that" and "him," him so, that differently etc. On the point of God and on the parallel true religious evaluation all such differences are impossible. Real prayer is pointed in all immediateness to one and the same and but one and the same can be the territory of prayer. Welcome may be some special facts which more or less facilitate the experience of prayer. Known is the age-old saying: He, who does not pray, to sea should go. Life in need and abundance, in happiness and disaster may relieve the experience of real prayer or hinder it. When we actually pray, prayer points immediately to God Himself. We do not worship God as our "neighbor," our "benefactor," neither as our creator, but we worship ONLY GOD. We come to the same conclusion, if we consider this question from the viewpoint of that value which is immediately adapted to real religious evaluation and which we called the value of HOLINESS. We must turn attention to the singular character of this value which is manifested in its UNPOLARITY by principle.

Religious evaluation is an unpolar, therefor, "absolutly positive" evaluation. The same holds for the religious value. With holiness does not correspond any parallel "negative" value, especially we have not to search for it in the negative value of "nullity" of nothingness. We said that the negative evaluation of nothingness is only the relative consequence of the "relative" evaluation of creation. "Nullity" has but a merely relative and dependent character: Nothingness is only so far the territory of the relative "value," as far as God is the territory of the "absolute value." Holiness, this absolute value of God, proves in a special meaning all the independent and merely relative positive and negative value of creation, as also the

merely relative negative value of nothingness. Holiness appears as the singular and absolute value. The singularity of this value is a double one: Holiness is the value which leads to the singular Being, and holiness is itself the singular value. It follows the further fact that the differing between God and holiness of God originates from the difference in THE VIEWPOINT OF THE CONSIDERATION OF THE ONE AND THE SAME Being: As far as we consider God with our THOUGHTS, we see him in the light of the "absolute substantive," but as far as we approach him with SENSATIONS, we see him in the light of the "absolute value." Actually are on this point both one and the same: The divine absolute substantive is the absolute value, and the absolute value the divine substantive. This fact gives to the religious evaluation the character of the immediate evaluation by principle. "This" that we evaluate, is essentially synonyme with "that" what this evaluation shows and may show on it. There is no any place for facts which may intervene between our evaluation on the one side and the territory of this evaluation on the other. Religious evaluation of God is IN ONE PASSAGE BOTH, the evaluation OF GOD and the appearing OF HOLINESS. How may be, therefore, real religious evaluation by its own essence still mediately based and mediately proven? I may enlighten this with an example. "Axioms" value immediately by themselves, prayer values and is proven immediately and by itself.

Religious evaluation has with the remaining evaluations many things in common, but is from them essentially different. It is a real evaluation, it means, a substantivic sensation and a sensation of the impressing and criticising type. It is the clearest substantivic sensation, because, it has as its legal territory the clearest, the absolute divine substantive. It is near to the personal evaluation and has the place of the singular absolutely personal evaluation.

With the religious evaluation corresponds a peculiar value, the singular value of holiness. For this reason has it, thirdly, the character of a singular evaluation which corresponds with the singular character of its territory and to this territory pertinent value. It is, fourth, the singular unpolar evaluation and religious value, immediately adapted to it is the singular un-

polar value. It is, fifth, by principle the alone immediate evaluation and the value immediately adapted to it is by principle an immediate value which is to the territory in the relation of the actual and substantial synonymity.

I may mention some important advantages of this definition for further discussions.

What about the entire system of human evaluation and to this evaluation immediately adapted value?

It is evident that we attained with the religious evaluation THE LEGAL HIGHPOINT of this system. Religious evaluation has the character of the EVOLUTIONARILY main evaluation. It has the legitimate place of the latest human evaluation. With this evolutionarily main character is connected its SYSTEMATICALLY BASICAL character. This character means that the legitimate territory of the religious evaluation is in the absolute substantiveness which is the singular origin of all remaining and merely relative substantivenesses, and that to this evaluation is immediately adapted the absolute value.

Religious evaluation is the singular evolutionarily main and systematically basical evaluation.

27. An essay of the system of evaluation and value.

Did we allege all grades of the human evaluation? For the decision of this question is important the conception of the evaluation as a sensation. With legal substantivic branches of the value correspond like legal branches of the substantivic sensation. We alleged three legal kinds of the substantivic sensation, of the true evaluation, which corresponds with three like kinds of substantivic entities, the substantivic, personal and religious evaluation, which corresponds with two kinds of the substantial and personal substantiveness and with the fact of the singular divine or absolute substantive.

Remember the discussions in the third chapter, where the substantives were parted in two prime-kinds, in the kind of DEAD AND LIVING substantives, it means, in natural THINGS and natural SUBJECTS. Things we parted in "things" in the stricter and broader sense of the words, namely, in inorganic and organic things. It seem that this difference has no mean-

ing for the evaluation. To the contrary. We evaluate organic things essentially like inorganic and this evaluation is in essence the substantivic evaluation, "delight" and "appraising." The hungry man does not differently evaluate the albumen, than the thirsty the water. Entirely different is the position in the transition from dead things to living subjects, from dead nature to the LIFE upon it. This transition is essential and proven by those discussions in the third chapter, where we ascertained that dead nature is merely "accidentally" working and that with the life on it begin entities which have the character of a substantivic working, although is this working on the point of natural animal life only heterogeneous. This difference between dead and living nature is valuably very delicate. No one will doubt that delight about dead things is essentially different from delight about the life itself. Delight here, delight there, but they have a such different meaning that they justify the distinction between a "substantivic" and a—LIFE-EVALUATION. The evaluation of life (life-evaluation) is empirically everywhere proven. A blind man is cured and "sees," a deaf "hears," a paralysed "moves." What a comfort! We all experience somehow comforts, when we awake, see, hear, smell... briefly: SENSE. These are experiences of comfort, discomfort, delight . . . we are delighted about life. Experiences form the accidental side of life. This side is to the "subjects" of life in the relation as are natural "qualities" to natural "things." We call this enjoyment pointed to the "experiences" an ACCIDENTAL SENSATION, life-sensation which coincides with the primary enjoyment. There is a substantivic and a primary life-enjoyment. The first is pointed to single and sensitively given natural phenomena and upon them built up "supersubstantivic" entities, the second to "experiences" and special "life-standings" which have the experiences as their fundamental. We enjoy experiences and anything built upon them. The primary life-enjoyment is positive or negative, "life-enjoyment" or "life-suffering." We have also an accidental LIFE-VALUE, the singular value of the experience and upon it built up supersubstantivic life-phenomena. The value shows the primary life-sensation thus, as the primary substantivic sensation the accidental substantivic value. For example. With the agreeable-

ness of the pear and with the beauty of the picture corresponds a peculiar "agreeableness" of life and a peculiar "beauty" of the melody of life.

Accidental life-enjoyment is connected with the parallel life-evaluation. We are delighted about the experience, but also about him who has the experience. This comfort is on the primary comfort built up, as is the delight of the pear on the agreeable enjoyment of the pear. We are peculiarily pleased with "subjects," because they are the bearers of the experience, it means, they actually LIVE. This peculiar delight is a secondary enjoyment and a real "life-evaluation" which has in the sphere of life the place occupied by substantivic evaluation in the sphere of dead things. To evaluate life, means, to evaluate someone. This life-evaluation is based on the life of that whom we evaluate and does not depend on the question, if this life is "normatively" correct or not. We evaluate the wild beast and Nietzsche's human fair beast, if there is on them some abundant and strong life.

With the life-evaluation corresponds the life-value based upon the primary value of the experience of subjects. This value is the value in the stricter sense of the word or a negative value. The decision depends on the experience of the subject. For xample. We evaluate a giant in life, because he is characterized by a strong experience, but we do not evaluate a weakling in life, because he is characterized by a weak experience. The evaluation of life has its territory in the experience and not in him who has the experience. We evaluate the dog and not his experience which primarily pleases us. The dog is to us valuable in the relation of his experience and his watchfulness connected with his experience. Life-evaluation is finally merely impressing or criticising: Animal is "valuable" only to us or for us, or its value appears to us still from the viewpoint of prizing which may be obligate also to others. Private lovers of animals experience more the first life-evaluation, professional appraisers of single animal races the second. I mention a peculiar side of the life-evaluation which is separated from the substantivic evaluation. Life-evaluation is internally "intimate" and personally immediate, substantivic evaluation "internally strange" and personally "remote." We stick in our

buttonholes rather living roses than dead imitations or dead things. Substantivic evaluation may get the character of an internal intimacy and personal immediateness, but in this case it turns in life-evaluation: The child is delighted about puppets as well as about the dog, because for the child the puppet has its peculiar life.

With life-evaluation is the human evaluation closed. This is now mediately proven.

With legal substantivic kinds correspond like legal kinds of parallel substantivic sensations. The discussions in the former chapter discovered four kinds of substantivic entities: Mere substantives or "things," living substantives or animal subjects, personal substantives, human subjects, and the singular absolute or divine substantive. With these four substantivic kinds correspond four human evaluations, the substantivic, life-evaluation, personal and religious evaluation. This legal classification has still a deeper meaning. The substantivic fourfoldness points in each consequent member to a more expressive "substantivic" character of the entity: Animal subjects are more expressive than mere things, personal subjects more than animal and the point of God is the point of the most expressive and absolute substantiveness. Mere substantives belong together and form in their wholeness dead nature. With the point of animal subjects begins true life. But the substantivic and living SUBSTANTIVES, it means, things and animal subjects belong also together, because, hitherto reaches the conception of the dead and living NATURALENESS. With the point of personal and singularly human subjects begins the sphere of exnatural and supernatural life. We discussed this classification in the former chapter and ascertained: Mere substantives (dead nature) are accidentally working. With the point of living substantives begins the substantivic working of creation. On the other side begins with the point of personal substantives the INDEPENDENT, AUTOGENEOUS substantivic working which may even oppose the merely accidental working and attains on the point of the divine substantive the form of—primeworking which is by principle outside of any accidental working.

We understand now better, why we distinguish between

substantivic and life-evaluation. This psychological difference is based upon the unpsychological difference between dead nature and life upon it. We understand, secondly, why substantivic and life-evaluation form but one higher kind of "natural" evaluation. This psychological fact is based on the unpsychological "natural" substantiveness of dead things and animal subjects and explains, why are other or secondary evaluations built up on the accidental and primary enjoyment of dead natural phenomena or of life. Thirdly, why begins with the personal such an evaluation which is immediately intended to substantives and by principle not more connected with the accidental primary enjoyment. Finally, why has the religious evaluation the character of the singular and absolutely immediate evaluation. The first psychological fact is based on the unpsychological fact of the independent substantivic working of personal subjects, the second on the singular and absolute primeworking of the divine substantive. We understand now, furthermore, the fact, why the substantivic evaluation forms some kind opposite to all remaining evaluation, to the life-evaluation, personal and religious evaluation: This psychological substantivic difference between anything that is "dead" and "living" and gets its expression for the reason that only the substantivic evaluation has the character of some "internal strangeness" and parallel "personal madiateness." We have from this viewpoint substantivic and life-evaluations. Life-evaluations are life-evaluations in the stricter sense of the word —mere life-evaluations—or life-evaluations in the broader sense of the word, WHICH are divided in the personal and religious evaluation. We are herewith sufficiently justified to speak about the legal system of evaluation and value. To the evaluation is adapted the value of its immediate territory and with the system of evaluation corresponds the system of values: Mere substantivic, value of living beings, personal and divine value. The points of value are in the same legal relation as the single kinds of the evaluation: Substantivic value is the single "dead" value, but with the value of living entities begins the "lifevalue." Substantivic and value of living entities form together "natural" values. With the personal value begin ex-natural and supernatural values. Natural values are built up

on accidentally primary values, personal values are by principle independent on such values. Religious value is the single by principle absolute and immediate value, therefore, the "primevalue" in the stricter sense of the word.

I complete the system still from two viewpoints. The first touches conditions which are in the psychological regard necessary for the access of the evaluation. What I mean with this condition, is evident from the example that the "idolater" has to put this that he worships on the grade of the singular and personal divine being. Religious evaluation rests on DEIFICATION of this and that whom we evaulate. The essence of such a deification is for this reason the internal "protruding" to the —singular divine substantive, that protruding which shows us ITS final territory in the light of GOD and not of a common person and by no means of a natural thing. The fact of this deification can astonish no one, who knows the indisputable fact of the PERSONIFICATION of nature and life on it. This personification is not only strongly difused, but for the primitive man and the child nearly exclusively characteristic: To the primitive man are single natural forces true personal beings and also the modern child sees in nature a personal life. The essence of personification is the internal "protruding" to personally substantivic entities. Even the territories of common love or hatred afford a common personification.

We mentioned a protruding to the substantivic side of the world and life and called it "touching," to distinguish it from the "viewing" which is immediately intended only to THE ACCIDENTAL FORM of creation. "Deification" and "personfication" shows that this "touching" is different and leads to different substantivenesses. For the reason that we have to distinguish between the substantial and the substantiveness of living entities, we come to the further conclusion that we have besides deification and personification to distinguish a "livification" and a "substantivification." Livification leads to living (animal) subjects, substantivification to things. In connection herewith is the further fact that we have phenomena so far as we evaluate them SUBSTANTIALLY to substantivificate, but so far as we phenomena evaluate from the view of life life-evaluation) to livificate. Substantivification, livification, per-

sonifciation and deification are thus that legal fourfoldness of TOUCHING ACTS which in a similar order lead to substantivic, living, personal substantivenesses and finally to the absolute divine substantive. This fourfoldness is afforded in the same order, if we should experience the substantivic, the life-evaluation, the common personal and finally the religious evaluation. *)

Substantivification is the fundamental for the substantivic evaluation, livification for the evaluation of life, personification for the personal and deification for the religious evaluation. I mention that this order is but by principle and that it allows a manifold ramification between its single members: I said that in single cases we may evaluate man substantively or God may become the territory of a personal evaluation. We must in such cases "substantivificate" man and (commonly, humanly) "personificate" God. The difference is, if the object of the substantivic or personal evaluation is actually a mere thing or a real person. Our PRESENT QUESTION about substantification and personification is different and touches alike the relation to livification and deification. The legality of all human evaluation is clear. This legality proves still clearly the bassical classification of all true "evaluations" and like true substantivic sensations. We can the legal fourfoldness of the touching acts call the legal fourfoldness of SUBSTANTIVING.

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*) Consider also this consequence of the FOURFOLDNESS of the "touching" act: The act is not the viewing act, but has its "objective" territory. With the legal differences in the touching act correspond like legal differences in the proper territories of touchings. This means that the INTERNAL difference between the merely substantivic, life, personal and divine substantivenesses is by the touching act, therefore, IMMEDIATELY witnessed and proven. A PECULIAR AND HITHERTO UNKNOWN SCIENCE APPEARS. This science may thoroughly examine the legalities of the touching act from the character of this act, therefore, immediately and without the help of the parallel "viewing act." THIS ASCERTAINMENT IS IMPORTANT.

Meinong did not know, how he may distinguish his "Theory of Objects" (Gegenstandstheorie—vide § 33!) from ancient ONTHOLOGY. Now this theory is evident. Real onthology is the ESSENCEVIEWING theory of TOUCHED THINGS, but "Theory of Objects" ESSENCIVIEWING theory of VIEWED THINGS. In the fifth chapter I will both theories unite in the whole touching and viewing essenceviewing of the world and life. (§ 34!).

This substantiving becomes clearer the more we move from substantivification to livification, from livification to personification, from personification finally to true and genuine deification. Substantivification is the most mixed and the less expressive substantiving, deification reaches by principle beyond creation and without it would be any substantiving of this creation impossible. I connect this theory of substantiving with thoughts outlined in former chapter. I proved a similar internal way to the "merely accidental" and to "accidentally supersubstantivic" side of the world and life ("sound"—"melody"). I now ascertain the legal basical trinity of SUBSTANTIVING, VIEWING and SUPERSUBSTANTIVING: Substantiving leads to substantivic entities, viewing to accidentals, but supersubstantiving to entities of an higher order systematically built up upon accidentals. This trinity is basical for our ACTS and basical also its relation to all SENSATIONS: Substantiving is the necessary fundamental for EVALUATION, but VIEWING and SUPERSUBSTANTIVING are fundamentals for "merely accidental" and "accidentally supersubstantivic" sensation, therefore, for that sensation which we called the primary or original enjoyment.

The system of evaluation and value affords a completion. We have PASSING sensations and PASSING values: They are on the boundary between the substantive and accidental of this, to where they are intended. We have sensations which are immediately pointed but to the accidental essentiality of the world and life, but have their territory in the pertinent substantivic essence of accidentals. Remember the discussions in the second chapter. We proved the fact of a moral or normative evolution of life. This evolution is correct or incorrect, and the correct evolution is a normative evolution in the broader or in the stricter sense of the word. For example. The "external" correctness or "incorrectness" of phenomena, with which we the REALITY TOUCH or MISS, without to be for this fact responsible, has been an example for the "incorrect" normative evolution. The fact of "perception" or "error" and the fact of "good" and "evil" performances were examples for the internal correct or incorrect experience and also for the TRUE normative evolution. The difference between perception and error

is the example for the normativeness in the broader sense of the word, between good and evil life in the stricter. It is evident that also such differences present a chance of evaluations and upon them based values. We evaluate an experience which seems to be externally correct, and do not evaluate an externally incorrect experience, but still unexpressively. We evaluate more expressively the "perception" in the relation to the "error," still more a "good" deed in the relation to the "evil." In general: We evaluate the external correctness and do not evaluate the external incorrectness.

More expressely we evaluate or do not evaluate the internal correctness or incorrectness, and most expressively we evaluate or do not evaluate the internal correctness or incorrectness in the stricter sense of the word.

In any case we must keep in mind that our doing is immediately pointed to experiences, therefore, to the accidental essentiality of life. In spite of this I call this sensation an evaluation, it would be an evaluation which is not a real substantivic sensation.

There is the question, if someone evaluates or does not evaluate the "experience," not about that, who has the experience. We evaluate "perceivable" and do not evaluate "halucinatorious" representations, furthermore, we evaluate or do not evaluate "thoughts," if we are of the meaning that they are "perceptions" or "errors," but also "sensations" and "aspirations," which appear to us as an experiencing reflex of the personal goodness or wickedness. I call these evaluations "transpassing" evaluations, but I call them evaluations, because such sensations would be impossible, if we should not be capable of the SUBSTANTIVIC consideration of the world and life. We do not evaluate perceivable representations THEMSELVES and refute halucinatorious, but thus evaluates or does not evaluate this, who has such representations. Important is the ascertainment that the representation "itself" is neither perceivable nor halucinatorious, but becomes so in regard to this, who represents to him something. The external correctness or incorrectness of the experience is not an image of the experience, but any experience can be externally correct or incorrct only with regard to somebody, who has it, only as HIS experience: My

"perceivable" representation does not deceive ME, but my "halucinatorious" deceives ME. A characteristic speciality of this grade of the development of life is that for the external correctness or nicorrectness of the experience we do not make responsible that, who has the experience: His perceivable representtaion is only for him "perceivable," but is not HIS merit, and his halucinatorious representation is only for him "halucinatorious," but is not HIS fault.

We must in this sense also say that this first step of the real moral or normative experiencing development does not characterize the real "self-giving" of that, who has the experience. Therefore is the positive or negative evaluation of this experience a first gradually transpassing positive or negative evaluation: It is an evaluation, because the main emphasis is on the substantivic essentiality of life, it is a transpassing evaluation, because it is immediately pointed to the experience, to the accidental essentiality of life, and it is a first gradually transpassing evaluation, because it is by its quality less expressive.

We can now better understand the essence of the transpassing evaluation of the SECOND and THIRD degree. The transpassing positive and negative evaluation of the SECOND grade leads to "perception" and "error": It is an evaluation, because perception and error are built up on the self-giving of that, who "perceives" or "errs," and because, the main emphasis is on the accidental essentiality of life, it is a transpassing evaluation, because, it is by all its emphassi on the substantivic side of life immediately pointed to the experience (to "thoughts"). That there is the question about the transpassing evaluation, is a fact, which has a double meaning: First is on this evaluation the emphasis on the substantiveness of life stronger than on the first gradual transpassing evaluation, and secondly, the accidental specialities of life in this evaluation are not entirely excluded. We found that the "internal" correctness or incorrectness of "perception" and "error" is built up on the—external correctness or incorrectness of thoughts (the "internal" correctness and incorrectness of thoughts we defined as the consequence of two facts: Of the personal self-giveness and of the external correctness or incorrectness of thinking). The transpassing positive or negative evaluation

of the THIRD grade leads to sensations and aspirations, from which radiates the goodness or wickedness of this who experiences them. This is but a transpassing evaluation, because it is immediately pointed to experiences. It is a true evaluation, because it has the emphasis of the true substantivic essentiality of life. For this reason is this the highest transpassing evaluation: The internal correctness or incorrectness of the experience, to which it is immediately intended, is the clearest INTERNAL correctness which is by principle built up on the personal giveness of that who has the experience, and for which is by principle not afforded any external correctness of this experience. When we thus evaluate the experience, we evaluate it "on account" of THAT who has the experience, and anything else in the experience is of a secondary meaning. The speciality of this transpassing evaluation is confirmed by a popular expression which best strikes it. This is AGREEMENT or DISAGREEMENT.

With regard to this fact we can speak about an "agreeable" or "disagreeable" sensation, and this is all transpassing evaluation. We distinguish three kinds of agreement, in the broader, strict and strictest sense of the word. In the broader sense we agre to experiences which are merely externally correct, in the strict to experiences which are because of their external correctness internally correct, in the strictest to experiences which are by principle internally correct. Characteristic examples for the territories of agreement of the first kind are perceiving representations, for the second perceptions, for the third good deeds. All threefold agreement can mediately touch the accidental side of external things or the merely substantial substantives. In this instance coincides the agreement with the CRITICISING EVALUATION. When we with regard to value criticise some food or a picture, is this criticising the agreement with the experience of those works which have been necessary for the creation of the food or of the picture (the WORK of the cook and the WORK of the painter). About what agreement? This depends on the question, what experiences and which works had been necessary for the creation of this that we by criticism and substantially evaluate. If these works point to the external correct experience, then the criti-

cising substantial evaluation of their external effects by criticism coincides with the agreement of the first degree. If there is the question on the psychological background of these works about the internal and external correct experience, with the second degree. If this experience seems to be in principle internally correct, with the third degree. Hereby is this agreement pointed to those experiences and parallel acts which has to have anyone to perform anything thus that we can this substantially evaluate by criticism. For example. We evaluate by criticism a well prepared meal, when we are of the meaning that the cook "strok" it blindly. In this case is the evaluation by criticism of the food the faintest agreement of the work of the cook. When we think that the cook proceeded along his masterly knowledge, along the real perception, then is the criticism of the food connected with a more expressive agreement to the work.

Take a beneficial foundation which someone founded with the most humanitary intention. We evaluate this foundation by criticism and this is the most expressive and clearest criticism, the "third" special agreement to those deeds which have been necessary for the creation of that foundation.

The theory of agreement or disagreement proves thus the basical partition of the sensation in the accidental and substantivic sensation which is not an evaluation, and in the sensation which is a true valuation. Agreement and disagreement are those intermediate sensations which emphasize the substantivic sphere of the world and life, but are immediately pointed to experiences. I call them TRANSPASSING evaluations. With them correspond transpassing values: They are the transpassing positive and negative value of the external correctness or incorrectness, furthermore, the positive or negative value of such an internal correctness or incorrectness which is built up on the external correctness or incorrectness, and finally the value of the genuine internal correctness or incorrectness itself. Here also the value of the first grade in the faintest transpassing value of the second grade the more expressive and of the third grade the most expressive and clearest. With the evaluation in the broader, strict and strictest sense of the word corresponds the transpassing value in the broader, strict and strictest sense.

This fact justifies that I call the "intermediate" sensations (evaluations), although but transpassing evaluations: These sensations and to them immediately adapted values become by their qualitative specialities the more expressive, the larger and the more expressive becomes their emphasis on the SUBSTANTIVIC sphere of the world and life, it means, the more they approach the real evaluation and the true value, namely, the real substantivic sensation and the true substantivic value. With regard to the transpassing positive or negative value I add that the value of the "perceivable" or the negative value of the "halucinatorious" representation is the faintest transpassing positive or negative value, furthermore, the value of perception or the negative value of error more expressive and the moral or unmoral life of the most expressive.

With these thoughts we arrived at the expected final picture of the legal system of value and evaluation. The picture of this system is: The sensations are accidental and substantivic, pointed to the accidentals or to the substantives. The accidental sensation show the accidental value, the substantivic the substantial. The first are twofold, but accidental or accidentally supersubstantivic, it means, pointed to mere accidentals or to entities of a higher order and upon such accidentals built up entities. Only the accidental sensations show the accidental value in the stricter sense of the word, but the accidentally supersubstantivic the accidentally supersubstantivic value. "Agreeableness" is the example for the accidental value in the stricter sense of the word, "beauty" for the accidentally supersubstantivic value. The substantivic sensations are true evaluations, the substantivic values real values. We have four kinds of these evaluations and values: The substantial, life-evaluation, personal and religious evaluation and the substantial, life-value, personal and religious value.

In the psychological regard is the evaluation impressing or criticising, where is the criticising developingly built up on the impressing. In the same regard rests the evaluation on the "substantiving" of this that we evaluate, as does the accidental sensation rest on the mere "viewing," the accidentally supersubstantivic sensation on the parallel "supersubstantiving" (e. gr. forming) of this that may be-

come the territory of such a sensation. With the fourfold kinds of the evaluation corresponds a "substantiv" fourfoldness, substantivification, livification, personification and deification. This fourfoldness means that the fourfoldness of the parallel evaluation is the fourfoldness of the more genuine and expressive SUBSTANTIVIC sensation. This is immediately manifested by characteristic specialities of this and of other evaluations. Thus is the substantial and life-evaluation merely relative, it means, that both are originally and finally necessarily built up on the parallel accidental and accidentally supersubstantivic sensation.. The substantivic and life-value is merely relative, necessarily built up on the parallel accidental or accidentally supersubstantivic value. Life-valuation is personally more immediate (more intime), whilst substantivic evaluation personally remote and strange. With the common personal evaluation begins the true systematical evaluation which is by principle not more connected to any accidental or accidentally supersubstantivic sensation. Personal value is, therefore, a real systematical value. On the other side is the substantivic, life-evaluation and personal evaluation still a merely mediate evaluation, it means, that this threefold evaluation leads to pertinent substantives (to things, animals and personal subjects), because of their SPECIAL sides which are entirely different from this that we are immediately touching with such an evaluation. For this reason is the substantial, life-value and personal value merely relative, such a value which leads to substantives, but is upon them merely mediately based. Religious evaluation is the singular systematical and immediate evaluation, it means, that it is first by principle not connected to any sensation, and, secondly, that it is immediately pointed to the divine substantive, and this in every regard and by principle: What we strike with religious substantiving (deification!), this and nothing else we strike with religious evaluation. Religious value is, therefore, the singular in principle systematical and immediate value, it means, that it is not only upon God immediately based, but with Him actually synonyme. For this reason is only the religious evaluation the real singular and alone unpolar evaluation and the religious value the true singu-

lar and alone unpolar value, THE VALUE PER EMINENTIAM, THE ABSOLUTE VALUE.

The system of the accidental and substantivic sensation is finally characterized by the transpassing evaluation which has its emphasis on the substantivic side of the world and life, although it is immediately pointed to its merely accidental essentiality. We have a trinity of the transpassing evaluation which is from degree to degree more expressive, as the emphasis on the substantivic side of the world and life becomes stronger and more exclusive. In the temporarily developing regard is in account of this legal system of evaluation and value necessary to emphasize that developingly the most original is doubtlessly the accidental sensation, developingly the latest the genuine religious evaluation. We have between these boundary-lines the following evolutionary grades of sensations: Substantivic evaluation, life-evaluation, accidentally supersubstantivic sensation, more and more expressive transpassing evaluation with the first traces of the common personal, common and true personal evaluation, the first traces of the religious evaluation. *)

Concluding I mention still the main principle speciality of this system of evaluation and value, sharply distinct from the theory of my teacher Meinong. Meinong leant consciously or unconsciously upon old Spinoza and tried to divide the sensations according to the question of their immediate psychological fundamentals. *)

Meinong parted the sensations in sensations which rest upon representations or upon thoughts. This partition is evidently unsufficient and can, as we have seen, serve us only, where there is the question about the distinguishing between accidental sensation and—substantivic evaluation. Accidental sensation is built up on rational experience, whilst substantivic

*) Expressly I have to mention that the soul of the child is full of this sensation, at least in the transition to school-age. In its systematical forms is this sensation a real CHILDISH SENSATION.

*) Spinoza is from the scientific standpoint an interesting person: He desired to be but a "scholar" and has been a searcher after God. He lived for God and God changed him to nature. In the history of philosophy has its place his methaphysics and nearly forgotten in his in the scientific regard uncomparatively more valuable psychology.

evaluation upon a SPECIAL SENSATION, namely, upon accidental sensation. Meinong did not see this and, therefore, did not observe that for ANY evaluation is more important the question, TO WHAT it is pointed, than, on what experience it may by only psychologically built up. Only this "onthological" (not psychological) viewpoint helps to speak about the legal and empirically doubtlessly given fourfoldness of real evaluation, namely, as the fourfoldness of real SUBSTANTIVIC SENSATION. Meinnong's psychological viewpoint would us just on this point disappoint. We have seen that common personal evaluation does at least not in principle afford any sensitive psychological fundamentals. This Meinong's psychological viewpoint has been in essence known to many older phylosophers, to Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. But these two thinkers employ in our question the "subjective" viewpoint and proceed in a central route. Such a route has been our route. We detected even in the first place the real psychological background of evaluation and value, but just in this way we observed that for the true understanding of all sensations and all values is more important the unpsychological objective and, therefore, the real onthological nature of the world and life. This is the accidentally substantivic essentiality of creation and this essentiality assisted us to arrive at the legal system of valuation and value.

28. Other specialities of the system of value. From value to God.

The system of evaluation and value appears in an internal legality, if we consider it from the viewpoint of other dependences between single evaluations and values. We have first the difference between the relative and systmatical and between the mediate and immediate value.

Let us begin with substantivic evaluation and value. This value is relative, built up on the accidental value of this, to where we ascribe it. The pear is valuable, because, it is accidentally agreeable, the picture, because, it is accidentally beautiful. There is still another conception of relative value. We ascribe to money a value, because, we attain by it other and

"by itself" valuable things. I characterized this difference already elsewhere—*)—as the difference between "self-value" and "co-value." We should not confound this difference with the difference of the picture as a relative value or of the systematical value of man. In this later difference there is the question, if the "value" of the phenomenon is connected still with values which are not real values. In the difference between "self-value" and "co-value" there is the question, if the value of the phenomenon is on another phenomenon independent or by its own essence connected with the value of the other phenomenon. The value of money is a "co-value," because it is connected with the value of food attained by money, and this value of food takes the place of self-value. The value is relative or systematical, may mean, that it is connected with other values or on them independent, or may mean, that the value of the phenomenon is connected with the value of DIFFERENT phenomena or on any such value independent. The first relativeness or systemness of value I call INTERNAL, the second EXTERNAL, because, in the first case there is the question about the difference on the one and same territory of the value, whilst in the second is always effected the transition from evaluation to evaluation, e. gr., the transition from the evaluation of food to the evaluation of money which is necessary for the food. If we transfer both these relativenesses or systemnesses to substantivic value, becomes evident: Substantivic value is by its own nature internally relative and there is no any internal systematical substantivic value, but merely externally relative or systematical, whereby we have to add that all externally relative substantivic values are finally built up on externally systematical substantivic values.

The value of the picture or pear is internally relative, built up on the accidental "agreeableness" of the pear and on the accidental "beauty" of the picture. But this value is at the same time an externally systematical value, because it does not demant a value of another phenomenon. Any substantivic value, is, furthermore, a mediate value, it means, it is the value of the phenomenon BY SUCH SIDES which are not with it

*) Vide "Ethics" Učiteljska tiskarna, Ljubljana, 1923.

synonyme. This fact is on the point of substantivic value evident from its internally relative character.

There is still another important conception of mediate or immediate value.

Think that creation would remain onward preserved, but all LIFE on it would suddenly disappear. In this case would many merely substantivic values remain onward preserved, those values which we ascribe to dead things. But it is evident that such values would lose any meaning. What may mean the value of an "agreeable" pear, if there is no living being which may actually enjoy and on account of his enjoyment evaluate it? Or what should mean the value of a "beautiful" landscape, if there is no one beautifully to enjoy this landscape and evaluate it? I admit that dead creation does not become valuable from life, but I can not oppose the conivction that any value has its meaning only IN REGARD TO LIFE, to which it is intended. The value of things leads to things, but becomes an actual value then, when it becomes the value for some life. We must speak about a mediateness of substantivic value which gets its meaning from life. Life-value is, therefore, "more immediate." We have a double mediateness or immediateness of value, and I call the first INTERNAL, the second EXTERNAL. The first leads to phenomena from sides which are from them different. The value of the phenomenon is with itself given and exhausted. The second means that the value of the phenomenon becomes "real" from the value of another phenomenon or it is independent. The first mediateness or immediateness is internal, the second external.

We have this mediateness or immediateness not to confound with the former internal or external relativeness and systemness of value. This fact is very well evident in the PERSONAL value, in "goodness." Personal value is first an internal and external systematical value: It is not connected with accidental personal values and does not represent only some "means." On the other side it is an internally and externally mediate value": Goodness is not personality and gets its real meaning because of the singular-religious goodness.

We return to the first and lowest member of the system of values, to substantivic value. Substantivic value is internally

exclusively relative, but externally relative or systematical, furthermore, exclusively internally and externally mediate, the most mediate. It is by principle connected with accidental values and presents some means or some intention. It leads, secondly, to its territory mediately and gets its meaning because of territories which are not more territories of the substantivic value. If we compare it with life-value, we see that this later is internally relative, externally relative or systematical and internally mediate, but has the character of a comparatively less external mediateness and a larger external immediateness. Life-value is necessarily built up on parallel "experiencivic values," and represents only some means or a purpose. Cattle represents to the farmer some means, sometimes also a purpose. We have seen in the former section that life-value is not life, but is such a value because of which gets the substantivic value its meaning. Life-value gives a "sense" and a "proof" to "other," "lower" values. Substantivic value is, therefore, in our system the first and lowest value, life-value the second and and immediately higher value.

I pass over to the discusion of PERSONAL VALUE, as it is verified in "goodness" and "wickedness." In our system this is the first value which has the character of the internal systematical value. It is by principle not connected with any accidental (experiencivic) value, moreover, it is the condition for experiencivic values, especially for transpassing life-values. Secondly, personal value is in the system of values the first value which is by its own nature externally systematical and not only relative. I remind here Kant's deep sentence that "man should be only the purpose and never but the means." For example. Goodness may represent some means and represents them in regard to this, whom it "serves." But goodness is always and necessarily to itself the purpose.

This is evident from the sentence that the value of our deeds conforms to our purpose (intention), but not to their actual and external "effect." Personal value has thus the character of the internal and externally systematical value. On the other side is from former sections evident that the (common) personal value is still an internally mediate value. For this fact we understand that the personal value is still very different,

positive or negative, larger or smaller, systemized by environments. It is always an internally mediate value. But with this internal mediateness is connected a very large external immediateness. We said formerly that the substantivic value gets its sense and proof from the life-value, thus we can say that both, the substantivic and life-value, get "finally" their sense and proof from the—PERSONAL VALUE. The reader may best see the evidence of this fact, if he abstracts from all dead and living creation the "personal," "human" life upon it. It is true that to the outside would remain all substantivic and life-value, but these values would not be rediated with that splendor actually given to them by the fact of essentially human, personal life and with this fact indissolubly united fact of CIVILIZATION upon earth. I see in this fact the true meaning of the thought that man is the "crown" of creation. What would mean to us men the substantivic and life-delight without—love, and what all substantivic and life-value without parallel—personal goodness? The personal value has the character of some external immediateness, although is this immediateness not yet final and perfect and has the place of the third and highest value: It is internally and externally immediate and surpasses the substantivic and life-value by its external immediateness. The last fact means that the life-value is in its sense and meaning dependent on the personal value, and that, therefore, "MERE LIFE IS NOT AT ALL A MAIN VALUE."

RELIGIOUS VALUE! This value has alone the general character of a real and perfect mediateness, it is the singular internally and externally systematical and immediate value. This is thoroughly proven by former discussions about religious value, it means, about HOLINESS. It is not connected with any value, most genuine, such a substantivic value which does not allow any distinction between substantiveness and some accidentalness, the value of the absolute substantive, by principle outside of any accidentalness. Religious value is the singular "ideal" internal systematical value and can not represent some means, but has exclusively the role of purpose, of the singular main purpose of the world and life. To take God as some means, would commonly means to "personificate" or even to "substantivificate" Him. A "god" thus concived is not GOD,

and can not be the territory neither of adoration nor worship, not the seat of religious value, the seat of genuine holiness. It is the singular value, the "self-value" and can never have the place of a "co-value," by its nature exclusively externally and internally systematical. The relation of religious value to its territory is the relation of absolute immediateness which does not allow any distinction between God Himself and some "special" holiness, it leads immediately to its territory and is by its territory and own essence entirely embraced and exhausted. The internal immediateness lifts the religious value above all common personal value and demands that we call it the singular and the singular unpolar value. I add that personal value becomes finally and entirely proven from religious value. We said that delight would mean nothing without parallel love, substantivic value nothing without life-value, life-value nothing without personal goodness. So we must say that genuine love would mean nothing without prayer and genuine goodness nothing without divine holiness.

I am on this point in accord with great thinkers of last centuries. These thinkers are also of the opinion and conviction that there is FINALLY for man of no meaning ethical or moral life as long as this life is not concentrated on faith in God and on the acknowledgment of singular divine holiness. This holiness gives—"sanctificyies"— everything, the entire world and the entire life ,also all personal effecting of man. *)

Modern humanity should ponder about these thoughts, if it may not be lost like the foam on the water. Without religious value would remain all other values without their "final" proof, weight and meaning. Religious value has the character of internal and external systemness and of internal and external immediateness.

We have in the system of value between single points important dependences. Any "relativeness" is built up on the

*) Vide St. Augustine. Remember the two main commendments in the Gospel, the "FIRST AND THE GREATEST" which puts upon us the love of GOD, and the "SECOND AND ALIKE to IT" which obliges us to the love of OUR NEIGHBOR. Thus we are instructed by the Gospel that the love of our neighbor (common personal evaluation) becomes by the love of God (by religious evaluation) sanctificated and gets its meaning.

"systemness" and any "mediateness" on the "immediateness." The relativeness depends on the systemness, the mediateness on the immediateness. This legality means that the internally or externally relative values depend on the internally or externally systematical and the internally or externally mediate values on the internally or externally immediate. Substantivic and life-values depend on the personal, internal relative on the internally systematical value, substantivic and "life-covalues" on the substantivic and "life-covalues," externally relative value on the externally systematical, substantivic, life-values and personal values on the singular religious value, internally mediate value on the internally systematical, finally, substantivic values on life-values, substantivic and life-values on the personal and substantivic, life-values and personal values on the singular religious value, externally mediate value on the externally immediate.

The whole system of values is built up on—religious value and this value is the necessary and principle system of values.

This fact is astonishing. We came in the psychological regard to the REVERSE ORDER. We have that in the temporally developing regard is substantivic value the most original, religious value the latest. We have, therefore, to speak still about the legal REVERSE RELATION between the "empirically psychological" and the "analythically objective" conception of value. This fact does not in any regard destroy the system of value, because the first, the psychological conception, touches empirically given evaluations, the second objective values: With the empirical order of evaluations corresponds the REVERSE analythical order of values. Religious value is the single and singular ANALYTHICAL SYSTEM of all values. I emphasize of "all values," because we considered from such viewpoints only real "values" and not accidental and transpassing values. Accidental values and may they be "merely accidental" (e. gr., agreeableness) or "accidentally supersubstantivic" (e. gr., beauty), as also all transpassing values have the character of DEPENDENT values. Accidental and accidentally supersubstantivic values are dependent, because, their territories belong to "dependent entities." We know from the third chapter that accidentalness depends on substantiveness, super-

substantiveness on accidentalness, finally again on substantiveness itself. Substantiveness is the system of all accidentalness and all supersubstantiveness, and without substantiveness would be accidentalness and supersubstantivenes a nothingness. "Color itself" gets, e. gr., ITS essential meaning in the relation to "colored thing." This is true also for "picture itself" which would become a nothingness, if we would abstract "colors themselves" and along them all "colored things." Accidental and accidentally supersubstantivic values are by principle SUBSTANTIVELY DEPENDENT. The same is true also in the realm of transpassing values. We have seen that these are but values of EXPERIENCE which have the character of such or a different "correctness." Experiences belong to accidental entities which would disappear into nothingness without pertinent substantivenesses, namely, without SUBJECTS. Transpassing values belong by principle to "substantively dependent" values. The singular religious value is, therefore, the principle objective system of ALL VALUES and not only of all evaluations.

To make this singular place of religious value clearer, I consider this system of two viewpoints. The first touches the POLARITY OF VALUE, therefore, the "positive and negative value" in the stricter sense of the word. We observe the fact that positive and negative value are on single points of the system not in the same relation. Take substantivic value. On this point is the relation of the positive to the negative value equal to the reverse relation of the negative to the value. We can not spak about a "priority" of the positive member to the negative. We have things which seems to be valuable then nonvaluable, but it is impossible to assert that the negative value of such things would be to the value of such or different things somehow "subjected." Positive and negative value are on an equal "hight." This fact is psychologically proven, as far as "valuation" has no principle "priority" before negative evaluation: The question, if we something substantially positively or negatively evaluate, depends only on the question, if this is still the source of parallel positive or negative primary sensation.

Quite different is this situation on the point of life-evaluation. Here has positive life-evaluation some "priority" before negative: We evaluate life and "do not evaluate it" only along

special conditions. We regard self-murderers as sickly people, because, they sin against the systematical principle that life is primarily something self-valuable, and we can only from this view of this systematical and primary value of life this life from instance to instance negatively evaluate.

Upon this fact rests the erroneous thought that life itself is the "value of all values." The thought is wrong, but its sound essence is in the characteristic "primacy" of positive value of life before its negative.

Still clearer and more expressive is this on personal value, on the point of good and evil. "EVIL" IS BY ITS ESSENCE THE OMISSION OF GOOD and by principle we could conceive a personal life in which would be realized everything "good," whilst there is impossible a conception of life in which would be realized everything "evil." "Evil" is destructing and destroying itself and the conception of "evil itself" is synonyme with the conception of an impossible system of deeds. *)

Parallely with this fact has love a doubtless priority before hatred: Man does but "love," special reasons incline him to hate. "Evil" is by its own essence but the "downfall" from "good," hatred by its own psychological essence but the downfall from love. Personal value is by its own essence something "primary," negative personal value something "secondary." The primacy of positive personal value is the higher the more immediate is its "personal" character: Rationality (which is, as we know, connected with the external correctness of experience) has a characteristic primacy before "unrationality" (any man is a rational being), but essentially larger is this primacy on a "good" man, because, goodness is the most genuine reflex of personal effecting. Personal value is primary, negative personal value secondary and this relation is here more expressive than on the poinf of life-value. Religious value is as the single UNPOLAR value OUTSIDE of any negative reflex. The primacy of religious value does by its own nature not permit any "downfall."

In the first chapter we have been speaking about an

*) Evil is possible but because of good, EVIL ITSELF only because of GOOD ITSELF. The idea of "devil" supposes the idea OF GOD.

"equal" and "unequal" doubleness of the world and life. The doubleness is represented in "positiveness" and "negativeness." The doubleness is equal, when both its members are in the same relation. The system of values is also a system of doublenesses which become along the starting "equality" more and more "unequal" till they unite on the point of avsolute UNIFORM value. Positive and negative substantivic value are equally doublefold values. Positive and negative life-value are "less" equal and more "unequal" values, whilst the unequality becomes in positive and negative personal value more and more expressive and finally "internally essential" (good—evil). Religious value is the single uniform value. We can better understand this important fact, if we remember the addition to the distinction between equal and unequal doubleness which we expressed in the sentence: The fact of unequal twofold entities requests a single UNIFORM entity which would belong to the place of the first "positive" member. Religious value is such an entity which we have to request already with regard to the doubtlessly given unequally twofold contrast to remaining values, especially between good and evil. The unequal doubleness of positive and negative life-value is still quite hiden and more psychologically also substantially based. But the contrast between good and evil is a contrast of true substantial unequal twofoldness and any such contrast affords a member which can such contrasts substantially "balance" and "remove." This contrast between good and evil is balanced on the point of religious value, on the point of true and genuine holiness. Holiness is a value with no immediate contrast, but considered from the viewpoint of twofold values, of good and evil, has the character of positive value (of "absolute good"). We ascertained that with "reality" and "nonreality," with twofold reality, is given the request for—PRIMEREALITY as the singular and uniform reality. Thus is with the empirically given positive and negative value, with "good" and "evil" given the request for—PRIMEVALUE as the singular and uniform value. Primevalue and religious value are one and the same.

The system of values allows a completion which concerns some astonishing and thoroughly legal "accumulation of value." What I mean with this accumulation shows substantivic and im-

mediately higher life-value. The relation is that life-value includes substantivic value, but not vice versa. This is a matter of fact. Living beings have by all means the value of common things, but mere things have not the life-value. We know also that we have phenomena, if we substantially evaluate them, to "substantivificate," and if we may evaluate them by life (life-evaluation) to "livificate." This is in the entire strictness only then the case, when we ascend from substantivic to life-evaluation, and not then, when we associate substantivic evaluation with life-evaluation: Things we have to "vivificate," when we evaluate them by life-evaluation, but living beings we may evaluate by life-evaluation or substantively. Primarily we evaluate living beings by life-evaluation, but this life-evaluation may incline us to evaluate living beings as we primarily evaluate dead things. This relation is still clearer on the point of personal evaluation. Personal value includes life-value and substantivic value, but not vice versa. PERSONAL life is LIFE and includes anything what may be personally valuable. But personal life may have in unnumerable examples the meaning of mere things: "Laborer" may be to the "enterpriser" a machine, real "goodness" can only "benefit," real "evil" only "hurt." There are cases, where this benefiting and hurting originates from merely substantivic natural phenomena (e. gr., from a "beneficial" rain or "anihilating" tempest). This relation is psychologically proven. Experiences show that we may evaluate personal beings (men) personally, but also by life or substantively. Primarily we love or hate "man," but many times we may be but "delighted" or "sadened" about him, as we are primarily delighted or sadened about natural phenomena. This may happen in two forms, if we "substantivificate" man that he becomes a mere "things" (thus proceed, alas, many enterprisers with their workers), or that we evaluate him merely substantively and not personally. The substantivic value can include the lifevalue, and by no means the personal value, because we have to "personificate" anything that we may personally evaluate. "Accumulated" values are psychologically based, but their immediate meaning is the unpsychological accumulation of values. The psychological side means that to any point of the system of values is immediately adapted the

"touching substantiving," as it is given with "substantivification," "vivification," "personification," and "deification."

Only to the substantivic, lifesubstantivification, personal and religious "substantivification" is immediately adapted the substantivic, life-evaluation, personal and religious "evaluation," BUT THUS that any higher substantivification is the natural legal fundamental for all lower evaluations. "Livification" is the indispensable condition for life-evaluation and the sufficient fundamental for substantivic evaluation. "Personification" is the indispensable condition for personal evaluation, and the sufficient fundamental for life-evaluation and substantivic evaluation. Religious substantivification (deification) is the indispensable condition for religious evaluation, and ITSELF also the sufficient fundamental for remaining evaluation, for all evaluations in general.

With this psychological legality corresponds the more important unpsychological legality, therefore, the legality OF VALUE, which means, that we distinguish four degrees of value: Substantivic, life-evalue, personal and religious value, but that in this fourfoldness is any HIGHER value ITSELF AS MUCH as all lower values: Life value has itself the place of the substantivic value, personal value the place of life value and substantivic value etc. The final and highest, the religious value, has, therefore, the place of ALL OTHER values: Religious value is the VALUE OF ALL VALUES.

I finished with this discussion the preparations which have been necessary for the effective start on the way OF VALUE to the acknowledgment of the divine essence. Two points characterize this way: The legal place of religious evaluation and the legal place of religious value. The specialities of religious evaluation are: Developingly considered in this evaluation the highest and finally the human evaluation. Normatively (morally) considered it is the basical and originating human evaluation, because it gives to all human evaluation its "real and final" meaning.

The specialities of religious value are: This is by principle the hgihest point of the system of values, which is for this reason the ponit of the singular, unpolar, in any regard independent, therefore, systematically basical and finally of such a

value, which holds especially for the fact that it is ITSELF both, the CONDITION for all values and the VALUE of all values.

There is no doubt that the way of value to God is necessary and possible. I am of the opinion that with these discussions is repelled the objection raised by critics that we can not deduct the ACTUAL essence of God from only SENSITIVE relations to Him. I do not discuss sensitive relations, but deal with LEGAL ACTUAL relations which correspond with LEGAL ACTUAL relations on the point of values, as also on the point of ANY VALUABLE THING. My way to God is not the way of wishes or seemingnesses, as I would wish that there should be a God, or as it would seem to me that there could be a God, as we wish many things and many things seem to be valuable. Just to the contrary. I deduct in this chapter the actual essence of God from the ACTUAL value. Without this actual value would all remaining—generally acknowledged and from nobody denied value of the world and life disappear into nothingness.

I have nothing against criticism, but I have to request from it that it may not burden me with thoughts I never expressed.

29. Value proves the primereality of God.

The fundamental PSYCHOLOGICAL background of my proof is in the speciality of religious evaluation. It is a double one. Religious evaluation is developingly and systematically the highest evaluation, with which becomes the line of all evaluations EXTERNALLY TEMPORALLY and INTERNALLY MEANINGLY concluded. Keep in mind that religious evaluation is a real EVALUATION, a real substantivic sensation, the most expressive and genuine. It takes amongst all evaluations the first place, has the first rank of "justification." We evalue thing, we should not, evaluation is often "erroneous." It is in any case erroneous? Is there anything that should not be, could not be the theme of evaluation?

We evaluate things, living beings, human persons. With this trinity corresponds doubtlessly the trinity of actual things, living beings and persons, therefore, actual entities, to where is any evaluation immediately pointed. With the psychological trinity of evaluations corresponds the unpsychological trinity of

the pertinent substantivenesses. We may in many cases "err" and evaluate phenomena which are not substantives. Many evaluate personally animals, "personificate" them and proceed as it would be justified only towards our neighbor. Single cases do not refute the fact that things, living beings and persons are ACTUALLY realized and that we have ACTUAL ENTITIES which we touch, when we evaluate them. Remove all actual things, living beings and human persons and any real evaluation disappears. What holds for substantivic, life- and personal evaluation, holds the more for religious evaluation. Who could be of the opinion that only the religious evaluation would be that evaluation, which would be in single cases and in principle erroneous, therefore, in regard to the question of the actual essence OF ITS territory in principle unjustified? Religious evaluation belongs to the system of evaluations, it is empirically given as all remaining valuations and even the empirical appex of all evaluations. Consequently, there can be no doubt that there hold for the religious evaluation with regard to its "territorial justification" EVERYTHING that we have to adjudge to remaining evaluations. It would be impossible and meaningless, if we should not speak about the actual essence OF ITS territory. God only is and can be the immediate territory of the religious evaluation and this is true in such a degree that this evaluation rests necessarily on the parallel deification of its territory. The actual essence of God follows in principle from the psychological fact of religious evaluation. As the actual psychological trinity of the substantivic, life- and personal evaluation warrants in principle by itself the unpsychological trinity of dead things, living beings and human persons, so warrants the psychological fact of religious evaluation in principle the unpsychological fact of God. As long as we consider the religious evaluation only from such general viewpoints, we must admit that "in single cases" it can be "erroneous," namely, the evaluation of an imaginated, but not also of an actual God. In the sense of us already known facts would be this "idolatrous" religious evaluation which rests on the deification of facts which are not divine entities. This errorness is not and can not be in principle. To the contrary. All such erroneous religious evaluation preserve THEIR real meaning

only, when we consider them from the view of religious evaluation, which is territorially justified. That worship turns to idolatry, are two things necessary: First that it rests on a substantially unjustified deification, secondly, that THERE IS GIVEN THE POSSIBILITY OF REAL WORSHIP, namely, the worship of That Whom substantially touches deification and but deification. We said that the possibility of delight and love would be impossible and meaningless, if there would not be a delight and love which leads to actual nature and personal life. "Erroneous" religious evaluations are alike conditioned by religious evaluation which leads to the actual entity of the divine essence, or they become impossible and meaningless. Real, territorially justified delight and love proceeds before territorially unjustifid delight and love. ALIKE PROCEEDS REAL, TERRITORIALLY JUSTIFIED WORSHIP BEFORE—IDOLATRY. The psycholical fact of religious evaluation, worship and adoration, testifies in principle for the actual essence of God.

This testification becomes still more expressive from all specialities of religious evaluation which lifts it unexampled above all evaluations. There is its SINGULAR character. Three things become clear: Religious evaluation is the singular evaluation of a—singular entity and the singular showing of a like—singular value. It is the singular by principle immediate evaluation, whose territory is it itself by its shown value and vice versa ("God" and "Holiness" is substantially one and the same!). It is for both reasons by its own nature the singular unpolar, uniform evaluation which excludes any negative affix of its essence. This singularity means that it must be by principle territorially entirely "justified," CORRECT. The mentioned occasionaly errorness of remaining evaluations originates first and finally from the most important parallel circumstance that these evaluations are not singular, but MANIFOLD, manifold by territory, immediate territory, by the relation to this territory and by the own psychological essentiality. We have different things, living beings and men, and the fact is thus justified that our evaluation may be in single cases at one's pleasure erroneous.

There is the further question, how we positively or negatively evaluate things, living beings and men, or on which and

what lines. All this disappears on religious evaluation. The question is here about the single and singular territory of this evaluation, about the single and by principle immediate relation to its territory and about the one and the same real evaluation, namely, about the one and the same real worship and adoration. Where from may appear some "erroneous" religious evaluation, a "downfall" from actual standing? The fact of idolatrous religious evaluation does not mean anything. The errorness is merely EXTERNAL and OCCASIONAL. The speciality of the idolater is but in external occasions which loosen in him the religious evaluation. Idolater seemingly religiously evaluates, say, dead things, because these are for him an external motive for religious evaluation of the SINGULAR ENTITY, for worship and adoration OF GOD.

Take the case of the historical idolater of the "golden calf." This idolater did in all probality not experience genuine religious, but one of the intermediate religious evaluations. The fact of that idolater can not serve as an objection against my assertion that genuine religious evaluation has by principle the character of unconditioned territorial justification. I do not exclude the possibility that such an idolater may have experienced occasionally and in single moments a genuine religious evaluation. For such a case I maintain my systematical assertion that such an evaluation of the idolater has been by its own nature, therefore, necessarily the evaluation of the singular divine essence and not of a livificated or personificated "calf": Calf disappeared before the eyes of the idolater and he "put" into his place the SAME singular entity, to which alone is intended genuine religious evaluation.

The reader may better understand this most important fact, if I add: Real worship and adoration is by ITS OWN NATURE worship and adoration OF GOD and of nothing else. For genuine religious evaluation is not only true that it rests upon a "deification" of its territory, but this deification is in principle "effective" and ACTUALLY justified. Remaining evaluation rests on a substantivification of this that we evaluate, but on THIS evaluation is substantivification a "touching" or a erroneous MISTAKE. Religious substantivification adapted to genuine religious evaluation is in advance TOUCHING and not

any mistake, it means, that the psychological fact of religious evaluation is ITSELF a sufficient warrant for the — actual essence of God. *)

The third affix of the psychological proof is in the relation of religious to remaining evaluation.

We ascertained that substantivic, life-evaluation and personal evaluation GETS BY RELIGIOUS EVALUATION its real and final valuable place, its real meaning. Religious evaluation gives to any evaluation the character of some deep "normative" or "moral" anchorage. What may mean substantivic delight without real life-rejoicing, what life-rejoicing without love and what love without prayer? Religious evaluation has the character of teh singular deep and final normatively moral basis of any evaluation in general: Without it would any evaluation in spite of its perfection and justification remain mutilated and unconcluded, and this mutilation would touch its FINAL PLACE IN THE SYSTEM OF EVALUATION. On this points opens the unbridgeable abyss between the former "heathen" and the following "christian" viewing of the world and life. Heathen world ascribes to evaluation the possibility of a "final" OWN conclusion, whilst christian world asserts that THIS conclusion is possible only because of—religious evaluation. I add that only this christian conception of the world and life is phychologically based and justified. If remaining evaluation gets by religious evaluation the final own proof, then it can not be in principle erroneous and unjustified. We may assert something the like in given cases about remaining evaluation, but only "in single cases," not by principle. Religious evaluation gives to any evaluation the meaning, it must be BY PRINCIPLE also territorially correct, justified. Herewith is given the third and mediate psychological proof that any denying of the actual essence of God would be the denying of—empirically actual and undisputable religious evaluation.

The fundamental UNPSYCHOLOGICAL background of my proof is not in the speciality of religious evaluation, but of religious value. Three grades of proofs by value of the divine

*) He, who really prays, knows that God exists and he, who does not admit God, can not pray!

primereality are possible. Religious value is first a real substantivic value, the most expressive and the absolute substantivic value. For this value holds anything that is true for any substantivic value, for all values. These values may be "in single cases" unactual, may not value and we should not admit them. But this is not true by principle, because we have doubtlessly actual values, valuable substantivic, life-values and personal values. It does not matter, if we can the value in any single case undisputably ascertain or not. There are two facts: The fact of things, living beings and persons and the fact of valuable things, valuable living beings and valuable persons. Both facts are also in accordance with the psychological fact that evaluations are, although not in all single cases, in principle correct and territorially justified. This must be true also for religious value, which is the highest substantivic value. It must be in principle actual, valuable, therefore, warrant itself the actual essence of its territory of God.

Secondly, from the known specialities of religious value is evident that it is the single value which actually BY PRINCIPLE exists, IN PRINCIPLE values and only values. These specialities are: It is the singular value, the value of the singular essence and the singular immediate value which is outside of any contrast, outside of any contrast to its territoriness. Such and only such a value can by its own nature not be different, it must be actual, true. Here also we may ask: Wherefrom may appear the possibility of some unactual, unvaluable religious value, if this value is BY ITS OWN NATURE the singularly immediate singular value of the singular essence?

Thirdly, we are acquainted with the religious value as with the principle essentially analythical and normatively moral SYSTEM of values. Only thus is possible that all remaining values are actual or unactual, value or do not value. Not so with religious value which has to be as the single principle system of value only an actual, only a valuable value. The valuableness of religious value excludes in advance any negative valuableness. I call it the real "uniform" value or the PRIMEVALUE: It is as primevalue the single primevaluable value. Religious value is, therefore, the undisputable proof for the

actual essence of God, because it is the singular primevaluable SUBSTANTIVIC value.

I can give a briefer form of the proof by value. The actual essence of God follows from actual religious evaluation and to its nature immediately adapted religious value. Genuine religious evaluation is by its own nature and as the moral system of all remaining evaluations necessarily territorially correct. Genuine religious value is by its own nature and as the essential and moral system of all remaining values necessarily the value of the actual, therefore, primeactual substantive. This proof is synonyme with the proof for the PRIMEREALITY of God. Religious value is the singular PRIMESUBSTANTIVIC value. The substantial meaning of these expressions has been cleared up in the discussions of former chapters. Primereality is the primesubstantiveness and primepersonality and vice versa. My argument of the actual essence of God, built up on religious (primesubstantivic) evaluation(namely, on adoration and worship and built up on religious (primesubstantivic) value, namely, on holiness, is, therefore, the argument for the evidence of the—primereality of God.

I may on this place add the conception of divine essence which has the character of some figurative value from reasons outlined in former chapters.

Our viewpoint of value allows a threefold conception of God. This threefold conception points to a trinity by value of divine Logos, Etos and Nomos and of Primesubstantiveness, Primegiveness and Primeliberty. For this purpose we have to approach the THREEFOLD nature of religious value. This value has first the ESSENTIAL character of the singular PRIMEVALUE, it means, religious value is by its own nature, without regard to the question, TO WHOM we ascribe it, as the VALUE PER EMINENTIAM. Secondly, it has the SUBSTANTIVIC character of singular PRIMEVALUABLENESS, it means, religious value and That, to whom alone we should and can ascribe it, are actually and substantially THE ONE AND THE SAME. Thirdly, it has the PROVING character of singular PRIMEEVALUATION, it means, religious value is the "onthological" and "moral" system of all values. From this reason appears the religious value in the light of such a prime-

valuation ,along which gets everything else, all creation its final place by value and its final meaning by value. Religious value is real, genuine "holiness." From this viewpoint can we its threefold character express as follows: God appears in the light of "holiness itself," in the light of "alone holy" and in the light of "alone sanctificying." GOD—HOLINESS, GOD—HOLY, GOD—SANCTIFICATOR is that trinity of value, which corresponds with the trinity of Logos, Etos and Nomos and with the trinity of Primesubstantiveness, Primegiveness and Primeliberyt. God "Holiness" is God "Logos," because the question is here about God as the singular ESSENTIAL origin of any value. God "Holiness" is God "Primesubstantiveness," because the question is again about God as the singular PRIMESUBSTANTIVIC origin of any value. God "Holy" is God "Etos," because the question is about God as the singularly ACTUAL PRIMETERRITORY of any value. God "Holy" is synonyme with God "Primegiveness," because the question is about God as the singularly PRIMEGIVING origin of any value. God "Sanctificator" is finally God "Nomos," because the question is about God as the singular origin of any final "valuableness" of value, therefore, also of all final LEGALITY of value. God "Sanctificator" is God "Primeliberty," because the question is about God as the singularly PRIMEFREE origin of all "legadity" of value. *)

I may repeatedly state that I ascribe to these final thoughts about the internal essence of God only the character of some merely "figurative" thoughts. These thoughts do not and can not mean any really IMMEDIATE viewing of God and His nature. Such a viewing is for any reason which is not the "divine reason" excluded. The more mean these thoughts a special consideration of God FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF ALL THIS THAT IS FOR US IMMEDIATELY ACCESSIBLE. There is here the question about the relation of "value" to its own "territory" and about the relation of "value to the value," briefly, about relations, as we find them in the system of all REMAINING values, and as we can with our human perceiving

*) I think herewith about that "sensivic" graduation which means that substantivic values get their real sense from life-values, these from personal and all personal from religious values.

powers entirely immediately observe them. Only then, when we transfer these immediately given relations to the—divine essence itself, we arrive entirely naturally at the threefoldness by value of the divine nature. Is this last step actually justified? At least one reason speaks for this justification. This reason is given with the known principle of "unfinalness" or "undefiniteness" of all the mentioned relations, as we can immediately observe them. My last step is, therefore, the substantially founded request of the actual perfection of something not final with something—final and of of something not concluded with something—concluded. My step is by no means merely figurative, but holds SUBSTANTIALLY by the most systematical exioms of logics and of all remaining scientific endeavoring. Figurative are these thoughts as far as they immediately speak about the finalness ITSELF and definiteness ITSELF. With other words: Our reason affords from us the doubtless duty that we ACKNOWLEDGE besides all not final and not concluded things, and this in first place, also still something that is final and concluded. But in advance is and remains in vain any endeavor that we COULD THIS THAT IS FINAL LIKE FINALLY UNDERSTAND.

I conclude this chapter with the repeated ascertainment that I refuse the "objection" mentioned at the conclusion of the former section against my special proof of the primereality of God by value, it means, that I try to deduct some reality only from the fact that we wish and aspire this reality. To the contrary.

My argument rests upon SUBSTANTIAL LEGALITIES of all evaluations and all values, especially upon the substantial legalities of religious evaluation and religious value.

CHAPTER V.

FROM ESSENCEVIEWING TO GOD.

30. Essentiality in relation to reality, valuation, personality and value.

Before we start on the essenceviewing way, we must consider legal connections of the essentiality with systematical specialities of the world and life, with reality, valuation, personality and value. We encounter an internal connection between essentiality, reality and valuation. This connection has two directions. We treat the essentiality of phenomena then, when we have before us phenomena that are real or of actual value. The naturalist shows the essentiality of nature, because he shows real and not imagined natural phenomena. The mathematician shows the essentiality of different numerical and quantitative relations, because he deals in principle with valuable relations. As far as we consider the "essence" and "essentiality" from such viewpoints, we agree that phenomena and relations are essential, because they are real or have value. The artist will from such viewpoints scarsely present to us the essentiality of the world and life. The artist pictures the world and life as it really does not exist, or it is not necessary for him to copy nature and life. This conception of the essentiality is generally common. We are accostumed to say that the essentiality of phenomena approaches he, who treads the road of reality and valuation, and is not led by phenomena which do not exist anywhere. The sober realist graps better essentiality of the world than the dreaming idealist, who struts amongst stars and falls upon a stone on the street. This conception is well known to theory and directly the systematical mover of old and new "positivism" which asserts that anything is a nothingness, if it

is not real or has no value. We expressed similar thoughts in the first and second chapter. We said that reality and valuation are those facts which alone give to anything in the world its essentaiality and the necessary distance from nothingness. Our discussions are by no means "positivistic" and this fact shall become clearer in the course of the discussions of this chapter. We are, therefore, justified to have a distinct conception of essentiality, whereby is the point of reality and valuation the point of some expressive "essentiality."

There exists a different conception of essentiality which seems to be contrary to the mentioned conception. It is an acquisition of modern times, and to my teacher Meinong goes the credit that we can to-day not deny it. It seems even that with this new conception is given the REAL conception of essentiality. Meinong asserts that we strike the real and genuine essence of phenomena then, when we consider phenomena THEMSELVES and do not care, if they are real or value. For example. The "essence" of a stone or of "Fountain of Youth" has nothing to do with the fact that the first is real, the second unreal. This essence is that property of the stone and "Fountain of Youth," which has the first without regard to this that it is real, and which has the second without regard to this that it is not real. Meinong would this his conception improve with thoughts which we expressed in another connections in the first and second chapter: Reality and valuation do not decide the question, WHAT are phenomena, but in reality and valuation matters only the question, IF phenomena ARE (exist) and if phenomena VALUE. When we ask about the essence of phenomena, we ask, WHAT are these phenomena, but not, IF they exist or value. From the viewpoint of such a conception of essentiality we would have to say that there is the task of the artist to give us the real essence of the world and life. The artist describes the world and life as he looks upon them, it means, without regard, if all this is also real and values. We came pretty near to such an appearance of the essentiality. We asserted that there is in reality and valuation not the question about any "what" on phenomena, but only about some "how." This we proved psychologically, when we said that phenomena are "represented to us" or "viewed," but that we only STRIKE

reality and valuation. We parted the universe into reality and valuation and anything that is "real" and "valuable."

The second conception of the essentiality asserts that the essentiality leads to phenomena "themselves," therefore, without regard to their reality or valuation. Thinkers in this realm assert even that we can only on the fundamental of this conception speak about real essentiality there, where in advance ceases any reality and any valuation. "Fountain of Youth" which does not exist has its essentiality and also "triangular circle" which is an impossibility. He, who would ascribe to anything only as far a real essentiality, as it is real or values, would have to deny the essentiality to such unreal or even impossible phenomena. But "Fountain of Youth" and "triangular circle" are SOMETHING and not a—nothingness. *)

It seems that on the point of reality and valuation cross two conceptions of the essentiality which evidently can not be united. Is this really so? By no means! The discussions in the first and second chapter indicate the way which renders both conceptions combinable. These two conceptions are uncombinable, when we consider them from the viewpoint of extreme "positivism" and of like extreme Meinong's "ontologism." In both cases would be the essentiality SYNONYME with reality and valuation. Can we not speak about a SPECIAL reality and valuation? Remember the discussions in the first and second chapter. We said there that reality and valuation are those basical facts, without which anything would cease to be something and turn into nothingness. We did not say that we should not speak about unreal and unvaluable phenomena, but we proved that any reality and any valuation is finally built up upon reality itself and upon valuation itself. We added, furthermore, that valuations accessible to us are finally built up upon realities. Reality appeared as the characteristic original and final fundamental of nonreality, valuation and nonvaluation.

But there we could and had to distinguish between reality and valuation on the one side AND THIS THAT is real or valuable on the other. The distinction between "reality" and "real

*) This is one of the basic tenets of Meinong's "Theory of Objects."

thing" and "valuation" and "valuable thing" remained from our viewpoint PRESERVED.

There is, as a matter of fact, a twofold conception of essentiality. The two conceptions do not contradict, but support each other. We can speak about a "single or genuine" and about a "strenghtened" essentiality. The first leads to real and valuable, as also to unreal and unvaluable things, but only SO FAR AS WE IN PRINCIPLE ACKNOWLEDGE REAL AND VALUABLE PHENOMENA, the second so FAR AS THIS ESSENTIALITY IS REAL OR VALUABLE. For example. The first leads to real Mt. Washington and to any valuable equation, but also to "Mt. Washington itself" and to "equation itself," it means, without regard that Mt. Washington is real and the equation valuable. It leads, furthermore, to unreal "Fountain of Youth" and to any unvaluable equation, but ONLY UNDER THE CONDITION THAT WE ACKNOWLEDGE ON OTHER points of THE UNIVERSE REAL AND VALUABLE PHENOMENA.

The second "strenghtened" essentiality leads but to real Mt. Washington and to a valuable equation, so far as the first is real and the second values.

There is from the viewpoint of reality and valuation a double essentiality completing each other: The "single" or "genuine" essentiality remains the SYSTEMATICAL essentiality and becomes "strenghtened," when real or valuable, and remains systematical, not strengthened, not a nothingness, if we acknowledge beyond and because of it the world of real phenomena and valuable relations. This may suffice.

I pass to legal relations of the essentiality to personality and value.

PERSONALITY and essentiality! The relations are internal as evident from discussions in the third chapter. Personal essence of man is the ESSENCE of human nature. Human nature is genuine human essentiality. To define the essence of man, means, to discover on man the single empirically given exnatural and therefore, "personal" being in the world. I state: Personality is but a kind of essentiality, of actual already exnatural essentiality. Still more. We discussed that man is "a world in a small way" (mikrokosmos). He includes all this

that we have "in the world in a large way" (megalokosmos), but surpasses it essentially, because, he has sides not found in creation. ..Man is the inorganic, organic, animally spiritual and "PERSONAL being in the world. Human personality is not only the essence of human nature, but the IDEAL ESSENCE of all creation. He, who perfectly knows the essence of man, knows the essence of creation AND MORE.

Important is some "susceptibly essential" relation. We encountered it in the introducing section of the fourth chapter between personality and value. ..Essentiality has a point accessible only to the human, personal being. Animal is in this point deficient. Nothing can appear to animal in the light of "essentiality." Animal sees colors, hears sounds, but no one can assert that animal could inquire about the "essence" of colors or sounds. Natural things appear to animal in this or that light, it observes in nature phenomena which seem to change and vanish, to be more or less homogeneous and durable. But animal lacks an ESSENCEVIEWING consideration of nature, what may be the essence of nature and what only its seeming apparition. Man differs steadfastly from animal. Man only can gaze into the—essence of the world and life, into his environment and into himself. Man only is capable of an essenviewing consideration of nature and life upon it. At the conclusion of the chapter we will see, which results we can expect from this human capability for decisions of our main question. Essenceviewing consideration is undispensably necessary in all spheres of cultural effecting, in sciences, in art and in cultural practical life. Any scientist must distinguish between important and unimportant, main and collateral, essential and unessential matters. Artists, too, who often show the essence of life that they shorten happenings effected in ten and hundred years to the span of some hours. In daily life would fare very badly he, who would not understand to distinguish the essence from all more or less "casual" trash.

We must grant a double connection between essentiality and personality. In the sence of the first is personality the essence of human nature, the ideal of creation, in the sense of the second only to persons accessible.

VALUE and essentiality! Also here exist internal connec-

tions. We deal with the essence of the world and life then, when we detect the valuable sphere of its nature. This conviction is age-old. What would mean the world and life, if we would be for "values" blind and would not know to distinguish between valuable and nonvaluable facts? Value and valuation effect the meaning of anything that we experience and deal with in personal life, in happenings in the world and in this that we call THE PURPOSE OF THE UNIVERSE. We "view" or "observe" phenomena and happenings, but we also "evaluate" them. Evaluation puts phenomena and happenings in the right "meaning" and "place," without it would anything disappear into nothingness. We might in this case somehow "hold on," as animal and dead nature holds on by natural law, but anything would be empty and null. We would lose that impulse that separates us from the remaining creation and forces us for SPECIAL reasons to hold on and in this OUR endurance CULTURALLY to work. This impulse is given with the perception of "values" of the world and life, FOR WHICH we should live and work. There exists an "essence" of the world and life. Phenomena and happenings become "essential," because they are defined by values. This conception is common in daily life and against it we could put only the conception more or less encountered in theory. This theoretical conception means that we have then, when we strike the essence of phenomena, to abstract all view of value. For example. The essence of food is in its material composition, not in a "value" we ascribe to it, when we are hungry. The essence of a work of art is this that we found exposed on it, not some esthetical its value.

I admit also such an essentiality and we know it. It is outlined with the realitively valuable views, it is the "single" or "strenghtened" essentiality of the world and life. It leads to a "single" value which is something and not a nothingness. But also from such a "single" essentiality is a short way to the essentiality by VALUE. Omne ens bonum, anything existing is something valuable, worthwhile, is the tenet of great philosophers. Any one will agree, if he admits the difference between that is "something" and NOTHINGNESS. He, who perceives this difference, may understand that this difference in the value is not only mental, but real. We start to shiver going

down to nothingness, and we may proceed from ourselves or from the most minute phenomenon of our environment. The point of nothingness is the point of singular USELESSNESS of the world and life expressed BY NULLITY. "Nullity" there, on the point of nothingness, therefore, some PRINCIPLE VALUE here, on the point OF ALL THIS THAT is something and not a nothingness. We will discuss this in detail in the present chapter and see that with the singular nullity of nothingness corresponds the singular—holiness of the absolute essentiality, the holiness of—God. Divine essence and nothingness form the legal utmost points of creation. The point of nothingness is the point of absolute nonexistence, the point of God the point of absolute existence, whilst all the remaining universe is the universe of relative between absolute fulness and absolute emptiness pending entities. This is the order of value. Nothingness is absolute uselessness, God absolute value. Anything between them has the character of a parallel larger or smaller but relative value. We call it the ESSENCEVIEWING value of the world and life. The legal relation of value to essentiality is proven from this side. It is a double one. The essence of phenomena may mean that phenomena are valuable facts, or phenomena are valuable facts as they are something and not nothing. To be "essential" may mean to "value" and "to value" may mean to be "essential." Herewith clearly appears the important connection of the essentiality to the divine singular entity. To this entity leads the essenceviewing concaption of the world and life.

In the first chapter appeared the essence of God immediately in the light of its primereality. In the second we detected like immediately on it the character of the parallel primevaluation (primereality is primevaluable reality). In the third we could define the divine essence from the view of its 'primesubstantiveness" and completed it in the fourth with the affix of the parallel "primevalue." Clear is the further fact that God and only God is the singular "primeessence," primeessentiality. The divine essence appears as absolute ESSENCE. All the remaining essentiality of the world and life can be measured only because of this Essence, and we may take essentiality in any outlined sense. Without this singular "primeessentiality" the re-

maining essentiality disappears into nothingness, as without primereality, primevaluation, primesubstantiveness and primevalue disappear into nothingness—reality, valuation, substantiveness and value.

DOUBLE ESSENTIALITY shown in the present section in the relation to reality, valuation, personality and value is systematically, originally and finally bound to the singular divine essentiality. The essenceviewing way to God is justified, because we can speak about an essenceviewing consideration of the world and life.

31. Determinating essenceviewing graduation of the world and life.

We know from daily life and more from scientific research the difference between SINGLE and GENERAL phenomena. We meet a single man, see a single mountain, have a single machine. We meet a Frenchman, American, men in general, have in mind a "mountain range," "machinery." The process from singleness to generalness means some expressive graduation "upward" or "downward." From ourselves to American, to "man" is the process upward, from "man" to ourselves downward. This characteristic graduation is evident also from the fact that 'singleness" or "generalness" are very expressive. "Man in general" has the character of a more expressive generalness than American, but "I" have the character of a broader singleness than "American." There are single and general phenomena. Singleness is the more expressive the lesser is generalness and vice versa. Still to-day is prevalent the opinion that "general" phenomena are not real "objects." Take a "triangle." Objects would be according to this opinion single triangles observed on a meadow with the form of a triangle, or a triangle drawn on a desk. When we speak about triangle, we have in mind single triangles. But this is not undispensably necessary. When we ascertain that the triangle has three sides and the sum of its angles is 180°, then we think about—triangle. We may ascribe this to any triangle, but this ascribing has a special meaning which is not realized, when we speak about "triangle itself." We express in this case that something values

in general and without any exception, any limitation. In the example of the single triangle we ascertain the same only in regard to the definite and single example. The ascertainment about the triangle has this meaning that this and that leads to all triangles. In this example would be the conception of "triangle itself" the conception of "all single triangles." I must deny also this interpretation. The thought concerning "triangle itself" is entirely different from the thought concerning "all triangles." This thought means in the first case that "triangle" has three sides, in the second that "all triangles" (this and this . . . triangle) have three sides. Both thoughts could be true, may "value," but they are by no means synonyme. We have in mind in the first example "one" phenomenon, in the second any quantity of phenomena. We must, therefore, speak about an essential difference IN THE MANNER OF THINKING, which leads to the ascertainment of "triangle itself," then of any single triangle. This manner of thinking is in the first case the analitical consideration, in the second a merely empirical measuring (geometry). The ascertainment of the sum of the angles is restricted to these and those single triangles, and this ascertainment can be proven only, if we ACTUALLY MEASURE all angles of single triangles.

There is another difference BY CONTENT between the first and the second ascertainment. The angles of a single triangle are, say 65°, 100° and 15°, or it has equal sides or equal angles, or it is a rectangular triangle, one angle has 90°, the other two 60° and 30° etc. Can we ascribe all this to "triangle itself?" By no means. We can not say about "triangle itself" that one of his angles has 65°. We have triangles which do not have any such angle. The same holds about equal sides and equal angles, or about rectangular and nonrectangular triangles. This means: Many things which we ascribe to the single triangle, we can not ascribe to "triangle itself." "Triangle itself" is different from any single triangle and different also from any mere "group" of single triangles, because such a group has no sides or angles. "Triangle itself" is at the best something that is to all single triangles common. Evident is the fact that a sharp distinction between "triangle itself" and single triangles is substantially and not only verbally necessary. What

may be to single triangles common, is not with any single triangle synonyme.

This difference by CONTENT between "triangle itself" and single triangles assists us in the stricter definition of the transition from one to the other member. This transition is a real DEFINITION. We assert about "triangle itself" that it has three sides and that the sum of its angles is 180°, but NOTHING MORE. All this we can assert about any single triangle, but STILL MORE: That it is rectangular, that one of his angles has 60°, the other 30°, that it stands upon one of his cathets etc. Any single triangle has by its nature many more OBJECTIVE DEFINITIONS, than "triangle itself": We find on the single triangle all single definitions, as we have to ascribe them also to "triangle itself," but besides any quantity of definitions which "triangle itself" does not have.

I emphasize that I speak about "definitions" and not about "qualities." Why? I can not assert about "triangle itself" that it has equal sides. Can I say that it has not equal sides? Doubtlessly not, because the equalsided triangle is a real "triangle" which has besides all other definitions also all definitions of "triangle itself." The undisputable fact follows that we can not assert about "triangle itself" that it has equal sides, neither that it has unequal sides. What remains? Certainly only the POSSIBILITY that it has, say, equal or unequal sides. We can, therefore, define the relation between "triangle itself" and "single triangle" essentially as follows: Whilst the single triangle has all its qualities IN TRUTH (actually-actualiter), has "triangle itself" from the quantity of these qualities only some (e. gr., that it has three sides and that the sum of its angles is 180°), but all the others only BY POSSIBILITY (potentially-potentialiter). Or briefly: Whilst any single triangle is in regard to all its qualities entirely DEFINED, is "triangle itself" defined only in regard to some of these qualities, but in regard to others UNDEFINED. What holds about triangle, holds about any other phenomenon of the world and life. With the outlined relation between "single" and "itself" triangle corresponds a similar relation between, say, "single" and "itself" stone, town, man, number, life etc. We arrived thus at this short and strict definition of "singleness" and "generalness":

General phenomena are in regard to their qualities undefined, single phenomena defined.

Generalness or singleness is larger or smaller, as also "definition" or "undefinition." "Triangle itself" is determinated only in regard to the quality that it has three sides and that the sum of its angles is 180°. The "unequalsided triangle" is besides this determinated by the quality that it has unequal sides and different other qualities, that one of its angles has, say, 52°, the other 70° etc. If we follow the determination of the triangle by the larger or smaller quantity of single qualities, we arrive at "triangle itself," to any SINGLE triangle on the one side, and to SOMETHING (aliquid) most general on the other. The single triangle before me is entirely determinated in regard to all qualities and has or does not have qualities, as they come to my mind. Similarly is "something" in regard to all such qualities entirely undeterminated, it means, such a general "something" has or does not have everything, but only BY POSSIBILITY. Between these utmost points of such an objective determination and nondetermination, it means, between phenomena, as this triangle, this man, this mountain and between "something" itself is an immense line of phenomena which have or do not have more or less qualities, whilst remaining qualities are given only by possibility: These are determinated or nondeterminated phenomena. "Triangle itself" is such more or less determinated and undeterminated phenomenon, therefore, a phenomenon which has only some degree of generalness and of parallel singleness, it is uncomparatively more general, than any single triangle, but uncomparatively more single, than, say, "phenomenon in general." I ascertain: Generalness of the phenomenon is its nondetermination, singleness its determination. Generalness grows with its nondetermination in the relation of equal proportion, with its determination in the relation of unequal proportion. Singleness grows with its determination in the relation of equal proportion, with its undetermination in the relation of unequal proportion. The question is about real OBJECTIVE differences which we have not to confound with that psychological standing which is necessary, if we should from the observation of single phenomena ascend to the perception of more general phenomena. There is the ques-

tion about some OFF-THINKING which is different from real (concrete) observation. This difference has its unpsychological, therefore, merely objective basis: With observation corresponds some high degree of determination of this that we thus observe, but with larger or smaller off-thinking-observation corresponds a larger or smaller "undetermination" of this that we thus observe. *)

Important is the difference between objective singleness and generalness. Without this difference any counting would be impossible. When we count, we consider single phenomena from the viewpoint of larger or smaller generalness: This and this and this are three "glasses," three "things," three "phenomena." Let us assume that we have before us a glass, a book and a pencil. If we really want to count, we can not remain on the single character of "glass," "book" and "pencil." We could never pronounce that this is or are three glass, book, pencil. We have to go from the singleness of any phenomenon to such a "higher" kind which helps to consider these phenomena from the view of this that is common to them. For example: These phenomena are "things." We can count them, when we say: These are three THINGS. The general and undeterminated fact of "thing" helps to real counting of glass, book and pencil. Similarly in any example.

I express the new detected legality as follows: The ability of counting is undispensably necessary based on the ability of so called "ranking-conception" of phenomena. The child does not know to count. His counting is a mechanical and rythmical or formal transition from phenomenon to phenomenon. Dot is for the child the sign of 1, vertical line for 2, triangle for 3 etc. The task of the teacher in the normal school is to observe the moment, when in the child begins to develop that "off-thinking," as it is undispensably necessary for real counting.

The given psychological legality is still unpsychologically objectively based.

With the internal "counting" of phenomena corresponds

*) Observable phenomena do not appear in all determination. We are "observing" but one side and not the other, only the immediate definitions and not the relative, in one single diagonal and not in the evolutionary process etc.

their own "numeralness." We can count phenomena only, if we subordinate them to the rank of a higher, MORE GENERAL, MORE UNDETERMINATED fact. So we can say that phenomena are numeralical, as they are representatives of a higher rank. The essence of "number" is based upon the difference between singleness and generalness, "numeralness" upon the determinating graduation of the world and life. Without this gradiation would be excluded the fact of counting and the fact of numeralness of that we count. I will many times return to this detection. The determinating graduation of the world and life affords a more detailed definition. Important are the legal BOUNDARY-LINES of this graduation. If there is anything that I observe more or less determinated, therefore, less or more single and less or more undeterminated, therefore, less or more general, there is the question at hand, how to define the legal points of the LARGEST OR SMALLEST such determination (singleness) and undetermination (generalness). For this purpose may follow a discussion of the relation between more or less determinated and parallel more or less undeterminated phenomena, which we call the relation of the "species" to its single "representative." For example. Men we actually meet are representatives of the species "man." This is the relation of the single (determinated) phenomenon to the more general (undeterminated) phenomenon. Single man is to "man" in a like relation, as any single triangle to "triangle itself." Undeterminated phenomena are to the determinated phenomenon in the relation of the SPECIES to its REPRESENTATIVE. We distinguish in the universe of phenomena two groups, specieses and representatives of specieses. This relation does not depend on the fact, if there is on these specieses and their representatives the question about specieses and representatives, as there are dealing with them systematical and describing branches in the scientific world. Specieses and representatives are selected for the better understanding of phenomena. ..Botanists have in their studies to turn to single plants, but care more for "specieses" which help to a SCIENTIFIC knowledge of botany. The relation between species and representative remains everywhere there, where it may be of no use for scientific researches on single phenomena. "Dirty glass" forms the objective con-

tent of the "species" which has in all determinated dirty glasses its single representatives. "Color"—"color green," "blossom" —"cherry blossom," "tree"—"limetree," "quality"—"diligence" etc. are examples of the relation between undeterminated and determinated phenomena, of the relation between species and representative.

In regard to this "representativic" and speciesivic" direction on single members of the determinating scale of the universe of phenomena arrises the question, if we have on any phenomenon BOTH directions, or if we have strata which have the first direction and not the second and vice versa. The question leads to legal boundary-lines set up to the determinating graduation of the world and life. We encounter this legality: Only in but "more or less" determinated or undeterminated phenomena we have both directions, the representativic and the speciesivic. "Glass" is the "species" for all single glasses, but also the "representative" of a more general species, as it is given, say, with "vessel" (dish is a "vessel," too) or with "thing" (stone is a "thing," too) etc. We find this relation realized wherever we have in mind phenomena which have the character of some 'larger" or "smaller" determination and undetermination. ("Glass" is less determinated, more general, than THIS actual glass before me, and "glass" is more determinated and less general, than "vessel," "thing" etc.). This relation shifts essentially, when we step on the point of largest and smallest determination or undetermination. The typewriter before me is in regard to all its specialities (color, weight, situation . .) entirely determinated. Any such determinated typewriter is the "representative" of pertinent less determinated phenomena (of "typewriter in general," "tool," "thing" . .), but IT IS NOT AND CAN NOT BE ANY "species," which would be represented from its side by any other and more determinated phenomenon. ..The typewriter before me is the 'representative" of pertinent more general phenomena and by them included specieses, but it is by principle not the "species."

This is the definition of the LOWER boundary-lines of determinated phenomena which have the "representativic," but not any "speciesivic" character. The legal UPPER boundary-line is SOMETHING (aliquid). "Something itself" is by its own

nature "species itself" and not any "representative." Anything is "something," and there is nothing that would not be something. The first thought is pointed to the speciesivic character of "something," the second adds that this is the broadest speciesness which can not be by SOMETHING "represented": ANYTHING is—something and SOMETHING is not—nothing! The UPPER boundary-line is the point of something itself as of the entirely undeterminated "entity" which has only the "speciesivic" and not any "representativic" character.

The determinating system of the universe has two legal boundary-lines, the lower and the upper. The first is given with the point of "largest" determination and "smallest" undetermination, and this is the point of REPRESENTATION ITSELF (it is outside of the parallel speciesness), the second with the point of "largest" undetermination and "smallest" determination, and this is the point of SPECIESNESS ITSELF (it is outside of the parallel representation). All points BETWEEN THESE TWO BOUNDARY-LINES are points of SPECIESNESS AND PARALLEL REPRESENTATION (e. gr., "key" is the species of all single keys and a representative of "tool," "thing," "something" . .). I call the two boundary-lines of the determinatively defined universe THE TWO TRANSPASSING BOUNDARY-LINES of the universe.

We have still two no less legal NONTRANSPASSING (BARRING) DETERMINATING BOUNDARY-LINES of the universe which are IN AN IMMEDIATE CONNECTION WITH THE MAIN QUESTION OF THIS BOOK.

There is besides the outlined determinating graduation of the world and life possible still its PARTICULAR graduation which does not concern the difference between their larger or smaller determination or undetermination of phenomena, but the difference of their larger or smaller PARTICULARITY and NONPARTICULARITY. The singularity of particular graduation is evident, because in the determinating graduation of phenomena are possible any "particular" differences between them. For example. Actual rocks have the same graduation of determination as an isolated bit of gold amongst them. This is the grade of "largest" determination, therefore, of real (actual) singleness. But the particularity of the bit of gold to the

rock is larger than the particularity of rock to rock. It is herewith clear that there exist besides determination and nondetermination of phenomena their peculiarity and nonpeculiarity which depends on the question, what is the contentive commoness between them: Rock has, e. gr., with rock more in common than gold with rock. The peculiarity of gold to rock is, therefore, larger than the peculiarity of rock to rock. But this peculiarity and nonpeculiarity is only RELATIVE AND PARTIAL, because it indicates but the contentive relations between phenomena and is built up on the partial contentive commoness and noncommoness between them. Between rock and gold are many things in common and between rock and rock are differences. We must add that THE DETERMINATING SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE IS THE SYSTEM OF SUCH BUT RELATIVELY AND BUT PARTIALLY "PARTICULAR" AND "NONPARTICULAR" PHENOMENA. We have seen that this universe is the universe of the "representativeness" AND "speciesness" or at least of "representativeness" ITSELF and "speciesness" ITSELF. To be a representative, means, to have the character of a relative and partial "peculiarity," but to be a species, means, to have the character of a relative and partial "nonpeculiarity." The peculiarity of the representative is limited by the species which is itself representing, and the nonpeculiarity of the species is limited by the representatives, by which is this species itself represented. Both TRANSPASSING DETERMINATING BOUNDARY-LINES of the universe are, therefore, the points of LARGEST, BUT ONLY RELATIVE AND PARTIAL PECULIARITY AND NONPECULIARITY. All entirely determinated, it means, ACTUAL AND SINGLE PHENOMENA have the character of largest relative or partial PECULIARITY, but the point of entirely nondeterminated SOMETHING ITSELF is the point of largest relative or partial NONPECULIARITY.

It is not difficult to find the two nontranspassing (barring) determinating boundary-lines of the universe. These two boundary-lines are the two points of largest, but SYSTEMATICAL OR PERFECT PECULIARITY and largest SYSTEMATICAL OR PERFECT NONPECULIARITY. In other words: One barring determinating boundary-line of the universe is given with

the point of the SINGULAR PECULIARITY which is by principle outside of any "speciesness," the other with the point of the singular nonpeculiarity which is by principle outside of any "representativeness." The necessity for these barring determinating boundary-lines is more evident, if we compare them with the two transpassing determinating boundary-lines, with the—lower or PECULIAR—given with the representatives of the species, and with the—upper or NONPECULIAR—given with the "speciesness itself." These two boundary-lines are the boundary-lines of the relative or partial peculiarity or nonpeculiarity, and for this reason is given the request for the systematical or perfect peculiarity and nonpeculiarity. SUCH A peculiarity excludes any speciesness above it, and SUCH A nonpeculiarity excludes any subordinated representation. As the lower transpassing determinating boundary-lines of the universe is given with the peculiarity which is in any regard still the representation of the species, so is the lower barring determinating boundary-line of the universe given with the PECULIARITY which does not permit any speciesness. And as the upper transpassing determinating boundary-line of the universe is given with the nonpeculiarity which is still a species, therefore, entirely represented, so is the upper BARRING determinating boundary-line of the universe given with the NONPECULIARITY which can not be in anything neither representatively contended. We know the name of these two barring determinating boundary-lines of the universe: The first is pointed to GOD HIMSELF, the second to the point of NOTHINGNESS. God and only God is the point of the singular peculiarity which is outside of any speciesive communion. Nothingness and only nothingness is the point of the singular nonpeculiarity which is outside of any single giveness.

True are the tenets: God is not nothing and nothing is not God, NOTHING is nothing and nothing is NOT NOTHING. The real meaning of these tenets is: God and nothing are by principle outside of any contentive communion with the universe of "phenomena." There is not any "phenomenon" which would be by God represented (God is not x, e. gr., color, stone, man...) and there is not any phenomenon which would be itself a special representative of God (x, e. gr., color, stone, man . . . is not

God). Furthermore, there is not any phenomenon which we could call "nothing" (something is not—nothing), and there is not any phenomenon which would be by nothing represented (nothing is not—something). God and nothing are, therefore, the two true BARRING boundary-lines of the universe which we must sharply distinguish from each other. God is the point of the barring singular PECULIARITY, nothing the point of the barring singular NONPECULIARITY or: God is the ABSOLUTE INDIVIDUALITY and nothing is the ABSOLUTE NON-INDIVIDUALITY. All universe between God and nothing—and this universe is given with our transpassing determinating system of the universe—is the system of relative or partial individualities or nonindividualities. God only is the real and immediate contrast of nothing and nothing only is the true and immediate contrast of God. The "remaining" universe, therefore, the empirically given world and life is the INTERMEDIATE universe which only approaches God, then nothing, but remains from the First and the second afar off. We will get the full perception of these universal relations then, when we shall see that the point of nothingness is based on the point of God and based so, as is based absolute nonindividuality on—absolute individuality. *)

Basical detections of the present section are: There exists, first, the fact of a determinating graduation of the world and life and this graduation is based on larger or smaller objective determination and nondetermination of single phenomena. Secondly, this graduation has two boundary-lines, the lower and the upper. The lower forms the hight of objective determination, the upper of objective nondetermination. This hight of determination is the representativeness of specieses and this hight of nondetermination the speciesness of (any) representativeness. Thirdly, it holds that we have besides transpassing boundary-lines of the universe also barring boundary-lines.

*) Nonpeculiarity, nonindividuality is only a "falling-off" from peculiarity, individuality and would be without this unconceivable and substantially impossible. The more is absolute nonpeculiarity, nonindividuality "dependent" on absolute peculiarity, individuality. This means: Only God is the ILLIMITEDELY ABSOLUTE entity, because the absoluteness of nonpeculiarity of nothing is limited by absolute peculiarity of the divine essence.

The request for these is based in the difference between "merely determinating" and "particular" graduation of phenomena. Particular graduation goes parallely with determinating (larger determination=larger particularity, larger nondetermination=larger nonparticularity), but it is not with it synonyme, because the points of determination or nondetermination may be the points of a very different particularity or nonparticularity, and all determinating points, also the points of largest determination or nondetermination, are in general only the points of merely relative and partial particularity or nonparticularity.

Fourthly, the point of absolute particularity is the point of God, the point of absolute nonparticularity the point of nothing.

32. Essenceviewing graduation of the world and life.

We encounter in the universe of phenomena an interesting graduation not so plain in daily life, although for it very significant. Take two "colors" and the "difference" between them. Colors and difference are independent phenomena which have to be represented to us separately. Do not confound the color red with the color green, neither with the difference between them. The trinity of the colors red and green and the difference is a TRINITY of special entities: Each entity is something independent and not a nothingness. Both colors are fuller entities than difference. "Color" is a more systematical entity and has "more" OWN essentiality than "difference," color is represented to us more vividly and immediately than difference, color is a fuller, difference an EMPTIER entity. We can, moreover, between color and difference imagine entities essentially "emptier" than color and "fuller" than difference. Such an entity is "harmony" between colors. Further examples are: Color and stone, stone and plant, plant and animal, animal and man. In many regards mean these twins an advanced penetration from emptier to fuller entities. "Stone" is a fuller entity than "color": Stone includes color and other "accidentals" and has as a real thing a SUBSTANTIVIC, essentially less dependent and merely relative nature. A similar progress in the direction of larger and larger essentiality and of parallel ES-

SENCIVIEWING fullness is given with the transition from stone to plant, from plant to animal and from animal to man. This transition can not be only linguistic, it must be connected with a consciousness of the substantial distance which leads from "stone" along "plant" and "animal" finally to the "human" being. Remember the discussions about the graduation of creation from "inorganic" to "organic," "animal living" and "personally spiritual" graduation. The graduation is doubtlessly given in all fullness: It is the transition from less to more systematical, from less independent to more selfown, from less immediate to more immediate, from essentially emptier to essentially fuller entities. We have also amongst experiences an adequate example of such a graduation. THIS IS THE DIFFERENCE BY FULLNESS BETWEEN "RATIONAL" AND "INSTINCTIVE" EXPERIENCE, BETWEEN REPRESENTATION AND PARALLEL SENSATION, EMPHASIZED HERE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN PHILOSOPHY: ..Sensations are in otherwise similar circumstances doubtlessly essentially fuller than representations. They seem to be more actual and more "touchable," whilst we confound representations many times with their external territories. ..I allege for the fact of a graduation by fullness of phenomena the important psychological experience that we must speak even about a sensation by fullness or ESSENCEVIEWING of man. Psychologists do not know this sensation or confound it with the esthetic or sensation by beauty. They are entirely wrong. We enjoy a picture or a melody by beauty, but we may enjoy it thus that before our eyes steps more its distance from some empty "relation" or "absrtact" system. In such a case there is not the question about beauty of the picture or melody, but about their ESSENTIAL HARMONY and that parallel essential fullness which we greatly miss on mere relations and on merely abstract systems. With ESSENCEVIEWING comfort from the picture or melody corresponds a parallel essenceviewing DISCOMFORT on mere relations or abstract systems. This would be impossible, if the comfort about the picture or melody would come from "beauty." I stated definitely in my "Estetika-Esthetics" that we can by beauty enjoy and tolerate only FORMS and that

"relations" are by principle outside of any view by beauty or uglines. *)

Discomfort about "relation" is merely essenceviewing and also with THIS discomfort corresponding—comfort about the picture, melody or about any phenomenon which is essentially fuller than mere relation. Picture or melody may become the territory of esthetic comfort and ESSENCEVIEWING DISCOMFORT and it becomes the second, when we consider it sensitively from the view of an essentially still UNCOMPARATIVELY FULLER ENTITY, say, from the view of personality. It holds, therefore: Essenceviewing sensation BY BEAUTY is impossible and uncomparatively broader. There is not any phenomenon which could not be the immediate motive for essenceviewing sensation.

This sensation is of an extraordinary meaning in life. It is known that men (already the child!) care much more for actual, concrete, systematical, full phenomena, than for unreal, abstract, relative, empty. Men care more for actual nature, than for mere mathematical natural equations. This direction in man is the direction of his—essenceviewing sensation: We essenceviewingly enjoy "fullness" and essenceviewingly tolerate "emptiness." NOW IS CLARIFIED THE FACT OF THAT "MERELY POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EVALUATION" OF THE UNIVERSE OF PHENOMENA I HAVE BEEN SPEAKING ABOUT IN THE FORMER CHAPTER, WHEN I DISCUSSED THE PRINCIPLE RELATION BY SENSATION TO—HOLINESS ON THE ONE SIDE AND TO NOTHINGNESS ON THE OTHER. I said that we may the universe of phenomena in the wholeness positively or negatively evaluate. We negatively evaluate it, when we consider it from the view of God, but positively, when we consider it from the view of nothingness. The basis of THIS evaluation or nonevaluation of the universe is the—ESSENVEVIEWING SENSATION about it: When we consider creation from the view of God, it means, from the view of singular FULLNESS, we essenceviewingly tolerate it, and when we consider it from the view of nothingness, it means, from the view of singular emptiness, we—essence-

*) "Estetika" published by Zvezna tiskarna, Ljubljana, 1925.

viewingly enjoy it. There exists without doubt an essenceviewing sensation there is, therefore, neither any doubt about THE UNDISPUTABLE FACT OF GRADUATION BY FULLNESS. Essenceviewing sensation is on graduation by fullness directly analitically built up and would be without it impossible.

There are relations between determinating and peculiar graduation of phenomena by fullness, as outlined in the former section. These relations should not confuse us. Do not overlook the principle difference between them. Larger or smaller determination of the phenomenon is larger or smaller essenceviewing fullness. The actual book before me has a larger essenceviewing fullness than "book in general" or entirely undeterminated "something." Similarly may larger or smaller "peculiarity" of the phenomenon mean its larger or smaller essenceviewing fullness. "Personality" is more peculiar and fuller than stone. The difference is in the view of determinatingly peculiar and graduation by fullness of phenomena. Determinating and peculiar graduation is by principle VERTICAL, graduation by fullness by principle merely HORIZONTAL. On determinating graduation there is the question about the transition from something determinated to something nondeterminated, from "representative" to "species," therefore, from SUBORDINATE TO SUPERORDINATE ENTITY (or vice versa). At least in principle hold this also for peculiar graduation which assisted us in the former section to detect the legal BARRING boundaries of the determinating system of the universe. We have seen that determinating graduation is closed by its "transpassing" lower and upper boundary and that all determinated (single, actual) phenomena form its lower boundary, but entirely nondeterminated "something" the upper boundary. Parallel peculiar graduation was leading us even beyond THESE TRANSPASSING BOUNDARIES of determinating graduation and showed in the vertical direction its "lower" and "upper" barring boundary, namely, God as the point of absolute Peculiarity (nondetermination) and nothingness as the point of absolute nondetermination (non-nondetermination). For this reason are for the view of peculiar graduation God and nothingness the "vertical" barring boundary-lines of the universe. In a sharp contrast with this ver-

ticalness of determinating and particular graduation is the graduation by fullness in principle merely HORIZONTAL. For example. The species of entirely determinated entities, as are "personality," "animal," "plant," "crystal," "colors" of this crystal, "harmony" between these colors, "difference" between them etc. is the real SPECIES BY FULLNESS which begins with some largest fullness and continues in the direction of smaller and smaller fullness. A larger determination of the phenomenon is equal to its larger, a smaller to its smaller fullness. This is only equality not synonymeness. We have, namely, that "smaller" essenceviewing fullness which originates from the smaller determination of the phenomenon, so to say, TO TRANSPLANTE from "vertical" determinating species to "horizontal" species by fullness. For example. "Book in general" is in the essenceviewing regard a pretty less full phenomenon than an entirely determinated actual book. But "book in general" considered FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF FULLNESS does not belong "above" the actual book, but on some place "besides" or "along" it and there is a matter of ESSENCEVIEWING TASK to decide the size of this HORIZONTAL fullnessive distance between "book" and the book on the table, therefore, if "book" belongs in the fullnessivic direction near to this actual book or along its qualities or even along some relation between them etc. For this reason is "book" considered by fullness not more a "speciesive," but an entirely INDEPENDENT phenomenon with this and that size of OWN essential fullness.

Still sharper and clearer may demonstrate this the upper transpassing boundary of the determinating system, therefore, entirely nondeterminated "something." This "something" is the common top of the determinating system and, therefore, to all its members in equal relation (anything, belonging to this system, is at least "something"). This relation essentially shifts at once, when we consider "something" by—fullness. It appears to us in the light of an extremely small and nearly not any fullness at all, but now it is not more the common top, but, say, the most LATERAL point in the universe of phenomena: "Something" belongs now immediately along (nondeterminated or also determinated) phenomena which are somehow

fuller from it, therefore, say, along "relations," "points," "signs" etc.

Do not confound the relation of phenomena by fullness with their determinating and particular graduation. With the determinatingly peculiar system of the universe corresponds its SYSTEM BY FULLNESS. A new question arrises. Where are the legal boundary-lines of THIS system?

I quote for the decision of this question the following line of phenomena: Man-animal-plant-stone-comfort-viewing-color-moving-form-number-relation-place. This is the line, in which any first member has the place of larger essenceviewing fullness, the following of smaller fullness. For our purpose is indifferent, if some one would for his "essenceviewing fancy" put this line differently and if the "essenceviewing distance" between single points of this line are at least incidentally equal. Neither it does disturb that we may have a manifoldness of phenomena of an EQUAL essenceviewing fullness (in transpassing determinating boundaries of the universe is this empirically even undispensable!) and that, therefore, belongs to single places a manifoldness of phenomena, e. gr., on the place of stone would belong also iron, gold, steel etc. This and anything the like is of a collateral meaning. We are interested only in an actual existence and valuation of a system by fullness, in which would be the universe of phenomena "horizontally" such arranged that any essenceviewing fullness uninterruptly reachers into the pertinent smaller and vice versa. The fact of such a system is proven with the doubtless fact of the graduation by fullness of phenomena and the given line may be only a single and infinitely imperfect example of such a system. Deep questions arrise: What is the internal structure of this line? Is the direction by fullness unique or is the direction of large essenceviewing fullness the direction of smaller essenceviewing emptiness? Does the line fullnessively go backward and forward? Where and what are the legal boundary-lines of this system of the universe?

We acquired for the decision of these questions the necessary knowledge. We know, first, the relation of "determination" to "nondetermination" and of "peculiarity" to "nonpeculiarity." Secondly, we know of graduation by fullness.

Thirdly, we know the important relation of this graduation to essenceviewing sensation.

With some degree of determination of the phenomenon corresponds necessarily the opposite degree of its nondetermination: A larger or smaller determination (singleness) connects with a smaller or larger nondetermination (generalness). Similar is the relation of peculiarity to nonpeculiarity. We can, therefore, very well imagine that the detected "fullness" is such a twofold fact, with which corresponds the essenceviewing-emptiness of the phenomenon. The degree of fullness is in the opposite relation to the degree of parallel emptiness: The larger the fullness, the smaller the emptiness and vice versa. This conception is empirically proven. We speak in daily life like immediately about both, about fullness, luxury, plenty . . . AND about emptiness, poverty, want . . . whereby both touch the contentive side of phenomena, about which there is the question. For example. The essence of dead nature appears to anyone who thinks about LIFE and PERSONAL life immediately pretty defective, poor, empty. We can be convinced of all this, if we immediately "look" at some more expressive fullnessivic relation between two or more phenomena. Consider in the essenceviewing line the fullnessivic distance between "stone" and "color" and you will agree that stone appears from the view of its fullness, color from the view of its emptiness. We see on the stone, what it has, but on the color we are "looking for," what it does not have. In another case may in the light of fullness appear also "color," in general appears this then, when we consider it from the view of fullnessivic distance, say, between it and mere "number" or mere "relation." Number or relation appears in this case more in the light of a large "emptiness" than of a very small "fullness." These examples prove that through the universe of phenomena go both directions, the direction of essenceviewing fullness and essenceviewing emptiness, that both are, furthermore, quantitatively graduating and in any point of the universe so represented that the quantity of fullness is everywhere in the reverse relation to the quantity of parallel emptiness. For this reason is the question, if we consider the phenomenon from the view of fullness or emptiness dependent on ourselves, therefore, psychologically based.

There are people, who incline to consider everything more from the view of fullness, others from the view of emptiness. We call the first "essenceviewing" positivists, the other "essenceviewing" nihilists. In general suffer people only partially from such an essenceviewing positivism or nihilism: "Materialists" may see in material something full, spirituality appears to them as a mere emptiness, and "spiritualists" will adjudge to the "soul" a real fullness, material is for them an empty word.

Even the determinating quantitative view of fullness and emptiness may be merely psychologically based. If we immediately look from the phenomenon of an extraordinary fullness to an extraordinary empty phenomenon (e. gr., LIFE-NUMBER), appears the first phenomenon still fuller and the second still emptier. To so called "sensational contrast" is, therefore, in the sphere of sensation accommodated a similar working of "essenceviewing contrast" in the sphere of viewing of the world and life by fullness and emptiness. Such special and in this speciality merely psychologically based examples prove the more that actual relation between essenceviewing fullness and emptiness, as it has been above decided. *)

I see the most decisive proof for the valuation of this relation in the fact of ESSENCEVIEWING SENSATION and in its relation to graduation of phenomena by fullness. As all sensation, is this sensation parted in ESSENCEVIEWING COMFORT and DISCOMFORT, and both have degrees. Comfort or discomfort may be larger or smaller. Remember the given instances of such a sensation. We ENJOY by essenceviewing the picture or melody in the relation to "relativeness," but TOLERATE by essenceviewing "relativeness" in the relation to the picture or melody. But we would still STRONGER enjoy in the relation to "relativeness" personality and still STRONGER tolerate in the relation of personality mere "relativeness." You ask: Why values in the fullnessivic regard essenceviewing "comfort," why essenceviewing "discomfort" and why still the degree of both. The only possible answer shows directly with

*) We could speak also about an ESSENCEVIEWING "differential depth and hight" which is for different people very different. For some people is very easy the essenceviewing consideration also of such a fullness or emptiness which other scarcely perceive or do not at all "sense" it.

a "mathematical" clearness that the graduation of phenomena by fullness is, so to say, in one stroke twofold, by "fullness" (in the stricter sense of the word) and by "emptiness." Why? He, who regards the graduation of phenomena by fullness as entirely UNIFORM and does not admit that the FULLNESS of phenomena is still parted in its "fullness" and "emptiness," remains chained to two possibilities which are both from the view of essenceviewing sensation untenable. He would have to think that with LARGER fullness corresponds essenceviewing COMFORT, with SMALLER DISCOMFORT. But why may value in this case the DEGREE of essenceviewing sensation, therefore, larger or smaller STRENGHT of essenceviewing comfort or discomfort? Or he would have to think that with LARGER fullness corresponds STRONGER essenceviewing sensation, with SMALLER FEEBLER sensation. But why should in this case value the first difference, therefore, the difference between essenceviewing COMFORT and DISCOMFORT? We may turn the matter so or so, as long as we do not abandon the standpoint that the direction by fullness of the universe is only quantitatively graduating, but in the remainder entirely uniform, so long we can not forbear the impossible abyss between fullness itself and parallel essenceviewing sensation: On the side of fullness we would have the QUANTITATIVE difference between "larger" and "smaller" fullness, on the side of essenceviewing sensation besides the quantitative difference between STRONGER and FEEBLER essenceviewing sensation still the special QUALITATIVE difference between essenceviewing COMFORT and DISCOMFORT. We have, therefore, on the side of fullness something to add, namely, something qualitative. This addition is us known, it is the TWOFOLD character of graduation by fullness, essenceviewing "fullness" in the stricter sense of the word AND parallel essenceviewing "emptiness," whereby is on any point of the universe (it means, on any phenomenon) the quantity of "fullness" in the invert proportion to parallel "emptiness" and vice versa. This twofold character makes the required equilibrium between graduation by fullness and parallel essenceviewing sensation possible: With essenceviewing COMFORT corresponds its essenceviewing "fullness," with DISCOMFORT its essenceviewing "emptiness."

With the degree of comfort corresponds the degree of fullness, with the degree of discomfort the degree of emptiness. If we keep in mind that these RELATIVES between graduation and sensation are directly extemporally strict, therefore, analitical and not only empirical (empirical is only the fact of sensation), then has our conception of fullness itself the character of a directly "mathematical" doubtlessness.

This conception only helps to arrive at the ESSENCEVIEWING BOUNDARY-LINES of the universe.

There exist TRANSPASSING and BARRING fullnessivic boundary-lines of the world and life. Fullness appeared as a singular TWOFOLD (polar) speciality which has the direction of larger or smaller fullness in the stricter sense of the word and parallel, but smaller or larger emptiness. In the line "Man-place" has "animal" a larger fullness than "stone" and stone a larger emptiness than animal. This means: The universe of phenomena by fullness is such a system, in which is the transition from point to point on the one side the transition from larger to smaller or from smaller to larger FULLNESS, but on the other side the transition from opposite smaller to larger or larger to smaller EMPTINESS. In our line is "man" (personality) the point of very large fullness and very small emptiness. Place (point) the point of very large emptiness and very small fullness.

Herewith are detected both, the transpassing and barring boundary-lines of the system of the universe by fullness. They are fullness and emptiness. The transpassing boundary by fullness is given with the entity with a fullness not without emptiness, by emptiness with the entity with an emptiness not without fullness. In our line would be this "man-place." These examples are only empirical and not BY PRINCIPLE. Man may with his fullness surpass all creation, all living and dead nature, but so many defiencies remain on him that we can not regard him as the entity which would have in ITS fullness only still a shadow of some emptiness. Nay, man also is the essential representative of such an emptiness that he is in the spirit and not only on the body but a realization of "dust and ashes!" It is evident that we have "our" line on both sides to "prolong" to come nearer to the transpassing boundary-lines. "Transpas-

sing" is given with melting of SUCH "largest" fullness into emptiness and of SUCH "largest" emptiness into fullness. Barring boundary-lines reach beyond transpassing and do not melt with them. They are fullness and emptiness. The first is given with Fullness which is without emptiness, the second with emptiness which is without fullness. Fullness without emptiness is SYSTEMATICAL OR ABSOLUTE FULLNESS, emptiness without fullness SYSTEMATICAL OR ABSOLUTE EMPTINESS. Absolute fullness and absolute emptiness are the barring boundary-lines of the universe. We know them: Absolute fullness is the essence of GOD, absolute emptiness the "essence" of NOTHING ITSELF. God and nothing are the barring DETERMINATING boundary-lines, and God and nothing are the barring FULLNESSIVIC boundary-lines of the universe.

The graduation by fullness is relative, because any measure of fullness corresponds with the opposite measure of emptiness and vice versa. Largest fullness connected with smallest emptiness and largest emptiness connected with smallest fullness follows from the principle of TWOFOLD FULLNESS (fullness-emptiness). This principle forces us to acknowledge a UNIFORM fullness and a UNIFORM emptiness. Why? Fullness by its own nature equivalent with some actual emptiness, and emptiness equivalent by its own nature with some actual fullness is RELATIVE FULLNESS AND RELATIVE EMPTINESS. SUCH A fullness and SUCH AN emptiness is systematically bound to real fullness and to real emptiness, it means, to FULLNESS ITSELF and to EMPTINESS ITSELF. Without such a systematical fullness and emptiness would be relative fullness and emptiness impossible. This means: Barring boundary-lines by fullness are the FIRST and directly ORIGINALLY NECESSARY CONDITION for the transpassing graduation of the universe by fullness which we actually proved. Moreover: Systematical emptiness, it means, the point of NOTHING, is the point of the "entity" which has the character of directly SUPERTEMPORALLY SYSTEMATICAL IMPOSSIBILITY. Systematical fullness, it means, the point OF GOD, is the point of ENTITY which has simply the character of directly SUPERTEMPORALLY SYSTEMATICAL NECESSITY. Therefore, there, on the point of systematical emptiness, NOTHING IT-

SELF, here, on the point of God, BEING ITSELF AND NECESSITY ITSELF. The "universe" between them approaches both points more or less and in this sense only EXISTS OR DOES NOT EXIST.

We arrived thus at the SECOND legal essenceviewing place which has—God and nothing towards the universe of "phenomena": God and nothing are the necessary DETERMINATING AND FULLNESSIVIC BARRING BOUNDARY-LINES OF THE UNIVERSE, and they are for this reason not connected, in no communion, neither by determination nor by fullness with phenomena which form this universe. God and nothing are, nevertheless, by no means not "one and the same." We have from the determinating viewpoint given to God the place of absolute Peculiarity, to nothing the place of absolute nonpeculiarity. We have from the viewpoint of fullness given to God the place of absolute Fullness, to nothing the place of absolute emptiness. Any "anihilation" of God, or "deification" of nothingness is from these viewpoints of question impossible.

We detected in the present section the fact of GRADUATION of phenomena by fullness, which we have not to confound with their determinating or peculiar graduation. With graduation by fullness corresponds "essenceviewing" sensation about phenomena which proves the actual internal structure of the system of the universe by fullness. The direction of the universe by fullness is TWOFOLD, namely, the direction of GROWING and DECLINING "fullness" and the direction of opposite DECLINING and GROWING emptiness. This system has its TRANSPASSING and BARRING BOUNDARINESS by fullness and emptiness. The first is "largest" fullness with some "smallest" emptiness, the second "largest" emptiness with some "smallest" fullness. The BARRING BOUNDARY-LINE of the universe by fullness is UNIFORM FULLNESS without emptiness, the BARRING BOUNDARY-LINE BY EMPTINESS UNIFORM EMPTINESS WITHOUT FULLNESS. The first touched the essence of God, the second the "essence" of nothing itself. THESE TWO BOUNDARY-LINES are indispensably necessary, because, without them would merely relative fullness of the universe remain without its systematical fundamental.

God is Necessity Itself, nothing impossibility itself.

33. Essenceviewing order-graduation of the world and life.

I start in the present section with teachings of Meinong's school. Meinong distinguishes in his famous "Theory of Objects" (Gegenstandstheorie) between "objects of the lowest, lower and higher order." *)

This theory is built up on the fact OF VIEWING and asserts that representations of experience are independent entities with own legalities without regard, if they are actually realized or could be realized. When we "listen" to a melody, we have representations of single "sounds" and upon them built up "melody." Sound is not the representation of sound, neither melody the representation of melody. Melody is also not the sum of sounds (otherwise would for "hearing" suffice healthy ears), it is an "object of an higher order" which has sounds as its fundamentals. Meinong ascertained the necessity of an examination OF "OBJECTS" NOT YET DISTRIBUTED AMONGST ANY OF HITHERTO KNOWN SCIENCES. He called them "Homeless Objects" (Heimatlose Gegenstaende).

This theory tried in the first youthful rush to embrace the UNIVERSE OB OBJECTS in a wholeness. All experiments were psychologically based. Legal specieses of "experience" showed the way to find legal specieses of parallel "objects," and legal "contentive" relations between experiences should help to detect parallel legal "objective" relations between their representations. By and by were added experiences themselves from two viewpoints: We "view" experiences and experiences appear as "viewvable" objectnesses of an higher order. I have been working on this subject and am of the opinion that this way is necessary for the essenceviewing examination of the world and life. But my research showed me that we have to abandon many dreams once dreamed about the "new doctrine" of our teacher.

Meinong distinguishing between "viewing" and "viewer" is on the most decisive places exaggerated. "Hearing" and "sound" are actually one and the same. It is only the work of

*) Confer my "Sistem Filozofije—System of Philosophy." Ljubljana, 1921.

a special and TO MY TEACHER an entirely UNKNOWN ACT of our soul that "hearing" APPEARS as a—sound, then as a—hearing. Herewith is "Theory of Objects" in its original form directly mortally hit. *)

There is, furthermore, nothing said about the principle parallelness between "experiences" and "objects," because just the most basical experiences of our soul are ACTS which are outside of any representation (convictions, consciousness, will etc.). Equally is the theory erroneous there, where it is speaking about "objective necessity," because this is only objective VALUATION which can not be again "objectively" based, as showed our discussions about valuation. We will finally see that the theory does with its own means not assist us to come to a general essenceviewing, because we have partitions of the universe—and these are its most important partitions—which we can not approach with "viewings."

"Theory of Objects" will retain in any form for ever its scientific and lifeworth sense for the ORDER and even for the extemporal order of the universe of phenomena. Order is the basical request for reason and will, order is, therefore, the equally basical key-note of the universe. "Theory of Objects" opens the door for the essenceviewing side of a world-order and assists us to speak about an order of the world and life which is entirely different from its "natural" and "psychological" legality, intended to the developing sphere of creation. "Theory of Objects" did not detect this order, but is dedicated to it and the science of it. ..Especially holds for this order the principle of graduation, as far as we have objects of the lower, lowest and higher order.

Melody is in relation to sounds an object of an higher order. Other examples are: Picture, likeness, difference, number. We have not to confound these objectnesses with their objective fundamentals: Picture is built up on single colors and shadows, but is not synonyme with them, likeness or difference built up on the like or different thing, number on that, to where we ascribe it. The distance which leads from objects of

*) I came to this detection after a long research in detail in the University (lectures in psychology and theory of perception). There is a lack of space to put all this actually before the Public.

the lower to objects of the higher order or vice versa may be discriminately different. "Difference" or likeness" between two "symphonies" is IMMEDIATELY built up on these symphonies, these equally immediately on single "melodies," these on single "motives" and these on "sounds." For this reason is the ORDER-ESSENCEVIEWING DIFFERENCE between souds motives smaller than between sounds and melody and between sounds and the symphonic systemness of melodies. The possibility and necessity of an "order-system" of the universe is evident. The single point of this system are so arranged that any following point is directed to objects of the higher or lower "order." This system is a GRADUATING SYSTEM, because the question is about graduation in "order-essenceviewing" of phenomena (lowest—lower—higher—highest order). More important is the further fact that we attain with this order-graduation the grade of their "essenceviewing substantiality" (independence) and "nonsubstantiality" (dependence). Melody has in the relation of single sounds both characters, of an "higher order-essenceviewing" AND of a "larger essenceviewing dependence and nonsubstantiality." Melody is a dependent and nonsubstantial objectness, because, it is a "built up objectness" and THIS its dependence and nonsubstantiality is the larger, the more intermediate positions are necessary for its composition. Symphony built up on more melodies has the character of a still larger essenceviewing dependence and nonsubstantiality.

I ascertain the tenet: THE HIGHER THE ORDER-ESSENCEVIEWING OF OBJECTS, THE LARGER THEIR ESSENCEVIEWING DEPENDENCE AND VICE VERSA.

This essenceviewing system of the universe is the THIRD system and the discussions show that such an "order"-graduation of phenomena is a particular graduation and not connected with the viewpoint of the "determinating" graduation and the graduation by fullness.

Order-graduation differs essentially from determinating graduation. The proportion between singleness and generalness is entirely different from the proportion between lower-orderness and higherorderness. Melody remains an objectness of the higher order, it may be in the remaining determinated or

nondeterminated, single or general. Determinating graduation is built up on the "speciesive" consideration of phenomena, but on order-graduation matters the question, if the phenomena are by their own nature, therefore, essenceviewingly connected with DIFFERENT "objects," without regard to the question, if some stricter speciesness connects or does not connect them with these "objects." That there is in melody the question about a "single" or "general" melody, means, that this melody is a "representative" of the melody or only a "species" of such representatives. That melody is an objectness of an "higher order," means, that it is by its own nature built up on single sounds, although it has with them not any stricter speciesive communion (melody is not "sound" and sound is not "melody"). Order-graduation is nearer to graduation by fullness. We encounter here the surprising fact that essenceviewing "fullness" is in some interesting reverse proportion to essenceviewing HIGHERORDERNESS: The fullness of the phenomenon is the smaller, the larger is it higherorderness and vice versa. Melody or picture is in relation to its objective fundamental of sounds or colors of an higher order and with regard to essenceviewing an emptier objectness ("melody" and "picture" DISAPPEAR along SOUNDS AND COLORS, if we consider them ALONE, and, therefore, essenceviewingly). But this strict connection between order-graduation and graduation by fullness does not permit any confounding of the first with the second. In any case remains the underangeable difference FROM THE VIEWPOINT of both graduations. When we consider the phenomenon by fullness, we remain IN ITSELF and we ask: What is the degree of ITS OWN ESSENTIALITY? But when we consider the phenomenon "by order," then we pass over from it TO OTHER phenomena and ask: Which place has it in this system of the universe? The side by fullness of the phenomenon is towards the side by order basical and primary. The phenomenon has "something" to be, if it should be to other phenomena in the determinating order-relation. The same holds in the relation to the determinating graduation of phenomena. As long as we do not know, what the phenomenon ITSELF is, it means, as long as the question of its own essenceviewing fullness remains open, so long is untangible also the question of its

—determination or nondetermination, singleness or generalness. This means: Graduation by fullness is in the relation to determinating and order-graduation directly A BASICALLY ESSENCEVIEWING GRADUATION. Moreover, we can in regard to the shown strict connection between the graduation by fullness and ORDER-graduation (a larger fullness conditions a smaller higher-orderness and vice versa) speak about a special SCALE of all essenceviewing graduation: The first place in this scale has the graduation by fullness, the second the order-graduation and the third the determinating graduation. The side by fullness is the basis for the order-side, the side by fullness and by order for the determinating: The character by order mediates between fullness and determination. Do not confound the order-graduation neither with the determinating nor with the graduation by fullness. *)

Very important becomes a new question. How do we arrive at the order-system of the universe on the wholeness? "Theory of Objects" can not give us a real assistance on this point.

This doctrine knows only "represented objectnesses" and asserts first that the objects of the "lowest order" are the representatives of our SENSES, as are "colors," "tastes," "sounds" (this is Meinong's "principle of lowest objectness") and, secondly, that THINGS are on such objectnesses of the lowest order built up—objects of THE HIGHER ORDER. This can not be. From the above shown legal PARALLELITY between the consideration of phenomena by order and SUBSTANTIALITY is clear that phenomena are essenceviewingly the more independent, the less are they of an higher order. If Meinong is right, then would be "colors" and "sounds" the MOST INDEPENDENT entities and more substantial than real THINGS. For example. "Color" has to be a more independent entity than the ACTUAL ROCK, to where we ascribe this color. This can not be and "Theory of Objects" appears in the light of some basical fault. We know this fault. From the discussions in the first, second and third chapter is evident that we

*) For this reason I am speaking is § 34 about a "directive order" of the essenceviewing system of the universe.

have besides the representation "of phenomena" to distinguish very important "touching" of their reality or valuation. Rock is only represented to us, but we strike its REALITY. Numerals are represented to us, but we strike the equation, if it also values. With regard to the reality show the discussions in the third chapter that with the important difference between real striking on the one side and representation on the other goes entirely parallely a not less important and age-old unpsychological differences between the SUBSTANTIVIC and ACCIDENTAL sphere of creation. We have seen that only accidentals can be in the true sense of the word represented to us and that striking is immediately adapted to the substantivic sphere of creation. The color or the form of the rock is represented to us, whilst we only strike the THING, to where we ascribe this color or form. We could, therefore, in the same chapter definitely disprove one of the basical points of "Theory of Objects," which sees in "things" composed, therefore, higher-order-objectnesses. Things appeared as real substantives, which can not be represented to us, because, we strike and only strike them. We outlined in the same third chapter a special doctrine about the substantivic side of the universe, which shows a legal substantivic order that we can in the sense of this order distinguish between lower and higher substantives: Substantivic creation became parted in dead "things" and living "subjects," things were parted in inorganic and organic substantives, subjects in plant and animal "living" beings and human "persons."....Accordingly, is more important the "order-transition" in creation to pass over that break which is given with the unmovable distance between the substantivic and accidental part of the universe, than the above outlined "objective theoretical" transition, say, from single sounds to the pertinent melody, or in general: From the accidental of a lower order to the accidental of a higher order.

Substantiveness and accidentalness! This entitive order in the universe does not destroy the order-relation between objects of a "lower, lowest and higher order," but assists to PROLONG this ORDER "downwards" and extend it to the utmost boundaries of the universe. Things are more independent entities than their accidentals which would be according to the

doctrine of "Theory of Objects" objects of the "lowest," therefore, of the less dependent order. For example. Rock is a more independent entity than its color or form, because it is a real substantive which appears accidentally in the light of color, form. Meinong's order of objects is, accordingly, the ACCIDENTAL ORDER of the universe, from which we have strictly to distinguish its SUBSTANTIVIC ORDER. Accidental universe is immediately or mediately built up on the substantivic and would become without this a nothingness. It is, therefore, evident that the substantivic order of the world and life is uncomparably deeper and more important than the accidental. That thread which binds both these orders to one order-graduation of the universe is the viewpoint of larger or smaller "essenceviewing substantiality or nonsubstantiality" of phenomena. "Theory of Objects" is right that it distinguishes between objects of a lower and higher order, but these objects are by principle mere—accidentals. It is, furthermore, correct that we ascribe to the accidentals of a lower order a larger essenceviewing substantiality than to the objects of a higher order, but the accidentals of the lowest order remain "accidentals" and do not attain neither a shadow of that essenceviewing substantiality which have the most common things. For instance. The transition from the color of the stone to the stone is a transition from the accidental of a lower order to the pertinent substantive, but this transition is the transition from an essenceviewing dependent to an independent or at least uncomparatively less dependent entity. This viewpoint helps to ascertain the general order-graduation of creation. The basis is the gap between the substantivic and accidental sphere and the line of all to this or to the other side of the gap belonging essenceviewing substantialities or nonsubstantialities. This graduation on the accidental sphere is the "order"-graduation of the lowest, lower and higher order. Known is us also the substantivic sphere and we promptly arrive to the essenceviewing graduation of the pertinent substantives. We ascertained a principle connection between the substantivic and accidental part of the universe. Accidentals are built up on substantives.

Substantiveness is fourfold: inorganic and organic things, living beings and personally spiritual subjects. Any following

point has a smaller accidental dependence. Still clearer is workingness. Inorganic and organic things work accidentally with an expressive graduation, inorganic heterogeneously, organic autogeneously. Substantivic workingness is on living animal subjects entirely heterogeneous, on personal subjects also autogeneous. This means that the transition from inorganic things to personal subjects is the ESSENCEVIEWING ORDER-GRADUATION OF SUBSTANTIVIC CREATION, the order of larger and larger accidental independence of the substantives. Expressly must be emphasized that this order is ESSENCEVIEWING and not developingly empirical. Merely empirical order is to substantivic directly opposed. Organic things are empirically built up on inorganic, living-animal subjects (differently, of course) on organic substantiality, personal life (again, of course, differently) on animal life. There ixist a double order in the universe: Empirical and essenceviewing. Our interest is concentrated in the essenceviewing order. I endeavor to shape a SINGLE order-graduation of the universe. Accidentals are more or less immediate or mediate and this difference coincides with their character of a "lower-order" or "higher-order": Immediateness grows with lower-orderness, mediateness with higher-orderness.

We have at our desposition all viewpoints to come to the expected uniform order-graduation.

The basical diagonal is the distance between the substantivic and accidental substantiality of the world and life. That this distance is organically transpassing, we may see in the difference of accidentals which plainly shows the strict connection between the substantivic and accdiental part of creation. There are accidentals which we essenceviewingly entirely embrace, if they are represented to us. All essence of sound or color is before us, when we only "hear" the sound or "see" the color. Entirely different is the representation of "moving." Moving is an accidental which we ascribe, say, to the billiardsball on the table, but we can not entirely embrace moving with representation. In the world of representations there is no moving, changing. But represented moving changes at once to phenomena which are entirely different from moving. In the place of "motion" we "perceive," e. gr., the pertinent geometrical "figure,"

as we ourselves make motion with it perceptible. Keep in mind that this is only an endeavor to make motion perceptible, the internal essence of motion is herewith not detected. This means: He, who should embrace the essence of motion, has to perform both, he must "represent to him" something in moving and STRIKE this something. The immediate territory of this striking is that substantive, to which we ascribe motion, say, the "moving" BALL on the tabel. We can call moving an "accidentally substantivic" entity, accidental so far as it is represented to us, substantivic so far as we strike it. In the spiritual world is such an entity any experience, say, delight. Delight becomes a nothingness, if we do not think about him, who experiences delight. To be "the delight," means, "to be delighted" and there is no any representation of delight itself. He, who should embrace the essence of delight, must perform both, delight must be represented to him and he has to strike that, to whom he ascribes delight. ..Systematical accidental conception of PHYSICS is MOTION, of PSYCHOLOGY the conception of EXPERIENCE. Physics and psychology intentionally deals with the actual substantivic essentiality of the world and life, but both have to proceed from most suitable ACCIDENTALS of motion and experience. These accidentals afford the striking protruding to the substantivic essence of the world and life: Moving is such an accidental in dead nature, experience in life upon it. On our uniform order-graduation of the universe there are no arbitrary transitions from grade to grade. This graduation is deeply anchored in systematical experiences of daily life and in upon them built up scientific endeavor. Let us try to perform this graduation.

The central point of order-graduation is the boundary between the substantivic and accidental creation. From this point lead two lines, of LARGER AND LARGER objective "higher-orderness," accidental mediateness and parallel and equally accidental "essenceviewing substantiality," and of LARGER AND LARGER "accidental independence" and parallel "essenceviewing substantiality." Color, contact, harmony, disharmony, picture, likeness, difference, number, relation . . . are examples of the first line of the order-line of accidentals. Stone, meat, plant, animal, man . . . are examples of the second line of

the order-line of substantives. ..These lines meet on the point of the transition of accidental creation to substantivic and vice versa. This is the transition of a LARGER essenceviewing substantiality into a SMALLER and of a smaller into a larger: The first holds for the transition of substantiveness into accidentalness, the second of accidentalness into substantiveness. "Stone" is essenceviewingly more independent than "color" and "color" is more dependent than "stone." Both order-lines are, therefore, ONE SINGLE graduation line, the line of the SUBSTANTIVIC (independent) ESSENCEVIEWING GRADUATION of the world and life.

For this reason arrises the most important question, if this graduation has its legal boundary-lines and if these are still two-fold, transpassing and barring. To get the right answer is necessary strictly to observe the difference on the VIEWPOINTS of the substantial graduation in the accidental and substantivic order of creation. We know these viewpoints: Essenceviewing independence, respectively, dependence of ACCIDENTAL creation grows equally with its LOWER-ORDERNESS or IMMEDIATENESS, respectively, HIGHERORDERNESS and MEDIATENESS. Essenceviewing independence, respectively, dependence of SUBSTANTIVIC creation equally with its ACCIDENTAL INDEPENDENCE, respectively, DEPENDENCE. Thus is "relation" a very mediate, more dependent ACCIDENTAL than "color" and "man" a more independent SUBSTANTIVENESS than "stone" . . .

Evident is also the division of PASSING BOUNDARY-LINES. These are the lines of essenceviewing order-independence and dependence. The first is given with the point of SUBSTANTIVES, WHICH HAVE the character of such LARGEST ACCIDENTAL INDEPENDENCE, that they are not WITHOUT ACCIDENTAL DEPENDENCE, the second with ACCIDENTALS, which have the character of such LARGEST MEDIATENESS, that they are not WITHOUT ACCIDENTAL CONNECTION WITH SUBSTANTIVENESS. Our line "Man"—"relation" is only a very imperfect section of this transpassingly universal graduation. "Man" is most certainly not a "substantive" which would be characterized only by the SMALLEST DEGREE of accidental dependence. We speak about "weaker"

and "stronger" personalities and the strongest human personality is still very essentially connected to its accidental essentiality, to its experiences (sensings, thoughts, desires . . .). The real transpassing boundary-lines are far behind of "man" and far ahead of "relation." Christian image of "angel" is nearer to the first, independent, the idea of "point" to the second, dependent. This can not disturb our PRINCIPLE DIVISION of both transpassing boundary-lines.

With the division of the transpassing order-boundary-lines are by themselves given the two BARRING ORDER-BOUNDARY-LINES. If, namely, the transpassing independent boundary-line is on that SUBSTANTIVIC point which is not without accidental dependence, and if the barring dependent boundary-line is on that ACCIDENTAL point which is still NOT outside of any accidental connection with the substantiveness, then is the barring independent boundary-line given with the substantivic point which is WITHOUT ACCIDENTAL DEPENDENCE, but the barring dependent with the accidental point WHICH IS IN ADVANCE WITHOUT ANY ACCIDENTAL CONNECTION WITH THE SUBSTANTIVENESS. This means: The barring independent line is the point of ABSOLUTE ESSENCEVIEWING SUBSTANTIALITY (independence), the barring dependent (nonsubstantial) the point of ABSOLUTE NONSUBSTANTIALITY (dependence). These points are GOD and NOTHINGNESS. Why? In the third chapter has been forced upon us the request for a singular substantive, by principle outside of any parallel accidentalness and any dependence. We called it PRIMESUBSTANTIVENESS of the divine essence. Expressly I emphasize that without this accidentally, therefore, absolutely independent primesubstantiveness of the divine essence would the accidentally dependent substantivic creation necessarily collapse into nothingness. The actual acknowledgment of God is in an equal manner proven from both "substantivic" viewpoints, from the viewpoint of the substantivic creation itself and from the viewpoint of the accidental order-graduation of the universe. As far as God is primesubstantiveness, so far is God also the barring order-boundary-line of the universe and this in the direction of his essenceviewing SUBSTANTIALITY (independence). About nothing we ascertained that

we can only MEDIATELY perceive it, only because of this that is NOT NOTHING. I emphasize again that there is the question about the really principle and not only "empirical" essence of nothnigness itself: There is and can not be any intellect which could perceive nothing differently than merely mediately (e. gr., relation is not nothing, melody is not nothing, color is not nothing.) This fact makes possible a special and for OUR MOMENTARY QUESTION DECISIVE DIVISION OF NOTHING. NOTHING is the singular "accidentalness itself," it means, the accidental which we can PERCEIVE ONLY BECAUSE OF SOMETHING ELSE and may NOT ATTRIBUTE IT TO NOBODY AND TO NOTHING (NOTHING is not nothing!). Nothing is, therefore, in truth the second barring order-boundary-line of the universe. We have seen above that in the order system of the universe are the accidentals essenceviewingly the more dependent, the more they are mediate, it means, the more mediate is their translation to the substantivic essentialness. Nothing is the point of accidentalness itself, namely, by no any way transferable accidentalness, therefore, the point of absolute essenceviewing dependence. We arrived in the former section to the conviction, that God and nothing are the barring boundary-lines by fullness and determination. Now we can add that GOD AND NOTHING are also the order-barring boundary-lines, God as absolute SUBSTANTIALITY (Independence) and nothing as absolute DEPENDENCE.

These boundary-lines are indispensably NECESSARY and not only "ideally" taken boundary posts. With regard to the transpassing independent boundary-lines I can not bind myself in advance, if they have also the character of a substatial necessity. Entirely different is the matter on the barring order-borderness. Only this borderness is in the sense of the shown order-graduation the single REAL, it means, the SYSTEMATICAL OR ABSOLUTE INDEPENDENCE on the one side and the single REAL, it means, the SYSTEMATICAL OR ABSOLUTE DEPENDENCE on the other. "Universe itself" has the character of a merely RELATIVE independence and dependence, and this values for all points of the universe, we may arrive at them by this or that way, empirically or nonempirically, intentionally or casually, scientifically or imaginarilly. This

important fact is clearly proven from the order-system. According to this system is the internal CROSS-SECTION on the border between substantivic and accidental creation. This border is the common outlet of two order-passings, namely, of the more independent substantiveness and the more dependent accidentalness. All these independences preserve also in their utmost PASSING-boundary still at least the "smallest" accidental dependence (the highest hitherto belonging personality is still connected with the "experience"), and all these dependences preserve also in their utmost PASSING-boundary still the "smallest" substantivic independence (the most mediate hitherto belonging accidental has still a "shadow of its own nature") This means: In the passing order-system are all independences and dependences in the best case relative dependences. But such a system is by principle possible only by the barring access of the basical, absolute independence on one side and the basical, absolute dependence on the other. GOD AND NOTHING ARE THE NECESSARY BARRING ORDER-BOUNDARY-LINES OF THE UNIVERSE. For this reason is, furthermore, in regard to the order only God (the single basical independence) the real and immediate contrast of nothingness and only nothingness (the single basical dependence) the real and immediate contrast of God. Clear and evident must be to anyone that God is also with regard to the order of the universe the point of NECESSITY ITSELF. What else should be the absolute, it means, from ANYTHING independent substantiality than necessity itself, and what else absolute, it means, from anything dependent nonsubstantiality than impossibility itself? The real concept of NOTHINGNESS decesively requests the acknowledgment of God.

To repeat some of the main results of this section I allege the fact of order-graduation. The first way to this fact opens Meinong's distinguishing between objects of the "lower and higher" order. But this distinguishing must be completed with the essentially deeper and broader diagonal in the accidental and substantivic order. This request already psychological viewpoints, but especially the twofoldness of "representation" and real "striking." Still two points access: The impossibility of "Theory of Objects," if we do not acknowledge still the substantivic order, and the further parallel fact that this "Theory

of Objects" is transferable only to the accidental half of the universe. A such completed consideration of the world and life leads to the singular order-graduation of THE UNIVERSE and shows that this graduation has two directions, the direction of larger and larger essenceviewing independence and of larger and larger dependence. This order-system has its passing and barring boundary-lines and these barring boundary-lines are given only with God and nothingness, with God in the direction of independence and with nothing of dependence.

God is the point of absolute independence and nothing the point of absolute dependence.

34. The essenceviewing system of the universe.

We discussed the direction of graduation of phenomena by determination, fullness and order. We have, accordingly, to speak about an entire essenceviewing system of the universe which includes all three main directions. There are but these three MAIN DIRECTIONS. We can ask about any phenomenon: What and how is itself and in what relations is it to other phenomena? Determination, fullness and order-place are the broadest viewpoints. The place of determination and fullness shows the size of "determinating" and its own "essentiality," order-place the relation to other phenomena, essenceviewing independence or dependence. With these three main directions is the essenceviewing exhausted. There are still merely empirical or occasional considerations, but they must be discarded, if they should not be erroneous.

We mentioned empirical, occasional examples of order-lines of empirically obtained phenomena by determination and fullness. These are only occasional OUTLETS and not to be confounded with the essenceviewing graduation. Mathematicians have to have empirically, occasionally given phenomena which they "count," but laws of mathematics have not an empirically occasional character and meaning. Essenceviewing order-system by determination and fullness does not embrace only REPRESENTED objectnesses, it means, accidentals, but it extends over all substantivenesses and embraces entities which we can only TOUCH and which are for this reason true realities.

We have also from this sphere to oppose "Theory of Objects" which asserts that essenceviewingness is possible only on the sphere of REPRESENTED phenomena. We have also a real essenceviewingness of substantivic, realitivic creation. Essenceviewingness is not in the ASCERTAINMENT of this creation, but in its order-graduation by determination and fullness.

The further important question touches intermediate relations between the three main directions. Are these directions separated or connected with each other? They can not be separated. The discussions showed that there is no phenomenon in the universe which would not have its place from the viewpoint of determination, fullness or order-graduation. There is no phenomenon which would not have its size of determination, fullness and order-independence or dependence. This means: All three directions are realized in each point of any phenomenon and each point has in any of these directions its determinated place. In Euvlid's room we can place any point in the direction of breath, highth and depth and vice versa. Any phenomenon has its place and any place is the place of some phenomenon. This systematical junction has a "practical" value which we find in the condition for "counting." We have ascertained that true counting is possible only from the viewpoint of speciesivic, therefore, determinating consideration (e. gr., this and that . . are two "phenomena"). If the main directions would be separated from each other, then only by fullness and order defined phenomena would be not more countable. For example. "Sound" and "melody" (which are in the order-system immediate to mediate accidentals or—accordingly Meinong—of the lower to the higher objectness) would not be countable, if we could not say that these are two "phenomena," it means, if we could not consider them from the speciesively determinating viewpoint. Phenomena are countable, because on them is realized their determinating place.

The systematical connection of all three main directions is not opposed to the systematical difference between them. We separately discussed each of them. Determinating graduation is different from the graduation by fullness and order-graduation and different is order-graduation from graduation by fullness. The question arrises, if we do not have between these

graduation SPECIAL relations which would not spoil neither their own character nor their intermediate connection. I mentioned that only the graduation by fullness is its first and basical graduation and upon it are built up order and determinating graduation.

I develop and complete this idea. The direction by fullness is the direction of "own essentiality," "own content." It is evident that the question of its content of the phenomenon goes BEFORE its relation to another phenomenon. Before we do not know, what the phenomenon is and contains, we can not take up any of its relations. Order-direction is evidently the direction of broadest essenceviewing relations, the direction by fullness, therefore, precedes BEFORE the order-direction. For equal reasons precedes the direction by fullness also before the determinating direction. Determinating direction necessarily embraces the relation between phenomenon and phenomenon, namely, the relation between singleness and generalnss. Without this relation it would disappear or would directly change into the grade by fullness. We ascribe to the actual stone ITSELF only a determinated size of essenceviewing fullness, but as a "single" thing appears this stone only, if we consider it, say, from the view of a general "thing." The direction by fullness precedes before the determinating. It remains still the relation between the determinating and order-graduation. Order-graduation precedes before the determinating. This is evident from two points. We know that fullnessive and order-graduation is realized originally and in full extent in the "LOWER" determinating point of the universe, it means, that SINGLE, entirely DETERMINATED phenomena are necessarily just fullnessively determinated and placed by order. All determinating lifting "upward" and with it all passing from singleness to generalness is possible and sensible IN THE FUNDAMENTAL of in advance given fullnessive and order-direction. We know, secondly, that order-graduation is built up on its SUBSTANTIVIC half, without which anything would disappear into nothingness: Without substantivic creation would disappear all "indetermination" and "generalness." These are special relations which connect the main directions of the essenceviewing system in an equal special organic whole-

ness. This system has the character of a LEGAL THREEFOLDNESS: by fullness, order and determination. They are different and, nevertheless, intermediately systematically connected. The connection is subject to a DIRECTIVE ORDER, because of this system holds that its direction by fullness precedes the order-direction and this the determinating. This "precedes" is systematical, not empirical. The direction by fullness is the FIRST SYSTEMATICAL DIRECTION, order-direction the SECOND and determinating the THIRD. If some ask, why I started in the former section with the determinating direction, I answer that this has been done by "methodical" reasons: This direction is not equally systematical, but it is more VISIBLE in daily life and in science. Art approaches more the direction by fullness than the merely determinating.

The essenceviewing system is with these thoughts INTERNALLY arranged. We view it now externally and consider also its legal BOUNDARY-LINES. Necessary is for this purpose a discussion of the relation between the PASSING and BARRING BORDERNESS of the universe. From the threefold direction follows a threefold borderness by fullness, order and determination. Equally follows that any borderness is still "twofold": The borderness by fullness embraces the borders of "fullness" and "emptiness," the order-borderness the boundary-lines of "independence" and "dependence" and the determinating the borders of "peculiarity" and "nonpeculiarity." All this has been discussed in former sections and is known.

The barring points of any of these borderneses are God and nothingness. I enlighten these points on the neutral example of the NUMERICAL LINE: "0-1-2-3-4-5-6-7 . . ." On purpose I started with nought, although it is from the view of numerical theory a disputable question, if nought belongs to the numerical line or not. I am of the conviction that nought is the beginning, but a very special beginning: On the point of nought is preserved the essenceviewing relation to "quantity" (e. gr., not any quanity) and nought is THE BARRING LOWER BORDER of this line, because from 1-to-0 there is not any internal transition. With the barring lower border of the numerical line corresponds its PASSING LOWER BORDER, which we attain from "1" by the known principle of "discriminately

small "differences, if we approach "0" (e. gr., 1-½-¼-⅛-1/16-1/32 etc.), for which we use a special sign, whereby it makes no difference, if there are "more" such lower passing bordernesses. It matters most that we keep in mind the principle difference between the passing and barring lower border of the numerical line: We attain the first by the way of "internal passing," the second by the characteristic "leap off" from such a passing (one broken up infinitely—0). Still more interesting becomes this difference, if we view it from the point of the UPPER borderness. On this point we get ONLY THE PASSING UPPER BORDERNESS (passing upper bordernesses), whilst ANY BARRING UPPER BORDARY-LINE IS HERE IN ADVANCE EXCLUDED. The upper border of the numerical line is given with the concept of so called "discriminately larger number "infinite". This border corresponds with its lower PASSING border "infinite." For this reason is THIS upper border only its PASSING upper border. In advance is excluded the concept of a BARRING upper border, which would be to its passing upper border one broken up infinitely in the relation, in the equal relation of nought to the lower passing border infinite. There is not and can not be any "number," which would have on the upper border of the numerical line the place, which nought has it on its lower place. Bay the way, herewith is dismissed the old question of so called "actually infinite" number. Such a number would be the BARRING upper border and is for this reason impossible, or we HAVE IN ITS PLACE TO PUT THE THREEFOLD "UPPER" BARRING BOUNDARY-LINE OF THE UNIVERSE (AND NOT OF THE NUMERICAL LINE), THEREFORE—GOD. *)

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*) Some object: Such an "actually infinite" number is realized with the "infinite" number of PARTS of any ACTUAL distance. This objection can not be supported. In this case there is the question about only a DISCRIMINATIVELY large number of these parts and THESE PARTS ARE NOT ACTUAL, but "mathematical" parts. The number of ACTUAL parts is also in this case limited, definite, and open remains but the question, if MAN actually can these parts separate (e. gr., on some grade of further partition would "materialness" disappear).

This fact discredits also the known false conclusions of old Greeks (sophisms), e. gr., the conclusion that a swiftfooted hero could not overtake the slow moving turtle, because, he would to have to run an infinite quan-

The numerical line is applicable also to the question of the passing and barring borderness of THE UNIVERSE. This numerical line shows clearly WHAT I mean on the side of the universe with the emphasized distance between its "passing" and "barring" borderness. This is the distance between the "internally passing" and "barringly leap-off" graduation of phenomena. Keep this instance in mind and you will not encounter any difficulties in the former discussions about the passing and barring boundary-lines of the universe. The example of the numerical line shows clearly the UNDERANGEABLE DIFFERENCE which exists between this "numerical" and the us interesting UNIVERSAL passing and barring borderness. The numerical line has "both" passing borders, the lower and the upper, but ONLY ONE BARRING BOUNDARY-LINE, namely, the lower not the upper. Our essenceviewing system of the universe has in any of its directions BOTH PASSING and BOTH BARRING boundary-lines, and the "upper" barring borderness is directly systematical, basical and primary. This is evident from the graduation of the world and life by fullness, determination and order.

Some main conclusions from our viewpoint may follow.

The fullness of the universe is passingly graduated on the one side to the highest "fullnessness" which is not without emptiness, and on the other side to the largest emptiness not without fullness. This passing line by fullness is systematically dependent on the BARRING FULLNESS without emptiness and on the BARRING EMPTINESS without fullness, whereby is the barring emptiness systematically dependent on the barring fullness and not vice versa.

The orderness of the universe is barringly graduated to the highest independence not without dependence, and to the highest dependence not without independence. The passing order-line is basically dependent on the BARRING INDEPENDENCE without dependence, and on the barring dependence without independence, whereby is the barring dependence dependent on the barring and not vice versa.

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tity of small distances. I answer: Just this quantity (e. gr., 1 foot, ½ foot, ¼ f., ⅛ f., 1/16 f., 1/32 f. etc.) IS ONLY MATHEMATICALLY PASSING and not also ACTUALLY BARRING INFINITE!

The determinateness is passingly determinated to the highest peculiarity not without unpeculiarity, and to the largest unpeculiarity not without peculiarity. This passing determinating line is basically dependent on the BARRING PECULIARITY without nonpeculiarity, and on the BARRING NONPECULIARITY without peculiarity, whereby is the barring nonpeculiarity dependent on the barring peculiarity and not vice versa.

He, who did not read and study the former sections, will not get much out of these sentences, but he, who diligently studied them and followed me substantially, will agree that we arrived in all principle details at the expected ENTIRE essence-viewing system of the universe.

This system is permeated by three main directions, by fullness, determination and order. This is the threefold essence-viewing graduation, to which is subordinated in principle all occasional and empirical consideration of the world and life. They are with each interwoven and realized on any point of the universe.

The system is subject to some DIRECTIVE ORDER. This means: The direction by fullness is the fundamental for the order-direction and both the fundamental for the determination. The graduation has two directions. Fullness includes "fullnessness" and "emptiness," order independence and dependence, determinating determination and nondetermination. Each direction is passingly and barringly concluded. Fullness has its passing border in the point of fullness not without emptiness, and in emptiness without fullness. The barring border of fullness is fullness without emptiness and emptiness without fullness. The first is the point of God, the second the point of nothingness. Similarly with the order-direction.

Determination has its passing border of "determinatedness" in the point of "representation itself" (confer §31), of "nondeterminatedness" in the point of "speciesness itself," it means, of peculiarity and nonpeculiarity. Similarly on the barring borders: Peculiarity and nonpeculiarity. The first is the point of God, the second the point of nothingness.

The essenceviewing system of the universe is in all three main directions BARRINGLY enclosed by barring fullness, in-

dependence and peculiarity and by barring emptiness, dependence and nonpeculiarity. THIS fullness, independence, peculiarity touches the ESSENCE of God, THIS emptiness, dependence, nonpeculiarity the "essence" of nothingness. GOD AND NOTHINGNES ARE THE BARRING BOUNDARY-LINES OF THE UNIVERSE.

Universe thus conceived is really the UNIVERSE in the strictest and broadest sense of the word. It embraces everything: World and life, all substantives and all accidentals, all real and nonreal things, all valuable and nonvaluable things, what is possible or what is impossible, what we may think about and what we neither can imagine, briefly, anything from God Himself and up to nothingness. This concept is in principle not NUMERICALLY MATHEMATICAL. From the earlier days to the most modern times men tried MATHEMATICALLY to define everything. To-day -we have in mind "Theory of Quantities" (Mengenlehre) and the hitherto belonging concept of "quantity of all quantities." Any such definition of REAL "everything" is in advance excluded, and to evidence this we do not need a discussion of "quantity." We know that any real numerical (and quantitive) numerableness is basically connected with the speciesivic character of this that we may count. We know, furthermore, that we get this species ONLY IN THE DETERMINATING DIRECTION of the essenceviewing system of the universe. CONSEQUENTLY, THE UNIVERSE IS IN PRINCIPLE AN EXNUMERABLE AND ALSO AN EXQUANTITATIVE "WHOLENESS." We can not "count" the universe, because, we can not speciesively subordinate it to anything. Moreover. The real universe appears in the light of a legal DOUBLE THREEFOLDNESS, internal and external. The INTERNAL THREEFOLDNESS is given with the fact of its three main directions by fullness, determination and order and this is the threefoldness of the PASSINGLY DEFINED UNIVERSE, (it means, of the universe with all the passing borders by fullness, determination and order). This universe has the legal place of the CENTRAL OR INTERMEDIATE universe, because, it is in the sense of its BARRING borderness enclosed by "two points," by the point of God and by the point of nothingness. This is the EXTERNAL THREEFOLDNESS of the uni-

verse and as much as the threefoldness of the BARRING DEFINED UNIVERSE (it means, of the universe which is and as much as it is still "embraced" by God and nothingness). If we return again to the question of real "numerableness," we have to say that only the real, internal threefoldness of the universe is a numerable speciality. All main directions are "representatives" of the species of the direction, therefore, in the true sense of the word numerable phenomena. The second, the external threefoldness, is clearly on the first sight unnumerable or better, a SUPERNUMERABLE speciality of the universe. This threefoldness is based on the "trinity" of God, of the (passingly defined) universe itself and of nothingness. We know that we can consider God, the universe and nothingness neither "representatively" nor "speciesively," therefore, neither in the true sense of the word count. GOD, SOMETHING (the determinating expression for the universe) and NOTHINGNESS IS THE SUPERNUMERABLE TRINITY OF THE ESSENCE-VIEWING SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE.

This fact speaks for the necessity of a special DISTINCTION, ABOUT WHICH, IT SEEMS, PHILOSOPHERS DID SO FAR NOT THINK.

This would be the distinction between nonfigurative (nontypical) or common and FIGURATIVE or METAPHYSICAL counting, whereby appears the nonfigurative, common counting systematically dependent on the figurative, metaphysical and not vice versa. Common counting is all counting which is based upon the determinating speciesness of this that we count, and this is "mathematical" counting. Metaphysical counting is realized there, where is in advance excluded any speciesness of this that we count. And that common counting is basically dependent on metaphysical, proves most evidently our example of metaphysical counting of—God, universe and nothingness: Remove from this "trinity" God, universe and nothingness and you have to remove all this that is in the universe determinatable, therefore, commonly countable.

MAY BE that in the empirically developing regard is common counting primary, metaphysical somehow later. But basically and ideally is metaphysical counting primary and basical, common secondary and collateral. Without such a metaphy-

sical counting would be the concept of REAL EVERYTHING only an empty word.

One of the most beautiful gifts of our human reason is that we ACTUALLY have such a cencept. Sometimes we are even shaken by this our gift in the depth of our souls. What are you experiencing, when you exclaim from the depth of your soul: EVERYTHING!

I appeal to this gift in the following section.

35. Essenceviewing proves the primereality of God.

We encounter in history of human thinking an entire line of experiments scientifically to prove the common faith in God. Remember Sokrates, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Anselmus, Albertus, Thomas, Scotus, Carthesius, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, Bolzanus, Brentano. In any century steps out a fighter for the scientific acknowledgment of God. I diligently avoided any of these historical "proofs for the existence of God." I did not do this to characterize my agreeing or disagreeing with these proofs, but I did this that to the reader may become in the wholeness represented MY WAY to God and that the clear view upon this way may not be obscured by thoughts about ways, where others passed.

I have to make an exception with one of these historic proofs. This is Anselmus's "onthological" proof for the actual essence of God. When I remember this proof, I always remember professor Anthony Medved, who was again and again speaking in the higher grades of the Gymnasium at Maribor (Yougoslavia) about this proof and who enthusiastically showed it us as the most clear proof ever given so far in history of philosophy. Later on was my faith in this "clearness" neatly shaken: In theology I heard that this proof has no real power, and when I later on became in the University at Graz (Austria) acquainted with Kant's philosophy, came my remembrance of Anselmus and professor Medved to an end. Why should I with Anselmus proof make an exception? The reason is, because, some may get the impression that this proof is akin to my essenceviewing way to the acknowledgment of God. First I present this proof.

St. Anselmus's famous proof says: Man has the CONCEPT of the most perfect being. This expression (most perfect being) means, that we can not think about a MORE PERFECT BEING. If so, then is such a being necessarily real, actual. The concept of "the most perfect" being would be in itself contradictious, if we should to this being deny the actual character. The ACTUAL perfect being is more perfect than the NONACTUAL. To have the concept of the most perfect being and to deny to this being the actual character, means, to have the concept of the most perfect being WHICH IS NOT THE MOST PERFECT. Such a concept is impossible. From the concept of the most perfect being follows, therefore, the actual essence of this being, God.

Duns Scotus tried later on this Anselmus's proof to improve as follows: The necessary actual essence of the most perfect being follows from the POSSIBILITY of such a perfect being, because, we can not deduct the most perfect being from any other (and less perfect) being. The "most perfect being" is, therefore, BY ITSELF NECESSARY, or BY ITSELF IMPOSSIBLE. For the reason that it is not impossible, it is by its own nature necessary, actual. *)

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*) Scotus's improvement of Anselmus's thoughts intended to be theoretical, because substantially ascended also Scotus from the view of actual creation to the acknowledgment of God. Anselmus's entire proof has according to the original (Prosl., c. 2-c. 4, edit. 1612) the following wording: Ergo, Domine, qui das fidei intelectum, da mihi ut, quantum scis expedire, intelligam quia es sicut credimus, et hoc es quod credimus. Et quidem credimus te esse aliquid quo nihil majus cogitari possit. An ergo non est aliqua talis natura, quia dixit insipiens in corde suo: non est Deus? Sed certe ipse idem insipiens, cum audit hoc ipsum quod dico, aliquid quo majus nihil cogitari potest, intelligit quod audit, et quod intelligit, in intellectu eius est, etiam si non intelligat illud esse. Aliud enim est rem esse in intellectu, aliud intelligere rem esse. Nam cum pictor praecogitat quae facturus est, habet quidem in intellectu, sed nondum intelligit esse, quod nondum fecit. Cum vero jam pinxit, et habet in intellectu et intelligit esse, quod jam fecit. Convincitur ergo insipiens esse vel in intellectu aliquid quo nihil majus cogitari potest, quia hoc, cum audit, intelligit; et quidquid intelligitur, in intellectu est. Et certe id quo majus cogitari nequit non potest esse in solo intellectu. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potes cogitari esse et in re, quod majus est. Si ergo id quo majus cogitari non potest est in solo intellectu, id ipsum quo majus cogitari non potest est quo majus cogitari potest. Sed certe hoc esse non potest. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re. Quod utique

The connections between Anselmus's and Scotus's proof and my thoughts are clear.

These connections are in PRINCIPLE thinking and in real ESSENCEVIEWING consideration of phenomena. Do not confound my essenceviewing way with that of Anselmus or Scotus. I will not enter in any immediate criticism of Anselmus's and Scotus's way. This is the less necessary, because, there had been plenty critics in most contradictorious camps of philosophical endeavor. I turn attention to principle DIFFERENCES which separates my essenceviewing way from Anselmus's and Scotus's way. There are at least three such differences:

1. My essenceviewing way to God is doubtlessly comparatively MORE IN DETAIL and MORE DILIGENTLY performed. I deal in the first place with the principle internal structure of creation and proceed on this fundamental to the essenceviewing system of the universe. I turn attention in the

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sic vere est, ut nec cogitari possit non esse. Nam potest cogitari esse aliquid, quod non possit cogitari non esse; quod majus est quam quod non esse cogitari potest. Quare si id quo majus nequit cogitari, potest cogitari non esse, id ipsum quod majus cogitari nequit non est id quo majus cogitari nequit, quod convenire non potest. Sic ergo vere est aliquid quo majus cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse. Et hoc es tu, Domine Deus noster. Sic ergo vere es Domine Deus neus, ut nec cogitari possis non esse. Et merito. Si enim aliqua mens posset cogitare aliquid melius te, ascenderet creatura super Creatorem et judicaret de Creatore, quod valde est absurdum. Et quidquid est alius praeter solum te, potes cogitari non esse. Solus igitur verissime omnium et ideo maxime omnium habes esse, quia aliquid est, non sic vere est et idcirco minus habet esse. Cur itaque dixit insipiena in corde suo: non est Deus, cum causa in promptu sit rationali menti, te maxime omnium esse? Cur nisi quia stultus et insipiens? Verum quomodo dixit insipiens in corde suo quod cogitare non potuit aut quomodo cogitare non potuit, quod dixit in corde, cum idem sit dicere in corde et cogitare? Quod si vere, imo quia vere et cogitavit, quia dixit in corde et non dixit in corde quia cogitare non potuit. Non uno tantum modo dicitur aliquid in corde vel cogitatur. Aliter enim cogitatur res, cum vox eam significans cogitatur aliter cum idipsum quod res est intelligitur. Illo itaque modo potest cogitari Deus non esse, isto vero minime. Nullus quippe intelligens id, quod deus est, potest cogitare, quia deus non est; licet haec verba dicat in corde aut sine ulla aut cum aliqua extranea significatione. Deus enim est id quo majus cogitari non potest. Quod qui bene intelligit utique intelligit idipsum sic esse, ut nec cogitatione queat non esse. Qui ergo intelligit sic esse deum, nequit eum non esse cogitare. Gratias tibi bone domine, gratias tibi, quia quod prius credidi te donante, jam sic intelligo te illuminante, ut te esse nollim credere, non possim intelligere.

perceiving regard FIRST only to the "intermediate" universe which makes possible to come to God, and this as the "upper barring" boundary-lines of the universe.

2. My essenceviewing way does, therefore, not originate from "God Himself," but from THE WORLD AND LIFE in the strictest and broadest sense of the word. My way is by principle essenceviewing, but, nevertheless, ONLY A MEDIATE and not an immediate way. I do not deal with the question of the "most perfect" or "highest" being, but I primarily deal with entities and phenomena which we are everywhere empirically immediately surrounded with. The essenceviewing discussion of SUCH phenomena and entities leads from my part to the acknowledgment of the most perfect and highest being, God.

3. My way is based on the threefold essenceviewing graduartion of the world and life which ACTUALLY VALUES FOR THE WORLD AND LIFE. For this reason is my way ENTITIVE and not any merely "conceiving" way.

Anselmus's proof became in history of philosophy known as the "onthological" proof. Wrongly. It merits only the name of a conceiving, therefore, merely LOGICAL proof. My essenceviewing way to God is an experiment to give the real ONTHOLOGICAL proof for the Fact of God.

One speciality of MY onthological argument is the EMPIRICAL OUTLET. This outlet becomes the object of the PRINCIPLE, ESSENCEVIEWING discussion. The value of this discussion is entirely independent on the question, if its empirical outlet is also itself actual. This is the second and most characteristic speciality of my onthological way ot the divine essence. For the value of this way suffices the ESSENCEVIEWING ACKNOWLEDGMENT that the UNIVERSE is by its own nature the universe of the graduation by fullness and determination of phenomena. The possibility of such a graduation requests the actual essence of God.

Anything that our reason can perceive concurs in the essenceviewing system of the universe which is permeated by three main directions: By fullness, independence and determination. The universe is in any direction passingly and barringly concluded, whereby is this conclusion in any direction still a double one, the "upper" and "lower" conclusion. All the

upper threefold barring conclusion of the universe touches the point of God, the lower the point of nothingness, and this still thus that the point of nothingness is immediately based on the point of God: Nothing is the immediate contrats of God and THIS CONTRAST is immediately based on God and only from the idea of God perceivable. Directly essenceviewingly is proven the deep truth that GOD CREATED FROM NOTHING "EVERYTHING ELSE" (world and life).

He, who has diligently followed my discussions in the former sections, sees that this proof is in truth the proof for that PRIMEREALITY of God. The direction of larger and larger essenceviewing fullness, independence and from the determinating essenceviewing fullness, independence and from the determinating direction deducted peculiarity is the direction of larger and clearer reality. The shown PRIMEFULLNESS, PRIMEINDEPENDENCE and PRIMEPECULIARITY of God is the PRIMEREALITY of God.

I may mention one historically decisive speciality of my essenceviewing proof of God.

Only with this proof is in all definiteness shown and attested that God is the true barring highpoint of the universe. If we examine from this sphere the known common proofs for the existence of God, we can not avoid the impression that they too less emphasize the EXNATURAL character of the divine essence. Such a character is certainly in some of these proofs actually conceived, but NOT ACTUALLY PROVEN. These proofs call God the "first," "highest," "most perfect," "purest" being, but they deal in important regards with this being thus AS ALSO THIS BEING WOULD BELONG IN THE LINE OF ALL OTHER BEINGS AND WOULD BE ONLY THE INTERNAL ORIGIN AND HIGHPOINT OF ALL BEINGS. "Colorness" white is the internally passing highpoint of the graduation which begins with the color "black" and ends with the color "white." So would be God only such an internally passing original and final highpoint of the universe. Such a view is entirely erroneous. God is the condition of the universe and for this reason is God in any regard OUTSIDE OF THE UNIVERSE!

That I repeat: Plato, Aristotle, Augustine and Thomas

embraced such thoughts, but these thinkers did not show this PRIMEFACT so clearly and doubtlessly, as it is shown with my ESSENCEVIEWING ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF GOD. God is the barring upper boundary-line of the universe, therefore, that Being, by which alone anything else becomes a "being," not that this Being would be only THE INTERNALLY SPECIESIVIC ORIGIN and HIGHPOINT of any being. Like NOTHINGNESS is outside of the universe, alike is GOD outside of the universe. Nothnigness is the point, on which is possible ONLY NEGATION, God the point, on which is possible ONLY CONSENT. Nothingness is OUTSIDE OF THE UNIVERSE impossibility itself, God OUTSIDE OF THE UNIVERSE necessity and strictness itself.

Keep in mind three things and you will not encounter any difficulty to follow my final confession that God is the singular ESSENCEVIEWING IDEAL OF THE WORLD AND LIFE. The essence of this universal idealness, unaccessible to human reason, is touched with the shown BARRING essenceviewing borderness of the divine essence. My essenceviewing way must be studied with reality, valuation, personality and value, but it has its special place and meaning. I call my way the "mathematical" way to God.

I turn to God Himself! I confess that I have a feeling of fear and weakness, I experienced before at the conclusion of former chapters. I have in mind that imagined "threefoldness" of the divine essence which appeared from the view of Logos, Etos and Nomos, from the view of Primesubstantiveness, Primegiveness and Primeliberty and from the view of Holiness, Holy and Sanctificator.

The essenceviewing way leads to the same threefoldness of the divine essence. Remember the passingly and barringly defined essenceviewing system of the universe! Both universes appeared in the light of a legal and, nevertheless, essentially different threefoldness. The threefoldness of the passingly defined universe is its directive threefoldness, and this threefoldness is understandable, as it was shown in the former section, from the view of common or unfiguratively mathematical counting. But the threefoldness of the barring defined universe is not more a common, but a figuratively metaphysical

threefoldness built up on the "uncountable" bases of GOD, SOMETHING (passingly defined universe) and NOTHING. Deeper and directly supermetaphysical is, accordingly, that THREEFOLDNESS of God, which means, that God is the THREEFOLD, fullnessive, independent and peculiar SINGULAR essenceviewing basis of "something" and—nothingness. Divine Primefullness, Primeindependence and Primepeculiarity is that trinity which corresponds with the trinity of Logos, Etos and Nomos.

DIVINE ORDER of primefullness, primeindependence and primepeculiarity corresponds with the shown "directive order" of the universe (or better, THIS directive order corresponds with that divine order): Primefullness is the FIRST, primeindependence the SECOND and primepeculiarity the THIRD basical side of divine nature. It can be shown that this trinity is substantially the same as the trinity of Logos, Etos and Nomos.

Primefullness (PRIMEESSENTIALITY) is the same as the shown divine original act of "reality itself and valuation itself" (without which would any "essentiality" of the universe disappear into nothingness).

Primeindependence (PRIMEPOWER) is the same as the shown divine original act of "anything real," (without which would also any "power" of the universe disappear into nothingness).

Primepeculiarity (PRIMEINDIVIDUALITY) is the divine original act of "singleness" and "generalness" and, therefore, the shown divine original act of "anything valuable" (legitimate).

Primefullness is, therefore, the same as Logos, Primeindependence the same as Etos and Primepeculiarity the same as Nomos.

Primefullness is the same as Primesubstantiveness and Holiness, Primeindependence the same as Primegiveness and Holy and Primepeculiarity the same as Primeliberty and Sanctificator.

I state these SUPEREMPIRICAL and SUPERVALUABLE equations:

Logos-Primesubstantiality-Holiness-Primefullness.

Etos-Primegiveness-Holy-Primeindependence

Nomos-Primeliberty-Sanctificator-Primepeculiarity.

This means:

We may proceed to God from the realitively valuable point of view or from personaly evaluation or essenceviewing, in any instance we encounter the deep and substantial one and the same "threefold" working of divine nature. In this connection is the main emphasis on this last chapter which showed that this THREEFOLDNESS is not any common or mathematical, but a supermathematically metaphysical or even a supermetaphysical threefoldness. It is the FIRST threefoldness and, nevertheless, a threefoldness, to which we do not arrive by the way of common, namely, on the "speciesively determinating" consideration built up "counting."

THIS AND SUCH a threefoldness of God is not in any contradiction with his shown SINGULARITY. "Singularity" of God is uncomparatively deeper than any common, mathematical "unity": "Unity" is only a speciesivic speciality (e. gr., before me is 1 glass). If we would try to consider God only commonly, mathematically countingly, we would be solely right, when we ascribe to him at least "unity" and not plurality: Such a common unity of God is not in any contradiction with his metaphysical threefoldness.

This final picture of God is ONLY SEEMINGLY IMMEDIATE. We arrived at it FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF BASICAL RELATIONS OF GOD TO THE UNIVERSE. The final picture of God is and can be only the picture of God as the shown singular realitively valuable, personally worthwhile and essenceviewing MAKER. Further onward can reason, should reason not go.

In this regard holds for me and may hold for everyone the remarkable words, with which ANSELMUS began his thoughts about God, and with which I conclude my thoughts about God:

LORD, NOT AT ALL I DO CONSIDER TO PROTRUDE INTO THY HIGHT, AS I CAN NOT COMPARE MY REASON WITH IT. BUT I, NEVERTHELESS, LONG TO PERCEIVE AT LEAST SOMEHOW THY TRUTH, IN WHICH MY HEART BELIEVES AND LOVES. NEITHER DO I TRY TO UNDER-

STAND THAT I MAY BELIEVE, BUT I BELIEVE THAT I MAY UNDERSTAND: I BELIEVE THAT I WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND, IF I HAD NOT BELIEVED." *)

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*) Anselmus, Prosl. c. 1: "Non tento, Domine, penetrare altitudinem Tuam, quia nullatenus comparo illi intellectum meum, sed desidero aliquatenus intelligere veritatem Tuam, quam credit et amat cor meum. Neque enim quaero intelligere, ut credam, sed credo, ut intelligam; nam et hoc credo, quia nisi credero, non intelligam."

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CORRIGENDA:

Page	72,	line	14	from	below	read: valuable.
"	75,	"	5	"	above	" : illusion.
"	99,	"	4	"	below	" : is no numeral.
"	219,	"	2	"	above	" : sensations.
"	219,	"	7	"	"	" : values.
"	228,	"	20	"	"	" : sign.
"	231,	"	20	"	"	" : personification.
"	250,	"	8	"	"	" : chapters.
"	252,	"	4	"	"	" : incorrectness.
"	252,	"	6	"	"	" : representations.
"	252,	"	14	"	below	" : emphasis.
"	254,	"	5	"	"	" : is the faintest . . .
"	257,	"	2	"	"	" : is his in . . .
"	259,	"	4	"	"	" : demand.
"	260,	"	15	"	above	" : conviction.
"	261,	"	18	"	"	" : and an immediate . . .
"	263,	"	6	"	below	" : commandments.
"	264,	"	20	"	above	" : We have seen that . . .
"	265,	"	13	"	below	" : speak.
"	267,	"	6	"	above	" : absolute.
"	269,	"	21	"	below	" : life-value.
"	269,	"	9	"	"	" : considered is this . . .
"	269,	"	3	"	"	" : highest.
"	270,	"	8	"	"	" : Is it in . . .
"	271,	"	18	"	above	" : there holds.
"	274,	"	13	"	"	" : of the singular.
"	283,	"	1	"	"	" : makrokosmos.

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